Boston Public Library
3 9999 10586 369 8

BOSTON
PUBLIC
LIBRARY

FITCHBURG PUBLIC LIBRARY
WITHDRAWN

331 - 2 - 3
Z 9 1 - 1 - 4

THE

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

VOL. C.

FITCHBURG PUBLIC LIBRARY

Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

BOSTON:
TICKNOR AND FIELDS.
1865.

0 5 1

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, by
TICKNOR AND FIELDS,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

N 1 W

University Press:
Welch, Bigelow, and Company,
Cambridge.

CONTENTS OF No. CCVII.

Art.		Page
I.	America and England	331
	England and America. A Lecture read before the Boston Fraternity, and published in the Atlantic Monthly for December, 1864. By Goldwin Smith.	
II.	Voltaire's Residence in England	347
	Lettres Inédites de Voltaire. Recueillies par M. de Cayrol, et annotées par M. Alphonse François. Precedées d'une Préface de M. Saint-Marc Girardin.	
III.	Jacob Grimm	390
	1. Deutsches Wörterbuch. Von Jakob und Wilhelm Grimm.	
	2. Deutsches Wörterbuch. Von Jakob und Wilhelm Grimm, fortgesetzt von Dr. Rudolph Hildebrand und Professor Karl Weigand.	
	3. Deutsche Grammatik. Von Jakob Grimm.	
	4. Geschichte der deutschen Sprache. Von Jakob Grimm.	
IV.	The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer	423
	1. Social Statics: or the Conditions essential to Human Happiness specified, and the First of them developed. By Herbert Spencer.	
	2. The Principles of Psychology. By Herbert Spencer.	
	3. Education, Intellectual, Moral, and Physical. By Herbert Spencer.	
	4. Illustrations of Universal Progress; a Series of Discussions. By Herbert Spencer.	
	5. First Principles of a New System of Philosophy. By Herbert Spencer.	
	6. The Classification of the Sciences; to which are added Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte. By Herbert Spencer.	
	7. Essays, Moral, Political, and Æsthetic. By Herbert Spencer.	
	8. Principles of Biology. By Herbert Spencer.	

V. Free Missouri 476
Inaugural Message of Governor Thomas C. Fletcher, to the Twenty-third General Assembly of the State of Missouri. In Session January 2, 1865.

VI. Wordsworth 508
The Works of William Wordsworth.

VII. Open Air Grape Culture 522
1. The Vine-Dressers' Manual, an Illustrated Treatise on Vineyards and Wine-Making. By Charles Reemelin.
2. Bright's Single Stem, Dwarf, and Renewal System of Grape Culture, etc. By William Bright.
3. Open Air Grape Gulture. A Practical Treatise on the Garden and Vineyard Culture of the Vine, and the Manufacture of Domestic Wine, etc. By John Phin.
4. The Grape Culturist. A Treatise on the Cultivation of the Native Grape. By Andrew S. Fuller.
5. Manual of the Vine. By C. W. Grant.

VIII. Reconstruction 540
1. The President's Message on the Peace Negotiation, presented to Congress, February 10, 1865.
2. The Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865.

IX. Death of Mr. Everett 560

X. Critical Notices 565
Müller's Lectures on the Science of Language, 565. — Milman's History of the Jews, 581. — Stevens's History of the Methodist Church, 585. — Martin's History of France, 594. — Guizot's Meditations, 600. — Perkins's Tuscan Sculptors, 602. — Newcomb's Critical Examination of our Financial Policy, 604. — Publications of the Tract Society, 614. — Youmans's Correlation and Conservation of Forces, 619. — Harper's Weekly, 623. — Johnson's Family Atlas, 625. — Vanity Fair, 626. — Mitchell's Wet Days at Edgewood, 626.

List of some Recent Publications 629

ERRATUM.

Page 460, line 1, *for* Uranus *read* Neptune.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCVI.

JANUARY, 1865.

ART. I. — *History of the Administration of* PRESIDENT LINCOLN; *including his Speeches, Letters, Addresses, Proclamations, and Messages. With a Preliminary Sketch of his Life.* By HENRY J. RAYMOND. New York: J. C. Derby and N. C. Miller. 1864. 12mo. pp. 496.

THE character of the man chosen to be President of the United States for the next four years is of importance to the nation only secondary to that of the moral and political principles involved in his election. He is not merely the representative of these principles, but upon him mainly depends the direction of the policy by which they are to be expressed and maintained in the acts of administration. And now that the people have decided the question at issue in the election in conformity with the dictates of honor and good sense; — now that they have decided that the national integrity must be preserved; that the constitutional rights of the majority must be maintained; that no price is too great to be paid for that Union which is the condition of national existence, dignity, and strength; that Rebellion must be punished, and slavery, the source of Rebellion, extirpated; that lasting peace must be secured by victory, and not by surrender; — and since by this decision they have reaffirmed the fundamental principles of American democracy, and have reasserted their devotion to justice and liberty as embodied in the national institutions, — there is reason for the heartiest satisfaction that the character of Abraham

Lincoln, upon whom more than upon any other man devolves the responsibility of giving effect to the popular will, has been already tried, and has proved worthy of the new trust which has been committed to him.

The period during which Mr. Lincoln has been President has tested him by altogether extraordinary circumstances. But the very storm and pressure of events, which have tried and proved the real qualities of the man, have also created such general excitement of feeling as to render the formation of a fair and impartial judgment of his course a matter of difficulty even for the coolest and most candid observers. Political passion and prejudice have dimmed the vision and distorted the views of men. The invidious scrutiny of vehement opponents has been exercised to discover faults, or their malignity has been employed in inventing them, while the zeal of no less vehement partisans has been displayed with scarcely less injurious effect in the exaggeration of merits or the denial of mistakes in judgment or in action. To be misrepresented is the penalty of one who holds exalted office. The President lives in a terrible publicity. His looks, his words, his deeds, are constantly supplying material for the fancy of friends or enemies to work upon. Frankness is a risk for him, reserve is hardly less dangerous. Simplicity of heart is no protection against those who are ready to suspect sincerity itself of being double-minded. Good faith and good humor afford no safeguard against misinterpretation. But all this is only the old complaint and the familiar vice of courts, aggravated by the peculiar conditions of American public life. Amid the perils of the Rebellion, and under the burden of cares of state, Mr. Lincoln might many times have exclaimed, with Henry VI.:

> "How will the country, for these woful chances,
> Mis-think the king, and not be satisfied!"

But in spite of misrepresentations, innocent or designed, and putting aside all rumor, and all that rests on hearsay and report, there has been during the term of Mr. Lincoln's Presidency a steady accumulation of material for judgment, until at length it has become sufficient for the formation of an estimate, if not complete, at least accurate as far as it goes, of his motives and character. A man is to be judged by the current of his

life. No fair opinion can be reached by the analysis of single acts; and after a careful, deliberate, and serious review of Mr. Lincoln's course during the past four years, we do not hesitate to say that there is no statesman in America to whose hands the great authority and power of the Presidency could be more fitly or confidently committed. And in saying this, we do not disregard the fact, that the affairs of the nation during the next four years will demand the highest statesmanship in the men called upon to direct them. The questions which returning peace and the re-establishment of the government will bring up for determination will be no less perplexing than those which have attended the course of the war. To restore the state, to settle the Union upon the firm foundations of order, will be a task requiring the best wisdom. It is vain to attempt to predict the exact form in which these questions will present themselves, but upon their correct solution depends the future welfare of the nation; and they will, we may be sure, be debated with an earnestness of feeling proportioned to their importance. And it is plain that what we have hitherto been but imperfectly as a nation, we are to become thoroughly. America is to become more American. We have passed the period of experiment. We have met, resisted, and overcome the worst perils. Prosperity and adversity have alike instructed us in the worth of our institutions, have alike confirmed our confidence in the genuine principles of democracy, and strengthened our faith in popular government.

We are now entering upon an era in which the political principles which are distinctively American, as having been here, for the first time in the history of the world, deliberately established as the foundation of a great, free political community, are to have fuller scope and new development. The principles themselves are as old as the moral nature of man; for they are simply the expression of the natural rights of man in society. The political equality of men, their right to equal justice and freedom, their right to self-government, their right to every means of self-development consistent with the general welfare, — these are the essence of the American system of democracy. To give to these principles their broadest applications, to embody these rights in practical measures, to

harmonize special acts of administration with the general system, is the duty of those intrusted with the power of the state. The men who are most fully possessed by the spirit of our system, the men who have most confidence in it, are those to whose hands the administration of the general government may most safely be committed; and there has never been a statesman in America more thoroughly in sympathy with the best interests of the American people, or more completely imbued with reverence for those ideas of justice, freedom, and humanity which inspire American institutions, than Abraham Lincoln. Indeed, one great source of the mis-esteem in which he is held by many persons in the community not opposed to him as partisans, and of the attacks upon him by the misnamed Democratic party of the present day, arises from the fact that there is a large class of Americans by birth or adoption, including the larger part of the spurious Democratic party, who are not Americans in principle. They have inherited prepossessions from the past; they belong to the old world of class-privilege, of inequality, of unjust political distinctions. They breathe with difficulty the free air of the new world. Their souls are not open to the inspiring and ennobling doctrines on which the future is to be builded fair. The revilings which have been shouted from Richmond, — the cries of "Ape," "Monster," "Imbecile," — revilings repeated by the low ministers of faction at the North, — are but the ribaldry in which the offscourings of an aristocracy based upon the denial of human rights display their hatred of those principles of democracy of which Mr. Lincoln is the worthy representative.

By birth, by education, by sympathy, Mr. Lincoln is of the people. His training has been in the popular school. He is an American in the best sense; and it is a circumstance beyond measure fortunate, that a man of this stamp should be at the head of affairs at a juncture so critical as the present, and during a period in which American principles are, as we have said, to receive new developments and wider application.

The prevailing quality of Mr. Lincoln as a statesman is his confidence, as he has himself expressed it, in "government of the people, by the people, for the people." From his first expression as President, this has been his ruling idea. In the

brief address that he delivered at Indianapolis on the day that he left Springfield to go to Washington, — the 11th of February, 1861, — he said, in words of the depth of whose meaning even he at that time was but partially conscious, "Of the people, when they rise in mass in behalf of the Union and of the liberties of their country, truly may it be said, 'The gates of hell cannot prevail against them'"; and he concluded his address with the words, "I appeal to you again to constantly bear in mind that with you, and not with politicians, not with Presidents, not with office-seekers, but with you, rests the question, Shall the Union, and shall the liberties of this country, be preserved to the latest generation?" Again and again, in the short speeches made by him during his journey to Washington, he dwelt on this idea. "It is with you, the people, to advance the great cause of Union and the Constitution." "I am sure I bring a heart true to the work. For the ability to perform it, I must trust in that Supreme Being who has never forsaken this favored land, through the instrumentality of this great and intelligent people." The same idea runs through the Inaugural Address, reappearing in various forms as it presents itself in connection with the different topics treated in that memorable discourse. "This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it." "The chief magistrate derives all his authority from the people." "Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

There is indeed nothing particularly new in the manner of these statements, and nothing original in the idea of the supremacy of the people. The new and remarkable thing in them is, that whereas hitherto these ideas have been held with more or less sincerity and confidence by our statesmen, they are the groundwork of Mr. Lincoln's political convictions; they are the essence of his political creed. The importance to the country of having a man in the Presidential chair during the Rebellion who was thoroughly and practically in earnest in holding these doctrines, is hardly to be over-estimated; for the events of this period have required such an appeal to be made by the government to the people as was never before demanded, and the course of the government on some of the

most important questions of policy has displayed an absolute confidence in the satisfactory answer that the people would make to their appeal. The nation was worthy of this confidence; and the past four years have done more than any similar period in our history to develop its trust in itself, and to convert not merely our politicians, but the whole people, from theoretical democratic republicans into practical believers in the rights of man, and in the power and virtue of an intelligent democracy.

No man can have such democratic instincts and principles as Mr. Lincoln has manifested, without being possessed with a strong devotion to liberty, and to the justice which is a component part of the idea of freedom. For a generation, at least, the large idea of liberty as a principle of conservatism and development has been greatly lost sight of in the narrower views which have grown out of the conflict in regard to slavery. Freedom has been opposed to slavery as if it were its contrary, as if it were little more than a merely destructive power. Our Northern statesmen have for the most part given themselves up to the argument against slavery, rather than to the argument for liberty. Had their devotion to liberty been equal to their zeal or their professions against slavery, the South could never have won those civil and political victories which encouraged her at length to try the force of arms.

Mr. Lincoln has throughout his public career been a consistent and steadfast opponent of slavery, not merely on the ground of the evil intrinsic to the institution, but mainly on the ground of its incompatibility with the free institutions of the country. The famous opening sentences of his speech at Springfield, Ill., on the 17th of June, 1858, contain the gist of his doctrine on the subject. "'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this government cannot permanently endure half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved, — I do not expect the house to fall, — but I *do* expect that it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other." The speech that contained these words was delivered, it should be remembered, some time before Mr. Seward, by his speech at Rochester, made the doctrine of the "irrepressible conflict" familiar to the people of the country.

In a speech at Independence Hall on the 21st of February, 1861, on his journey to Washington, Mr. Lincoln said, speaking of the Colonies during the Revolution: "I have often inquired of myself what great principle or idea it was that kept this confederacy so long together. It was not the mere matter of the separation of the Colonies from the mother land, but that sentiment in the Declaration of Independence which gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but, I hope, to the world, for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men." The Declaration of Independence, thus interpreted, is the inspiration of Mr. Lincoln's political faith. It is impossible for him to dissociate from his confidence in the people as the source of all authority, and as competent to rule themselves, his equal confidence that "nothing stamped with the Divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on and degraded and imbruted by its fellows." In declaring the truths with which the Declaration of Independence opens to be self-evident, the signers of that charter but gave expression, to use Mr. Lincoln's own words, to "their lofty and wise and noble understanding of the justice of the Creator to his creatures." And it is his strong sense of the fact that it is by these principles that the republic lives, and that by its existence it keeps them alive for the benefit of the world, which has directed his policy, and marked his utterances, in regard to the Rebellion whose object was "to overthrow this government, which was built on the foundation of human rights, and to substitute for it one which should rest exclusively on the basis of human slavery."

In his letter to the workingmen of London, on the 2d of February, 1863, Mr. Lincoln said: "The resources, advantages, and powers of the American people are very great; and they have consequently succeeded to equally great responsibilities. It seems to have devolved on them to test whether a government established on the principles of human freedom can be maintained against an effort to build one upon the exclusive foundation of human bondage." And in an address made to an Ohio regiment on its return home through Washington at the expiration of its term of service, on the 18th of

August last, he said, giving a brief but excellent definition of political equality: "I wish it might be more generally understood what the country is now engaged in. We have, as all will agree, a free government, where every man has *a right to be equal with every other man.* In this great struggle this form of government and every form of human right is endangered, if our enemies succeed. There is more involved in the contest than is realized by every one: there is involved in this struggle the question whether your children and my children shall enjoy the privileges we have enjoyed."

No man has seen more clearly or felt more deeply than Mr. Lincoln, that, whatever were the pretexts and motives of the Rebellion, and however we may name the cause in which we are contending, whether we call it a struggle for the integrity of the Union and the maintenance of the Constitution, or give it some other name, its essence is the defence of human rights against the attacks of those who practically deny them; and the issue is most distinctly joined on the point of the rights of labor. It is a struggle for the rights of labor, and for the form of government by which alone those rights can be securely maintained. It is on the preservation of these rights that the progress of the world in civilization depends. The freedom, the dignity, the intelligence of labor, are the tests of the true civilization of a community. Great refinement, great moral elevation, may be attained by individuals, even by classes, in a society where these rights are denied and withheld. But a society in which such a condition exists rests upon foundations that will assuredly prove insufficient, and will in time crumble away, to the destruction of whatever superstructure rests upon them. The excellence of a political society may be judged by the degree in which the rights of its humblest member are protected, and in which the benefits which flow from it may be shared by him. The true position of the laboring man in a free community, and the relations of labor to the other interests of society, have rarely been stated with more clearness than by the President in his Annual Message to Congress in December, 1861. He said: —

"It continues to develop that the insurrection is largely, if not exclusively, a war upon the first principle of popular government, — the rights of the people. Conclusive evidence of this is found in the most grave

and maturely considered public documents, as well as in the general tone of the insurgents. In those documents we find the abridgment of the existing right of suffrage, and the denial to the people of all right to participate in the selection of public officers, except the legislative, boldly advocated, with labored arguments to prove that large control of the people in government is the source of all political evil. Monarchy itself is sometimes hinted at as a possible refuge from the power of the people.

"In my present position I could scarcely be justified were I to omit raising a warning voice against this approach of returning despotism.

"It is not needed nor fitting here that a general argument should be made in favor of popular institutions; but there is one point with its connections, not so hackneyed as most others, to which I ask a brief attention. It is the effort to place *capital* on an equal footing, if not above *labor*, in the structure of government. It is assumed that labor is available only in connection with capital; that nobody labors unless somebody else, owning capital, somehow by the use of it induces him to labor. This assumed, it is next considered whether it is best that capital shall *hire* laborers, and thus induce them to work by their own consent, or *buy* them, and drive them to it without their consent. Having proceeded so far, it is naturally concluded that all laborers are either *hired* laborers or what we call slaves. And, further, it is assumed that whoever is once a hired laborer is fixed in that condition for life. Now there is no such relation between capital and labor as assumed, nor is there any such thing as a free man being fixed for life in the condition of a hired laborer. Both these assumptions are false, and all inferences from them are groundless.

"Labor is prior to, and independent of, capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration. Capital has its rights, which are as worthy of protection as any other rights. Nor is it denied that there is, and probably always will be, a relation between capital and labor producing mutual benefits. The error is in assuming that the whole labor of a community exists within that relation. A few men own capital, and that few avoid labor themselves, and with their capital hire or buy another few to labor for them. A large majority belong to neither class, — neither work for others, nor have others working for them. In most of the Southern States a majority of the whole people of all colors are neither slaves nor masters; while in the Northern, a large majority are neither hirers nor hired. Men with their families — wives, sons, and daughters — work for themselves, on their farms, in their houses, and in their shops,

taking the whole product to themselves, and asking no favors of capital on the one hand nor of hired laborers or slaves on the other. It is not forgotten that a considerable number of persons mingle their own labor with capital; that is, they labor with their own hands, and also buy or hire others to labor for them; but this is only a mixed, and not a distinct class. No principle stated is disturbed by the existence of this mixed class.

"Again, as has already been said, there is not, of necessity, any such thing as the free hired laborer being fixed to that condition for life. Many independent men everywhere in these States, a few years back in their lives, were hired laborers. The prudent, pennyless beginner in the world labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land for himself, then labors on his own account another while, and at length hires another new beginner to help him. This is the just and generous and prosperous system which opens the way to all, gives hope to all, and consequent energy, and progress, and improvement of condition to all. No men living are more worthy to be trusted than those who toil up from poverty, — none less inclined to touch or take aught which they have not honestly earned. Let them beware of surrendering a political power which they already possess, and which, if surrendered, will surely be used to close the door of advancement against such as they, and to fix new disabilities and burdens upon them, till all of liberty shall be lost."

In March, 1864, on receiving an address from the New York Workingmen's Democratic Republican Association, Mr. Lincoln made a reply to the committee who represented the Association, in which he said: —

"You comprehend, as your address shows, that the existing Rebellion means more and tends to more than the perpetuation of African slavery; that it is, in fact, a war upon the rights of all working people. Partly to show that this view has not escaped my attention, and partly that I cannot better express myself, I read a passage from the Message to Congress in December, 1861."

After reading the extract which we have quoted, he added, in words full of good sense and wisdom, which display his characteristic skill in the art of "putting things": —

"The views then expressed remain unchanged, nor have I much to add. None are so deeply interested to resist the present Rebellion as the working people. Let them beware of prejudices, working division and hostility among themselves. The most notable feature of a disturb-

ance in your city last summer was the hanging of some working people by other working people. It should never be so. The strongest bond of human sympathy, outside of the family relation, should be one uniting all working people of all nations and tongues and kindreds. Nor should this lead to a war upon property or the owners of property. Property is the fruit of labor; property is desirable, is a positive good in the world. That some should be rich shows that others may become rich, and hence is just encouragement to industry and enterprise. Let not him who is houseless pull down the house of another, but let him labor diligently and build one for himself; thus by example assuring that his own shall be safe from violence when built."

Such words as these, simple, pointed, sincere, address the intelligence of the plain people. They are not to be misunderstood, and the character of the speaker gives to them additional weight. He is no mere theorist, no political schemer, giving utterance to popular or acceptable truths of which he is not convinced. The very form of his expressions, so markedly original and vigorous, indicates that the thoughts contained in them are his own, both by right of moral conviction and intellectual assimilation. Mr. Lincoln represents and contends for the democracy of free labor, in opposition to those at the North, as well as at the South, who regard the laboring classes as the "very mudsills of society and political government," and assert that "you might as well attempt to build a house in the air, as to build either one or the other except *on* the mudsills."

"But," it may be objected, "even if Mr. Lincoln has given evidence of possessing more deeply rooted and sincere convictions in respect to the source of authority in government, the rights of man, the nature of political liberty and justice, and the claims of labor, than any other American statesman, and admitting even that by birth, by education, by experience, his instincts and his principles are alike soundly democratic, and his whole nature in hearty sympathy with the best aspirations of the American people, admitting still further that he has a thorough comprehension of the American system of government, and an unalterable determination to maintain that system in its integrity, yet all this is not sufficient to make him a wise ruler of the nation. A man may have all good

principles and desires, and yet pursue a wrong policy. Integrity and intelligence are not enough in times of trial. To think well and to mean well are of no use, if a man knows not how to act well. Mr. Lincoln's administration for the past three years and more is the true test of his capacity and worthiness for his great office." We admit all this fully. But this only leads to the question, Has Mr. Lincoln's course of action as President, viewed broadly and estimated fairly, failed to correspond with his declared principles, or has he failed to perform the duties imposed upon him by his oath of office? And to this question the answer is to be found in the character of the specific charges brought against his administration.

In respect to many of these charges a final judgment has been rendered by the people at the polls. They have re-elected the man who, by the suspension of the *habeas corpus* and the suppression of newspapers, was, it is asserted, depriving them of their most precious rights, and establishing the worst despotism over them. The truth is, that however men may differ as to the necessity and policy of these and similar acts of Mr. Lincoln's administration, there is not an honest, sensible man in the Free States who considers any one of his personal or political rights to be in danger, or who can be scared with the bugbear of despotism proceeding from the President. The privileges and rights of the loyal citizens of the United States were never more secure than at this moment; and never was the determination to protect and defend them against all peril more manifest than in the election of Mr. Lincoln to a second term of office. The good sense of the people understands the matter as Mr. Lincoln himself understands it. "Nor am I able," said he in his letter to the Hon. Erastus Corning and others, on the 13th of June, 1863, "to appreciate the danger apprehended that the American people will, by means of military arrests during the Rebellion, lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and *habeas corpus*, throughout the indefinite peaceful future which, I trust, lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to

persist in feeding upon them during the rest of his healthful life."

Unquestionably there is matter for difference in respect to many of the acts of Mr. Lincoln's administration. In the pressure of events of a character utterly novel, and involving consequences of the utmost importance, with the need frequently of prompt decision and immediate action upon them, mistakes have been committed, and errors of judgment have occurred, such as were inevitable in a season of such stress and difficulty. Still further, the period has been one full of instruction to every man of candid and intelligent mind. The whole nation has been at school. It has been taught new ideas in respect to duty and to policy. Old ideas have been rudely shaken, and have given way to others more conformed to the necessities and changes of the time. A policy fit for 1861 is not the policy for 1864. Principles do not change, but their application to events is continually changing. The consistent statesman is not he who never alters his policy, but he who, adapting his policy to shifting exigencies, is true always to the fixed north star of duty and of principle. Above all, in a period of social convulsion, a true and honorable consistency does not consist in adherence to the details of any preconceived plan or system, but in the ready adjustment of its details to the novel demands of the time; and it is this consistency which, in our opinion, Mr. Lincoln has eminently displayed. In his Inaugural Address, he said, "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and posts belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere." But he also said, "I hold that, in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the union of these States is perpetual." And in support of this fundamental doctrine, his declaration that "there will be no using of force against or among the people anywhere" was rightly and consistently disregarded, and the tramp of the soldier in every seceded State was its commentary.

On no subject have the sentiments of the Northern people undergone a more entire change since 1861, than on the ques-

tion of the right of the general government to interfere with slavery. Not only is their view of the relation of the Constitution to slavery essentially modified, but within the powers with which the Constitution invested the President has been found the arm from which slavery has received its death-blow. The idea of being called upon to use this arm had never crossed the mind of Mr. Lincoln up to the time of his inauguration. He, in common with the mass of the people of the North, was ready then to guarantee to the people of the South protection for slavery within its existing limits. His oath as President to support the Constitution was interpreted by him as depriving him of all lawful right to interfere, directly or indirectly, with the institution of slavery in the States where it then existed. But the progress of events taught him, as it taught the people, that slavery, like every other partial interest or relation, was subordinate to the general interest; that it was subject to the Constitution; that if, to preserve the Union, slavery must be destroyed, the Constitution, which formed the bond of the Union, could not be pleaded in its defence. His course on the matter was in accordance with the fundamental principles of his political creed. Other men, no doubt, earlier reached the same conclusions at which he arrived, and urged upon him the adoption of the policy which he at length pursued. But on them the responsibility of decision and action did not rest; and Mr. Lincoln's deep sense of that responsibility caused him to seem to reach slowly the point to which more eager and less considerate men had long before attained.

Moreover, in Mr. Lincoln's position, the conflicting interests and the contradictory opinions of men of the loyal, and especially of the Border States, have made it a task of extreme difficulty and delicacy to learn the true sentiment of the North. To unite and to keep united the people of the loyal States in the support of the administration, so far as such union was possible, was Mr. Lincoln's arduous task. On this union depended the power to carry on the war. Every delay, every disaster to our arms, every incompetence, every personal disappointment and private grief, every wounded vanity, all partisan hates and jealousies, every danger, in fine,

against which an American statesman could be called on to provide, lay in his path. He could not, if he did his duty, expect either wholly to please his friends or to win his enemies; he could not force compliance with his views, or insist on the adoption of measures which he might esteem desirable or essential. His character was not fitted to secure a strong body of personal supporters. He stood comparatively isolated and alone; and his duty was to save the Union, and to save it with its institutions sound and whole. Popular opinion was changing and developing rapidly. Mr. Lincoln's own views were changing and advancing with it. But it was impossible to make sure of popular opinion, so diverse were the voices of the people. "I am approached," said Mr. Lincoln, "with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men, who are equally certain that they represent the Divine will. I am sure," he added, with humorous irony, "that either one or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps in some respect both." The elements in the problem given him to solve were of the most complex and difficult character. He might well be pardoned, if, doing his best, he had failed. But he has not failed. Sagacious beyond most men in his estimate of popular opinion, he has the intuition of a genuine statesman as to the manner and the moment of its use. He has not fallen into the common error of politicians, of mistaking a gust of enthusiasm or of passion for the steady wind of conviction, or of fancying a thunder-squall of violence to be a black storm of gathered discontent. He has not sought to control events, but he has known how to turn events, among the most important of which are to be reckoned the moods of a great people in time of trial, to the benefit of the cause of the nation and of mankind.

In regard to the question of slavery and emancipation, he has, fortunately for the country and for history, given a statement of the principles and motives of his policy in a brief letter, which must take rank as one of the most important documents in the remarkable series of state-papers which he has published since his accession to the Presidency. It is a production of the highest interest, not only as containing the authentic record of his opinions and his action on this great

topic, but as exhibiting the frankness, candor, integrity, and sagacity which are the distinguishing traits of his personal character. We cite this letter in full, because, in the crowd of matters of public concern, it has not received the attention it deserves as an exposition of the President's policy, and because it is well fitted to inspire confidence in the wisdom of its author.

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
April 4th, 1864.

"A. G. HODGES, ESQ., Frankfort, Ky.

"MY DEAR SIR: — You ask me to put in writing the substance of what I verbally stated the other day, in your presence, to Governor Bramlette and Senator Dixon. It was about as follows: —

"'I am naturally antislavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel; and yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it in my view that I might take the oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral question of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times and in many ways; and I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery. I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government, that nation, of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life *and* limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life, but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that to the best of my ability I had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save slavery, or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of government, country, and Constitution altogether. When, early in the war, General Frémont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then

think it an indispensable necessity. When, a little later, General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected, because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunter attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come. When, in March and May and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the Border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come, unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition; and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss; but of this I was not entirely confident. More than a year of trial now shows no loss by it in our foreign relations, none in our home popular sentiment, none in our white military force, — no loss by it anyhow or anywhere. On the contrary, it shows a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen, and laborers. These are palpable facts, about which, as facts, there can be no cavilling. We have the men; and we could not have had them without the measure.

"'And now let any Union man who complains of the measure test himself by writing down in one line that he is for subduing the Rebellion by force of arms; and in the next, that he is for taking three [one?] hundred and thirty thousand men from the Union side, and placing them where they would be but for the measure he condemns. If he cannot face his case so stated, it is only because he cannot face the truth.'

"I add a word which was not in the verbal conversation. In telling this tale, I attempt no compliment to my own sagacity. I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years' struggle, the nation's condition is not what either party or any man desired or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills also that we of the North, as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new causes to attest and revere the justice and goodness of God.

"Yours, truly,

"A. Lincoln."

This excellent letter, in giving the grounds and explaining the motives of Mr. Lincoln's action, affords a complete vindication from the complaints that have been frequently brought

against him by the thoughtless and impatient, by the men of ardent temperament and of limited views, for not advancing more rapidly, for not giving more speedy effect to a supposed popular sentiment, for not adopting what is called a more decisive policy, for being content not to lead the people, but to wait for their progress. These men have desired him to anticipate public opinion, and in doing so they have failed to consider how slow, even in times like these, is the maturing of popular conviction, and how liable to be checked by over-hasty action. The vicissitudes of war produce a frame of mind in which the feelings of the masses of men are likely to oversway their reason, and in which, consequently, there is a constant danger of the rise of reactionary opinions and measures. Political action based on the feeling of a moment is liable to speedy reversal. A policy that is to be lasting must rest on solid and well-formed convictions. The art and the duty of a true statesman in a republic is not to act on what the people ought to wish and to think, but to adopt the best course practicable in accordance with what they actually do wish and think. It is not to attempt to exercise a despotic leadership, but to divine and to give force to the right will of the nation.

Above all, in such circumstances as those in which the American nation has been placed by the Rebellion, it is of infinite importance that it should learn to conduct its own affairs, trusting to no one man to deliver it from peril, and yielding to no temptation to give up its own power into the hands of any, even the wisest dictator. A Cromwell, if a Cromwell had been possible, would have been an unspeakable calamity to the nation during the past four years. A free and intelligent people has no place for, and no need of, a Cromwell. It must be its own ruler and its own leader. This war has been a war of the people for the people; and in order to reach a successful conclusion, — the only conclusion worthy of a self-sustained and self-governed nation, a conclusion which should be a final settlement of the quarrel, — it must be fought out by themselves. They are to save themselves, not to look to any man for their salvation. The nation is already lost when it seeks relief from its own duties by shifting them on to the shoulders of a leader. And in this view Abraham Lincoln has well fulfilled the duty imposed

on him, not seeking to control opinion any more than to control events, but seeking to make use of both in accordance with the laws by which they are governed, so as to secure the working out of the great problem of national salvation. "I have understood well," said he, "that the duty of self-preservation rests solely with the American people."

The powers granted by the people to the President are limited, not unlimited and arbitrary. He has no right to compel the nation against its will. He has no right to lead where they are averse to follow. In the use of these limited powers, there is indeed large room for individual judgment. The President, by virtue of his position and office, may exercise a direct and most powerful influence on the formation of public opinion. He is bound, as the chief executive officer of the nation, to make the best use of this influence, as of every means which the people place in his hands, for the execution of its will. And we believe, with General Sherman, that Mr. Lincoln has done the best he could.

In the estimate and enumeration of the grounds of confidence in the President, it is not enough to consider his political principles and the acts of his administration, but we must also take into view the predominant qualities of his moral nature. Some of those qualities have been incidentally touched upon in what precedes. There is no need to insist on the commonplace, that a strong and virtuous moral character is the only absolute foundation of reliance on a man, whatever be his position. But there is need of considering that a special class of moral virtues is requisite in a statesman, and that, without them, the highest intellectual qualities may be exercised merely to the danger of the state. It was one of the curious features of the late political campaign, that a very wide confusion on this matter seemed to prevail among the supporters of General McClellan. They dwelt upon his moral excellence, apparently unmindful that general moral excellence is no indication of a man's fitness for administrative, judicial, or executive office, but that that fitness depends upon a combination of special moral qualities with special intellectual faculties.

To draw the portrait of the ideal statesman is no easy task. Nor is it needed here. But among his prime virtues would be

reckoned integrity of purpose, firmness of will, patience, fidelity, humanity, and a deep sense of accountability for his conduct, not only to his nation, but to God. These virtues Mr. Lincoln has displayed. From the beginning, his integrity of purpose has been plain to men not blinded by prejudice or passion. He has never lost sight, in selfish objects or pursuits, of the duty which had been laid upon him, — "a duty which," as he said, in words of grave prescience, to his fellow-citizens of Springfield, on taking leave of them, — "a duty which is perhaps greater than has devolved upon any other man since the days of Washington. . . . . I feel that I cannot succeed without the same Divine aid which sustained him, and on the same Almighty Being I place my reliance for support."

Deliberate in forming his opinions, feeling the vast burden of responsibility resting upon him, he has welcomed counsel and suggestion, listened to men of all parties, made up his judgment carefully, and then acted, and stood firm. Patient under circumstances that might well have provoked impatience, and with men who have baffled the best designs by wilfulness or incompetence, he has preferred to be charged with slowness, rather than by rashness to run the risk of doing injustice, or of endangering the real interests of the country. Faithful to his paramount duty to maintain and preserve at once the Constitution and the integrity of the Federal Republic, he has acted under "a sense of responsibility more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official." A conscientious purpose to perform his duty he has declared to be the key to all the measures of administration which have been adopted; and we believe that it will be the key of the future, as it has been of the past.

The results of the policy pursued by Mr. Lincoln during his administration thus far are its own best justification. The verdict of the future is not to be foreshown. But there can be little doubt that history will record the name of Abraham Lincoln as that of a pure and disinterested patriot. She may find in his course many errors; she may point out in his character many defects; she will speak of him as a man who had to contend against the disadvantages of imperfect culture, of self-education, and of little intercourse with men of

high-breeding. But she will speak also of the virtues which the hard experience of early life had strengthened in him; of his homely sincerity and simplicity; of his manly frankness and self-respect; of his large, humane, and tender sympathies; of his self-control and good temper; of his truthfulness and sturdy honesty. She will represent him as actuated by an abiding sense of duty, as striving to be faithful in his service of God and of man, as possessed with deep moral earnestness, and as endowed with vigorous common-sense and faculty for dealing with affairs. She will tell of his confidence in the people, and she will recount with approval their confidence in him. And when she has told all this, may she conclude her record by saying that to Abraham Lincoln more than to any other man is due the success which crowned the efforts of the American people to maintain the Union and the institutions of their country, to widen and confirm the foundations of justice and liberty, on which those institutions rest, and to establish inviolable and eternal peace within the borders of their land.

ART. II. — 1. *Christianity and Emancipation; or the Teachings and the Influence of the Bible against Slavery.* By the REV. JOSEPH P. THOMPSON. New York. 1863. 8vo. pp. 86.

2. *De l'Abolition de l'Esclavage Ancien au Moyen Âge, et de sa Transformation en Servitude de la Glèbe.* Par J. YANOSKI. Paris. 1860. 8vo. pp. 154.

WE have thought that the attention of our readers might perhaps be not unprofitably bestowed upon a brief review of the relations between the early Christian Church and slavery. These relations have been strangely misrepresented. It is true that materials are wanting to supply all the details of the subject; but enough has been preserved to enable any honest and impartial writer to arrive at correct conclusions as to the manner in which the fathers of the first five centuries

treated a matter, wisely to deal with which was almost as delicate and dangerous a task then as now.

That our Saviour rejected, as incompatible with his great mission, all direct interference with the existing organization of society, is too evident to require demonstration. He preached non-resistance and subordination to the powers that be. To specially attack, therefore, the abuses which prevailed, and to excite an insurrection like that of Spartacus, or a revolt such as led to the destruction of Jerusalem, would have been totally inconsistent with the principles which vivify his teachings. His object was, not to found a sect like Islam, which should go forth to conquer the infidel, the sword in one hand and the Gospel in the other, but to regenerate human nature, so that, in the long succession of centuries, man should be purified, and evil should suffer a gradual but a permanent overthrow.

When Christ proclaimed the principle of the Golden Rule; when Saint Paul bade Philemon to take back his fugitive slave Onesimus, not as a slave, but above a slave, a brother beloved; when he ordered masters to grant justice and equality to slaves, for the sake of the Master of all, — the rules of life were laid down which, conscientiously followed, must render slavery finally impossible among Christians.

The world into which Christianity was thus introduced recognized slavery everywhere. Practised by all races from time immemorial, tolerated by all religions, regulated by all codes, it was apparently an institution as inseparable from society as the relationship between parent and child. What were the restrictions laid upon it by Moses, or the customs respecting it among the Greeks, are foreign from our present purpose; but it is worth while to cast a rapid glance at its legal condition in Rome, for her laws were dominant, and were destined to supersede all others throughout the regions which eventually received and believed the truths of the Gospel.

Roman slavery was hard and unrelenting. The right of the master was supreme. The stern character of the race was shown in all its institutions, and principles once admitted were carried out to their logical results with the severity of a mathematical demonstration. From the primitive days of the Re-

public, the power of a father over his children knew no limit. Their life and death were in his hands; he could sell them into slavery; and the son was liberated from the *patria potestas* only by being thrice sold and returned, which became the legal formula for emancipating him from the control of his parent. That no limits should be placed on the power of the *paterfamilias* over the bondsmen whom he had captured in war, bought with his money, or had born to him in his household, was therefore but reasonable. No humanizing laws, like those of Moses, restrained the passions or caprices of the master.

In the early period of the Republic, slaves were comparatively few. Citizens were wanted in the infant state; and the neighboring tribes, when subdued, were used to swell the numbers of the people, rather than to minister to idleness and luxury. As the Roman conquests spread, however, the captives became an important portion of the spoils, and were sent home in myriads, as when Fabius drew thirty thousand from the sack of Tarentum, and L. Æmilius Paullus a hundred and fifty thousand from the conquest of Epirus. Such a slave-trade, co-operating with their natural increase, rapidly swelled their numbers to an extent which renders not improbable the assertion of Athenæus, that wealthy proprietors possessed sometimes from ten to twenty thousand, and even more.[1] We know from Livy that portions of Italy, anciently populous with freemen, were in his time occupied almost exclusively by slaves;[2] and since the conscript fathers feared to give them a peculiar dress, lest they should recognize the comparative fewness of the freemen,[3] we are almost ready to yield credence to the calculation of Gibbon, who estimates that under the reign of Claudius the slave population was equal to the free, each comprising about sixty millions of souls.[4]

In the ages of primitive simplicity, the slave was valuable, and was rather a humble companion than a slave.[5] When

---

[1] Deipnosoph. VI. vii.

[2] Liv. VI. xii.

[3] L. A. Senec. de Clement. I. xxiv.

[4] Decline and Fall, Chap. II.

[5] "Nam et majores nostri omnem dominis invidiam, omnem servis contumeliam detrahentes, dominum patremfamilias, servos familiares appellaverunt." — Macrob. Saturnal. I. xi.

massed in numbers, sold at an inconsiderable price, and employed to pander to the vilest passions of the most corrupt society recorded by history, they became the object of unbridled cruelty and savage suspicion. As, in the time of Augustus, Vedius Pollio was in the habit of feeding the fish intended for his table with the slaves who chanced to displease him,[1] Juvenal can scarcely be deemed an unfaithful delineator of contemporary manners in representing the Roman matron as crucifying her slave from no motive but the caprice of the moment, and as characterizing as insanity the inquiry whether he also was not a human being.[2] Slaves, indeed, could scarcely have been so regarded by those who were in the habit of exposing them, when sick, upon a desert island, in order to escape the expense of curing them.[3]

A system of rigorous terrorism was the necessary complement of such cruelties. How the public safety was guarded is told by the fearful slaughters which followed the Sicilian revolt and the war of Spartacus; and the private citizen was protected by a merciless severity. If a master was murdered in his own house, all his family slaves were put to death, on the principle that some of them must have been privy to the crime, and that thus alone could all the guilty be reached, and the servile population be made to feel that their master's safety was essential to their own.[4] The practical working of Roman servitude is aptly condensed in the proverb, "Totidem esse hostes quot servos."

The position and prospects of the slave grew worse with the settlement of affairs under the Empire. The traditional processes of emancipation were by the *vindicta* or rod, in open court, by the inscription of the slave's name in the quinquennial census, or by testament; and the freedman became a Roman

---

[1] Senec. de Clement. I. xviii. De Ira III. xl.

[2] "Pone crucem servo. — Meruit quo crimine servus
Supplicium? Quis testis adest? Quis detulit? Audi,
Nulla unquam de morte hominis cunctatio longa est.
O demens, ita servus homo est? Nil fecerit, esto:
Hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas." — Sat. VI. 218.

[3] Sueton. Claud. xxv. Claudius had the humanity to decree that those who chanced to survive should be liberated from their inhuman masters.

[4] Tacit. Annal. XIV. xlii. – xlv.

citizen,[1] subject only to the rights of patronage of his former master. Various causes, among which the principal was the civil wars, had caused an enormous increase of this class. When Augustus undertook to construct a new and stable order of things, he laid restrictions on the indiscriminate practice of manumission, especially in regard to the right of citizenship involved in it.[2] In A. D. 4, the *L. Ælia Sentia* established a minimum age, — thirty for the slave, and twenty for the master, — below which no manumission was legal.[3] In A. D. 9, the *L. Furia Caninia* prohibited the liberation by testament of more than a certain portion of the slaves of a decedent, and fixed one hundred as the maximum number of those set free in this manner.[4]

At the same time, considerable changes for the worse were introduced in the condition of freedmen. The *L. Ælia Sentia* created an intermediate class called *dedititii*, consisting of those who had been guilty of crime. The *dedititius* could never become a citizen, he was incapable of receiving legacies, and, as he could make no will, whatever property he might accumulate passed on his death to his patron or former master. In A. D. 19, a third class of freedmen, known as *Latini*, was constituted by the *L. Junia Norbana*. These were not admitted to citizenship, but held the position of Latin colonists. In certain cases, the magistrates could remand them to slavery, or the master could confer upon them the *legitima libertas*, and make them citizens.[5] Like the *dedititii*, they were incapable of devising property, and their estates reverted to the patron on their death.[6]

At the best, the freedman enjoyed but an imperfect liberty.

---

[1] "Antea enim una libertas erat, et libertas fiebat vel ex vindicta, vel ex testamento, vel in censu, et civitas Romana competit manumissis, quæ appellatur legitima libertas." — Frag. Vet. Jcti. de Manumiss. § 6.

[2] "Et civitatem Romanam parcissime dedit, et manumittendi modum terminavit. .... Servos non contentus multis difficultatibus a libertate, et multo pluribus a libertate justa removisse, cum et de numero et de conditione ac differentia eorum qui manumitterentur curiose cavisset, hoc quoque adjecit, ne vinctus unquam tortusve quis, ullo libertatis genere civitatem adipisceretur." — Sueton. August. xl.

[3] Ulpian. Fragg. Tit. I. §§ 11, 12. — Gaii Lib. I. Institt. Tit. i. §§ 4, 5.

[4] Ulpian. Fragg. Tit. I. §§ 24, 25. — Pauli Sentt. Receptt. Lib. IV. Tit. xiv. § 4.

[5] Ulpian. Fragg. Tit. I. § 10. — Gaii Lib. I. §§ 2, 4. — Frag. Vet. Jcti. §§ 8–16.

[6] Institt. III. vii. 4.

The tie between him and his former master or patron was never broken. The master might liberate a slave under conditions, and thus require a continued rendering of service; and even when the manumission was unconditional, he still retained a certain control. The slave was born again into liber ty by means of his master, who thus was his second father, to whom the same reverence was due as to a parent.[1] The ingratitude of a freedman to his patron was, therefore, a crime punishable by law,[2] and the magistrates were directed to chastise any neglect of duty, with a threat of increasing punishment for repetitions of the offence. Insults were visited with temporary exile; and blows or delation, with condemnation to the mines.[3] Even as early as the time of the laws of the Twelve Tables, the patron had claims on the estate of the freedman.[4]

Claudius sought to render still more precarious the deceptive liberty enjoyed by this class. He remanded to servitude all who manifested ingratitude or gave cause of complaint to their patrons; and he punished by confiscating to the state those who aspired to rise beyond the sphere allotted by law.[5]

Claudius also made a serious innovation on the traditional reverence for liberty. By the Roman law, freedom had always been imprescriptible. To him is attributed a law by which a freeman who fraudulently had himself sold as a slave was reduced to slavery.[6] The famous *Senatusconsultum Claudianum* also doomed to slavery the woman who, knowing herself to be free, married a slave, and refused to leave him on being duly warned by the master.[7]

The only effort in favor of the slave was the *L. Petronia*, which, in A. D. 11, prohibited the master from devoting his slave to combat with the beasts, unless with the approval of a

---

[1] "Honori parentium ac patronorum tribuendum est." — L. 1 Dig. XXXVII. xv. (Julian.). "Liberto et filio semper honesta et sancta persona patris ac patroni videri debet." — Ibid. l. 9 (Ulpian.).

[2] "Si ingratus libertus sit, non impune ferre eum oporteat." — L. 1 Dig. XXXVII. xiv. (Ulpian.).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ulpian. Fragg. Tit. xxix. § 1.

[5] "Libertinos qui se pro equitibus Romanis agerent publicavit. Ingratos et de quibus patroni quærerentur, revocavit in servitutem." — Sueton. Claud. xxv.

[6] L. 7 Dig. XL. xii. — L. 1 Dig. XL. xiii. (Ulpian.).

[7] Pauli Lib. II. Sentt. Receptt. Tit. XXI. A.

magistrate.[1] There was no other restriction on his absolute control of life and limb; and the sole resource of the slave was to seek, if possible, a momentary asylum in some temple, or at a statue of the Emperor, forcible removal from which incurred the penalty of sacrilege or of treason.[2]

It is probably something more than a mere coincidence, that, while the despised religion of Christ was quietly spreading, some efforts were made to ameliorate the condition of the slave. Thoughtful men, while they might look with contempt on the carpenter's son of Judæa and his humble apostles, could not but feel the moral beauty of his doctrines; and their effect may not have been less potent because unacknowledged. Thus Adrian not only punished with five years' exile a matron who had wantonly treated her slaves with outrageous cruelty,[3] but he forbade by law that slaves should be put to death without trial, or be sold for prostitution or the arena without cause.[4] The best of the Cæsars, Antoninus Pius, about 160 A. D., decreed that the murder of a slave by his own master should be visited with the same penalty as though it had been the slave of another,[5] — the penalty being prosecution under the *L. Cornelia de sicariis*, or the *L. Aquilia*.[6] This law which protected the life of the slave was followed by another of scarcely less importance, which provided that, when a slave was exposed to intolerable oppression, the magistrates on appeal could force the owner to sell him on reasonable terms.[7] How great was this innovation is shown by the deprecatory ex-

[1] L. 11, §§ 1, 2. Dig. XLVIII. viii. (Modestin.).

[2] Thus Seneca: "Servis ad statuam licet confugere." (De Clement. I. xviii.) Cf. Const. vi. Cod. I. xii. and § 2. Inst. I. viii.

[3] L. 2 Dig. I. vi. (Ulpian.).

[4] "Servos a dominis occidi vetuit, eosque jussit damnari per judices si digni essent. Lenoni et lanistæ servum vel ancillam vendi vetuit, causa non præstita."— Spartian. Hadr. xviii.

[5] L. 1 Dig. I. vi. (Gaius).

[6] "Si dolo servus occisus est, et lege Cornelia agere dominum posse constat; et si lege Aquilia egerit, præjudicium fieri Corneliæ non debet." — L. 23, § 9. Dig. IX. ii. (Ulpian.). The *L. Aquilia* permitted the master to sue for the value of the slave. (L. 1 Dig. IX. ii.) The *L. Cornelia* originally punished homicide with confiscation and deportation; but Marcian states that in his time (c. 200 A. D.) this was applied only to men of rank. The middle classes were beheaded, and the rabble were given to the beasts. (L. 3, § 5. Dig. XLVIII. viii.)

[7] § 2 Institt. I. viii. — L. 2 Dig. I. vi. (Ulpian.).

pressions of the Emperor, disclaiming a desire to interfere with the rights of the master, and arguing that his true interest lay in affording his slaves some chance of escape from cruelty and hunger.

Such was the institution of slavery in the Roman world when Christianity emerged from its obscurity. We know little of the internal discipline of the Church during the first three centuries; but sufficient evidence exists that slavery was at least tolerated, and that slaves were held by Christians. To have made it an article of faith or discipline that Christians should own no slaves, would have given color to the political accusations which were made the pretexts of successive persecutions. Yet short of this, everything was done to render slavery nominal.

That to liberate the bondsman was recognized and applauded as a good work, is shown by the numerous instances of those who at their baptism gave freedom to their slaves; and it is placed by Lactantius in the same line of duty as other acts of charity.[1] Indeed, in the earliest extant record of ecclesiastical customs, dating probably from the end of the third century, the liberation of slaves and that of martyrs condemned for the faith are enumerated in the same category, as objects to be assisted from the oblations of the churches.[2]

To the Christian the slave was no longer a chattel; he was a man and a brother. The denial of the absolute ownership of man in man is shown tacitly but forcibly in the Apostolic Constitutions, where, in reciting the tenth commandment, the man-servant and maid-servant are omitted, as though they were no longer considered as property which might be coveted to the injury of a neighbor.[3] They were called brothers, and were considered to be equals. Lactantius, in an exposition of Chris-

[1] "Proprium igitur justorum est alere pauperes ac redimere captivos." — Lactant. Institt. Divin. Lib. VI. cap. xii. He even urges it upon the pagans whom he desires to convert: "Unde bestias emis, hinc captos redime, unde feras pascis, hinc pauperes ale."

[2] "Quare de justo labore fidelium alite et vestite inopes, et quæ ex eo, ut dictum est, cogitur pecunia, statuite ut conferatur in redemptionem sanctorum, liberantes servos, captivos, vinctos, ignominiæ notatos, damnatos propter nomen Christi de tyrannorum sententia ad monomachias et mortem." — Constitt. Apostoll. Lib. IV. cap. ix.

[3] "Non concupisces res proximi tui, veluti uxorem, filium, bovem, agrum." — Constitt. Apostoll. VII. iv.

tian doctrine, formally addressed to the Emperor Constantine, not only asserts the general principle that all men are children of one God, but declares in the most explicit manner that, among Christians, slaves and masters were practically all brethren, and all on an equality.[1] In the fifth century, St. Augustine declares that the owner's property in him is not that which is held in a horse or a treasure, and that the Gospel precept of non-resistance is not to be obeyed when it might conflict with his welfare.[2]

This, of course, did not interfere with the legal relation between master and slave, which the Church fully recognized;[3] but the authority of the former was to be exercised as that of a parent over his children, for the benefit of those under his care,[4] and invidious distinctions between the classes were carefully removed. Thus among Christians the slave was admitted as a witness;[5] and in the minute directions respecting public worship, while men and women were separated, and each sex was arranged in careful gradations as to age and position, there is no regulation segregating the slave from the freeman:[6] in the temple of God, all were on an equality. Cruelty to slaves was reprobated in the strongest manner, even to the extent of rejecting the oblations of harsh masters, as coming from those hateful to God, and as unfit to be used in ministering to the wants of the widow and orphan.[7]

---

1 "Nemo apud eum (Dominum) servus est, nemo dominus. Si enim cunctis idem pater est, æquo jure omnes liberi sumus. — Ubi enim omnes non sunt universi pares, æquitas non est, et excludit inæqualitas ipsa justitiam, cujus vis omnis in eo est, ut pares faciat eos, qui ad hujus vitæ conditionem pari sorte venerunt." — Institt. Divin. V. xiv. And again: "Dicet aliquis: Nonne sunt apud vos alii pauperes, alii divites, alii servi, alii domini? .... Nec alia causa est cur nobis invicem fratrum nomen impertiamus, nisi quia pares esse nos credimus. .... Nobis tamen servi non sunt, sed eos et habemus et dicimus spiritu fratres, religione conservos. .... Cum igitur et liberi servis et divites pauperibus, humilitate animi pares simus, apud Deum virtute discernimur." — Ibid. cap. xv.

A century earlier, M. Minucius Felix held nearly the same language: "Fratres vocamus et unius Dei parentis homines, ut consortes fidei, ut spei cohæredes." — Octavius.

2 De Serm. Dom. in Monte, Lib. I. cap. xxxvi.

3 Constitt. Apostoll. IV. xii.; VII. xiv.

4 Lactant. de Ira Dei, xviii.

5 Constitt. Apostoll. II. liii.

6 Ibid. II. lxi.

7 "Episcopum scire oportet quorum debeat recipere fructus et quorum non debeat.

Marriage between slaves, which, in the eye of the law, was merely a *contubernium*, or cohabiting, was regarded among the faithful as binding; and the close supervision exercised over the welfare of their dependants is illustrated in a curious passage which directs masters, under pain of excommunication, to provide spouses for those whose passions would otherwise lead them into sin.[1] Regular prayers in the litany were offered for those enduring the hardships of servitude.[2] No master was allowed to work his slaves more than five days in the week; and numerous additional holidays were provided for them, including two weeks at Easter, all the principal festivals of the Church, and the frequent anniversaries of the martyrs.[3]

At the same time a most prudent care was exercised to avoid increasing the odium attaching to Christianity by any interference with the rights of those who still labored under the darkness of paganism. The slave of an unbeliever, on being admitted to the Church, was specially exhorted to strive for the good graces of his master, that the Word of God might not suffer in the estimation of the heathen;[4] and even sin was tolerated when it was committed at the command of an owner who had the power by law to enforce it.[5]

Such being the tendency of the Church while it was compelled to observe extreme circumspection in its relations with a jealous and persecuting society, it might have been expected eagerly to seek the earliest occasion on its emancipation to use its influence in moulding the laws to accord with its principles; and its principles, as we have seen, tended directly to uni-

---

. . . . Illi quoque qui servos suos male tractant, verberibus inquam ac fame, atque acerba servitute . . . . quoniam inquit Scriptura tales homines apud Deum esse abominabiles. Nam qui ab eis aliquid capiunt et alent de eo viduas et orphanos, rei in judicio Dei efficientur. . . . . Quod si ab impiis pasta vidua et satura facta pro eis supplicaverit, non exaudietur." — Constitt. Apostoll. IV. vi.

1 "Si dominus fidelis sciens servum vel ancillam fornicari, tamen non dat servo uxorem vel ancillæ virum, excommunicetur." — Ibid. VIII. xxxviii.

2 "Pro oppressis amara servitute orate. . . . . Etiam rogamus . . . . pro laborantibus infirmitate et pro acerbam servitutem servientibus." — Ibid. VIII. xiii., xix.

3 Ibid. VIII. xxxix.

4 "Si sit ethnici servus, instruatur quomodo placeat domino, ne blasphemetur verbum." — Ibid. VIII. xxxviii.

5 "Pellex, infidelis ancilla, solo domino obsequiens, recipiatur. Si cum aliis intemperans fuerit, rejiciatur." — Ibid. VIII. xxxviii.

versal manumission. Why this was not the case, however, is susceptible of easy explanation.

In becoming the religion of the state, Christianity merely exchanged an external for an internal master, — persecution for corruption. When despised and friendless, its members were in the main pure and unselfish. When it became the avenue through which worldly ambition might be gratified, the Church was crowded with men whose object was self-aggrandizement, and whose restless talents speedily enabled them to control the humble and conscientious. With wealth and influence came conservatism. The interest of the Church was no longer identical with that of religion, and in any conflict between the two, the latter was apt to succumb.

Other causes were also at work to prevent any earnest endeavors at so great a reform as emancipation. Such ardent souls as were not seduced by the temptations of wealth and power had ample occupation elsewhere. Paganism was still to be combated, and the great heresies which threatened the existence of the Church organization afforded an ample field for religious zeal and worldly skill. But more than all, the pure and unselfish were fast yielding to the asceticism which was to become for a time the peculiar characteristic of Christianity. The dogmas of the Montanists and Cathari, reinforced by the wide-spreading heresy of the Manicheans, exercised the most powerful influence in moulding the destinies of religion. The Saviour had taught men to despise the things of earth in comparison with those of heaven, and his teachings were elaborated and exaggerated into a philosophy of stoicism beyond the reach of Epictetus himself. The believer must devote himself exclusively to his own salvation; the world must sink into nothingness; wife, children, friends, must be set aside; and earthly joy and grief become purely indifferent. Men possessed with these convictions could not be expected to waste much thought on the transient wrongs and woes of slaves. Even as early as the second century, Tatian boasts of the indifference which he assumes as to freedom or slavery.[1] When the spirit of asceticism became dominant, and when Antony

[1] "Si servus sim, servitutem sustineo; si liber sim, de ingenuitate non glorior." — Tatian. Assyr. Orat. contra Græcos.

and Pachomius were peopling the deserts with thousands of cenobites, who could stop to waste pity on the fate of a slave, whose worst extremes of ill-usage were luxury compared to the hardships self-inflicted by those saintly men?

While thus the disposition to interfere effectively with slavery was weakened among those who controlled the Church, the power was likewise wanting. The "clinical baptism" of Constantine sufficiently shows that he embraced Christianity from worldly motives, rather than from religious conviction. He sought to consolidate his power. The majority of his army and of his subjects were probably nominal Christians, and it was safer to side with the growing than the declining party. Yet the reaction under Julian the Apostate shows that parties were not so unequally balanced as to render it safe to unnecessarily offend or injure either of them. A general emancipation of the slaves would have seriously imperilled the dynasty which Constantine sought to found. Without him, the Church could do nothing. The Emperor was its ruler in all things temporal; and temporal things merged so imperceptibly into spiritual, that even in the latter he was wellnigh supreme.

These various causes were amply sufficient to prevent any general measures tending directly or remotely to emancipation. Yet the influence of Christianity was not long in making itself felt on the spirit of legislation. Almost immediately after his conversion, Constantine issued an edict, which was evidently suggested by his priestly advisers, and was destined to have a powerful effect on the progress of liberty. Besides the old modes of manumission known to the Roman law, he introduced a new one, by which a slave could be liberated at the altar, in presence of the bishop, on the simple execution of a paper testifying to the fact. Subsequent laws, in 316 and 321, extended and perfected the system, by which citizenship was conferred on all slaves thus manumitted; and as a particular favor, ecclesiastics were permitted to liberate their bondsmen by a simple declaration, and without witnesses or writings.[1] Not only was the influence of religion thus declared to be in favor of liberty, but many of the difficulties formerly thrown in the way of manumission were removed; and a hundred years later,

[1] Constt. 1, 2. Cod. I. xiii. —Lib. IV. Cod. Theod. vii. 1.

Sozomen alludes to these measures as a conspicuous example of Constantine's piety and Christian fervor. At that period, indeed, they were so thoroughly regarded as the principal source of freedom, that these laws of Constantine were customarily inscribed at the head of all deeds of manumission.[1] In process of time, as we shall see, these customs enabled the Church to become the especial patron and protector of freedmen.

That the Church took a lively practical interest in the matter is not simply conjectural, for we find the bishops of Africa sending a special mission to Rome, to ask that the privilege should be extended to their province;[2] and we see, moreover, that the people were taught to regard the manumission of a slave as an act acceptable to God; for the ceremony was preferably performed amid the solemnities of Easter, along with other charitable works.[3]

These regulations were followed by various laws favoring liberty and ameliorating the condition of the slave. A constitution of 314, strengthened by one of 323, declared that no lapse of time conferred prescription on an owner who had bought or brought up a freeman as a slave.[4] Another law, of which the exact date is doubtful, forbids the separation of families in the division of estates; "for who," says the Emperor, "can endure that children should be torn from their parents, sisters from their brothers, or wives from their husbands." Those who had been guilty of such cruelty were ordered to reunite the severed kindred; and the magistrates were commanded to see that in future no cause should be given for complaints on the subject.[5] An edict of 322 greatly increased the chances of a presumed slave procuring an *assertor* to defend his case in court, — for no man claimed as a slave could appear in his own defence, since, if he lost the suit, he would have been engaged in a legal contest with his master, — and it further inflicted severe penalties on the claimant if he failed to make good his claim.[6] Rescripts of 319 and 326 pronounced guilty of homi-

[1] Sozomen. Hist. Eccles. I. ix.
[2] Concil. Carthag. ann. 401, can. vii., xvii.
[3] Gregor. Nyssens. Orat. 3 de Resur. Christ. (apud Gothofred.).
[4] Lib. IV. Cod. Theod. viii. 2. — Const. 3 Cod. VII. xxii.
[5] Lib. II. Cod. Theod. xxv.
[6] Lib. IV. Cod. Theod. viii. 1.

cide the master who should wantonly or intentionally, or by any cruel or unusual punishment, cause the death of a slave;[1] and a blow, though an ineffectual one, was also aimed at one of the worst abuses of slavery, by the prohibition of the profession of the gladiator, whether voluntary or enforced.[2]

These regulations went far toward recognizing the slave as a human being, and removed some of the most abhorrent features of the Roman slave code. Yet Constantine was by no means consistent; and his legislation varied as, perhaps, the Christian or the heathen parties predominated. Thus some of his laws maintain with extreme jealousy the worst of class distinctions, and the rights of masters and patrons. An edict of 314 abrogated the necessity of the three preliminary warnings which were required under the odious *Senatusconsultum Claudianum* before a free woman who voluntarily connected herself with a slave could be reduced to slavery with her offspring.[3] In 317, however, the Emperor mercifully restored the warnings;[4] and in 320, he introduced a relaxation in favor of fiscal slaves, whose wives might be free and whose children be *Latini*.[5] In 326, he issued an edict of great severity, by which a woman connecting herself with her own slave was put to death, and her accomplice burned; while the children of such a union were reduced to simple freedom, without rank or honors or capacity of inheritance. Slaves were even permitted to bring accusations of this kind, and were encouraged to do so by the offer of freedom.[6] The children of a female slave were always slaves, even when the master was the father; and in 321, Constantine decreed that the sixteen years' prescription which conferred freedom was not applicable to cases where a freeman had offspring by a slave, and brought them up with him as free. For them, no lapse of time could bar the claim of the father or of his heirs.[7] The control of the patron over his freedmen was likewise guarded by the same careful legislation. By a law of 332, the freedman was remanded to slavery for even slight offences against his patron.[8]

---

[1] Lib. IV. Cod. Theod. ix. 1, 2.
[2] Lib. XV. Cod. Theod. xii. 1.
[3] Lib. IV. Cod. Theod. ix. 1.
[4] Ibid. l. 2.
[5] Ibid. l. 3.
[6] Lib. IX. Cod. Theod. ix. 1.
[7] Lib. IV. Cod. Theod. viii. 3.
[8] Ibid. xi. 2.

Between Constantine and Justinian, little was done by the Emperors to ameliorate the legal condition of the slave. Indeed, a considerable portion of the legislation of the period manifests a tendency to reaction, as though to suppress an increasing popular feeling in favor of liberty. Thus the odious Claudian law was re-enacted by Julian the Apostate, and again, in 366, by Valentinian I.; and the servitude of the children of such unions was especially decreed by the latter, though Arcadius, in 398, restored the practice of giving the unfortunate wife three warnings before final proceedings could be taken against her.[1] In 468, Anthemius went further than his predecessors, by prohibiting marriages between free women and their freedmen, under pain of deportation and confiscation, while the offspring became slaves of the fisc.[2]

In the same spirit, the dependence of the freedman on his patron was enforced by successive edicts. Under a law of Honorius, in 423, the relationship was continued to the second generation of both parties.[3] In 376, Gratian denounced the most savage penalties against freedmen who brought accusations against their patrons; except in cases of treason, they were not to be listened to, and their ingratitude was to be punished with the stake.[4] In 397, Arcadius contented himself with threatening a less cruel death;[5] and in 423, Honorius pronounced them incapable of bearing witness against their patrons, and declared that they should not be called upon to give evidence in such cases.[6] In 426, a law of Theodosius the Younger and Valentinian III. prohibited them from aspiring to any honors in the state, and ordered that even service as soldiers should not exonerate them from being reduced to slavery, if guilty of ingratitude to the patron or his heirs.[7]

This frequent repetition and re-enactment of laws is strikingly suggestive of a growing popular opinion which rendered them rapidly nugatory. It would seem as though this feeling at length grew too powerful for the prejudices of the rulers; for in 447 Theodosius and Valentinian issued an edict in strong contrast with their law of 426. It expressly prohibited

[1] Lib. IV. Cod. Theod. x. 4, 5, 6, 7.
[2] Novell. Anthem. Tit. I.
[3] Lib. IV. Cod. Theod. xi. 2.
[4] Lib. IX. Cod. Theod. vi. 1, 2.
[5] Ibid. 3.
[6] Ibid. 4.
[7] Lib. IV. Cod. Theod. xi. 3.

the heirs of a patron from endeavoring to reduce his freedmen to slavery; and while it granted remedies against ingratitude, it annulled the ancient *actio contra ingratos*, which remanded the freedman to his former condition. It likewise gave him a much larger control over the testamentary disposition of his property than he had previously enjoyed; and these provisions, the monarchs declared, arose from their detestation of injustice, and their leaning in favor of liberty.[1]

Whatever alleviations the lot of the slave received during this period, either from the legislation of the ruler or the growth of liberal public opinion, may safely be attributed to the influence of the Church. That the Church, indeed, was looked upon as the natural protector of the slave, that religion favored his emancipation, and that his liberation was regarded as an act acceptable to God, is sufficiently manifested by several laws enacted about this time. Thus, by a constitution of Theodosius the Great, the sanctity of the Sabbath was enforced by forbidding any legal process or act on that day; but the act of manumission was expressly excepted, — it was a work of charity, and therefore no violation of religious observance.[2] Somewhat in the same spirit was an edict of Theodosius the Younger, setting at liberty any Christian slave circumcised by a Jewish master.[3] Religion likewise led to the suppression of one of the worst abuses of slavery, when Constantius, in 343, decreed that any Christian slave sold to prostitution could be redeemed at a fair price by any priest or Christian man of good character;[4] and this reform was carried out to its legitimate results in 428 by Theodosius the Younger, in a law which set at liberty any slave girl employed for such purposes, and doomed to exile and the mines the master guilty of a wrong which in the early days of the Empire was recognized as a regular occupation and source of profit.[5] So decided an interference with the rights and powers of slave-owners betokened a steady advance in the direction of liberty.

Not only did religion thus use its influence in favor of the slave, but the Church became the legalized intercessor between

---

1 Novell. Valent. III. Tit. xxv.
2 Const. 2. Cod. III. xii.
3 Const. 1. Cod. I. x.
4 Lib. XV. Cod. Theod. viii. 1.
5 Ibid. 2.

him and his master. It thus employed its right of asylum; and in 432 it obtained from Theodosius the Younger a rescript which established it in this position. Any slave, flying from his master's wrath, could take refuge in a church. After a sojourn of twenty-four hours, the priests were bound to notify the master, who could not withdraw the fugitive until he had pledged himself to a full pardon.[1] The right thus obtained was quickly extended. The limit of twenty-four hours was not observed; the slave was retained until the master could satisfy the clergy, and if he subsequently violated his promise of forgiveness, he was promptly excommunicated.[2]

Such was the position of slavery when the Western Empire was overthrown by the barbarians, arresting at once and for ages the humanizing influences which were gradually undermining the institution. Before considering the effect produced by this revulsion, we will glance for a moment at the legislation of Constantinople, where, for a while at least, the progress of reform continued with but little interference from external causes.

The legists whom Justinian assembled for the great work of revising and codifying the imperial jurisprudence, were thoroughly imbued with the spirit of freedom; and the Emperor himself lost no fitting opportunity of proclaiming his love of liberty, and his hatred of slavery.[3] His legislation, therefore, is all directed in the interest of the slave and of the freedman.

Thus a presumed slave, either claiming or defending his liberty, was allowed to appear in person against his master, without the intervention of an *assertor;* he was thus given a status in court equal to his master, and was removed altogether from the category of mere chattels.[4] All the restrictions upon manumission, as distinguished from other legal acts, arising from the age either of the master or of the slave, were removed by successive edicts.[5] The *L. Furia Caninia*, which limited the number of slaves to be liberated by will, was repealed.[6] All

[1] Lib. IX. Cod. Theod. xlv. 6.
[2] Concil. Arausican. I. (ann. 441), can. v.—Concil. Arelatens. II. (ann. 443), can. ii.
[3] Const. 2. Cod. VII. vii. —Novell. XXII. cap. viii.
[4] Const. 1. Cod. VII. xvii.
[5] Const. 4. Cod. VII. xi. — Novell. CXIX. cap. ii. — Const. 2. Cod. VII. xv.
[6] Cod. VII. iii.

doubtful questions were decided in favor of freedom,[1] and this was carried so far as to trench upon the undoubted rights of masters. Thus, when a slave was owned by several masters in common, and one of them desired to liberate him, the rest were obliged to part with their shares at a price fixed by law;[2] and if one of the shareholders in dying left his share to the slave himself, it was held that the decedent intended to set him free, and the heirs were obliged to purchase the other shares, and manumit the slave.[3] If a man had children by his female slave, and died without making special disposition of them, the mother and children were all set free.[4] In the same spirit, if a man called his slave his son in any legal act, the slave was emancipated, whether the fact was so, or the words were only used as an expression of affection.[5] Any slave who, at a funeral and in presence of the heirs, stood at his master's bier, or walked in the procession with a cap — the emblem of freedom — on his head, was likewise emancipated by the act.[6]

The laws concerning marriages between slaves and freemen were thoroughly reformed. The cruel *Senatusconsultum Claudianum* was stigmatized as barbarous, and repealed.[7] If a man married a slave, believing her to be free, the marriage was annulled, and the parties were separated;[8] but if the master of the slave had connived at the deception, the slave became free, and the marriage held good;[9] or, if the master had given her in marriage with a dower, she was, *ipso facto*, declared free.[10]

Penal servitude, which had entailed dissolution of marriage, was abolished. No man could be reduced from freedom to servitude, nor could marriage be dissolved on any such pretext.[11]

Although Justinian preserved the *L. Ælia Sentia*, as far as regarded testamentary manumissions in defraud of creditors,[12] still the careful provisions of his laws on this subject manifest extreme solicitude to secure the liberation of as many slaves as possible in the settlement of insolvent estates.[13]

---

1 See Constt. 14, 16, 17. Cod. VII. 4.
2 Const. 1. Cod. VII. vii.
3 Const. 2. Cod. VII. vii.
4 Const. 3. Cod. VII. xv.
5 Const. 1. § 10. Cod. VII. vi.
6 Const. 1. § 5. Cod. VII. vi.
7 Cod. VII. xxiv.
8 Novell. XXII. cap. x.
9 Ibid. xi.
10 Const. 1. § 9. Cod. VII. vi.
11 Novell. XXII. cap. viii.
12 Const. 5. Cod. VII. ii.
13 Const. 15. Cod. VII. ii.

Favorable as was all this legislation to the slave, the laws respecting freedmen were not less liberal and enlightened. The old classification, introduced five hundred years before by Augustus, was abolished. Justinian declared that the *dedititii* enjoyed an empty mockery of liberty, not endurable in his system of jurisprudence.[1] The freedom of the *Latini* was no freedom, since it was lost at the hour of death.[2] In 539, he further bestowed on all future freedmen the full rights and privileges of freemen, even to the gold ring which had previously been the distinctive mark of birth and station.[3] At the same time he removed all restrictions as to their marriage, and even Senators were permitted to marry freedwomen. Marriages with slaves were not allowed. A master must liberate his slave before he could marry her; but if children had been born before such marriage, they were rendered free and capable of inheritance by the legal union of their parents.[4]

The stormy times which followed the reign of Justinian were not favorable to the prosecution of the reforms which he had thus carried so far, while the succession of heresies, whose bitter strife constitutes the ecclesiastical history of the East from the fourth to the ninth century, left the Church little leisure for exerting its influence in favor of the slave. Rigid Churchmen, however, gradually came to regard slave-holding as sinful in ecclesiastics, and to promulgate the rule that it was permissible only to the laity. St. Theodore Studita, about the year 790, repeatedly addresses his flock on the subject, and warns them that man, made in the image of his Creator, is not to be reduced to a servile condition among those who are all servants of the Lord.[5] The gathering clouds of barbarism, however, erelong began to close around the throne of Constantine and Justinian. The Empire, wasting by piecemeal and struggling for existence, became more and more

---

[1] Cod. VII. v.

[2] Const. 1. Cod. VII. vi.

[3] Novell. LXXVII. cap. i., ii. "Sint quidem et liberti et ingenui."

[4] Ibid., cap. iii.

[5] "Et nunc præmuniens edico, ne quis solitarius degito, neu supinus fertor, nec aurum cogito, neu servum teneto." — S. Theod. Studit. Serm. CIII. And again: "Non hominem factum ad imaginem divinam servum parabis, nec usui privato nec monasterii quod administres nec agrorum. Id nam solis mundanis permittitur, uti nuptiæ." — Ibid. Testament.

corrupt. The savage energy of Islamism prevented the conquerors from yielding to the influences of civilization and of the true religion; and while humanity was making progress in the West, it sunk in the East, century by century, into a deeper gloom of barbarism.

The Latin Church was eventually more fortunate. The barbaric hordes which swept over the Western Empire, and threatened to extinguish forever the light of civilization, succumbed one by one to its influence; and though the Church lost much of softness by the transfusion of wild Teutonic blood, yet it preserved the seeds of love and charity which, slowly growing through the centuries, promise to overshadow the earth in the fulness of time.

The new element thus introduced diverted the progress of practical Christianity, and may be said to have postponed for many centuries the liberation of the slaves of Europe. The task, indeed, might well appear hopeless, when we consider the relationship between the master and bondsman among the wild barbarian tribes, and reflect that the high places in the Church soon came to be filled with Frankish and Gothic prelates, who brought with them all their ancestral customs and prejudices.

All the *Leges Barbarorum* consider slaves simply as property. They have no protection for themselves, no legal existence save through the rights of the master or the law over them. Their only safeguard is the damage entailed upon the owner by their loss or mutilation. This damage is the same whether the slaves be killed or stolen; and it must be made good, with perhaps some little additional compensation for the wrong inflicted on him. In some codes this damage is established at a fixed rate;[1] in others, slaves are divided into classes according to their value, and their homicide is settled for on the basis of the legal tariff;[2] in others, again, the master has the right of appraising his loss under oath.[3] By the Salic law, when one slave killed another, the respective masters divided the murderer,[4] — either literally, we may

[1] L. Salic. (Text I. of Pardessus), Tit. x. § 1; Tit. xxxv. § 6.
[2] L. Burgund. Tit. X.
[3] L. Frision. Tit. I. § 11; Tit. IV. § 1.
[4] L. Salic. (Text I.) Tit. xxxv. § 1.

presume, or by means of a pecuniary transaction, as the whim might take them. If a man beat the slave of another, so as to cripple him for forty days, a trifling fine paid the owner for the loss of his bondsman's labor.[1] A slave accused of crime was tortured as a matter of course. If no confession was extracted by the legal torment, the aggrieved party, by depositing a pledge with the owner, could take the unfortunate and continue the torture at his pleasure, subject only to the condition, that, if the poor wretch died on the rack, his value must be made good out of the security given.[2] It is significant that provision is made only for accusations against slaves brought by third parties. For their own grievances, masters had the law in their own hands, and required no powers beyond the utter irresponsibility of their ownership.

Under such a system, the value of a slave was, as we have said, his only protection; and, with a tribe of wandering or scarcely settled conquerors, his value was very small. Thus, among the Salian Franks, the payment for stealing or killing a skilled slave was thirty *solidi*, while for stealing a stud-horse it was forty-five, or a tame stag, thirty-five; for skinning the carcass of a horse without the owner's consent, thirty; and for riding a horse without permission, likewise thirty *solidi*.[3] It is easy to see from this how slender was the safeguard which protected the slave from the cruelty of the freeman or the wanton caprice of the master.

The brutality of this barbarian servitude is equally manifested in the regulations respecting marriages between slaves and freemen. In such unions, the party who was free, whether husband or wife, became a slave, and the offspring were likewise slaves.[4] Under the Ripuarian law, however, a woman under such circumstances had the privilege of escaping by murdering her husband.[5] One text of the Salic code pro-

[1] L. Salic. (Emend.) Tit. xxxvii. § 4.

[2] L. Salic. (Text I.) Tit. xl. §§ 3, 4.

[3] L. Salic. (Text I.) Tit. xxxv. § 6; Tit. xxxviii. § 1; Tit. xxxiii. § 2; Tit. lxv. § 2; Tit. xxiii. There were in addition the legal expenses and the claim of the fisc on all compositions, which brought up the cost of killing a slave to 75 sol. Tit. xxxv. § 7.

[4] L. Ripuar. Tit. lviii. § 11. L. Salic. (Emend.) Tit. xiv. §§ 6, 11. Marculf. Formul. Lib. II. No. xxix. Formul. Bignon. No. x.

[5] L. Ripuar. Tit. lviii. § 18. "Spata vel conucula."

vides that, if a woman marry a slave, all her property shall be confiscated, any of her kindred may kill her without paying blood-money either to the family or the fisc, any relative giving her bread or hospitality shall be fined fifteen *solidi*, and the audacious slave shall be put to death by the severest torture.[1] By the Lombard law, a freewoman marrying a slave might be put to death within the year by any member of her family; if they abstained from this, she became a slave of the fisc.[2] So, in the Burgundian code, both parties to such unions were to be killed; but if the kindred of the woman did not see fit to put her to death, she became a slave of the king.[3]

It would be easy to multiply references of this kind; but we have given enough to illustrate the material upon which the Church had to act, and the influences to which it was exposed. To its honor be it said, that, even while it was striving for its own safety, and dexterously fighting the battle which eventually left it master of its conquerors, it never abandoned the helpless multitudes of which it was sole protector. In those wild times, when Frankish and Gothic warriors not seldom wore the episcopal mitre, we may find frequent instances of selfishness, cases in which personal or class aggrandizement outweighed the precepts of love and charity which the Church never ceased to preach; but these human failings should not blind us to the vast influence which was honestly exerted in favor of the oppressed, at a period when to make such an effort was to risk that influence itself.

We have seen that, by the early laws of all the tribes, the slave owner was absolute master of the life and limb of his slave. There was no court to which the latter could appeal for safety or for redress. The law took no account of him save as his master's chattel. Yet the Church stood boldly up between them, and, in the name of a higher law, interposed while the slave was living, and sought to avenge his wrongs after he was dead.

Thus, through all these troublous times, the Church maintained the right of asylum, and forced the half-heathen Mero-

---

[1] Cap. Extrav. V. of Pardessus (Leyden MS.).
[2] L. Longobard. Lib. II. Tit. ix. l. 2.
[3] L. Burgund. Tit. xxxv. §§ 2, 3.

vingian to respect the power granted by a forgotten Christian Emperor. The savage Frank must forego his vengeance ere he can win his slave from the shadow of the altar; and if the plighted pardon be violated, the watchful priest excommunicates the perjurer. The fugitive who once reaches the sacred porch is secure, as far as the power of the Church can bind the minds and souls of men.[1] And, where the unconverted Frank or the heretic Arian is concerned, good Catholic security is required for the protection of the slave.[2] The clergy themselves were not excepted, and were taught by suspension and penance to set a proper example to their flocks.[3] When, indeed, a slave had been guilty of some atrocious crime, the master was forced only to forego all bodily chastisement; the criminal might be disgraced by shaving the head, and brought to a sense of his wrong-doing by heavy tasks.[4]

We have said that the life of the slave was legally at the mercy of his master, who could no more be called to account before the tribunals for the slaughter of his bondsman, than for that of his ox or his dog. Here, again, the Church interposed its spiritual authority, and sought to throw some protection over the despised class. Excommunication or penance for two years was denounced against him who should put his slave to death without the sanction of a court;[5] and though the penalty may not seem particularly efficacious, it has significance from the fact that, where the law could take its course, the life of the freeman is not guarded by any ecclesiastical regulation of the period.

Nor was it only with respect to life and limb that the Church

---

[1] Concil. Aurelianens. I. (ann. 511), can. iii.

[2] Concil. Aurelianens. V. (ann. 549), can. xxii.

[3] Concil. Ilerdens. (ann. 523), can. viii.

[4] Concil. Epaonens. (ann. 517), can. xxxix.

[5] Concil. Agathens. (ann. 506), can. lxii. Concil. Epaonens. (ann. 517), can. xxxiv.

These canons show how soon the barbarian carelessness of life had affected the Church. In 305, before the conversion of Constantine, the Council of Illiberis adopted a canon to punish jealous mistresses who, in the blind fury of their rage, might beat their female slaves to death. If the act were done intentionally, seven years of penitence were requisite to wipe away the sin; if unintentional, five years. Concil. Eliberit. can. v.

exercised a watchful care over those who had no other protector. In 650, the Council of Rouen reminded the faithful that Christ redeemed with his precious blood the slave as well as the freeman, that he chose his Apostles from the humblest ranks, and that the lofty in pride and station were hateful to God. A stern reproof was administered to those who kept their herdsmen and ploughmen like beasts of the field, and allowed them no religious privileges; and they were admonished, that at the last great day they would be responsible for the souls of their slaves.[1] The same care was manifested by another Council the year previous, in ordering that no slave should be sold beyond the confines of the kingdom, and condemning any international slave-trade as contrary to the spirit of Christianity.[2] Frequent prohibitions were launched against the holding of Christian slaves by Jews; and in 581 the first Council of Macon stretched its authority so far as to order that all such should be redeemed or purchased by Christians for twelve *solidi* each, a price far below their value; and if the master refused to part with them, they were declared free.[3] So, in 625, the Council of Rheims assumed authority to forbid masters, who were obliged to part with their slaves, from selling them to Jews or heathens. All such sales were pronounced void, and the sellers were excommunicated.[4] Evidently, the Church was disposed to go as far as it dared in interfering with the imprescriptible rights of masters.

It did not teach, as some so-called Christian ministers and prelates have done in our day, that slavery was a blessing. The Council of Rouen, alluded to above, declared that the liberation of captives was the highest duty of Christians; and that this teaching was general, and not unfruitful, is shown by the numerous charters of liberation which have reached us. Nearly all the formulas for these prove that the emancipation of a slave was regarded as an act acceptable to God, which the donor performed in the hope of gaining pardon for his sins. The notaries who drafted these deeds were all ecclesiastics; and the pious phrases employed show that both the good and the selfish impulses of the laity were carefully

[1] Concil. Rotomag. (ann. 650), can. xiv.
[2] Concil. Cabillon. can. ix.
[3] Concil. Matiscon. (ann. 581), can. xvi.
[4] Concil. Remens. (ann. 625), can. xi.

directed in favor of freedom.[1] Nor was the teaching by example wanting, as may be seen by the numerous instances related by Gregory of Tours, and in the contemporary hagiology.

The greatest ecclesiastic of the period, Gregory I., lent the immense weight of his name and influence to the cause of emancipation. In manumitting two slaves of the Church, he expressly declares that we do well when we restore to liberty those whom nature created free, and who have been reduced to slavery by the laws of man, since the Saviour himself assumed the human form in order to break our chains, and to restore us all to freedom. These pious considerations he declares to be the motive which prompts him to release the objects of his benevolence, — a motive of universal application, and as sufficient for the liberation of all slaves as of one.[2]

All this points directly to universal emancipation; but the Church was not unselfish enough to give practical application, even in its own sphere, to the principles which it thus promulgated. Nor, indeed, could this be expected in an age of lawless violence, when the poor and humble were glad to gain protection at any price, and were in the habit of surrendering themselves as slaves to some powerful neighbor or wealthy

---

[1] For instance: "Qui debitum sibi nexum relaxat servitium, mercedem in futurum apud Dominum sibi retribuere confidat." — "Pro remissione peccatorum meorum." — "Propter nomen Domini et retributione æterna." — "In Dei nomine, pro animæ meæ remedio, vel pro meis peccatis minuendis, ut in futurum Dominus veniam mihi præstare dignetur," etc. V. Marculf. Formul. Lib. II. No. xxxii., xxxiii., xxxiv. Append. Marculf. No. xiii. Formul. Sirmond. No. xii. Formul. Bignon. No. i. Formul. Lindenbrog. No. lxxxv., xc., xci., xcii., xciv., xcv., xcvi., etc.

[2] This declaration of Gregory's is worthy of transcription entire: "Cum Redemptor noster, totius conditor creaturæ, ad hoc propitiatus humanam voluerit carnem assumere, ut Divinitatis suæ gratia, dirupto quo tenebamur captivi vinculo servitutis, pristinæ nos restitueret libertati; salubriter agitur si homines, quos ab initio liberos natura protulit, et jus gentium jugo substituit servitutis, in ea in qua nati fuerant, manumittentis beneficio libertate reddantur. Atque ideo pietatis intuitu, et hujus rei consideratione permoti, vos Montanam atque Thomam, famulos sanctæ Romanæ ecclesiæ, cui Deo adjutore deservimus, liberos ex hac die civesque Romanos efficimus, omneque vobis vestrum relaxamus peculium." — Gratian. Decret. P. II. cau. xii. q. 2, cau. 68 (an. 595).

Gregory, however, had two years before bestowed a slave on his counsellor Theodore (Ibid., can. 67), showing that he was not prepared for the logical application of the principles which he so broadly enunciated.

monastery. The Church held many slaves, and their treatment in general was sufficiently humane to cause their numbers to grow by voluntary accretion. Manumissions, however, were frequent, and, considering all circumstances, were greatly favored.

As the Church became wealthy, the management of its property grew to be a source of care and perplexity. It was peculiarly subject to dilapidation at the hands of unfaithful stewards; and, from an early period, stringent regulations were found necessary to check its alienation by those to whom it was intrusted. Bishops and priests were forbidden to sell or give away the possessions of their dioceses or benefices; and, unless they made restitution or compensation, their acts were invalid. It is a noteworthy fact, that an exception was made in favor of slaves whom they emancipated, provided those slaves remained as freedmen of the Church and devoted to its service.[1]

It would thus appear that the ecclesiastic in charge of a church was empowered, at his discretion, to manumit the slaves intrusted to him. In 506, the Council of Agde went even further than this, and authorized bishops not only to liberate slaves, but to endow them with a moderate amount either of money or land; the sole restriction being, that, if the limit specified for the gift was exceeded, the excess could be recalled after the death of the manumittor.[2] To any one who is familiar with the jealous care exercised to prevent any alienation of ecclesiastical property, this concession in favor of the liberated slave may well appear extraordinary.

It is true that a few years afterwards, in 517, the Council of Epaone prohibited abbots from emancipating the slaves of their monasteries. At this period, the life of a monk was one of labor; and the idleness of the freedman was thought to

---

[1] "Ita tamen libertos quos sacerdotes presbyteri vel diaconi de ecclesia sibi commissa facere voluerint, actis ecclesiæ prosequi jubemus; quod si facere contempserint, placuit eos ad proprium reverti servitium." — Statut. Eccles. Antiq. cap. xxxi. (Concil. Carthag. IV. ann. 398.)

[2] Concil. Agathens. can. viii., xlix. Another canon of the same Council granted permission to the bishops to sell such slaves as were afflicted with what our Southern psychologists used to call *drapetomania*, — the insane desire of liberty, which prompted them to run away.

offer an unpleasant contrast to the toil of the hard-working brethren.[1] A century later, the Council of Rheims, in prohibiting the posthumous alienation of slaves, did not restrict their manumission.[2]

In Spain, the subject gave rise to endless trouble. In 589, the third Council of Toledo confirmed the right of the bishops to liberate slaves according to the ancient canons;[3] but shortly afterwards, in 597, the fourth Council stigmatized as robbers of the poor those bishops who manumitted the slaves of the Church without giving an equivalent, and their successors were instructed to reclaim all who were set free under such circumstances. At the same time, prelates who had benefitted their dioceses in any way were allowed the privilege of manumission; but the right of patronage over the freedmen and their posterity was carefully reserved.[4] This settled the principle among the Wisigoths, but bishops contrived to emancipate, and freedmen endeavored to throw off their subjection to their holy patron. Until the conquest of Spain by the Saracens, the Councils were perpetually obliged to repeat the canons, and devise new modes of protecting themselves against the audacious attempts of their liberated slaves.[5]

While thus occasionally jealous of ecclesiastical rights, the Church showed itself equally vigilant in defending those of freedmen in general. The practice, introduced by Constantine, of manumitting slaves in churches, seemed to place them in some degree under ecclesiastical guardianship; and, as it became the general custom, the Church gradually threw its protecting care over all the unfortunate class. Even before the subversion of the Western Empire, the proceedings of several Councils show that this protection was extended over those

---

[1] Concil. Epaon. can. viii.

[2] Concil Remens. (ann. 625), can. xiii.

[3] Concil. Toletan. III. can. vi.

[4] Concil. Toletan. IV. can. lxvii., lxviii., lxix., lxx., lxxi. The turning point of the question seems to have been at the Council of Seville in 590, when the manumissions and donations of slaves to his kindred by Gaudentius, late Bishop of Ecija, were contested, and the case decided in favor of the Church. Concil. Hispalens. I. can. i., ii.

[5] Concil. Hispalens. II. (ann. 618), can. viii. Toletan. VI. (ann. 638), can. ix., x. Toletan. IX. (ann. 655), can. xii., xiii., xiv., xv., xvi. Emeritens. (ann. 666), can. xx. Cæsaraugustan. III. (ann. 691), can. iv.

who were freed by testament, as well as before the altar. Any attempt to remand them to slavery was prohibited under pain of ecclesiastical censure, and patrons who brought actions against them on the plea of ingratitude were required to proceed in a manner designated by the Church.[1]

This was already a bold intrusion on the well-defined limits of a rigid and time-honored system of jurisprudence. In the wild times which followed, however, amid the crash of conflicting codes and the all-pervading law of the strongest, the Church, taking advantage of the breaking down of the old landmarks, made bolder assumptions, and dared even more in favor of a class which had no other guardians. As early as 506, the Council of Agde declared that all who had received manumission at the altar should be defended in case of necessity, and it denounced expulsion from the Church against those who should illegally oppress them.[2] In 549, two Councils, those of Orleans and Clermont, pronounced it a sin against God to reduce to servitude those who had, "*Dei consideratione*," been liberated at the altar; and a unanimous resolution was adopted to defend them in all cases, except when they had committed crimes involving the legal penalty of slavery.[3]

In 585, another step was taken by the Council of Macon, which placed the Church in the position of the recognized guardian of all freedmen, and assumed their quarrels as its own. It threatened with damnation all who should disregard its decrees, declared that it would defend all freedmen against assaults on their liberty, and assigned the decision of all cases in which freedmen were concerned to the bishops, or to such assessors as they might select to sit with them in judgment; the civil judge, indeed, could only act when invited thereto by his episcopal brother.[4] In 615, the fifth Council of Paris followed this up by arrogating to the ecclesiastical courts all cases in which freedmen were concerned, and threatening with excommunication those who should dare to bring such mat-

---

[1] Concil. Arausican. I. (ann. 441), can. vii. Arelatens. II. (ann. 443), can. xxxiii., xxxiv.

[2] Concil. Agathens. (ann. 506), can. xxix.

[3] Concil. Aurelianens. V. can. vii. Arvernens. II. can. vii.

[4] Concil. Matiscon. II. (ann. 585), can. vii.

ters before the lay tribunals, or should refuse to obey a sentence duly pronounced. It moreover declared it to be the duty of all priests to defend the freedmen.[1] The value of the privileges thus won for freedom can scarcely be computed.

Nor was this all; for the Church manifested its practical interest in freedom by its efforts to prevent the subjection of freemen to slavery, — a process for which the barbarian codes gave great facility. Thus, in 567, a Council at Lyons deplored the numerous cases in which men were reduced to slavery without color of justice, and it excommunicated all who should be guilty of such attempts.[2] A similar canon, but couched in even stronger terms, was adopted by the Council of Rheims in 625.[3] In the same spirit, another Council of the seventh century decreed that, when a freedman sold himself to slavery, he could at any time be redeemed on repayment of the sum advanced; and further, that, when such a slave was married to a free person, the issue of the marriage should be free.[4] The Church could only have obtained the power thus to contravene the written law by a bold extension of the jurisdiction already assumed: that it ventured to do so is a striking proof of its eagerness in the cause of freedom, and that it had earned the position of the defender of liberty.

In one respect, the relations between the Church and the slave would appear to conflict with the general favor shown to freedom and human equality. The slave who was admitted to orders was not thereby emancipated. His master could reclaim him; and by the earlier canons he was not to be received in the ranks either of the regular or secular clergy.

That in the times of persecution a slave could not be ordained without the master's consent, is not surprising.[5] In a society so purified, it may well be assumed that no Christian master would refuse consent, or even liberty, to any one deemed worthy by the Church to be a minister of Christ; while, if the

[1] Concil. Parisiens. V. (ann. 615), can. v. Clotaire II. confirmed this, and gave it the full force of law. Edict. Chlot. II., ann. 615, cap. vii. (Baluz.)

[2] Concil. Lugdun. II. (ann. 567), can. iii.

[3] Concil. Remens. (ann. 625), can. xvii.

[4] Concil. Loc. Incert. can. xiv. (Bruns, Canon. Concil. II. 260).

[5] Canon. Apostoll. lxxxi. The Council of Illiberis went even further, prohibiting the ordination of freedmen of lay patrons. Concil. Eliberit. (ann. 305), can. lxxx.

master were a heathen, the slave ordained without his knowledge or against his wishes would have scanty opportunity of discharging his sacred duties. Even after the conversion of Constantine, these reasons still had weight, and others yet more imperative arose. The institution of monachism afforded an asylum for fugitives and criminals; and had legal force been given to the claim that the clerical profession conferred emancipation, the societies of anchorites would have attracted hordes of ferocious and untamed savages, who would have perverted the system and brought it into general discredit.

Besides this, the Church speedily claimed for its members exemptions of the most valuable character, — release from the terrible public burdens which were eating out the heart of the republic, and rendering, in many instances, citizenship a curse rather than a privilege. The threatened absorption of the active producing elements of society soon attracted attention; and laws of a comprehensive character were enacted, prohibiting clerkship to all who owed service, whether public or private.[1] Slaves could scarcely complain when they were merely subjected to the same regulations as the decurions and curiales, classes whose burdens arose from their honors and prominence. This rule was constantly transgressed. In 443, St. Leo I. deplored that the ranks of the priesthood were crowded with those who were unfitted for it either by birth or education, and he directs that in future none should be admitted who were bound in any way; alluding, we may presume, to public as well as private obligations.[2] The Church, indeed, was interested in sustaining these laws; for an abuse sprang up, by which masters procured the ordination of their slaves, in order to enjoy the fruits of the benefices occupied by the latter. To prevent this, the Emperor Leo I., about the year 470, directed that no slave should be eligible to the priesthood, unless liberated for the purpose by his master.[3]

Refuge in monasteries was frequently sought by slaves to

[1] Lib. IX. Cod. Theod. xlv. 3.

[2] "Admittuntur passim ad ordinem sacrum quibus nulla natalium nulla morum dignitas suffragatur; et qui a dominis suis libertatem consequi minime potuerunt, ad fastigium sacerdotii, tanquam servilis vilitas hunc jure capiat, provehuntur," etc. — Leon. I. Epist. Universis Episcopis.

[3] Const. 37. Cod. I. iii.

escape their bondage; and after a sojourn more or less prolonged, they returned to the world as freemen. In 451, the Council of Chalcedon threatened with excommunication those concerned in admitting to monastic vows slaves without the knowledge of their masters;[1] while the Emperor Leo, about 470, decided that in such cases the master's consent gave freedom to the slave as long as he remained a monk, but that, if he abandoned his monastic life, the master was at liberty to reclaim him.[2] The frequent repetition of these commands shows how futile was the effort to deprive the bondsman of admission to the Church.

In the East, this delicate question was finally settled by Justinian, on a basis strongly leaning in favor of freedom. While he positively forbade — "*ut non ex hoc venerabili clero injuria fiat*" — any *curialis* or public officer to be admitted to clerkship, unless he were already a monk of fifteen years' standing, the Emperor ordered that any slave obtaining ordination with the knowledge of his master should be free and remain in the Church. If without his master's knowledge, a year was allowed for his reclamation, and after that he was free, *ipso facto*, as long as he remained in the Church. The *coloni*, or prædial slaves, could enter the Church, even without permission from their masters, subject only to the condition of not abandoning their agricultural occupation.[3]

As regards the monastic profession, he was even more liberal. A novitiate of three years was required of all applicants, during which claims could be presented, and after which the novice became a monk; when, if a slave, he was lost irrevocably to his master, unless he voluntarily abandoned his convent. Even during the term of probation, however, fugitive slaves were only rendered up on proof of having fled to escape punishment for crime. If criminals, they were given up on promise of pardon. If of good conversation, and nothing were proved against them, the master's claim was fruitless.[4]

In the West, the Church was unable to obtain legislation so

---

[1] Concil. Chalced. can. iv.
[2] Const. 38. Cod. I. iii.
[3] Novell. CXXIII. cap. xv., xvi. (ann. 541).
[4] Novell. V. cap. ii. (ann. 535).

enlightened. We have seen how stringent, under the barbarian codes, was the tie which bound the slave to his master, and can readily conceive how hopeless must have been the attempt to procure its relaxation in favor of those who might seek a refuge in the cloister or in the ministry of the altar. Slaves were simply property, like asses and swine, — somewhat less valuable, indeed, than a stud-horse or a village bull; and the owner could demand compensation for his loss, as he could for a fractured finger or any other damage. Yet the Church, in such cases, refused to render up the slave, and preferred to purchase his liberty at a heavy price. Thus, in 511, the Council of Orleans provided that a slave ordained without the knowledge of his master must be paid for at twice his value. If the officiating bishop was acquainted with the circumstances, he paid the fine; if not, it fell on those who warranted the postulant or requested his ordination.[1] Another Council, in 538, prohibited the ordination of slaves, and punished a wilful violation of the rule by a suspension of the officiating bishop from the celebration of mass for a year.[2] These canons do not seem to have met with proper observance, for in 549 the prohibition was repeated, but the penalty was reduced to six months; the master could claim his slave, but the latter was only to render such obedience as comported with the dignity of his order; and if the master was not satisfied with this, his claim was to be bought off by the officiating bishop, giving him two slaves to replace the lost one.[3] The matter was clearly beyond the control of the Church; and it could only make the best bargain in its power with its half-Christian rulers, while vindicating the principle that the ministry of Christ was inviolate, and that its functions were incompatible with a condition of servitude.

Such were the relations of the early Christian Church with slavery. It was subject to the law; it could not abolish servitude, for in Rome the law emanated from the theoretically autocratic Emperor, and among the barbarian races from an assembly of the nobles, presided over by the monarch. The Church could only exercise an indirect and moral influence;

---

[1] Concil. Aurelian. I. can. viii.

[2] Concil. Aurelian. III. can. xxvi.

[3] Concil. Aurelian. V. can. vi. — Concil. Arvernens. II. can. vi.

and this, as we have seen, was almost without exception thrown in favor of freedom. The path to emancipation was widened and rendered more facile, the rights of the freedman were protected, the sufferings of the slave were alleviated. The Church stood with its ecclesiastical censures between the master and the bondsman, as the sole guardian of the friendless, and sought by its teachings to show that a being made in the image of his Creator should not be the property of his fellow-creature.

Its practice was frequently at variance with the spirit of its preaching, but not in this particular more than in a thousand others. If the example of the Church be sufficient to justify transgressions of the law of God, it would be easy to make a satisfactory defence of all the sins of the Decalogue from the ecclesiastical history of the first six centuries. These things demonstrate the fallibility of human nature: they prove nothing more. The teachings of Christ have not extirpated pride, envy, cruelty, covetousness, and sloth; nor has the sacred character of the priest in any age exempted him from the weakness which we all inherit.

Religion tells us to look upon all mankind as brethren, and leaves us to improve the lesson. How slowly this has been learned, the annals of Christendom for fifteen hundred years render only too apparent. It were easy, if space permitted, to follow up our theme, and show how successive causes interfered to prevent the more speedy liberation of the slave, in tracing the slow and painful steps by which the only humane civilization which the world has seen has been evolved, under the guidance of Christianity, from the iron institutions of feudalism. The results of this slow process have been to render general emancipation for the first time possible. Few can doubt that this is owing solely to Christianity; and as it has already done so much for man, we may reasonably and reverently anticipate the time when the chattelism of Virginia and Mississippi will be looked back to by the descendants of those who now defend it with much the same disgust as that with which we now regard the capricious cruelty of the feudal system, or the rude blood-mongering of the Salian lawgivers.

ART. III.—*La Diplomatie Vénitienne. Les Princes de l'Europe, au 16ieme Siècle. François I., Philippe II., Catharine de Médicis, les Papes, les Sultans, etc., etc. D'après les Rapports des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens.* Par M. ARMAND BASCHET. Ouvrage enrichi de nombreux Fac-simile. Paris: Henry Plon, Imprimeur Editeur. 1862. 8vo. pp. 616.

THIS handsome volume is the result of the researches of M. Baschet during a residence of five years in Venice, under the patronage successively of the Minister of Public Instruction and of the Minister of State in France. The archives of the ancient republic were opened to the author by the Austrian Minister, Baron Bach, at the request of Count Bourqueney, Ambassador of France at Vienna. These archives contain plentiful material for illustrating the history of France during a long period; and M. Baschet proposes to publish, under the general title of *La Diplomatie Vénitienne*, a series of volumes drawn from their invaluable stores of manuscripts. Among the special subjects to which these volumes will be dedicated are the following: "Audiences de Catherine de Médicis," "Œuvres secrètes du Conseil de Dix," "L'Emprunt de la France à Venise sous Charles IX.," "Henri III. à Venise," "Guise, Sixte Quint et Philippe II., d'après les Venitiens," "Henri IV. et la Republique Sérénissime," "Audiences et Conversations politiques du Cardinal de Richelieu."

The present volume, and two others to complete this portion of the work, will treat exclusively of the "Relations" or Reports presented by the ambassadors of Venice on their return from their missions, and of their despatches during their period of service. The former have been better known than the latter; but both make a series of rare and original documents, worthy of complete and extensive study, as affording much curious and important information of men and manners in the long course of time over which they extend.

Venice is an exhaustless mine of research; its ancient government offers, both in its politics and its administration, an admirable example of sagacity and vigor expended in all directions whence it could draw glory and renown. In the singular

organization of this ancient state, its diplomatic system presents many curious and striking features. The exceptional usages and duties established for the honor and dignity of its diplomatic body, the minute and incessant attention to make it influential, considerable and considerate, powerful, and felt to be so, in every court and kingdom of Europe, exhibit a view of Venice of the highest interest. From the close of the twelfth to the middle of the seventeenth century, Venetian diplomacy achieved and maintained its greatness and reputation. During this long period its activity was incessant, both in the East and in the West.

M. Gachard, in his *Monuments de la Diplomatie Vénitienne* (a memoir presented to the Belgian Academy in 1853), says that, "At a time when almost everywhere else in Europe the administration of all branches of government was given up a prey to confusion and anarchy, when political science was in its infancy, the Grand Council of Venice had already determined by careful orders the exact duties of those who were chosen by the Republic to represent it abroad."

When an ambassador of the Republic of Venice had completed the fixed term of his service in some foreign mission, it was the usage for him to present to the Senate, within fifteen days of his return, a solemn written discourse, under the title of *Relazione*, or Report upon the government to which he had been accredited; on leaving the hall, the original was deposited with the Chancellor, who at once placed it in the *Secreta* specially designated for these documents. This remarkable custom lasted down to the close of the Republic, in 1797; and as it originated at an early period, it supplied an extraordinary series of papers on public affairs. The fire of 1577, by which some of the halls of the Doge's palace were ruined, destroyed the text of the oldest of these reports; but the libraries of St. Mark and of the Doge's palace, as well as the archives of state, dating from 1492, are rich in these contemporaneous records of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Within the last few years, a large share of public attention has been drawn to them; and much private research has been expended in reproducing such of these valuable papers as have been specially required in particular branches of

historical study, or in illustration of special events and the characters of individuals.

M. Baschet's work has a wider scope. He first exhibits a brief view of the progress of Venetian diplomacy and its results to Venice itself, and then he shows the value of these collections to historians and students of the political affairs of Europe; and he adds an elaborate account of the various reprints and republications of and from these sources. The volume is also enriched with copies of autographs of the great personages specially mentioned; and a brief summary of the documents from which these are taken furnishes food for the curious and material for the antiquarian. The best account of the early days of Venetian diplomacy, M. Baschet tells us, is given in the *Storia documentata di Venezia*, by Romanin.* The first decree in reference to the *Relazione*, or Report of Ambassadors, is dated in 1285, and the next in 1296.

During the earlier history of Venice, an ambassador could remain at one place only two years; in the fifteenth century, the time was extended to three years. The object of this regulation was to prevent too great personal intimacy on the part of the representatives of the Republic with either foreign courts or people. During his residence abroad, he maintained a steady correspondence with the Senate, and made gradual preparation for the *Relazione* with which his embassy was to be closed, and which was to afford him the opportunity of establishing his name and reputation at home, and give proof of the value of his services. The advantages of this admirable custom, so peculiar to Venice, (*legge nostra laudatissima*, it was pronounced by Daniele Barbarigo in 1552,) are very plain. A clear view of the political condition of allied and neighboring states and princes was furnished with precision and at almost regular intervals.

The Senate was fully informed of the power, the resources, the character, the strength, and the weakness of every government near which it was represented. Nicolo Tiepolo, in his report of a mission to Charles V. in 1535, said: "Before me, many senators, some present, some, alas! dead, have fully and admirably described the prince from whose court I come; and

* In ten volumes, 8vo, Venice, 1853 – 1860.

what I shall say will be only an addition to the intimate knowledge already possessed by this Senate of the acts and words of the great Emperor, supplying the events of the last few months, 'perche le cose de principi e stati umani di giorno in giorno si vanno in diversi modi mutando,' because the affairs of princes and powers change from day to day."

Pietro Duodo, the ambassador from Venice to Henry IV. of France, after the Treaty of Vervins, thus states the main divisions of the report which he read to the Senate: "The principal points of my relation are as follows,—the kingdom, the chief of the state, the princes and the nobility, the clergy, the people, the council of the cabinet, the royal family, the king himself, his personal appearance, and the conditions and character of his policy." This programme, enounced with such rapidity and clearness, is almost exactly that of all the *Relazioni*. A manuscript document, found among the papers bequeathed by the last of the illustrious family of Contarini-Corfu to the library of St. Mark, sets forth, under the title of *Ricordi per Ambasciatori*, those things which should make the subject of a report, "queste cose si ricercano per far una relazione": "The situation of the country, its ancient and modern designations, the part of the world in which it lies, its latitude and longitude, its boundaries, its extent, its divisions and subdivisions, its principal cities, its seaports, its fortresses, its bishops and archbishops, its rivers, its mountains, its forests, and its high roads. It should speak of the inhabitants, their customs, usages, and traditions, their religion and superstitions; their munitions of war, and the strength of their forces, military and naval; the arts and trades which they exercise, and those particularly in which they excel; their productions and importations and manufactures. An account should be given of the government, its officers and ministers, its powerful alliances and surrounding neighbors; the character and condition of the people; particulars concerning the king, his genealogy, his physiognomy, his life and his habits, his popularity, his revenues and his expenditures, his court, and the princes with whom he is friendly, and those with whom he is at enmity." *

---

* Bib. Marciana, MSS. Contarini, CLXXXVII.

The ambassadors for whom these instructions were written conformed to them with such talent and ability, that the Neapolitan Scipione Ammirato, in his *Discorsi su Tacito*, says that they were so happy in the art of describing the men and things of other countries, as often to show that they knew them better than the people of those very countries themselves.

The despatches and the relations taken together, form a complete record of every Venetian embassy. The despatches were like those of our ambassadors now-a-days, a rapid account of contemporaneous events, written on the instant of their occurrence. They were, so to speak, the daily report of successive occurrences, stamped with the impress of the moment, developing negotiations or measures in hand as they progressed from point to point. The *Relazioni* were works of elaborate study, the fruit of long and leisurely observation, the result of patient application to questions worth studying well and thoroughly. The *Relazioni* were moreover exclusively Venetian in their political significance. The ambassadors of other states, indeed, wrote reports to gratify the curiosity of princes and for the edification of secretaries of state; but they were not written or read at regular intervals, no official solemnity ushered them before the world, and no prestige accompanied them, like that which made every *Relazione* an event in the city where the lion of St. Mark guarded the Holy Evangel and held the sword of the Republic.

In his researches in the Chigi and Corsini Libraries at Rome, the Palatine and Maggliabecchi at Florence, and the Municipale at Sienna, M. Baschet found many manuscript reports by the ambassadors of other states, remarkable for excellence of style, or importance of matter, and full of interest in themselves and from their authors. Machiavel, for example, wrote a curious account of France after the death of Cardinal d'Amboise, in all the proportions and forms essential to a real *Relazione*. Alphonso de la Cueva, Marquis de Bedmar, Spanish Ambassador at Venice in 1618, and many Nuncios during the seventeenth century, have left reports which give curious details of that city. The President Jeannin, French Ambassador to Spain and Portugal, Chanut in Sweden during the reign of Christina, Walsingham, the ambassador of Eliza-

beth, and Wotton of James the First, all wrote diplomatic memoirs or papers of great historical value, but touching for the most part only on actual negotiations, and possessing, therefore, rather the character of despatches of great length, and with full comments for their explanation, than an account of the country or the court to which they were accredited.

Wicquefort says, therefore, with great reason, that "There is a real difference between the report which an ambassador makes of his negotiation or his embassy, and an account of the constitution of the state or court with whom he negotiated. All ambassadors make reports, but there are few who give elaborate accounts of the state in which they lived; to do so was peculiar to Venice, and particularly to those of its agents sent to Rome and to other Italian courts."

The organization of political life in Venice during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was well fitted to develop the talent of those who were intrusted with offices of state. The Republic of Venice was governed by an aristocratic oligarchy, in the broadest acceptation. The patricians were numerous; and by reason of being patrician, every member of the order became, and could not help becoming, an active servant of his country. The vote of the Grand Council decided the post to be occupied, and the only way of escape from the service of the state was to take refuge in the Church. No priest could deal in things temporal in Venice. At the age of twenty-five, and on the Feast of St. Barbara, (hence the name of *Barbarelle*, given to the registers on which the young patricians subscribed the date of their entry in the Grand Council,) the citizenship began to be active. Every nobleman was trained as a silent but interested spectator of the *Maggior Consilio*, and he therefore entered on his duties with some experience, and with a knowledge of the difficulties and of the customs of his new career, and with free scope for his largest ambition. The exercise of important official duties, the habit of discussion in council, the choice by vote for the most varied political functions, gave to the Venetian statesmen that subtlety and intelligence which distinguished them, and inspired the Republic with an intrepidity and boldness which secured it a rank

among states far beyond it in strength of numbers and in force of arms.

During the first half of the sixteenth century, the ablest diplomatists of Venice were Sebastiano Giustiniani,* Andrea Navagiero, Marino Cavalli, and Lorenzo Contarini; and their return from each mission was distinguished by new proofs of the value of their Relations.

At this time, the ambassadors of foreign powers at Venice began to recognize the influence, and to report the impression, made on the Senate by these reports. Forbidden to listen to them, and knowing them only as state secrets, carefully concealed and preserved in the archives, it was natural that this veil of mystery should be an irresistible attraction to the wealthy and powerful ambassadors of the allied sovereigns of the rest of Europe. The judgment and the political genius of Venice was held at a very high value; and hence the importance of a knowledge of their actions, their opinions, and their intentions. Hence, too, the number of copies of certain state papers to be found in the foreign offices of the ancient allies of Venice. A striking proof of the contemporaneous celebrity of the *Relazioni* is shown in the high price given for authentic copies of them by the great noblemen of the sixteenth century, who began and made it the fashion to collect those precious *raccolte di codici*, series of manuscripts, composed entirely of state papers from all sources, now filling the public libraries of Italy. The decrees intended to preserve inviolate the secrecy of all Venetian affairs of state were frequent, and the penalties for disregard of them, severe.† But dealers in these forbidden treasures, obtaining and disposing of their booty by corrupt means and ingenious devices, found customers in the powerful cabinets of Spain and Rome. It was not necessary for the authors or the official custodians of original papers to put themselves in danger by direct violation of their charge; but

* See his despatches, translated and published in England in the well-known and interesting volumes, "Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII., by Rawdon Brown." London, 1854.

† "Ambasciatores non conferant cum aliquo forinseco de rebus ad statum pertinentibus."—Ann. 1480. "Consuetudo per aliquos oratores nostros non bona neque conveniens rebus nostris quod ostendunt et legunt litteras quas eis scribuntur." — Ann. 1468.

the people who surrounded them, their servants and their familiars, shared the profit and gain of this illicit traffic; and the circulation of these state papers was steadily and successfully maintained, in spite of the laws of the Republic. Some of the ambassadors sent abroad reported to the Senate the names and titles of the *Relazioni* thus supplied abroad, and, in giving a detailed account of the famous collections of the Vatican and of Paris, include a long list of their own most secret state papers.

As the reputation of the *Relazioni* had thus led to the circulation of a large number of manuscript copies in the first part of the sixteenth century, so the close of it increased and extended their fame by delivering them to the press. Printing completed the work which copyists had begun. In 1589, for the first time, some of the *Relazioni* of Venetian ambassadors were printed and published under the collective title of *Tesoro Politico*, at Cologne.*

In 1649, the historian Aubery added to his work, "De la Prééminence des Rois de France," a translation of two reports of Venetian ambassadors. In 1663, Almarigo Lorens printed at Leyden a report by Angelo Correro, on his mission to Rome: and shortly after there appeared at Montbelliard, in France, in 1666 and 1668 successively, two small volumes, one a report on Spain, by Thomas Contarini, the other on England, by Marc Antonio Correro. In 1670, the bookseller Cottin published at Paris, "La Relation de la Cour Imperiale, faite au Doge de Venise, par le Sieur Sacredo, après son retour d'Allemagne à Venise"; but these, with the other earlier partial publications, are now bibliographical rarities. In 1673, three reports on Rome were printed at Brussels, under the title, "Li Tesori della Corte Romana in varie Relazioni fatte in Pregadi d' alcuni ambasciatori veneti residenti in Roma, sotto diffe-

* This appeared under the care of the Accademia Italiana at Cologne, under the following pompous and pretentious title: "Tesoro Politico, cioè Relazioni, Istruzioni, Trattati, Discorsi varii d' Ambasciatori pertinente alla cognizione ed intelligenza degli Stati, interessi e dipendenze de più gran principi del mondo." In 4to. A second edition of this volume appeared at Cologne in 1595, and a third in 1598; a fourth, at Milan in 1600; a continuation, at Bologna in 1603; and a third part, at Serravalle in 1605, which was honored with a Latin translation published at Frankfort in 1618.

renti pontifici e dell' Almaden ambasciatore francese." The success of this work was very decided. The ambassadors who represented Venice at Rome were men of great experience, and famous for their ability. The publication of their labors naturally awakened great curiosity, and was soon followed by that of the "Relazione succinta della famosa Corte di Spagna," by Domenico Zane, printed at Cosmopoli, and of the "Lettere memorabile istorico-politiche ed erudite, raccolte da Antonio Bulifon," at Pozzuoli, in 1692. From this time, a long series of years elapsed with almost total neglect of these papers; and more than a century passed before the appearance of the next volumes. In 1804, Count Macartney printed at London twenty-five copies of the report of Daniele Barbarigo on England, in 1551. In 1827, the Marquis de Châteaugiron printed at Paris thirty-two copies of that by Cavalier Erizzo on Florence, in 1699. Although these two little books are addressed to a very limited audience, and are the result of bibliographical caprice only, still they belong to the history of the subject, and are the first instances of a renewed interest in the records of Venetian diplomacy. To the next ten years, from 1830 to 1840, belong by far more important publications; but before entering into an account of them, it will be well to complete this part of the subject by a list of partial and separate publications, and to explain the curious custom to which they owe their existence, and the literary gallantry which has given them a special character.

In many parts of Italy, and in Venice particularly, there exists a very ancient custom of consecrating to the marriage of a friend or relation some literary or learned publication. Of late years, and since historical study, or rather historical curiosity, has become so general, this fashion has led to frequent delving in the unworked mine of manuscript collections, in order to bring their best treasures to the light of day. No marriage takes place in a patrician, or even a respectable citizen's family, without its announcement furnishing occasion for a large number of *Libretti*, dedicated to the happy pair with the customary formula, *Per le nozze faustissime*. Of course, under such circumstances, these publications are often remarkable for the singular luxury and splendor of their appearance.

They are one of the surest elements of activity for the printers in Venice; and while the usage itself has its ridiculous side, and gives only too frequent occasion for printing wretched verses, with all the usual exaggeration of emphatic praise and prophetic happiness of marriages which often turn out badly enough, it has its advantages in sometimes securing for the public the printing of very curious inedited manuscripts, selected from the archives of the family in whose honor the work is prepared. The best instance of these highly valuable treasures of Italian courtesy is dated in 1844. In that year the Grand Councillor Spiridione Papadopoli, wishing to celebrate the marriage of a friend, sought and obtained the help of Count Agostino Sagredo, a literary patrician, and an historian thoroughly acquainted with the deeds of their common ancestors. From his family archives Count Sagredo selected a *Relazione*, read in 1656 before the Senate by Giovanni Sagredo, on his embassy to London during the stormy period of Cromwell's power. It was supplied with an excellent Preface and learned notes by Count Sagredo, and printed at the expense of Papadopoli, who made it his gift in honor of the marriage of his friend, under the title, "Relazione di Messer Giovanni Sagredo, Cavaliere e Procuratore di San Marco, ritornato dall' Ambasciata straordinaria d' Inghilterra nell' Anno MDCLVI."

On the occasion of a wedding between the families of Cittadella and Dolfin, in 1854, a part of the *Relazione* of Cavaliere Dolfin, ambassador to France in 1785, was published. During the same year three others were printed; — that on Constantinople, in 1521, by Marco Minio, edited with a biography and notes by Cicogna; the second on the Portuguese in India, by Leonardo da ca Messer, in 1497, after the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope; the third by Federigo Badoer, on his mission to Philip II. at Brussels, in 1557. In 1846, P. Manzi inserted in the *Saggiatore*, a literary and artistic journal published at Rome, another report on Philip II., written in 1599 by Michel Surian. In 1844, M. Melchiori printed in the same journal a report by Battista Nani, on France. In 1850, Bradford, in his Correspondence of the Emperor Charles V., translated the report made by Bernardo Navagiero on the

court of that prince. In 1852, the complete edition of the works of the historian and politician Paruta, published at Florence by Monzani, included his discourse on the government of Pope Clement VII. In 1854, Count Alessandro Marcello, Podesta of Venice, and a firm supporter of the municipal liberties of his native city, printed on the *nozze faustissime* of a friend the report on Constantinople made by Morosini to the Senate on his return from an embassy in 1585. In 1856, M. Vincenzo Lazari printed the report of Federigo Badoer, in 1547, on his embassy to the court of Giudobaldo II., Duke of Urbino. This closes the list of the privately printed *Relazioni*, and of those published in a fragmentary way; but it is to be hoped that many *nozze faustissime* may produce further literary offspring for the use of students of history and the delight of bibliographers.

To return now to the more important collections of *Relazioni*. Leopold Ranke was one of the first of the modern school of historical writers to use and appreciate the value of the original sources hidden in the rich collections of Italian manuscripts; and he began his career as a successful historian by hard work in Venice, Florence, Naples, and Rome. Then he sought out in Vienna the treasures brought from Milan and Venice; and at his suggestion the catalogue of the important *raccolta Foscarini* was printed, in one of the volumes of the *Archivio Storico*, published in Florence by Vieusseux, under the care of M. Tommaseo Gar. After his return to Berlin, Ranke published an elaborate account of his investigations, recounting his travels, and telling the story of his lucky discoveries. He was soon followed by intelligent and industrious fellow-laborers. In 1830, the distinguished Italian historian, Cibrario, issued a work on the House of Savoy, drawn exclusively from the *Relazioni* of Venetian ambassadors, with notes and commentaries. It was the first work of an author who is now foremost among the honorable and honored men of regenerate Italy of to-day, — an active statesman, a tried patriot, a loyal subject, the faithful companion of the unfortunate and gallant Charles Albert, his brave comrade on the field of battle, his last support in the anguish of exile and in the agonies of death. This earliest of his publications included three

Relazioni of well-known ambassadors, belonging to different centuries, and characterizing consecutive periods of national history.

The first is that of Francesco Molino, read to the Senate in 1574, the year that saw France restore to Emmanuel Philibert his native strongholds. The second is that of Catterino Belegno, ambassador to Charles Emmanuel II. from 1667 to 1670; who carried on the negotiations touching the island of Cyprus, and on their conclusion made the report here reprinted. The third is that of Marco Foscarini, one of the most illustrious representatives of Venice, written in 1742, when, after a lapse of seventy-two years, the Republic sent him to renew its relations at the court of Charles II., the son and successor of that Victor Amadeus II. who more than any other prince of his house had made the new throne of Savoy powerful and famous. Foscarini was alike honored for his rare political sagacity and for his love of letters, his generous encouragement of authors, and his own work, "Della Letteratura Veneziana." He died with due glory, for he died Doge of Venice. His collection of *Relazioni* was enormous; and even the catalogue of it, printed by Gar in the *Archivio Storico Italiano*, is valuable. Foscarini foresaw the future value of these documents for historical writers. In his own *Relazione* there is evidence of careful study, the style is clear, and it is strikingly meritorious in form and detail; it is indeed not so much a simple discourse as a book in completeness and excellence.

In France, M. Tommaseo executed a similar task to that which Cibrario had accomplished for Sardinia. On the 31st of December, 1833, M. Guizot, then Minister of Public Instruction, made a report to the King of the value and extent of the manuscript collections on the history of France, and asked for an appropriation to examine them, and to publish the most important. On the 18th of July, 1834, a commission was appointed for this purpose, and a credit opened for their use to the amount of 120,000 francs. On the 2d of December, 1835, M. Guizot reported that his plan was in successful operation; that the work was divided into two distinct series, — the one including documents relating to the political and

social history of the country, its legislation and its institutions, and the other relating to the history of sciences, letters, arts, and their monuments. About this time, a number of copies of the *Relazioni* on France were found and shown to M. Guizot, who at once saw their value, and assigned them a place in the published collections. At the end of the year 1836, the task of preparing them for the press was intrusted to M. Tommaseo, a native of Venice living in France, full of patriotism and eloquence, but sadly deficient in learning and cultivation, and quite wanting the technical qualifications required for the purpose. Under his care, two volumes were published in 1838.

While these volumes were in press, an association was formed at Florence for the purpose of undertaking a publication of a similar kind, but on a much larger scale. In 1838, M. Eugenio Alberi printed in that city his *Vie de Catherine de Medicis*, in the preface to which he said that the best sources of the history of the epoch were the "relations des ambassadeurs vénitiens, où les faits sont racontés et jugés avec cette pleine connaissance des choses qui n'appartient qu'à des témoins oculaires et désintéressés." This phrase struck with full force the Marquis Gino Capponi, a Florentine of high birth, a patriot of whom Italy was proud, a generous patron, a liberal benefactor of literature and of all intellectual enterprises. He conceived the idea of obtaining copies of all the *Relazioni* of the sixteenth century, and proposed to print them with notes in chronological order, to give Florence the honor of its publication, and to secure its success by an association of his friends in that city exclusively for this purpose. The names of the members of the little society thus formed are curious and interesting. The leading persons were Prince Louis Bonaparte, once King of Holland, his daughter-in-law, the Princess Charlotte, and the Marquis Gino Capponi. Around them were grouped ten others, — the Marquis Azzolino, a Roman nobleman, belonging to those who have given their labor in the sad hours of exile to add commentaries to the *Divina Commedia;* the Marquis di Bagno of Mantua; Dr. Branchi, a lawyer of Florence, and author of "Corografia d' Italia"; the Marchioness Ginori Venturi; Count Teodoro

Mastiani Brunnacci of Pisa; M. Giannini, a clever author and statesman; the Marquis Rinuccini, an hereditary patron of letters; M. Mayer, a Swiss merchant, naturalized in Tuscany by his generous activity in all good works; Mr. Sloane, an Englishman, who acquired a fortune by working the copper mines near Prato, and spends it in charity and munificence; M. Alfred de Reumont, Prussian Ambassador to Tuscany and Rome, and author of several able books; and Count Louis Serristori, a man of rank and talent. The direction of the labors of the society, the choice of editors, the charge of all details of business, were unanimously and unconditionally confided to M. Alberi. The manner in which he has executed his task is not more remarkable than his whole life. Born at Bologna, brought to Florence in his twenty-first year, he first figured there by the publication of a chivalric letter on the wars of Italy and Eugene of Savoy; in 1836, he became a member of the household of Prince Louis Napoleon, the exiled King of Holland, and remained in his service for twelve years. It was during this period that he published his Life of Catherine de Medicis. On the occasion of the Scientific Congress in Florence in 1841, the Grand Duke intrusted to M. Alberi the task of editing the works of Galileo; and ten years were spent in accomplishing this charge. Meanwhile, in 1848, he joined the army of General Durando, took part in the campaign of Venice, fought at Vicenza, and after the fall of that place negotiated a convention with the Austrian General Hess. He then went to Rome as Chief Secretary of the War Office, was named by Count Rossi Professor in the University of Bologna, but on the death of that great man returned to Florence, and renewed his labors as editor of the *Relazioni.*

Of the merits of this great collection, its use by historians and their praise may be taken as sufficient proof. The success of the plan is best established by the fact of its adoption in a similar republication of the *Relazioni* of the seventeenth century, now in course of printing in Venice by Nicolo Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet. The strongest evidence of its completeness is the significant phrase with which M. Baschet closes his Introduction: "La collection de Florence est mon guide; on ne saurait trop lui faire honneur; elle est le pays, je suis le voyageur."

The best volumes of the Florentine collection are the two that contain the *Relazioni* on Rome and the Popes during the sixteenth century. A biography of each ambassador precedes his reports, giving in full all facts touching on public life in Venice, and drawn in the main from a curious source of contemporaneous history. There are among the treasures of the library of St. Mark fifty-eight folio volumes in manuscript, bearing the modest title of "Diarii di Marin Sanuto," commencing in 1496, and ending in 1533. Its author, who as Senator and historian had full access to public and private sources of information, gives day by day an account of the political news, the administrative or municipal changes, the discourses in the tribune and in council, the despatches and reports from abroad, with the current opinions of his friends and colleagues. After his death, the Council of Ten took possession of all the papers left by Sanuto; and in the eighteenth century they were carefully copied, annotated, indexed, and bound.

The first person to use and to make known the proper use of these invaluable treasures was Mr. Rawdon Brown, an English gentleman, long resident in Venice, who in 1837 published three volumes of selections from them.* Sanuto gives simply and concisely each day's news and opinions, with its suppositions and flying rumors, echoes of the crowd of talkers who filled the Piazza of St. Mark with their discussions, their contradictions, their gossip, their beliefs, and their doubts. These little hints and indications of the popular currents of public opinion show that, as Venice was unfortunate in the field, so it learned to achieve success in the art of government, to use the refinement of scientific diplomacy, and to stop even on the brink of what seemed final disaster. The risks, the dangers, the contests of the Republic required from its ambassadors and enforced upon them incessant activity, prudence, dexterity, and a vigilance elsewhere unknown. The safety and independence, even the existence of Venice, were by turns their reward and their aim.

* His work was entitled: "Ragguagli sulla Vita e sulle Opere di Marin Sanuto detto il juniore, Veneto patrizio e cronista pregevolissimo dei secoli XV., XVI., intitolati dall' amicizia di uno straniero al nobile Jacopo Vincenzo Foscarini. Opera divisa in 3 parti." Venezia, dalla tipografia di Alvisopoli. 1837.

Among the curious and interesting material collected by M. Baschet are the notes of a mission to Rome, made by Leonardo Dona, preserved in the archives of the family of Dona della Rosa. These notes show how an ambassador of Venice did his work, and what that work embraced; with what care he collected all preparatory knowledge and means of knowledge, with how much research he sought information, how painstaking the process by which his first impressions reached the stage of conviction, and how all things were fitted for the solemn and weighty close of his labors, the *Relazione*. We see here, and at length, the gradual development and final accomplishment of the functions of an ambassador, — functions which only the finer adaptation of Italian to the language of politics can define: "l' intendere e l' avisare, le negoziare e le riferire." It was thus that the diplomatists of Venice, who best knew their office, learned to fulfil its duties. It is not surprising, therefore, that finally, and for a long series of years, Venice became the arbiter between the armed rivals of the rest of Europe.

The extent to which other governments looked to Venice and sought aid from it in matters of diplomacy, is exhibited in an unpublished collection called *Espozioni Principi*, a series of negotiations, public and private, between foreign courts, carried on at and through the Republic. In a report from Paris in the stormy days of Catherine de Medicis, Correro tells the Senate that French merchants often asked if they could invest their money in Venice, if its *zecca* were open; "for they knew that it was a sure haven, a country of one religion, of one government, of one law, where all men lived without fear and in the peaceable enjoyment of their property." The contrast between the Venice of that day and the Venice of this is not stronger or more impressive, than the lesson to be drawn from the political life of Venice then and now. The diplomacy of Venice died when Venice died; but it left an invaluable legacy in the monuments of its greatness, worthy of our study and admiration.

ART. IV. — 1. *Girard College and its Founder.* By HENRY W. AREY, Secretary of the Girard College. Philadelphia. 1852.

2. *Biography of Stephen Girard.* By STEPHEN SIMPSON, Esq. Second Edition. Philadelphia: Thomas L. Bonsal. 1832.

3. *Annual Reports of the Board of Directors of the Girard College for Orphans.* Philadelphia. 1848 to 1863.

WITHIN the memory of many persons still alive, "old Girard," as the famous banker was usually styled, a short, stout, brisk old gentleman, used to walk, in his swift, awkward way, the streets of the lower part of Philadelphia. Though everything about him indicated that he had very little in common with his fellow-citizens, he was the marked man of the city for more than a generation. His aspect was rather insignificant and quite unprepossessing. His dress was old-fashioned and shabby; and he wore the pig-tail, the white neck-cloth, the wide-brimmed hat, and the large-skirted coat of the last century. He was blind of one eye; and though his bushy eyebrows gave some character to his countenance, it was curiously devoid of expression. He had also the absent look of a man who either had no thoughts or was absorbed in thought; and he shuffled along on his enormous feet, looking neither to the right nor to the left. There was always a certain look of the old mariner about him, though he had been fifty years an inhabitant of the town. When he rode, it was in the plainest, least comfortable gig in Philadelphia, drawn by an ancient and ill-formed horse, driven always by the master's own hand at a good pace. He chose still to live where he had lived for fifty years, in Water Street, close to the wharves, in a small and inconvenient house, darkened by tall storehouses, amid the bustle, the noise, and the odors of commerce. His sole pleasure was to visit once a day a little farm which he possessed a few miles out of town, where he was wont to take off his coat, roll up his shirt-sleeves, and personally labor in the field and in the barn, hoeing corn, pruning trees, tossing hay, and not disdaining even to assist in butchering the animals which he raised for market. It was no mere ornamental or experimental

farm. He made it pay. All of its produce was carefully, nay, scrupulously husbanded, sold, recorded, and accounted for. He loved his grapes, his plums, his pigs, and especially his rare breed of Canary-birds; but the people of Philadelphia had the full benefit of their increase — at the highest market rates.

Many feared, many served, but none loved this singular and lonely old man. If there was among the very few who habitually conversed with him one who understood and esteemed him, there was but one; and he was a man of such abounding charity, that, like Uncle Toby, if he had heard that the Devil was hopelessly damned, he would have said, "I am sorry for it." Never was there a person more destitute than Girard of the qualities which win the affection of others. His temper was violent, his presence forbidding, his usual manner ungracious, his will inflexible, his heart untender, his imagination dead. He was odious to many of his fellow-citizens, who considered him the hardest and meanest of men. He had lived among them for half a century, but he was no more a Philadelphian in 1830 than in 1776. He still spoke with a French accent, and accompanied his words with a French shrug and French gesticulation. Surrounded with Christian churches which he had helped to build, he remained a sturdy unbeliever, and possessed the complete works of only one man, Voltaire. He made it a point of duty to labor on Sunday, as a good example to others. He made no secret of the fact, that he considered the idleness of Sunday an injury to the people, moral and economical. He would have opened his bank on Sundays, if any one would have come to it. For his part, he required no rest, and would have none. He never travelled. He never attended public assemblies or amusements. He had no affections to gratify, no friends to visit, no curiosity to appease, no tastes to indulge. What he once said of himself appeared to be true, that he rose in the morning with but a single object, and that was to labor so hard all day as to be able to sleep all night. The world was absolutely nothing to him but a working-place. He scorned and scouted the opinion, that old men should cease to labor, and should spend the evening of their days in tranquillity. "No," he would say, "labor is the price of life, its happiness, its everything; to rest is to rust; every man should labor

to the last hour of his ability." Such was Stephen Girard, the richest man who ever lived in Pennsylvania.

This is an unpleasing picture of a citizen of polite and amiable Philadelphia. It were indeed a grim and dreary world in which should prevail the principles of Girard. But see what this man has done for the city that loved him not! Vast and imposing structures rise on the banks of the Schuylkill, wherein, at this hour, six hundred poor orphan boys are fed, clothed, trained, and taught, upon the income of the enormous estate which he won by this entire consecration to the work of accumulating property. In the ample grounds of Girard College, looking up at its five massive marble edifices, strolling in its shady walks or by its verdant play-grounds, or listening to the cheerful cries of the boys at play, the most sympathetic and imaginative of men must pause before censuring the sterile and unlovely life of its founder. And if he should inquire closely into the character and career of the man who willed this great institution into being, he would perhaps be willing to admit that there was room in the world for one Girard, though it were a pity there should ever be another. Such an inquiry would perhaps disclose that Stephen Girard was endowed by nature with a great heart as well as a powerful mind, and that circumstances alone closed and hardened the one, cramped and perverted the other. It is not improbable that he was one of those unfortunate beings who desire to be loved, but whose temper and appearance combine to repel affection. His marble statue, which adorns the entrance to the principal building, if it could speak, might say to us, "Living, you could not understand nor love me; dead, I compel at least your respect." Indeed, he used to say, when questioned as to his career, "Wait till I am dead; my deeds will show what I was."

Girard's recollections of his childhood were tinged with bitterness. He was born at Bordeaux in 1750. He was the eldest of the five children of Captain Pierre Girard, a mariner of substance and respectability. He used to complain that, while his younger brothers were taught at college, his own education was neglected, and that he acquired at home little more than the ability to read and write. He remembered, too, that at the age of eight years he discovered, to his shame and sorrow, that

one of his eyes was blind, — a circumstance that exposed him to the taunts of his companions. The influence of a personal defect, and of the ridicule it occasions, upon the character of a sensitive child, can be understood only by those whose childhood was embittered from that cause; but such cases as those of Byron and Girard should teach those who have the charge of youth the crime it is to permit such defects to be the subject of remark. Girard also early lost his mother, an event which soon brought him under the sway of a step-mother. Doubtless he was a wilful, arbitrary, and irascible boy, since we know that he was a wilful, arbitrary, and irascible man. Before he was fourteen, having chosen the profession of his father, he left home, with his father's consent, and went to sea in the capacity of cabin-boy. He used to boast, late in life, that he began the world with sixpence in his pocket. Quite enough for a cabin-boy.

For nine years he sailed between Bordeaux and the French West Indies, returning at length with the rank of first mate, or, as the French term it, lieutenant of his vessel. He had well improved his time. Some of the defects of his early education he had supplied by study, and it is evident that he had become a skilful navigator. It was then the law of France that no man should command a vessel who was not twenty-five years old, and had not sailed two cruises in a ship of the royal navy. Girard was but twenty-three, and had sailed in none but merchant-vessels. His father, however, had influence enough to procure him a dispensation; and in 1773 he was licensed to command. He appears to have been scarcely just to his father when he wrote, sixty-three years after: "I have the proud satisfaction of knowing that my conduct, my labor, and my economy have enabled me to do one hundred times more for my relations than they all together have ever done for me since the day of my birth." In the mere amount of money expended, this may have been true; but it is the *start* toward fortune that is so difficult. His father, besides procuring the dispensation, assisted him to purchase goods for his first commercial venture. At the age of twenty-four, we find him sailing to the West Indies; not indeed in command of the vessel, but probably as mate and supercargo, and part owner of goods

to the value of three thousand dollars. He never trod his native land again. Having disposed of his cargo and taken on board another, he sailed for New York, which he reached in July, 1774. The storm of war, which was soon to sweep commerce from the ocean, was already muttering below the horizon, when Stephen Girard, "mariner and merchant," as he always delighted to style himself, first saw the land wherein his lot was to be cast. For two years longer, however, he continued to exercise his twofold vocation. An ancient certificate, preserved among his papers, informs the curious explorer, that, "in the year 1774, Stephen Girard sailed as mate of a vessel from New York to [New] Orleans, and that he continued to sail out of the said port until May, 1776, when he arrived in Philadelphia commander of a sloop," of which the said Stephen Girard was part owner.

Lucky was it for Girard that he got into Philadelphia just when he did, with all his possessions with him. He had the narrowest escape from capture. On his way from New Orleans to a Canadian port, he had lost himself in a fog at the entrance of Delaware Bay, swarming then with British cruisers, of whose presence Captain Girard had heard nothing. His flag of distress brought alongside an American captain, who told him where he was, and assured him that, if he ventured out to sea, he would never reach port except as a British prize. "*Mon Dieu!*" exclaimed Girard in great panic, "what shall I do?" "You have no chance but to push right up to Philadelphia," replied the captain. "How am I to get there?" said Girard; "I have no pilot, and I don't know the way." A pilot was found, who, however, demanded a preliminary payment of five dollars, which Girard had not on board. In great distress, he implored the captain to be his security for the sum. He consented, a pilot took charge of the sloop, the anchor was heaved, and the vessel sped on her way. An hour later, while they were still in sight of the anchorage, a British man-of-war came within the Capes. But Dr. Franklin, with his oared galleys, his *chevaux de frise*, his forts, and his signal-stations, had made the Delaware a safe harbor of refuge; and Girard arrived safely at Philadelphia on one of the early days of May, 1776. Thus it was a mere chance of war that gave Girard to the Quaker

City. In the whole world he could not have found a more congenial abode, for the Quakers were the only religious sect with which he ever had the slightest sympathy. Quakers he always liked and esteemed, partly because they had no priests, partly because they disregarded ornament and reduced life to its simplest and most obvious utilities, partly because some of their opinions were in accord with his own. He had grown up during the time when Voltaire was sovereign lord of the opinions of Continental Europe. Before landing at Philadelphia, he was already a republican and an unbeliever, and such he remained to the last. The Declaration of Independence was impending: he was ready for it. The "Common Sense" of Thomas Paine had appeared: he was the man of all others to enjoy it. It is, however, questionable if at that time he had English enough to understand it in the original, since the colloquy just reported with the American captain took place in French. He was slow in becoming familiar with the English language, and even to the end of his life seemed to prefer conversing in French.

He was a mariner no more. The great fleet of Lord Howe arrived at New York in July. Every harbor was blockaded, and all commerce was suspended. Even the cargoes of tobacco despatched by Congress to their Commissioners in France, for the purchase of arms and stores, were usually captured before they had cleared the Capes. Captain Girard now rented a small store in Water Street, near the spot where he lived for nearly sixty years, in which he carried on the business of a grocer and wine-bottler. Those who knew him at this time report that he was a taciturn, repulsive young man, never associating with men of his own age and calling, devoted to business, close in his dealings, of the most rigorous economy, and preserving still the rough clothing and general appearance of a sailor. Though but twenty-six years of age, he was called "old Girard." He seemed conscious of his inability to please, but bore the derision of his neighbors with stoical equanimity, and plodded on.

War favors the skilful and enterprising business-man. Girard had a genius for business. He was not less bold in his operations than prudent; and his judgment as a man of business was wellnigh infallible. Destitute of all false pride, he bought

whatever he thought he could sell to advantage, from a lot of damaged cordage to a pipe of old port; and he labored incessantly with his own hands. He was a thriving man during the first year of his residence in Philadelphia; his chief gain, it is said, being derived from his favorite business of bottling wine and cider.

The romance, the mystery, the tragedy of his life now occurred. Walking along Water Street one day, near the corner of Vine Street, the eyes of this reserved and ill-favored man were caught by a beautiful servant-girl going to the pump for a pail of water. She was an enchanting brunette of sixteen, with luxuriant black locks curling and clustering about her neck. As she tripped along with bare feet and empty pail, in airy and unconscious grace, she captivated the susceptible Frenchman, who saw in her the realization of the songs of the forecastle and the reveries of the quarter-deck. He sought her acquaintance, and made himself at home in her kitchen. The family whom she served, misinterpreting the designs of the thriving dealer, forbade him the house; when he silenced their scruples by offering the girl his hand in marriage. Ill-starred Polly Lumm! Unhappy Girard! She accepted his offer; and in July, 1777, the incongruous two, being united in matrimony, attempted to become one.

The war interrupted their brief felicity. Philadelphia, often threatened, fell into the hands of Lord Howe in September, 1777; and among the thousands who needlessly fled at his approach were "old Girard" and his pretty young wife. He bought a house at Mount Holly, near Burlington, in New Jersey, for five hundred dollars, to which he removed, and there continued to bottle claret and sell it to the British officers, until the departure of Lord Howe, in June, 1778, permitted his return to Philadelphia. The gay young officers, it is said, who came to his house at Mount Holly to drink his claret, were far from being insensible to the charms of Mrs. Girard; and tradition further reports that on one occasion a dashing colonel snatched a kiss, which the sailor resented, and compelled the officer to apologize for.

Of all miserable marriages this was one of the most miserable. Here was a young, beautiful, and ignorant girl united

to a close, ungracious, eager man of business, devoid of sentiment, with a violent temper and an unyielding will. She was an American, he a Frenchman; and that alone was an immense incompatibility. She was seventeen, he twenty-seven. She was a woman; he was a man without imagination, intolerant of foibles. She was a beauty, with the natural vanities of a beauty; he not merely had no taste for decoration, he disapproved it on principle. These points of difference would alone have sufficed to endanger their domestic peace; but time developed something that was fatal to it. Their abode was the scene of contention for eight years; at the expiration of which period Mrs. Girard showed such symptoms of insanity that her husband was obliged to place her in the Pennsylvania Hospital. In these distressing circumstances, he appears to have spared no pains for her restoration. He removed her to a place in the country, but without effect. She returned to his house only to render life insupportable to him. He resumed his old calling as a mariner, and made a voyage to the Mediterranean; but on his return he found his wife not less unmanageable than before. In 1790, thirteen years after their marriage, and five after the first exhibition of insanity, Mrs. Girard was placed permanently in the hospital; where, nine months after, she gave birth to a female child. The child soon died; the mother never recovered her reason. For twenty-five years she lived in the hospital, and, dying in 1815, was buried in the hospital grounds after the manner of the Quakers. The coffin was brought to the grave, followed by the husband and the managers of the institution, who remained standing about it in silence for several minutes. It was then lowered to its final resting-place, and again the company remained motionless and silent for a while. Girard looked at the coffin once more, then turned to an acquaintance and said, as he walked away, "It is very well." A green mound, without headstone or monument, still marks the spot where the remains of this unhappy woman repose. Girard, both during his lifetime and after his death, was a liberal, though not lavish, benefactor of the institution which had so long sheltered his wife.

Fortunes were not made rapidly in the olden time. After the Revolution, Girard engaged in commerce with the West

Indies, in partnership with his brother John; and he is described in an official paper of the time as one who "carried on an extensive business as a merchant, and is a considerable owner of real estate." But on the dissolution of the partnership in 1790, when he had been in business, as mariner and merchant, for sixteen years, his estate was valued at only thirty thousand dollars. The times were troubled. The French Revolution, the massacre at St. Domingo, our disturbed relations with England, and afterwards with France, the violence of our party contests, all tended to make merchants timid, and to limit their operations. Girard, as his papers indicate, and as he used to relate in conversation, took more than a merchant's interest in the events of the time. From the first, he had formally cast in his lot with the struggling Colonists, as we learn from a yellow and faded document left among his papers: —

"I do hereby certify that Stephen Girard, of the city of Philadelphia, merchant, hath voluntarily taken the oath of allegiance and fidelity, as directed by an act of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, passed the 13th day of June, A. D. 1777. Witness my hand and seal, the 27th day of October, A. D. 1778.

"Jno Ord.

"No. 1678."

The oath was repeated the year following. When the French Revolution had divided the country into two parties, the Federalists and the Republicans, Girard was a Republican of the radical school. He remembered assisting to raise a liberty-pole in the Presidency of John Adams; and he was one of Mr. Jefferson's most uncompromising adherents at a time when men of substance were seldom found in the ranks of the Democracy. As long as he lived, he held the name of Thomas Jefferson in veneration.

We have now to contemplate this cold, close, ungainly, ungracious man in a new character. We are to see that a man may seem indifferent to the woes of individuals, but perform sublime acts of devotion to a community. We are to observe that there are men of sterling but peculiar metal, who only shine when the furnace of general affliction is hottest. In 1793, the malignant yellow-fever desolated Philadelphia. The

consternation of the people cannot be conceived by readers of the present day, because we cannot conceive of the ignorance which then prevailed respecting the laws of contagion, because we have lost, in some degree, the habit of panic, and because no kind of horror can be as novel to us as the yellow-fever was to the people of Philadelphia in 1793. One half of the population fled. Those who remained left their houses only when compelled. Most of the churches, the great Coffee-House, the Library, were closed. Of four daily newspapers, only one continued to be published. Some people constantly smoked tobacco, — even women and children did so; others chewed garlic; others exploded gunpowder; others burned nitre or sprinkled vinegar; many assiduously whitewashed every surface within their reach; some carried tarred rope in their hands, or bags of camphor round their necks; others never ventured abroad without a handkerchief or a sponge wet with vinegar at their noses. No one ventured to shake hands. Friends who met in the streets gave each other a wide berth, eyed one another askance, exchanged nods, and strode on. It was a custom to walk in the middle of the street, to get as far from the houses as possible. Many of the sick died without help, and the dead were buried without ceremony. The horrid silence of the streets was broken only by the tread of litter-bearers and the awful rumble of the dead-wagon. Whole families perished, — perished without assistance, their fate unknown to their neighbors. Money was powerless to buy attendance, for the operation of all ordinary motives was suspended. From the 1st of August to the 9th of November, in a population of twenty-five thousand, there were four thousand and thirty-one burials, — about one in six.

Happily for the honor of human nature, there are always, in times like these, great souls whom base panic cannot prostrate. A few brave physicians, a few faithful clergymen, a few high-minded citizens, a few noble women, remembered and practised what is due to humanity overtaken by a calamity like this. On the 10th of September, a notice, without signature, appeared in the only paper published, stating that all but three of the Visitors of the Poor were sick, dead, or missing, and calling upon all who were willing to help to meet at the City

Hall on the 12th. From those who attended the meeting, a committee of twenty-seven was appointed to superintend the measures for relief, of whom Stephen Girard was one. On Sunday, the 15th, the committee met; and the condition of the great hospital at Bush Hill was laid before them. It was unclean, ill-regulated, crowded, and ill-supplied. Nurses could not be hired at any price, for even to approach it was deemed certain death. Then, to the inexpressible astonishment and admiration of the committee, two men of wealth and importance in the city offered personally to take charge of the hospital during the prevalence of the disease. Girard was one of these, Peter Helm the other. Girard appears to have been the first to offer himself. "Stephen Girard," records Matthew Carey, a member of the committee, "sympathizing with the wretched situation of the sufferers at Bush Hill, voluntarily and unexpectedly offered himself as a manager to superintend that hospital. The surprise and satisfaction excited by this extraordinary effort of humanity can be better conceived than expressed."

That very afternoon, Girard and Helm went out to the hospital, and entered upon their perilous and repulsive duty. Girard chose the post of honor. He took charge of the interior of the hospital, while Mr. Helm conducted its out-door affairs. For sixty days he continued to perform, by day and night, all the distressing and revolting offices incident to the situation. In the great scarcity of help, he used frequently to receive the sick and dying at the gate, assist in carrying them to their beds, nurse them, receive their last messages, watch for their last breath, and then, wrapping them in the sheet they had died upon, carry them out to the burial-ground, and place them in the trench. He had a vivid recollection of the difficulty of finding any kind of fabric in which to wrap the dead, when the vast number of interments had exhausted the supply of sheets. "I would put them," he would say, "in any old rag I could find." If he ever left the hospital, it was to visit the infected districts, and assist in removing the sick from the houses in which they were dying without help. One scene of this kind, witnessed by a merchant, who was hurrying past with camphored handkerchief pressed to his mouth,

affords us a vivid glimpse of this heroic man engaged in his sublime vocation. A carriage, rapidly driven by a black man, broke the silence of the deserted and grass-grown street. It stopped before a frame house; and the driver, first having bound a handkerchief over his mouth, opened the door of the carriage, and quickly remounted to the box. A short, thick-set man stepped from the coach and entered the house. In a minute or two, the observer, who stood at a safe distance watching the proceedings, heard a shuffling noise in the entry, and soon saw the stout little man supporting with extreme difficulty a tall, gaunt, yellow-visaged victim of the pestilence. Girard held round the waist the sick man, whose yellow face rested against his own; his long, damp, tangled hair mingled with Girard's; his feet dragging helpless upon the pavement. Thus he drew him to the carriage door, the driver averting his face from the spectacle, far from offering to assist. Partly dragging, partly lifting, he succeeded, after long and severe exertion, in getting him into the vehicle. He then entered it himself, closed the door, and the carriage drove away towards the hospital.

A man who can do such things at such a time may commit errors and cherish erroneous opinions, but the essence of that which makes the difference between a good man and a bad man must dwell within him. Twice afterwards Philadelphia was visited by yellow-fever, in 1797 and 1798. On both occasions, Girard took the lead, by personal exertion or gifts of money, in relieving the poor and the sick. He had a singular taste for nursing the sick, though a sturdy unbeliever in medicine. According to him, nature, not doctors, is the restorer,—nature, aided by good nursing. Thus, after the yellow-fever of 1798, he wrote to a friend in France: "During all this frightful time, I have constantly remained in the city; and, without neglecting my public duties, I have played a part which will make you smile. Would you believe it, my friend, that I have visited as many as fifteen sick people in a day? and what will surprise you still more, I have lost only one patient, an Irishman, who would drink a little. I do not flatter myself that I have cured one single person; but you will think with me, that in my quality of Philadelphia physician I have been

very moderate, and that not one of my *confrères* has killed fewer than myself."

It is not by nursing the sick, however, that men acquire colossal fortunes. We revert, therefore, to the business career of this extraordinary man. Girard, in the ancient and honorable acceptation of the term, was a merchant; i. e. a man who sent his own ships to foreign countries, and exchanged their products for those of his own. Beginning in the West India trade, with one small schooner built with difficulty and managed with caution, he expanded his business as his capital increased, until he was the owner of a fleet of merchantmen, and brought home to Philadelphia the products of every clime. Beginning with single voyages, his vessels merely sailing to a foreign port and back again, he was accustomed at length to project great mercantile cruises, extending over long periods of time, and embracing many ports. A ship loaded with cotton and grain would sail, for example, to Bordeaux, there discharge, and take in a cargo of wine and fruit; thence to St. Petersburgh, where she would exchange her wine and fruit for hemp and iron; then to Amsterdam, where the hemp and iron would be sold for dollars; to Calcutta next for a cargo of tea and silks, with which the ship would return to Philadelphia. Such were the voyages so often successfully made by the Voltaire, the Rousseau, the Helvetius, and the Montesquieu; ships long the pride of Girard and the boast of Philadelphia, their names being the tribute paid by the merchant to the literature of his native land. He seldom failed to make very large profits. He rarely, if ever, lost a ship.

His neighbors, the merchants of Philadelphia, deemed him a lucky man. Many of them thought they could do as well as he, if they only had his luck. But the great volumes of his letters and papers, preserved in a room of the Girard College, show that his success in business was not due, in any degree whatever, to good fortune. Let a money-making generation take note, that Girard principles inevitably produce Girard results. The grand, the fundamental secret of his success, as of all success, was that *he understood his business.* He had a personal, familiar knowledge of the ports with which he traded, the commodities in which he dealt, the vehicles in

which they were carried, the dangers to which they were liable, and the various kinds of men through whom he acted. He observed everything, and forgot nothing. He had done everything himself which he had occasion to require others to do. His directions to his captains and supercargoes, full, minute, exact, peremptory, show the hand of a master. Every possible contingency was foreseen and provided for; and he demanded the most literal obedience to the maxim, "Obey orders, though you break owners." He would dismiss a captain from his service forever, if he saved the whole profits of a voyage by departing from his instructions. He did so on one occasion. Add to this perfect knowledge of his craft, that he had a self-control which never permitted him to anticipate his gains or spread too wide his sails; that his industry knew no pause; that he was a close, hard bargainer, keeping his word to the letter, but exacting his rights to the letter; that he had no vices and no vanities; that he had no toleration for those calamities which result from vices and vanities; that his charities, though frequent, were bestowed only upon unquestionably legitimate objects, and were never profuse; that he was as wise in investing as skilful in gaining money; that he made his very pleasures profitable to himself in money gained, to his neighborhood in improved fruits and vegetables; that he had no family to maintain and indulge; that he held in utter aversion and contempt the costly and burdensome ostentation of a great establishment, fine equipages, and a retinue of servants; that he reduced himself to a money-making machine, run at the minimum of expense; — and we have an explanation of his rapidly acquired wealth. He used to boast, after he was a millionnaire, of wearing the same overcoat for fourteen winters; and one of his clerks, who saw him every day for twenty years, declares that he never remembered having seen him wear a new-looking garment but once. Let us note, too, that he was an adept in the art of getting men to serve him with devotion. He paid small salaries, and was never known in his life to bestow a gratuity upon one who served him; but he knew how to make his humblest clerk feel that the master's eye was upon him always. Violent in his outbreaks of anger, his business letters are singularly polite, and show consideration for the health and happiness of his subordinates.

Legitimate commerce makes many men rich ; but in Girard's day no man gained by it ten millions of dollars. It was the war of 1812, which suspended commerce, that made this merchant so enormously rich. In 1811, the charter of the old United States Bank expired ; and the casting vote of Vice-President George Clinton negatived the bill for rechartering it. When war was imminent, Girard had a million dollars in the bank of Baring Brothers in London. This large sum, useless then for purposes of commerce, — in peril, too, from the disturbed condition of English finance, — he invested in United States stock and in stock of the United States Bank, both being depreciated in England. Being thus a large holder of the stock of the bank, the charter having expired, and its affairs being in liquidation, he bought out the entire concern ; and, merely changing the name to Girard's Bank, continued it in being as a private institution, in the same building, with the same coin in its vaults, the same bank-notes, the same cashier and clerks. The banking-house and the house of the cashier, which cost three hundred and fifty thousand dollars, he bought for one hundred and twenty thousand. The stock, which he bought at four hundred and twenty, proved to be worth, on the winding up of the old bank, four hundred and thirty-four. Thus, by this operation, he extricated his property in England, invested it wisely in America, established a new business in place of one that could no longer be carried on, and saved the mercantile community from a considerable part of the loss and embarrassment which the total annihilation of the bank would have occasioned.

His management of the bank perfectly illustrates his singular and apparently contradictory character. Hamilton used to say of Burr, that he was great in little things, and little in great things. Girard in little things frequently seemed little, but in great things he was often magnificently great. For example : the old bank had been accustomed to present an overcoat to its watchman every Christmas ; Girard forbade the practice as extravagant ; — the old bank had supplied penknives gratis to its clerks ; Girard made them buy their own ; — the old bank had paid salaries which were higher than those given in other banks ; Girard cut them down to the average

rate. To the watchman and the clerks this conduct, doubtless, seemed little. Without pausing to argue the question with them, let us contemplate the new banker in his great actions. He was the very sheet-anchor of the government credit during the whole of that disastrous war. If advances were required at a critical moment, it was Girard who was promptest to make them. When all other banks and houses were contracting, it was Girard who stayed the panic by a timely and liberal expansion. When all other paper was depreciated, Girard's notes, and his alone, were as good as gold. In 1814, when the credit of the government was at its lowest ebb, when a loan of five millions, at seven per cent interest and twenty dollars bonus, was up for weeks, and only procured twenty thousand dollars, it was "old Girard" who boldly subscribed for the whole amount; which at once gave it market value, and infused life into the paralyzed credit of the nation. Again, in 1816, when the subscriptions lagged for the new United States Bank, Girard waited until the last day for receiving subscriptions, and then quietly subscribed for the whole amount not taken, which was three million one hundred thousand dollars. And yet again, in 1829, when the enormous expenditures of Pennsylvania upon her canals had exhausted her treasury and impaired her credit, it was Girard who prevented the total suspension of the public works by a loan to the Governor, which the assembling Legislature might or might not reimburse.

Once, during the war, the control of the coin in the bank procured him a signal advantage. In the spring of 1813, his fine ship, the Montesquieu, crammed with tea and fabrics from China, was captured by a British shallop when she was almost within Delaware Bay. News of the disaster reaching Girard, he sent orders to his supercargo to treat for a ransom. The British admiral gave up the vessel for one hundred and eighty thousand dollars in coin; and, despite this costly ransom, the cargo yielded a larger profit than that of any ship of Girard's during the whole of his mercantile career. Tea was then selling at war prices. Much of it brought, at auction, two dollars and fourteen cents a pound, more than four times its cost in China. He appears to have gained about half a million of dollars.

From the close of the war to the end of his life, a period of sixteen years, Girard pursued the even tenor of his way, as keen and steady in the pursuit of wealth, and as careful in preserving it, as though his fortune were still insecure. Why was this? We should answer the question thus: Because his defective education left him no other resource. We frequently hear the "success" of such men as Astor and Girard adduced as evidence of the uselessness of early education. On the contrary, it is precisely such men who prove its necessity; since, when they have conquered fortune, they know not how to avail themselves of its advantages. When Franklin had, at the age of forty-two, won a moderate competence, he could turn from business to science, and from science to the public service, using money as a means to the noblest end. Strong-minded but unlettered men, like Girard, who cannot be idle, must needs plod on to the end, adding superfluous millions to their estates. In Girard's case, too, there was another cause of this entire devotion to business. His domestic sorrows had estranged him from mankind, and driven him into himself. Mr. Henry W. Arey, the very able and high-minded Secretary of Girard College, in whose custody are Girard's papers, is convinced that it was not the love of money which kept him at work early and late to the last days of his life.

"No one," he remarks, "who has had access to his private papers, can fail to become impressed with the belief that these early disappointments furnish the true key to his entire character. Originally of warm and generous impulses, the belief in childhood that he had not been given his share of the love and kindness which were extended to others changed the natural current of his feelings, and, acting on a warm and passionate temperament, alienated him from his home, his parents, and his friends. And when in after time there were superadded the years of bitter anguish resulting from his unfortunate and ill-adapted marriage, rendered even more poignant by the necessity of concealment, and the consequent injustice of public sentiment, and marring all his cherished expectations, it may be readily understood why constant occupation became a necessity, and labor a pleasure."

Girard himself confirms this opinion. In one of his letters of 1820, to a friend in New Orleans, he says: —

"I observe with pleasure that you have a numerous family, that you

are happy and in the possession of an honest fortune. This is all that a wise man has the right to wish for. As to myself, I live like a galley-slave, constantly occupied, and often passing the night without sleeping. I am wrapped up in a labyrinth of affairs, and worn out with care. I do not value fortune. The love of labor is my highest ambition. You perceive that your situation is a thousand times preferable to mine."

In his lifetime, as we have remarked, few men loved Girard, still fewer understood him. He was considered mean, hard, avaricious. If a rich man goes into a store to buy a yard of cloth, no one expects that he will give five dollars for it when the price is four. But there is a universal impression that it is "handsome" in him to give higher wages than other people to those who serve him, to bestow gratuities upon them, and, especially, to give away endless sums in charity. The truth is, however, that one of the duties which a rich man owes to society is to be careful *not* to disturb the law of supply and demand by giving more money for anything than a fair price, and *not* to encourage improvidence and servility by inconsiderate and profuse gifts. Girard rescued his poor relations in France from want, and educated nieces and nephews in his own house; but his gifts to them were not proportioned to his own wealth, but to their circumstances. His design evidently was to help them as much as would do them good, but not so much as to injure them as self-sustaining members of society. And surely it was well for every clerk in his bank to know that all he had to expect from the rich Girard was only what he would have received if he had served another bank. The money which in loose hands might have relaxed the arm of industry and the spirit of independence, which might have pampered and debased a retinue of menials, and drawn around the dispenser a crowd of cringing beggars and expectants, was invested in solid houses, which Girard's books show yielded him a profit of three per cent, but which furnished to many families comfortable abodes at moderate rents. To the most passionate entreaties of failing merchants for a loan to help them over a crisis, he was inflexibly deaf. They thought it meanness. But we can safely infer from Girard's letters and conversation that he thought it an injury to the community to

avert from a man of business the consequences of extravagance and folly, which, in his view, were the sole causes of failure. If there was anything that Girard utterly despised and detested, it was that vicious mode of doing business which, together with extravagant living, causes seven business men in ten to fail every ten years. We are enabled to state, however, on the best authority, that he was substantially just to those whom he employed, and considerately kind to his own kindred. At least he meant to be kind; he did for them what he really thought was for their good. To little children, and to them only, he was gracious and affectionate in manner. He was never so happy as when he had a child to caress and play with.

After the peace of 1815, Girard began to consider what he should do with his millions after his death. He was then sixty-five, but he expected and meant to live to a good age. "The Russians," he would say, when he was mixing his *olla podrida* of a Russian salad, "understand best how to eat and drink; and I am going to see how long, by following their customs, I can live." He kept an excellent table; but he became abstemious as he grew older, and lived chiefly on his salad and his good claret. Enjoying perfect health, it was not until about the year 1828, when he was seventy-eight years of age, that he entered upon the serious consideration of a plan for the final disposal of his immense estate. Upon one point his mind had been long made up. "No man," said he, "shall be a gentleman on *my* money." He often said that, even if he had had a son, he should have been brought up to labor, and should not, by a great legacy, be exempted from the necessity of labor. "If I should leave him twenty thousand dollars," he said, "he would be lazy or turn gambler." Very likely. The son of a man like Girard, who was virtuous without being able to make virtue engaging, whose mind was strong but rigid and ill-furnished, commanding but uninstructive, is likely to have a barren mind and rampant desires, the twin causes of debauchery. His decided inclination was to leave the bulk of his property for the endowment of an institution of some kind for the benefit of Philadelphia. The only question was, what kind of institution it should be.

William J. Duane was his legal adviser then, — that honest and intrepid William J. Duane who, a few years later, stood calmly his ground on the question of the removal of the deposits against the infuriate Jackson, the Kitchen Cabinet, and the Democratic party. Girard felt all the worth of this able and honorable lawyer. With him alone he conversed upon the projected institution; and Mr. Duane, without revealing his purpose, made inquiries among his travelled friends respecting the endowed establishments of foreign countries. For several months before sitting down to prepare the will, they never met without conversing upon this topic, which was also the chief subject of discourse between them on Sunday afternoons, when Mr. Duane invariably dined at Mr. Girard's country-house. A home for the education of orphans was at length decided upon, and then the will was drawn. For three weeks the lawyer and his client were closeted, toiling at the multifarious details of that curious document.

The minor bequests were speedily arranged, though they were numerous and well considered. He left to the Pennsylvania Hospital, thirty thousand dollars; to the Deaf and Dumb Asylum, twenty thousand; to the Orphan Asylum, ten thousand; to the Lancaster public schools, the same sum; the same for providing fuel for the poor in Philadelphia; the same to the Society for the Relief of Distressed Sea-Captains and their families; to the Freemasons of Pennsylvania, for the relief of poor members, twenty thousand; six thousand for the establishment of a free school in Passyunk, near Philadelphia; to his surviving brother, and to his eleven nieces, he left sums varying from five thousand dollars to twenty thousand; but to one of his nieces, who had a very large family, he left sixty thousand dollars. To each of the captains who had made two voyages in his service, and who should bring in his ship safely into port, he gave fifteen hundred dollars; and to each of his apprentices, five hundred. To his old servants, he left annuities of three hundred and five hundred dollars each. A portion of his valuable estates in Louisiana he bequeathed to the corporation of New Orleans, for the improvement of that city. Half a million he left for certain improvements in the city of Philadelphia; and to Pennsylvania, three hundred

thousand dollars for her canals. The whole of the residue of his property, worth then about six millions of dollars, he devoted to the construction and endowment of a College for Orphans.

Accustomed all his life to give minute directions to those whom he selected to execute his designs, he followed the same system in that part of his will which related to the College. The whole will was written out three times, and some parts of it more than three. He strove most earnestly, and so did Mr. Duane, to make every paragraph so clear that no one could misunderstand it. No candid person, sincerely desirous to understand his intentions, has ever found it difficult to do so. He directed that the buildings should be constructed of the most durable materials, "avoiding useless ornament, attending chiefly to the strength, convenience, and neatness of the whole." *That*, at least, is plain. He then proceeded to direct precisely what materials should be used, and how they should be used; prescribing the number of buildings, their size, the number and size of the apartments in each, the thickness of each wall, every detail of construction, giving as he would have given it to a builder. He then gave briefer directions as to the management of the institution. The orphans were to be plainly but wholesomely fed, clothed, and lodged; instructed in the English branches, in geometry, natural philosophy, the French and Spanish languages, and whatever else might be deemed suitable and beneficial to them. "I would have them," says the will, "taught facts and things, rather than words or signs." At the conclusion of the course, the pupils were to be apprenticed to "suitable occupations, as those of agriculture, navigation, arts, mechanical trades, and manufactures."

The most remarkable passage of the will is the following The Italics are those of the original document.

"I enjoin and require that *no ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the said College; nor shall any such person ever be admitted for any purpose, or as a visitor, within the premises appropriated to the purposes of the said College.* In making this restriction, I do not mean to cast any reflection upon any sect or person whatsoever; but as there is such a multitude of sects, and such a diversity of opinion amongst them,

I desire to keep the tender minds of the orphans, who are to derive advantage from this bequest, free from the excitement which clashing doctrines and sectarian controversy are so apt to produce; my desire is, that all the instructors and teachers in the College shall take pains to instil into the minds of the scholars *the purest principles of morality*, so that, on their entrance into active life, they may, *from inclination and habit*, evince *benevolence toward their fellow-creatures*, and *a love of truth, sobriety, and industry*, adopting at the same time such religious tenets as their *matured reason* may enable them to prefer."

When Mr. Duane had written this passage at Girard's dictation, a conversation occurred between them, which revealed, perhaps, one of the old gentleman's reasons for inserting it. "What do you think of that?" asked Girard. Mr. Duane, being unprepared to comment upon such an unexpected injunction, replied, after a long pause, "I can only say now, Mr. Girard, that I think it will make a great sensation." Girard then said, "I can tell you something else it will do, — it will please the Quakers." He gave another proof of his regard for the Quakers by naming three of them as the executors of his will; the whole number of the executors being five.

In February, 1830, the will was executed, and deposited in Mr. Girard's iron safe. None but the two men who had drawn the will, and the three men who witnessed the signing of it, were aware of its existence; and none but Girard and Mr. Duane had the least knowledge of its contents. There never was such a keeper of his own secrets as Girard, and never a more faithful keeper of other men's secrets than Mr. Duane. And here we have another illustration of the old man's character. He had just signed a will of unexampled liberality to the public; and the sum which he gave the able and devoted lawyer for his three weeks' labor in drawing it was three hundred dollars!

Girard lived nearly two years longer, always devoted to business, and still investing his gains with care. An accident in the street gave a shock to his constitution, from which he never fully recovered; and in December, 1831, when he was nearly eighty-two years of age, an attack of influenza terminated his life. True to his principles, he refused to be cupped, or to take drugs into his system, though both were prescribed by a physician whom he respected.

Death having dissolved the powerful spell of a presence which few men had been able to resist, it was to be seen how far his will would be obeyed, now that he was no longer able personally to enforce it. The old man lay dead in his house in Water Street. While the public out of doors were curious enough to learn what he had done with his money, there was a smaller number within the house, the kindred of the deceased, in whom this curiosity raged like a mania. They invaded the cellars of the house, and, bringing up bottles of the old man's choice wine, kept up a continual carouse. Surrounding Mr. Duane, who had been present at Mr. Girard's death and remained to direct his funeral, they demanded to know if there was a will. To silence their indecent clamor, he told them there was, and that he was one of the executors. On hearing this, their desire to learn its contents rose to fury. In vain the executors reminded them that decency required that the will should not be opened till after the funeral. They even threatened legal proceedings if the will were not immediately produced; and at length, to avoid a public scandal, the executors consented to have it read. These affectionate relatives being assembled in a parlor of the house in which the body of their benefactor lay, the will was taken from the iron safe by one of the executors.

When he had opened it, and was about to begin to read, he chanced to look over the top of the document at the company seated before him. No artist that ever held a brush could depict the passion of curiosity, the frenzy of expectation, expressed in that group of pallid faces. Every individual among them expected to leave the apartment the conscious possessor of millions, for no one had dreamed of the probability of his leaving the bulk of his estate to the public. If they had ever heard of his saying that no one should be gentleman upon his money, they had forgotten or disbelieved it. The opening paragraphs of the will all tended to confirm their hopes, since the bequests to existing institutions were of small amount. But the reader soon reached the part of the will which assigned to ladies and gentlemen present such trifling sums as five thousand dollars, ten thousand, twenty thousand; and he arrived erelong at the sections which disposed of millions for the benefit of great cities and poor children. Some of them made not the slightest attempt

to conceal their disappointment and disgust. Men were there who had married with a view to share the wealth of Girard, and had been waiting years for his death. Women were there who had looked to that event as the beginning of their enjoyment of life. The imagination of the reader must supply the details of a scene which we might think dishonored human nature, if we could believe that human nature was meant to be subjected to such a strain. It had been better, perhaps, if the rich man, in his own lifetime, had made his kindred partakers of his superabundance, especially as he had nothing else that he could share with them. They attempted, on grounds that seem utterly frivolous, to break the will, and employed the most eminent counsel to conduct their cause, but without effect. They did, however, succeed in getting the property acquired after the execution of the will; which Girard, disregarding the opinion of Mr. Duane, attempted by a postscript to include in the will. "It will not stand," said the lawyer. "Yes it will," said Girard. Mr. Duane, knowing his man, was silent; and the courts have since decided that his opinion was correct.

Thirty-three years have passed since the city of Philadelphia entered upon the possession of the enormous and growing estate with which Mr. Girard intrusted it. It is a question of general interest how the trust has been administered. No citizen of Philadelphia needs to be informed, that, in some particulars, the government of their city has shown little more regard to the manifest will of Girard than his nephews and nieces did. If he were to revisit the banks of the Schuylkill, would he recognize, in the splendid Grecian temple that stands in the centre of the College grounds, the home for poor orphans, devoid of needless ornament, which he directed should be built there? It is singular that the very ornaments which Girard particularly disliked are those which have been employed in the erection of this temple; namely, pillars. He had such an aversion to pillars, that he had at one time meditated taking down those which supported the portico of his bank. Behold his College surrounded with thirty-four Corinthian columns, six feet in diameter and fifty-nine in height, of marble, with capitals elaborately carved, each pillar having cost thirteen thou-

sand dollars, and the whole colonnade four hundred and forty thousand! And this is the abode of poor little boys, who will leave the gorgeous scene to labor in shops, and to live in such apartments as are usually assigned to apprentices!

Now there is probably no community on earth where the number of honorable men bears a larger proportion to the whole population than in Philadelphia. Philadelphia is a community of honest dealers and faithful workmen. It is a matter of the highest interest to know how it could happen that, in such a city, a bequest for such a purpose should be so monstrously misappropriated.

The magnitude of the bequest was itself one cause of its misappropriation, and the habits of the country were another. When we set about founding an institution, our first proceeding is to erect a vast and imposing edifice. When we pronounce the word College, a vision of architecture is called up. It was natural, therefore, that the people of Philadelphia, bewildered by the unprecedented amount of the donation, should look to see the monotony of their city relieved by something novel and stupendous in the way of a building; and there appears to have been no one to remind them that the value of a school depends wholly upon the teachers who conduct it, provided those teachers are free to execute their plans. The immediate cause, however, of the remarkable departure from the will in the construction of the principal edifice was this: the custody of the Girard estate fell into the hands of the politicians of the city, who regarded the patronage appertaining thereunto as part of the "spoils" of victory at the polls. As we live at a time when honest lovers of their country frequently meditate on the means of rescuing important public interests from the control of politicians, we shall not deem a little of our space ill bestowed in recounting the history of the preposterous edifice which Girard's money paid for, and which Girard's will forbade.

Both political parties were to blame. It is the system that we have chiefly to condemn, — the system that allows national politics to control municipal elections. In 1832, when the great bequest of Mr. Girard fell to the city, the Democrats were in a majority in the City Councils; and it was that ma-

jority which took the first wrong step. Instead of simply handing a copy of the will to a competent builder, and directing him to construct the buildings for the College in accordance therewith, they advertised for plans, and offered a reward for the one that should be approved. Very soon, the walls of the City Hall were hung with pictures of splendid edifices competing for the prize, — edifices that might relieve the monotony of Philadelphian architecture, but which certainly set at naught the will of Stephen Girard. But in October the Whig party triumphed; and one of the first acts of the Whig majority in the Councils was to declare null and void all that the Democrats had done in relation to the College. This accomplished, they neither recurred to the will nor consulted any friend of Girard as to his intentions, but proceeded in reckless defiance of both. Nicholas Biddle was then at the zenith of his power and celebrity, the idol of his party, the king of finance, the favorite of society. "There are but two truths in this world," he used to say, "the Bible and Greek architecture." Able to command any position he might choose to fill, he was placed at the head of the commission appointed by the City Councils for the construction of the College; and he wielded over his colleagues the same commanding influence as over the Directors of the Bank of the United States. It was he who selected the plan of the magnificent edifice which wasted thirteen years of time and half a million of money,— which entailed upon his native town the discredit of disregarding the will of its benefactor, and the ridicule of building an imitation of the Parthenon for little boys to shiver in.

And more, while erecting an edifice the most opposite to Girard's intentions that could be contrived by man, the architect was permitted to follow the directions of the will in minor particulars, that rendered the building as inconvenient as it was magnificent. The vaulted ceilings of those spacious rooms reverberated to such a degree, that not a class could say its lesson in them till they were hung with cotton cloth. The massive walls exuded dampness continually. The rooms of the uppermost story, lighted only from above, were so hot in the summer as to be useless; and the lower rooms were so cold in winter as to endanger the health of the inmates. It has

required ingenuity and expense to render the main building habitable; but even now the visitor cannot but smile as he compares the splendor of the architecture with the homely benevolence of its purpose. The Parthenon was a suitable dwelling-place for a marble goddess, but the mothers of Athens would have shuddered at the thought of consigning their little boys to dwell in its chilling grandeurs.

We can scarcely overstate the bad effect of this first mistake. It has constantly tended to obscure Mr. Girard's real purpose, which was to afford a plain, comfortable home, and a plain, substantial education to poor orphans, destined to gain their livelihood by labor. Always there have been two parties in the Board of Directors: one favoring a scheme which would make the College a *college;* the other striving to keep it down to the modest level of the founder's intentions. That huge and dazzling edifice seems always to have been exerting a powerful influence against the stricter constructionists of the will. It is only within the last two years that this silent but ponderous argument has been partially overcome by the resolute good-sense of a majority of the Directors. Not the least evil consequent upon the erection of this building was, that the delay in opening the College caused the resignation of its first President, Alexander D. Bache, a gentleman who had it in him to organize the institution aright, and give it a fair start. It is a curious fact, that the extensive report by this gentleman of his year's observation of the orphan schools of Europe has not been of any practical use in the organization of Girard College. Either the Directors have not consulted it, or they have found nothing in it available for their purpose.

The first class of one hundred pupils was admitted to the College on the first day of the year 1848. The number of inmates is now six hundred. The estate will probably enable the Directors to admit at length as many as fifteen hundred. It will be seen, therefore, that Girard College, merely from the number of its pupils, is an institution of great importance.

Sixteen years have gone by since the College was opened, but it cannot yet be said that the policy of the Directors is fixed. These Directors, appointed by the City Councils, are eighteen in number, of whom six go out of office every year,

while the Councils themselves are annually elected. Hence the difficulty of settling upon a plan, and the greater difficulty of adhering to one. Sometimes a majority has favored the introduction of Latin or Greek; again, the manual-labor system has had advocates; some have desired a liberal scale of living for the pupils; others have thought it best to give them Spartan fare. Four times the President has been changed, and there have been two periods of considerable length when there was no President. There have been dissensions without and trouble within. As many as forty-four boys have run away in a single year. Meanwhile, the Annual Reports of the Directors have usually been so vague and so reticent, that the public was left utterly in the dark as to the condition of the institution. Letters from masters to whom pupils have been apprenticed were published in the Reports, but only the letters which have nothing but good to say of the apprentices. Large numbers of the boys, it is true, have done and are doing credit to the College; but the public have no means of judging whether, upon the whole, the training of the College has been successful.

Nevertheless, we believe we may say with truth that invaluable experience has been gained, and genuine progress has been made. To maintain and educate six hundred boys, even if those boys had enlightened parents to aid in the work, were a task which would exhaust the wisdom and the tact of the greatest educator that ever lived. But these boys are all fatherless, and many of them motherless; the mothers of many are ignorant and unwise, of some are even vicious and dissolute. A large number of the boys are of very inferior endowments, have acquired bad habits, have inherited evil tendencies. It would be difficult to overstate the difficulty of the work which the will of Girard has devolved upon the Directors and teachers of Girard College. Mistakes have been made, but perhaps they have not been more serious or more numerous than we ought to expect in the forming of an institution absolutely unique, and composed of material the most unmanageable.

There are indications, too, that the period of experiment draws to an end, and that the final plan of the College, on the basis of common-sense, is about to be settled. Mr. Richard

Vaux, the present head of the Board of Directors, writes Reports in a style most eccentric, and not always intelligible to remote readers; but it is evident that his heart is in the work, and that he belongs to the party who desire the College to be the useful, unambitious institution that Girard wished it to be. His Reports are not written with rose-water. They say *something*. They confess some failures, as well as vaunt some successes. We would earnestly advise the Directors never to shrink from taking the public into their confidence. The public is wiser and better than any man or any board. A plain statement every year of the real condition of the College, the real difficulties in the way of its organization, would have been far better than the carefully uttered nothings of which the Annual Reports have generally consisted. It was to Philadelphia that Girard left his estate. The honor of Philadelphia is involved in its faithful administration. Philadelphia has a right to know how it is administered.

The President of the College is Major Richard Somers Smith, a graduate of West Point, where he was afterwards a Professor. He has served with distinction in the Army of the Potomac, in which he commanded a brigade. To learn how to be an efficient President of Girard College is itself a labor of years; and Major Smith is only in the second year of his incumbency. The highest hopes are indulged, however, that under his energetic rule, the College will become all that the public ought to expect. He seems to have perceived at once the weak point of the institution.

"I find in the College," he says in one of his monthly reports, "a certain degree of impatience of study, an inertness, a dragging along, an infection of 'young-Americanism,' a disposition to flounder along through duties half done, hurrying to reach — what is never attained — an 'easy success'; and I observe that this state of things is confined to the higher departments of study. In the elementary departments there is life; but as soon as the boy has acquired the rudiments of his English or common-school education, he begins to chafe, and to feel that it is time for him to *go out*, and to make haste to 'finish (!) his studies,' — which of course he does without much heart."

And again: —

"The 'poor white male orphan,' dwelling for eight or ten years in

comfort almost amounting to luxury, waited upon by servants and machinery in nearly all his domestic requirements, unused to labor, or laboring only occasionally, with some reward in view in the form of extra privileges, finds it hard to descend from his fancied elevation to the lot of a simple apprentice; and his disappointment is not soothed by the discovery that with all his learning he has not learned wherewithal to give ready satisfaction to his master."

It has been difficult, also, to induce the large manufacturers to take apprentices; they are now accustomed to place boys at once upon the footing of men, paying them such wages as they are worth. Men who employ forty boys will not generally undertake the responsibilities involved in receiving them as bound apprentices for a term of years.

To remedy all these evils, Major Smith proposes to add to the College a Manual Labor Department, in which the elder boys shall acquire the rudiments of the arts and trades to which they are destined. This will alleviate the tedium of the College routine, assist the physical development of the boys, and send them forth prepared to render more desirable help to their employers. The present Board of Directors favor the scheme.

In one particular the College has fulfilled the wishes of its founder. He said in his will, "I desire that by every proper means a pure attachment to our republican institutions, and to the sacred rights of conscience, as guaranteed by our happy Constitution, shall be formed and fostered in the minds of the scholars." Three fourths of the whole number of young men, out of their time, who were apprenticed from Girard College, have joined the Union army. We must confess, also, that a considerable number of its apprentices, *not* out of their time, have run away for the same purpose. With regard to the exclusion of ecclesiastics, it is agreed on all hands that no evil has resulted from that singular injunction of the will. On the contrary, it has served to call particular attention to the religious instruction of the pupils. The only effect of the clause is, that the morning prayers and the Sunday services are conducted by gentlemen who have not undergone the ceremony of ordination.

The income of the Girard estate is now about two hundred

thousand dollars a year, and it is increasing. Supposing that only one half of this revenue is appropriated to the College, it is still, we believe, the largest endowment in the country for an educational purpose. The means of the College are therefore ample. To make those means effective in the highest degree, some mode must be devised by which the politics of the city shall cease to influence the choice of Directors. In other words, "Girard College must be taken out of politics." The Board of Directors should, perhaps, be a more permanent body than it now is. At the earliest possible moment a scheme of instruction should be agreed upon, which should remain unchanged, in its leading features, long enough for it to be judged by its results. The President must be clothed with ample powers, and held responsible, not for methods, but results. He must be allowed, at least, to nominate all his assistants, and to recommend the removal of any for reasons given; and both his nominations and his recommendations of removal, so long as the Directors desire to retain his services, should be ratified by them. He must be made to feel strong in his place; otherwise, he will be tempted to waste his strength upon the management of committees, and general whitewashing. Human nature is so constituted, that a gentleman with a large family will not willingly give up an income of three thousand dollars a year, with lodging in a marble palace. If he is a strong man and an honorable, he will do it, rather than fill a post the duties of which an ignorant or officious committee prevent his discharging. If he is a weak or dishonest man, he will cringe to that committee, and expend all his ingenuity in making the College show well on public days. It might even be well, in order to strengthen the President, to give him the right of appeal to the Mayor and Councils, in case of an irreconcilable difference of opinion between him and the Directors. Everything depends upon the President. Given the right President, with power enough and time enough, and the success of the College is assured. Given a bad President, or a good one hampered by committees, or too dependent upon a board, and the College will be the reproach of Philadelphia.

It is a question with political economists, whether, upon the

whole, such endowments as this are a good or an evil to a community. There is now a considerable party in England, among whom are several clergymen of the Established Church, who think it would be better for England if every endowment were swept away, and thus to each succeeding generation were restored the privilege of supporting all its poor, caring for all its sick, and educating all its young. Dr. Chalmers appears to have been inclined to an opinion like this. It will be long, however, before this question becomes vital in America. Girard College must continue for generations to weigh heavily on Philadelphia, or to lighten its burdens. The conduct of those who have charge of it in its infancy will go far to determine whether it shall be an argument for or against the utility of endowments. Meanwhile, we advise gentlemen who have millions to leave behind them not to impose difficult conditions upon the future, which the future may be unable or unwilling to fulfil; but either to bestow their wealth for some object that can be immediately and easily accomplished, or else imitate the conduct of that respectable and public-spirited man who left five pounds towards the discharge of his country's debt.

ART. V. — 1. *History of the Romans under the Empire.* By CHARLES MERIVALE, B. D. From the Fourth London Edition. In Seven Volumes. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1863–64.

2. *Life of Marcus Tullius Cicero.* By WILLIAM FORSYTH. London: John Murray. 2 vols. 1864.

THE great epic poet of the Augustan age, secure in the strength of the newly organized Empire, pictures the shade of Anchises foretelling to his son the greatness of the nation he was about to found. "Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento." Could Virgil have seen the extent and duration of that sway; could he have discerned, looking down the vista of centuries, the destruction of the political fabric which surrounded him, while the ideas on which it was based yet mas-

tered the world; could he have known that peoples of diverse origin and language should construct their civilization upon a Roman foundation, and that even those wild tribes who raged along the Danube and the Rhine, sending a shudder to the heart of the Imperial city, should all be brought in the progress of the ages into subjection to a power which issued from the circle of the seven sacred hills on the banks of the Tiber, — his heart might have swelled with a more exultant pride, and in even loftier strains he might have sung the glories of the mistress of nations.

This destiny was not revealed to the poet's vision; but we of another race, and of a civilization farther from the Roman type than that of the western nations of the European continent, must consider with wonder and admiration the irresistible power of that people, who, after conquering the known world by their arms, possessed a vitality sufficient, even in their overthrow, to project their ideas into the institutions of their conquerors, to work like a leaven, until they had penetrated the whole mass, and by a wonderful chemistry had transformed it into their own likeness.

The extent and importance of the Roman element which has entered into the civilization of modern Europe and of America is hardly to be over-estimated. The languages which are more or less directly derived from the Roman tongue serve to keep alive in the common speech something of the habits of thought of the Roman people; for words, in one sense, are not the mere arbitrary signs of ideas, but ideas once linked to them are perpetuated through the most radical and violent changes, changes that have been able even to sever all outward connection between those who originally wedded the thought and the utterance, and those to whom the united pair have descended. Savigny has shown that many of the municipal institutions left existing throughout Italy and the Western provinces, spared by the barbarians amid the general wreck of the state polity, were the means of preserving during the Middle Ages, and even under the fierce domination of feudalism, a type of organization which dated back to the Empire in its vigor and integrity. But it is chiefly by her jurisprudence, that consummate product of her organizing power, that perfected fruit of her

civilization, that Rome reaches across the gulf of the ages, and still directs so much of the social relations of modern times. Not only is this continued sway to be recognized in those states which have professedly based their legal systems upon the codifications of Justinian, but England, and through her America, must acknowledge the vast contributions made to their private law by the Roman legislation.

It is not strange that the history of such a nation has been the study of scholars, jurists, and statesmen of all countries; but it is strange that hitherto English literature has afforded no means of tracing the course of the Roman state from its birth amid the barbarous tribes, who collected on the banks of the Tiber, to its death on the shores of the Bosphorus. Gibbon, unsurpassed in the extent of his learning and the minuteness of his research by the most diligent of Germans, has indeed narrated with such mastery the decline and fall of the Empire, as to prevent all attempts at rivalry; and Arnold, the disciple but not imitator of Niebuhr, has described the early condition of the Roman state, and has followed its progress until it had fairly commenced its career of conquest. But the connecting link between these extremes has been wanting. The story of the Republic, flushed with success, but overwhelmed by her own power, and decayed at the core by the vices of all her citizens; of the utter corruption and venality which spread through all departments of the state, until a reconstruction of society became necessary; of the final struggle of the oligarchy, who perpetuated the traditions of the early and exclusive rule of the *populus*, with the middling classes and provincials, whose power was constantly increasing; of the new birth through which the nation passed with many terrible throes; of the rise of the Empire until it reached its culminating point and began its downward course, — had not yet been told by an English historian.

The work of Mr. Merivale is written to supply this most important gap, and to complete the tale of the Roman state. It will be most welcome to every student and reader of history, and will take its place by the side of Arnold and Gibbon. In his Life of Cicero, Mr. Forsyth has been compelled to make many references to the condition of public affairs in which the

great orator took so prominent a part; but still these references are incidental, and the author has not been drawn away from his legitimate functions as a mere biographer to attempt the more arduous task of the historian. His book is a valuable contribution to our standard literature, and we are pleased to learn that it is soon to be reissued in this country. Its style may be obnoxious to criticism; it lacks the easy flow and calm dignity of Mr. Merivale's narrative; it strains too much after effect, and occasionally becomes flippant or inflated. But it is a work which will aid our progress towards the truth; it lifts a corner of the veil which has hung over the scenes and actors of times so full of ferment, and allows us to catch a glimpse of the stage upon which the great drama was played; while Mr. Merivale has torn the veil completely away, and permitted us to gaze without obstruction upon the arena where so many antagonistic principles, represented by opposing parties, were contending for existence and supremacy.

Among the duties of the accurate and conscientious historian, not the least important is the correction of the mistakes and false impressions of those who have preceded him, even though they may have the sanction of authority, and be accepted as a part of the common opinion of mankind. Especially must he subject the accounts of those writers contemporary with the events he narrates to a careful criticism, and detect, if possible, their errors of statement and colorings of passion and prejudice. In this respect Mr. Merivale has done the cause of truth good service. We believe that the reader will rise from these volumes disabused of many notions which he had derived from ordinary histories and from familiar Latin authors. The actors in the great struggle which preceded the death of the Republic will appear in a new light.

We doubt not that, according to the general opinion of English and American writers and readers in respect to the merits of those engaged in the contest which terminated in the dictatorship of Julius Cæsar, that great man was impelled only by an unbridled ambition, to which the liberties of the people, the government of the Commonwealth, and even the structure of society, must be sacrificed, in order that he

might be raised to sole power over the ruined state; while in the prosecution of his designs he made use of the vilest and lowest populace of the city, ever ready to be bought by those who would purchase their services at the highest price. To those who have thus interpreted his character, the party of the Senate, of Pompeius, of Cicero, of Cato, of Brutus, represented what was virtuous in the Republic, struggling to preserve the ancient liberties and the constitution under which Rome had advanced to greatness, against the attacks of an unprincipled though powerful faction, led by a man dangerous because of his pre-eminent abilities as a military commander, and his unbounded influence over the blinded and besotted multitude. Such representations as these of men and motives were set forth by those who wrote at or near the period of which we speak, in the interest and with the prejudices of the nobility; and they have been constantly reproduced by succeeding authors, until they have come to be generally adopted as correct. The critical investigations of modern Continental scholars have, however, led them to question the truth of this picture; and among the recent English students of history, DeQuincey has perceived how hollow were the pretensions of the Senatorial faction to be called the friends of liberty, and has detected their true character as an effete and odious oligarchy, aiming to destroy the rights of all other classes in the state in the endeavor to secure and confirm their own privileges, until the middling orders, which embraced much of the wealth and all of the elements that give stability and power to a nation, were led to rise against them, and, under the leadership of their great advocate, friend, and captain, to throw off the hated tyranny of the Senate and nobility. This view, dogmatically stated by DeQuincey in the glowing diction of one of his essays, Mr. Merivale has now set forth in plain and perspicuous narrative, and supported by overwhelming proofs drawn from a comparison of all contemporary writers.

But although history thus serves to throw light upon the acts and motives of the men who have been pre-eminent in a nation's public affairs, and enables us to form a correct judgment of their characters, this is an incident merely to its grander and more legitimate purposes. Its great object is to discover

and exhibit the national forces which have swept along individuals and institutions in their irresistible progress,— the essential causes which have led to known and positive results. Its province is to trace those elements which, interwoven from the beginning into the life of a state, or added from without by violence, or adopted from choice, have exerted a controlling sway over a people's destiny, and have determined the external forms of their social activity, and the internal character of their civilization. It is from these investigations that lessons of the highest value to the citizen and the statesman are drawn; by the side of these, all disputes or questions about the character and merits of particular persons, however important may have been their part in history, are comparatively insignificant. The first Cæsar perished before the work he had attempted was complete; but that work would have been done had he never lived. Those potential forces which compelled him, as well as the nation, did not depend for their existence upon his life, although he had the sagacity to perceive, and the strength of will to wield and direct them.

We propose, as far as the limits of a single article will permit, to describe some of the most important of those essential causes which acted upon Roman society, and the progress of events through which they worked out their legitimate results in the overthrow of the paramount control of the nobility, the downfall of the Republic, and the establishment of a powerful and concentrated government based upon the principle of absolutism.

M. Guizot, in his Lectures upon Civilization in Europe, asserts that Roman society was entirely of a municipal character; that its organization took the city as its type; and he ascribes to this cause the incoherence, and the constant tendency to disintegration, which made a central and absolute power finally necessary to hold its separate parts in union and subjection. As is true of many of M. Guizot's historical generalizations, this statement is to be taken with much limitation. The Roman genius for order, unequalled by that of any other people, which produced the wonderful system of jurisprudence whence so many modern nations have borrowed, not only the general ideas, but the minutest details of their laws,

did also display itself in the municipal organizations throughout Italy and the provinces, whose perfection gave them such stability, that not a few survived the shock of barbarian invasion and feudal violence, and developed into the free commercial republics of the Middle Ages. But it is not true that, during the later period of the Commonwealth, or under the Empire, the city was the exclusive type of social order. It may have been so in the earliest ages of the Roman states, when the Populus and Plebs were held within the circuit of the sacred walls, when the contiguous nations were mere collections of isolated and fortified towns perched upon the summits of rocky eminences, and the Roman colonies were the armed occupants of some newly captured fastness or outlying city in the territory alternately overrun by the armies of the Republic and its enemies. But the subjugation of the entire peninsula of Italy, and the consequent transfer of active hostilities to a distance from its soil, was accompanied with the rapid and extensive growth of a population permanently rural, either distributed upon farms, or collected into villages. The same was true in those western provinces, which had been the earliest conquered and the longest exposed to the influence of Roman civilization. The ancient isolation of the municipalities passed away; and the intervening country was filled up with resident occupants, who engaged with zeal in the terrible struggles which preceded and attended the destruction of the old constitution. We must, then, look further into the condition of the Roman people than its mere outward form of organization, to find those controlling causes which led to the establishment of the imperial rule.

During the entire period of the Commonwealth, from its origin, upon which a vague tradition serves to throw the only light, through its proud career of development in civilization and expansion in territory, until the revolution accomplished under the first Cæsar, we can discover two opposed elements in the Roman state giving shape to all its institutions. Indeed, during the early centuries of its existence, Rome was not so much a single state as two repellent, and often openly hostile states, engaged in a fierce and determined contest, but held together by bonds sufficiently strong to prevent their vio-

lent separation. Of these, one was dominant, the other subject. To the former — the Populus, the burghers of primitive Rome — belonged all the rights of citizenship given by the private law, all political privileges, and the power of managing and carrying on the affairs of the Commonwealth. The latter — the Plebs or commons — were a conquered people, brought in and annexed to the body politic, not incorporated with it, who were left at first to the principles of natural justice for many of the legal rules which guided their private relations, and who, not being a part of the state, derived no benefit from it except protection. Required to fight its battles, they had no share in the fruits of its victories, and no voice in the direction of its public acts.

From this primitive condition of the two orders, there was a constant attempt on the one side to produce, and on the other to prevent, a complete assimilation and fusion of both elements into one. The whole internal domestic history, and much of that which relates to the foreign policy of the Republic, is simply a record of this struggle, varied by many alternations of success and defeat, but still constantly progressing, until the whole people, of the city and of the provinces, were joined in a common citizenship, and the Roman Empire, through all its wide extent, was animated by the same national sentiments. It was the work of centuries to accomplish this vast result. The old constitution had been devised when the original ideas of two distinct orders were in their full vigor, and it was framed to uphold and preserve this division. The gradual but sure progress of other ideas, the longing after unity, the restless demands of commons and provincials to be admitted to an equal share of the government, had strained this ancient political fabric to the utmost. Before the destiny of Rome could be accomplished, its ancient institutions, sacred by so many memories, must give way, and be supplanted by others through which the new life might develop itself.

Much of this advance had been accomplished before the first Cæsar arose to bring the reign of the old system to an end. The course of centuries had already wrought a great change in the social organization, so that, long before the close of the Republic, the ancient formal distinction between the Populus

and the Plebs had entirely disappeared; the same private law controlled the acts and prescribed the duties of the whole people; the choice of rulers and the direction of the state, so far as they were determined by voting at the elections, were committed to all classes of citizens; and even the full right of citizenship had been granted to many who were not dwellers on the original Roman soil, while a partial right had been freely bestowed among the inhabitants of large portions of Italy.

The causes of this revolution were many. Among the most important, without doubt, was the fact that, as the plebeians began to form the bulk of the armies, they grew to be an essential element in carrying out the national ideas of conquest, and were thus led continually to assert their independence and to acquire political power. At a very early day, the aristocracy, with their more complete organization and their more concentrated class feeling, could dispense with the aid of the inferior populace, and found little difficulty in maintaining their own supremacy. But as wars grew from mere predatory excursions into regularly arranged campaigns, and as the armies were changed from roving bands of marauders into equipped and trained battalions, it was from the ranks of the plebeians that the mass of fighting-men must be drawn, for purposes either of protection or of invasion. Thus a most important advantage was given to the commons in their struggles with the patricians, which their leaders were not slow to use, and by means of which they finally achieved a permanent victory for their own order.

Another cause, more obscure but hardly less efficient, to which historians have scarcely attributed a due influence, lent its aid in elevating the commonalty to an equal share in the control of state affairs. This was the constant and steady progress of the private jurisprudence from its primitive rudeness and severity, its unnatural distinctions and technical rules, to a nearer agreement with the principles of justice and equity. A nation's law is always the result and exponent of its civilization, but it is more: as its development keeps pace with that of the state, it also reacts upon the people themselves, and is a constant stimulant to a further advance. Especially is this

true in those countries where the law is the continuous product of tribunals acting independently of the executive, and comparatively free from the restraints of statutory legislation. Such is the law of England and America, and such was that of Rome. Although at the time of Cicero this jurisprudence had only reached a middle point of its growth, yet even then the prætors, as the constitutional organs by which the discussions of learned jurisconsults became clothed with the binding quality of law, had made marked and important improvements in the ancient code. Possessing a legislative function similar in principle to that of our own judges, they had broken down much of the arbitrariness of the early law, and had raised a new and imposing superstructure upon the old foundations of the Twelve Tables. In the domestic relations, in the rules of property, of inheritance, and of obligations, their innovations were plainly felt, and the whole private jurisprudence had made an approximation to that homogeneity and equity which so strongly characterized its later period of development. The effect of this constant improvement in the rules of the municipal law — penetrating as it did into the private life and relations of the citizens, shaping all their intercourse, clothing their obligations with a character of abstract right instead of technical form, defining their duties, regulating the acquirement, transmission, and ownership of their property — must have been very powerful in producing an approach towards equality, not only in the social condition, but in the political functions of the different orders of the people. It aided in the downfall of the aristocracy, drew all classes closer to each other, and hastened the time when the Roman Commonwealth should be a unit.

But these great and most important changes in the old constitution had not yet resulted in that consummation which was necessary in order that the Roman people might reach the height of their greatness and the full development of their civilization. Although the Licinian and the Publilian laws had swept away the distinction between the Plebs and the Populus, and the assemblies of the Curiæ had been degraded from their original omnipotence to a mere empty form, a wide interval still separated the different orders in the Commonwealth, and a

long course of the nation's life must be passed over before these should be completely assimilated and moulded into one mass, possessing coherence and the power of common hopes and aspirations. But the tendency to union, which had effected so much, would not rest until its work had been entirely accomplished, and the city, Italy, and the provinces had become but parts of one grand whole, embracing the world in its bounds.

The old idea of duality had indeed lost much of its intensity, but it was still controlling in the practical administration of public affairs. If patricians and plebeians had disappeared as distinct castes in the state, they had left behind them parties who inherited their memories, preserved their ideas, and endeavored to carry out their policy. On the one hand was an aristocracy which succeeded to all of the worst characteristics of the ancient patrician order, without possessing any of those nobler qualities that had shed a lustre over it. The pride and arrogance, the exclusiveness, the contempt for those of recent families who had raised themselves by merit, the determined resistance to any attempt to abridge their own privileges, the zeal for the supremacy of their own order, were still characteristic of the nobility of the later Republic; but the simplicity of manners and the purity of morals, the lofty devotion, the stern virtue, the exalted patriotism which elevated the thought of Rome as a state above all other thoughts, and by that very means raised their own rank, in their estimation, as the crowning ornament and excellence of the civil fabric, — these had gone, and their place was supplied by those selfish passions and motives which belong to a corrupt oligarchy, and serve to render it the most odious of all forms of society. The stronghold of this party was the Senate; and although the magistracies were open to all citizens, it was able, through the prestige of its position and of its inherited ideas, through the personal influence and wealth of its members, and through the most unblushing use of bribery and intimidation, to control most of the elections, the popular assemblies for the enactment of laws, the bench of tribunes, and even the judges to whom was committed the duty of deciding the questions involved in criminal prosecutions.

On the other hand, the commons had been succeeded by the great body of citizens, both those of Roman and those of Italian birth. To them all the avenues to distinction and political power were theoretically open; for the elections were nominally free, and any citizen might aspire to the highest offices in the Republic. In fact, not a few were successful in reaching the goal of a Roman's ambition; the ranks of the nobility were not unfrequently recruited by persons of humble origin, — "new men," in the language of the times, — who had risen by their own merit in the field or the forum, attained to curule magistracies, and were thus entitled to a seat in the Senate. Pompeius and Cicero, the military and the civic champions of the oligarchy in its struggle with Julius Cæsar, were examples of this class of recent nobles. While such successful partisans, fresh from the contests of the state, with the experience and skill afforded by long service at home and abroad, were thus adding strength to their adopted order, and infusing life and vigor into it, they were covertly despised by their brethren of ancient family. The oligarchy was willing to use their services, but it seldom gave them its confidence.

Although an opportunity of engaging in the administration of the government was thus apparently afforded to all citizens, and although upon a superficial view it would seem that the nobility, from their comparatively small numbers, might have been set aside, and deprived of a controlling share in the public acts of the state, through the constitutional means of the elections, the tribunes, and the assemblies, yet in fact their power still continued almost supreme. What they lacked in numerical force, they more than made up by their party discipline, and by their constant resort to all the methods whereby the popular will may be thwarted, or the popular opinions misguided. They were thus able to oppose a steady resistance to any alterations of the laws which would lessen their own power or increase that of the rival party. It was only at times, when the whole body of the people, under the championship of such a leader as Cæsar, united in pressing a demand, with the evident purpose of enforcing compliance, that the nobility would sullenly withdraw their opposition, and suffer the reformatory legislation to proceed.

To the popular party among the citizens in the later days of the Republic was added the great mass of the provincials, among whom the Roman civilization had made some progress, and who were henceforth to live either as integral parts of the state, or as mere dependents upon it. Doubtless, at this time, no class at Rome entirely apprehended the importance of these provincials as elements of the Commonwealth. None clearly perceived that the exhaustion of the native stock was to be supplied from this source; that the destiny of the nation rested in their hands; that the imperial greatness of Rome would be a result of the spread of common sentiments and a united political activity among the peoples who bordered on the Mediterranean. The haughty exclusiveness which had anciently cherished the idea of the citizen as something peculiarly sacred, and had surrounded it by bulwarks built upon the very foundations of the private law and the public constitution, had in a great measure given way. Foreign intercourse, the extension of territory, with the consequent political necessity of making some additions to the ranks of the citizens from among the Italian states, and the amelioration of the private law by the free introduction of equitable principles, had done much to soften this old harshness of feeling towards other nations, to weaken this once profound conviction of the essential superiority of Roman birth and lineage. But the change was a partial one. Among the popular party, who were not bound by the traditions of the patrician supremacy, the greater progress had been made, the nearer approach to an acknowledgment of the brotherhood of mankind, the more visible movement towards a perfect unity among all who composed the state, both citizens and provincials. Probably some of their leaders, and especially Cæsar, perceived the necessity for a breaking down of the barriers of separation, and contemplated a Commonwealth one and indivisible, as the result of the contest which had been going on so long, and was now approaching its conclusion.

Whatever undefined sentiments or well-founded expectations might have been held by others, the position of the aristocracy, as a ruling class, towards the provincials, could not be mistaken. They had firmly opposed and would continue to resist any attempt at an extension of citizenship, any project which

looked towards an incorporation of these dependents into the Commonwealth. Such measures were antagonistic to the whole traditional policy of their order, would weaken their grasp upon power, and threaten their political supremacy. Motives more sordid, and perhaps more cogent than these, gave intensity to opinions which had a natural origin in class feelings and prejudices. The provinces had long been the unfailing sources of supply, where the fortunes of needy officials might be repaired; and as the higher magistracies were almost entirely filled by members of the aristocracy, that party came to look upon these regions as their own peculiar ground, from which they might levy contributions to replenish their private coffers.

Accustomed as we are to the well-regulated governments of our own day, in which the rights of property are respected, and such an approach towards purity in the public administration is attained, that bribery and corruption and official peculation are exceptional, and are carefully concealed from the public knowledge, we can scarcely appreciate the condition of the Roman provinces under pro-consular and pro-prætorian rule. The race for the political honors of the Republic was no easy one. Success itself was expensive; the candidate must expend his means with a lavish hand; when his own resources were exhausted, he must draw on those of his friends; and when these proved unavailing, resort must be had to the usurer. But to the candidate who was thus impoverishing himself and his friends, a glittering prize constantly appeared at the end of the course, which was sufficient to allure him on through any labor, and to reward any sacrifice. He knew that, as soon as the somewhat empty honor of the prætorship or the consulship was ended, a province stood ready to receive him and furnish the substantial recompense for his outlays. There he confidently expected to pay all his indebtedness, to enrich all his friends and followers, and to amass a boundless fortune for himself. His power as provincial governor was unlimited; no counterpoise in the political machinery checked his movements. The arts and appliances for extorting money from a subdued people had been cultivated to perfection, and he was master of them all.

The constitution, indeed, afforded a single safeguard to the

rights of the provincials ; but even that the ruling faction had been able to thwart and turn entirely to its own profit. At the expiration of his term of office, the late magistrate, now a private citizen, might be impeached by his recent subjects, and brought to trial upon charges of corruption or oppression. But the fountains of justice themselves had been polluted. The systematic bribery of the judges, who were largely taken from their order, was a part of the tactics of the oligarchy ; and this practice was so universally known, and the results were so well understood, that a conviction was never even apprehended by the accused. The successful prosecution of Verres first startled the aristocracy in their security, and showed them that their peculiar measures had been pushed too far, and that a pursuing Nemesis might already be awakening. These reasons conspired to throw the provincials as a body into the arms of the popular party, which thus enjoyed whatever aid could be afforded by the moral support, the hearty good wishes, and the material resources of its allies.

Already, before the final struggle, had the opposing forces of the people and of the aristocracy met in bitter and bloody conflict. At first the former were triumphant in the resort to arms, and Marius for a while held undisputed sway through the state. But, though a brave and successful captain, he was entirely unfitted for the arduous position of a political leader ; he had nothing of the quality which we call statesmanship. He was strong in opposing and overthrowing, but he had no constructive power. His death left his party in no condition to maintain the supremacy which they had temporarily acquired ; no general schemes of legislation tending to enforce their ideas had been inaugurated ; no progress had been made, except the substantial incorporation of the Italians into the Roman Commonwealth. The reaction followed, and the oligarchy were restored to their former position ; they were even strengthened in it, and recovered many important privileges which they had been forced to abandon a generation or two before. Their leader, Sulla, was an ideal aristocrat. He outraged all sentiments of justice, he proscribed, he massacred, upon principle ; not for his own aggrandizement, nor from any thirst for blood, or passion of cruelty, but with a cool and

calculating design to promote the advantage of his own order, and settle forever the disputes which had distracted the Republic. He strove to return to the good old times, when the supremacy of the Populus was unquestioned, and the commons were an inferior and subject race. As soon as he supposed his work was complete, and the oligarchy so firmly established that no civil commotions could overthrow it, he resigned his power, that his class might alone reap the advantage of their triumph in him. But, though stunned, the spirit of opposition, that spirit in which were expressed the sentiments of the great body of citizens and of all the provincials, was not dead. It soon revived, and prepared for a more determined struggle under a leader who was wise enough to understand the wants of the age and of the state, and skilful enough to combine and direct all the forces which tended to the great end of unity and comprehension.

We do not propose to sketch the life of Julius Cæsar, or to narrate the successive steps of his rise to power, or to describe his gradual concentration of the popular elements, until by one blow he toppled over the fabric which Sulla had left so seemingly secure. The incidents in this eventful career are too familiar to need recapitulation. How well defined and complete a plan Cæsar had proposed for himself, how consciously he was carrying out the principles of unity against those of exclusion, we can only judge from his acts and from his general character. His writings exhibit a remarkable reticence, and disclose nothing of the course of thought which occupied his mind. At the same time, the thorough scholarly culture of the man is nowhere more clearly shown than in the fact that his works, written amid the cares and business of the camp, are models of a pure idiomatic Latinity. But when we review the whole course of Cæsar's life, his early identification of himself with a party then depressed, his steady pursuit of a single object, his careful organization of the means with which he was to work, so that he had but to put them in motion and the work was done, and, finally, the manner in which he met and used success, we must admit that his ambition was far more than a mere selfish love of glory and power for their own sakes; we must confess that with his ambition nobler and

more statesmanlike qualities were joined, which gave color and character to his public acts. Cæsar was the single Roman of his times who fully comprehended the genius and destiny of his nation. He read the meaning of the party strifes; he had watched the ebb and flow of the popular will, and noticed that, with all its fluctuations, it was rising higher and higher. Of old patrician family, and knowing when and how to appeal to the natural feelings of admiration for those of ancient lineage, he had broken away from the prejudices of his class, and had formally and forever cut himself off from the past. It was the studied policy of his life to sever also the bonds which held the state to the traditions, forms, and ideas of a bygone time, and thus to give it freedom of action in the course of development which lay before it.

The Romans, from the earliest period of their history, possessed a wonderful regard for the letter of the law. Even the Twelve Tables had enacted, as the very basis of all obligations, "Ubi lingua nuncupasset, ita jus esto." They clung to the outward form when the spirit and life had departed. But to Cæsar, above all his countrymen, was given the clear vision that pierced through the husks, the carefully folded envelopes of things, and saw the substance in its naked simplicity. He was impatient of mere forms which no longer symbolized any living fact. Fully convinced that the pretensions of the aristocratic party were utterly irreconcilable with the claims of the popular party, and that their policy was entirely opposed to the interests of the Commonwealth, and that, if carried out, it would dwarf the growing society, produce premature decay and decrepitude, and arrest the destiny of Rome, he plainly perceived that no compromise was possible with them. He saw that one or the other must triumph in the complete destruction of its rival's power. Which should be the victor, he never doubted; and his life was devoted to organizing the victory, so that it should be at once thorough and comparatively bloodless. At the same time, he recognized the fact that the old constitution was insufficient for the needs of the Commonwealth; and that, in the very triumph of liberal ideas, it must be overthrown. The yearly consuls, the general elections, the assemblies for voting upon proposed laws, the appeal of public

criminals to the tribunal of the people, were institutions devised and fitted only for a purely municipal society, — a society at once compact and united. They were outgrown when the right of citizenship was extended over the Italian peninsula, and especially when the Mediterranean was fringed with dependent provinces, which must receive their law from the central city. As a necessary result, the control of the administration came into the hands of a few leaders, and of the populace of Rome itself, to the exclusion, except on extraordinary occasions, of the mass of Italian citizens, and to the utter denial to the provinces of any voice in public affairs. This, indeed, was the condition which the oligarchy favored and strove to make perpetual; but it was a condition of national paralysis, and would soon end in national death.

These institutions, then, as methods by which the government was administered, had become mere forms; their usefulness had ended; they were only hindrances in the progress of the state towards maturity. The consummation of the struggle which had now lasted since the banishment of the kings, the success of liberal ideas and of an enlarged policy, must be accompanied by a reconstruction of society, a remodelling of the state, a redistribution of the functions of government. Old names might be retained, many old forms preserved; but the substantial power must be lodged somewhere beyond the caprice of the urban populace and the reach of a bigoted aristocracy, where it would be wielded for the benefit of the whole commonwealth, and would thus inevitably tend to draw together all portions into a united empire.

For this result Cæsar prepared by a long and careful training of himself, his soldiers, and the people; and when the time to strike had come, when the oligarchy, by their mad persistence, had left no alternative but a hostile movement or his own destruction, he put the forces which he had perfected into motion, and the overthrow of the aristocratic faction was immediate. They were forced at once to retire from the city and from Italy, to abandon the government, and to mass their military resources in a distant province, there to await attack. This very suddenness of their fall shows that the oligarchy had no hold upon the affections of the people, — that their boasted

championship of liberty and order was universally understood to be a sham. The final conflict soon came, was short and decisive, and Rome was regenerated.

The victory of Cæsar was worthy of himself, of the principles he represented, and of the party he led. It only needs to be compared with the acts by which Pompeius and the Senate had determined to follow up their assumed success, in order that it may appear in its true character, as a triumph of more advanced and comprehensive political ideas of the nation itself over those who looked upon the state as their own exclusive patrimony, to be managed for their personal aggrandizement. Even Cicero, who thoroughly knew his own partisans, and who had barely escaped with his life from their violence, was forced to confess that a victory of Pompeius would have been accompanied by indiscriminate proscriptions and massacres, and that even those who had remained quiet in their own homes, refusing to join either army, had been doomed to death; while Cæsar had exhibited a leniency unexpected by his adversaries, but which marked the natural generosity of his character and the elevation of his policy. Indeed, when all armed opposition had been overcome, he trusted no longer to his soldiery, but threw himself with perfect faith upon the people. Many of the Senatorial leaders had perished in battle, a very few had been banished or put to death, while the remainder had given in their adherence to the new order of things, and some had united their fortunes with those of the Dictator. All seemed to be safe; confidence would beget confidence; the people were more than satisfied; the necessity for the army was ended.

We can only conjecture how the supreme power which he had thus reached would have been practically used in reconstructing a system of state polity out of the fragments of the shattered republican constitution; but we have a right to judge from the past life of the Dictator, and from his moderation in success, that much would have been done for the benefit of the whole Commonwealth. What particular course of legislation he would have adopted, how extensive and complete would have been his plans of comprehension, whether he would at one blow have accomplished all his intended reforms, or whether he would have proceeded gradually in his work, are interesting

subjects for speculation; but beyond speculation we cannot reach. We may be sure that no return would have been made to the former constitution; probably not even such a resemblance to republican forms would have been retained as was preserved by Octavius. The condition of the state at the time, and the subsequent course of events, leave no room for doubt, however, that the premature death of Cæsar was a loss to the Roman nation not to be measured by words. His assassins, in gratifying their private pique, in avenging their personal slights and fancied wrongs, under the sacred name of liberty, inflicted a blow upon their country from which it never entirely recovered, even during the long course of imperial rule. This act renewed the civil war, and made it one of extermination.

The oligarchy had been thrust from its exalted station, but many of its members were yet living, enjoying their estates and honors, and not forgetful of their former pre-eminence. Cæsar's power was firm so long as he lived; so far as it depended upon his personal influence, it was secure; but it had not yet become incorporated into the governmental functions of the state; no dynastic measures had been arranged to perpetuate it, no general legislation matured to make the system complete. The Dictator's intentions had not yet been adopted as the national policy, to be carried out after his life was ended. On the other hand, the events of the last two generations, and especially of the career just closed, rendered it plain that the ideas of the popular party had gained the ascendant, that the exclusiveness of the aristocratic rule was forever broken. But the sudden death of Cæsar revived the hopes of the fallen faction, who regarded liberty and the Republic but as synonymous of their own supremacy.

The civil war broke out afresh, and everything conspired to make the conflict bitter and bloody. On the one side, the shame of recent defeat and the hope springing up out of despair, on the other, feelings of revenge and motives of personal ambition, gave a deadly character to the hatred, and added fierceness to every blow. The loss of Cæsar deprived his party of the one leader who combined military skill, political sagacity, and indomitable will with generous impulses and lofty, comprehensive aims. Antonius and Octavius were great men, — indeed, no

moderate abilities would have sufficed to control the storm that now raged through the state, — but neither of them was a Julius. Still, under their leadership, the issue of the conflict now waged with the remains of the oligarchy was never doubtful; by what measures their success would be accompanied was, unhappily, no less certain. The day that saw Cicero's head and hands nailed to the rostra, insulted by a coarse Antonius and an infamous Fulvia, was the saddest that had yet risen upon Rome; but its advent was made sure when Brutus and Cassius drew their daggers on the fatal ides of March. While the old Senatorial party was thus doomed, it was long doubtful which of the competitors would be successful in grasping the prize that had fallen from the grasp of the dying Cæsar. The politic, persistent Octavius at last triumphed over the military experience and fitful energy of his rival, and was destined to found the Roman Empire.

We have the materials, without relying too much on conjecture, for comparing the political structure which permanently succeeded the Republic with that which Julius would have left behind him had he lived to finish the task he had but commenced. Certain unmistakable facts in the internal condition of the nation, and certain contrasts of personal character in the first and second Cæsar, enable us to perceive the organic differences in the creations of their administrative faculty. Roman society, at the time when Octavius had overcome all opposition and had been invested with imperial powers, was greatly changed in many of its features from that which existed at the death of the Dictator. The first Emperor reached his height of power by a road marked with the slaughter of Rome's best citizens. He had no confidence in the people; he was timid and cautious in political expedients, only firm and vigorous in dealing with his enemies. The policy of the first Cæsar was broader and wiser. He had spared all the aristocratic party who abandoned their open hostility and gave in their submission, and had received many of them into his confidence. After the force necessary to break the organization of the oligarchy had been exerted, he trusted entirely to the power of ideas to finish the revolution. He hoped to win the leaders of the old *régime* to his own views, or at least to secure their co-operation in carry-

ing out his plans, as the only means of promoting the best interests of the state, and aiding its progress towards unity. While destroying their exclusive power, he would not lose them as individual elements in the community, but would retain and use whatever of good they might contribute to the nation in the commencement of its new life. This body of men was sufficiently large, and the prestige of their name and station was sufficiently great, to have constituted them a strong conserving force in the fermenting mass of Roman society. Whatever of learning, of culture, of love for art and letters existed, was chiefly to be found in the ranks of the oligarchy. It was by no means true that their order as a whole was distinguished by these graces and amenities of life. Many whose patrician lineage extended back to the infancy of the city prided themselves on retaining the roughness and severity of their fathers, and despised, or affected to despise, all the adventitious aids which had been borrowed from Grecian civilization. Others were entirely given up to debauchery, using their fortunes only as means of pandering to their baser appetites. But with all this stubborn clinging to the customs of their ancestors which was peculiar to some, and the profligacy which disgraced others, the wealth and leisure of the class afforded opportunities of prosecuting those studies and engaging in those pursuits which cultivate breadth of thought, completeness of character, and that refinement and delicacy of manner which the Romans called urbanity. A political reason far more important made these men necessary to the highest development of the state. They were the representatives of much that had made Rome glorious through her past career. They carried with them the memories and sentiments of the illustrious dead whose exploits formed the national history, or were woven into the myths from which that history emerged. They were the link which would visibly connect the greatness of the past with that yet to come. They had indeed proved themselves unequal to the task of government, and had been justly driven from power, but their personal presence and influence could not be spared in a society passing through a revolution so fundamental as that which closed the Republic and ushered in the Empire. Cæsar would have retained a large admixture of this element, and its effect

upon the current of thought and opinion would have been felt through the whole extent and life of the Empire. No memories of general proscriptions and sweeping confiscations would have clung to the new-founded dynasty; no gaps made by violent death would have reminded every influential family of the ordeal through which it had passed; no patrimonial estate, enjoyed by some imperial favorite, would have been a constant suggestion to every ancient proprietor of the diminution made in his fortunes.

The reality was far different. The classes which would have done so much towards elevating and refining the tone of society were swept away. The people, worn out by the commotions of two generations, only longed for quiet, and were willing to accept any government which gave them peace. The habits of thought, the opinions and passions, which were the legitimate result of familiarity with scenes of slaughter and devastation, heightened as they were by the absence of that softening influence which a more generous culture would have added, stamped a character upon society which it never entirely shook off, and which thus proved how great an evil had been inflicted on the state by the substitution of Octavius for Julius as the first Roman Emperor.

While Cæsar would probably have pursued a policy in a measure conservative, and would have strengthened the foundations, and added grace to the superstructure, of the political fabric he was raising, by working into it choice material which was afterwards rejected, in some respects he was more radical than the actual founder of the Empire. Octavius was timid by nature, and his statesmanship bore the impress of his personal character. At the very outset of his public career, amid the general confusion and the conflict of interests which followed the murder of the Dictator, with Antonius on the one side, and the Senatorial faction on the other, as rivals who sought to crush him as an upstart, he had resolved to gather all power into his own hands; but in the accomplishment of his design he proceeded by cautious and halting steps. Driven by the necessities of his position to consent to proscriptions which Julius had avoided, he yet lacked the nerve to announce his real purposes, and to expose his policy of reconstructing the

state. Even to the last he strove to cover up the fact of his absolute dominion under the semblance of institutions familiar to the days of the Republic. He shrunk from assuming the title of King, for that name was traditionally hateful. He was Imperator, in virtue of his command of the armies of the Commonwealth. He cloaked his supreme civil authority under the guise of the consular and the tribunitian powers, and thus united in his own person those jurisdictions which belonged to the highest magistracies of the old constitution. The legislative function — that attribute which subsequently cast such lustre upon the office of Roman Emperor, elevating it immeasurably above all the monarchies of modern times, rendering it not merely in theory but in fact the single source of law and justice to a nation which the imperial writers fondly described as including the world — he never openly exercised. He retained the Senate, ostentatiously submitting to them all matters of public welfare, and treating them as still the national legislature, although he contrived that their decrees should simply be the echoes of his own will. Under such a complete change of circumstances, he attempted to revive the habits of thought and to return to the customs of a former age. The old nobility, which had been swept away during the civil wars, and in whose extermination he had so materially assisted, was replaced by a new race of men suddenly elevated to dignity, whom he required to adopt the ideas and manners of the republican aristocracy. While he was in all things but the name an absolute monarch, he surrounded himself with many of the appearances of a liberal government, and endeavored by empty shows to impose upon the people, to whom he granted no political rights. That this policy was short-sighted, the subsequent history of the Empire demonstrates; it served to give him present security, but only postponed the dangers which it could not remove. Through a protracted and fearful agony, a new birth had come to the state; old things had passed away; and these attempts to preserve or restore the cast-off institutions simply turned the current of national progress away from its direct course. It needed a ruler of a different intellectual and moral nature from Octavius to guide the forces which were then at work in consolidating the Roman Empire, so as to secure

the utmost freedom of development towards perfection. Augustus repressed and deadened the organic life of society and the individual life of the citizens; Julius would have quickened and stimulated both. The Emperor produced a peace, but it was one of indifference and timidity, not of calm and strong repose. The Dictator would have aroused to action, and the energy of his creative genius would have pulsated to the last bounds of the mighty Empire. Octavius had no confidence in his subjects, and was engrossed in expedients to strengthen his own dominion and secure the succession to his family; Cæsar would have been restrained by no fears of the people, or doubts of the permanency of his position. He would have accepted the lessons of the past, and, with the self-reliance of true greatness, would have carried out his measures of reorganization until the work was accomplished, and the new Commonwealth stood forth in the complete triumph of those ideas which had been struggling for supremacy through long centuries of conflict. The ancient institutions would have been abandoned, but the true Roman spirit would have been preserved and directed into new channels.

The Empire was a necessity, resulting both from the internal condition of the state, and from the grand movements of Providence in unfolding the truth, hitherto unrecognized, of the universal brotherhood of mankind. The events in the history of the Commonwealth all pointed to this consummation. This was the period of transition from the ancient to the modern civilization. The ideas of distinctive nationalism, of separate races, of citizens and barbarians, which had hitherto been universal, were to disappear in the wide-embracing fold of the Roman state; and the Christian principle, working in a society specially prepared for its reception, was to produce its fruit in the belief of a common origin and a common destiny for humanity. To the hastening of this glorious result, the Roman civilization, freed from the restraints of the Republic, was peculiarly adapted. Its ethnic life and energy were such that no nation could withstand it. All tribal forms, all institutions, all languages, brought between the poles of its ever-circling current, were disintegrated, resolved into their elements, and recombined in new proportions and with even stronger affini-

ties. The Keltic races, which in Britain successfully resisted the moulding forces of Saxon culture, and even remain to the present day in sullen separation from their English neighbors, opposed no obstacle to the mastering influence of the Roman life in Gaul and Spain. So completely were they transformed, so entirely changed into the likeness of their conquerors, that, when the hordes of barbarian invaders, the Visigoths, the Burgundians, the Franks, swept over them, they in turn communicated the living spirit of Rome to their new masters, until Western and Southern Europe was once again recast in the imperial mould. He must be blind indeed, who does not see in this all-pervading vitality of a single people the preparation which Providence made for the spread of the Christian religion among those races which were to give laws to the world.

Art. VI. — *The National Resources, and their Relation to Foreign Commerce and the Price of Gold.*

On the 12th of January, 1843, Mr. Walter Forward, then Secretary of the Treasury, reported to Congress the result of negotiations for a loan of $3,500,000; which negotiations were begun in April, 1842. But two bids had been made for this loan, one of 50,000, and one of 60,000 dollars; both at 96 per cent, for a six per cent twenty years' stock. The Secretary in a special report to Congress said: "The repeated failures incurred in negotiating at home upon advantageous or creditable terms suggested the policy of sending an agent abroad for the purpose of endeavoring to effect a favorable negotiation in England or upon the Continent. Accordingly, a gentleman of the highest consideration for intelligence and integrity was selected for the purpose, and left the United States in July last. I regret to communicate that he has since returned without effecting the object of his mission." Without citing the more recent failures of the public credit, when the personal discredit of the negotiators may have influenced the public quite as much as

the actual state of the public resources, or, again, when the alarms of the opening war agitated the nation and paralyzed business, the contrast presented by this incident of twenty years since, and the financial facts of 1862, 1863, and 1864 is very striking. At a date so recent as to mark little distinction in European history, and therefore to be scarcely credited as a distinct period by European observers, there was absolutely no money in the United States to invest in loans, and no credit in foreign countries on which money could be raised. Nor was this the consequence of debt, since less than ten millions of the debt accrued in former years remained unpaid. Such was the financial condition in 1842; while in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864, after taking $200,000,000 in permanent loans, $275,000,000 in temporary loans, and $300,000,000 in circulating notes in the previous fiscal year, the people of the United States have again taken $424,503,638 in permanent loans, $166,798,045 in temporary loans, and in interest-bearing treasury-notes $227,076,366. With the exception of a small temporary loan immediately repaid, not a dollar of this vast sum has been asked for or obtained in the first instance in any foreign country. And while the revenues of 1842 were but $18,187,908 from customs, and $19,965,009 from all ordinary sources, there was received in 1863–64 from customs, $102,316,153; from internal revenue, $109,741,134; and from all ordinary sources, exclusive of all loans and currency or other notes issued, $260,627,717.

Here is a contrast sharper than mere words can express between the financial strength of the nation in a time of peace with its resources undeveloped, and in a time of war with our vast natural wealth developed and in process of development. It cannot be expected that European nations will at once appreciate the extent and significance of changes so great, nor perhaps fully accredit the facts of this current history. But the full measure of this increased strength should be made known to our own people in terms so clear, and with proof so decisive, as to remove all doubt and despondency as to the power of the government to surmount the great trial the Rebellion has brought on it. The purpose of this article is to promote this better knowledge of the extraordinary facts that make the

present vast expenditure possible, and that supply loans and revenues unprecedented in the history of nations.

The premium on gold, and the unexpectedly high point to which it has attained, are striking and impressive facts, which have been construed by the public at home and abroad as indicative of the financial weakness of the United States. The history of the price of gold, it is generally assumed, has been uniform; a high price has almost invariably signified commercial exhaustion and dependence. It has been taken as the measure of real weakness, though in some cases military power or stringent legislation has prevented the transfers of wealth which its price would create if commerce had been free, and the enfeebled nation has ultimately gained strength again sufficient to restore its commercial and financial equality with others. It is necessary to inquire, therefore, whether the high price of gold in the United States, continued now more than two years, is an instance corresponding to previous cases of high price of gold in Europe, and whether it signifies a depreciation or destruction of values in the United States equivalent to the premium it bears. It is asserted with great positiveness, that the price of gold does signify the depreciation of values as expressed in the usual terms; that the dollar of account is no longer a dollar in real value, but is reduced to forty cents only, when gold is at 250 in currency. All fixed property in lands, houses, and estates is proportionately depreciated, it is said; and movable property, whether for use and consumption at home, or for export and exchange abroad, is to be reduced in the same proportion from the nominal value it bears.

Before undertaking an analysis of the relation the price of gold now bears to commercial exchanges, a word should be said on its relation to fixed or real property. The real estate of the United States is of such vast magnitude, and has such permanence of productive value in the occupancy and uses of a great people, that the point is almost settled by the mere statement; it is not, and cannot be, subject to the absurd changes which have marked the price of gold. Very slight changes have occurred in the usual business valuations of lands, buildings, and all fixed property, in city or country; changes less in amount, indeed, than have frequently taken place in ordinary

periods of the same extent. Farms or city properties, for example, worth $20,000 each in 1860, have not risen to $56,800 in paper currency, nor fallen to $7,150 in gold, when the speculative premium was carried up to 280. The dollar of account is still a dollar in actual value for all the greater purposes of business in the country. People buy, sell, and affix values by it now as before. Indeed, as to fixed property, little or no argument is necessary to assure its holder that his ten thousand dollars' worth of four years ago has not fallen to four thousand dollars' worth, because the nominal price has remained the same; but it is necessary to urge that the same plain principles be fairly applied to our business in general merchandise, and to exchanges with foreign countries.

The claim made here is, that the full premium on gold is not now due in fact, and has not at any time been due, to natural and unavoidable business causes. It is not a result of the commercial and financial condition of the nation,—a condition bringing with it a general depreciation of all values and all property, or an inflation of the currency price affixed to them, signifying the same thing. It is an anomaly, a circumstance altogether different from the apparently similar circumstances in the history of other nations; and is neither a measure of our inherent strength, nor of our relation to the world at large. The mode in which our external commerce is conducted, and the imperfect statements of facts in regard to it, do seem to imply commercial dependence and subordination as the existing condition; yet this appearance is to a great extent deceptive and unreal. There is no drain to pay commercial indebtedness that is not easily met by the proceeds of commercial shipments; and, in fact, the shipment outward precedes the shipment inward, and the credits are produced before they are required in use. There is no drain to reimburse loans taken abroad and now falling due, and no dependence for loans yet to be taken there. There is no general adjustment of accounts going on, which calls for heavy remittances to pay balances accrued against us. Yet with all this there are very large exchanges constantly conducted, and great quantities of gold have, within two years past, been driven to deposit in England by the piracies which have endangered our shipping between

the Isthmus and our commercial cities of the East. If, therefore, this increased price of gold does not represent debt held and in process of payment abroad, nor any other form of public or private monetary dependence or exhaustion, to be adjusted only by payment of coin to such extent as to double the value of gold as compared with the dollar of account maintained by law, this price is an anomaly, for which some other explanation or solution must be sought.

Such are the terms in which the general positions here taken are stated, in order to be definite and concise, and without intending to assume undue positiveness. It is not supposed that the concurrence of the majority of those best able by their knowledge of facts, or most competent otherwise to judge, can be secured in these assumed positions without admitting important qualifications; yet the extreme pressure of adverse opinion abroad appears to require the strongest counteracting statements that are justified by the facts. The experience of the past three years has shown that, in some important departments, the public judgment has greatly undervalued the resources, the capacity, and the endurance of the people of the loyal States. It is already apparent that the rules heretofore held to control the finances of nations are inadequate to measure the recorded events of our recent history.

With sufficient space to record, both in summary and in detail, the quantities and values of articles of internal and of foreign exchange produced and sold to consumers, the best mode of treatment of the whole question of resources would be through such full statistics; but it is necessary to limit this form of illustration to the use of annual aggregations only. Even in this condensed form, the simple facts of our commercial condition and foreign exchanges for the past ten years will perhaps do more, through mere statement and comparison, than can otherwise be done to illustrate the real character of the gold movement, and to throw light on all its relations, at the same time that they serve the principal purpose of this paper in showing what the resources of the country are.

Previous to July, 1862, there was no premium of consequence on gold, and no possibility therefore that the prices then prevailing were unduly enhanced. The aggregate values annually

exchanged with foreign countries are, therefore, up to that time, true representatives of the financial relation of the United States to Europe; and this is decisively proved by the large importation of specie drawn from England in 1861 and 1862. To show that no recent occasion of exhausting drain had occurred when the present disturbed period began, the comparison is carried back to the fiscal year 1854–55, in the following statement of total exports, imports, and balances in foreign trade.

	Total Exports.	Total Imports.	Excess of Exports.
1854–55	$ 275,156,846	$ 261,468,520	$ 13,688,326
1855–56	326,964,908	314,639,942	12,324,966
1856–57	362,960,682	360,890,141	2,070,541
1857–58	324,644,421	282,613,150	42,031,271
1858–59	356,789,462	338,768,130	18,021,332
1859–60	400,122,296	362,163,941	37,958,355
1860–61	410,856,818	352,075,535	58,881,283
1861–62	229,790,280	205,819,823	23,970,457
1862–63	350,017,338	252,187,587	97,829,751
1863–64	340,665,580	330,109,840	10,555,740

There are several important points to be considered which affect these aggregates, that first in order being the deficiency of the export account. It has long been known that, from the absence of penalty for deficient or untrue outward invoices, or of especial necessity, from any cause, requiring the record of the export manifests to be complete and full, there has been more or less of failure either to clear outward shipments of domestic produce, or to secure the record of such clearances when the ship obtains its general clearance and leaves the port. The deficiency at the port of New York on this account is estimated by officers most competent to judge at one fourth the total of outward shipments of domestic produce annually. Taking the deficiency at one sixth only, it amounts, at the port of New York alone, for the fiscal year 1863–64, to $35,200,000.

On the other hand, the reported imports, though more rigidly and closely valued, undoubtedly are always short, not only of the true valuation when entered, but still more deficient in the valuation they should have as one side of the com-

mercial exchanges. The increase over the invoice price at which they are entered, resulting from transportation across the Atlantic, and the advance properly charged on them on arrival by the importer, add twenty per cent to the recorded aggregate values at the point and time of actual exchange. A portion of this is profit falling wholly to citizens and capital of the United States, while a portion remains attached to the original foreign ownership. Taken together, the corrections due to undervaluation nearly balance each other, probably giving a few millions of preponderance to the export side.

Again, there is an account of gold and silver coin and bullion exchanged, which largely increases the volume for the ten years of the table, both in imports and exports. Previous to 1857, no report of specie and bullion entering and leaving the ports of England was required by law, and in so far official recognition was given to the claim that they are not merchandise. But with the large surplus of precious metals produced in many countries now, it becomes impossible to deny the commercial character of specie and bullion shipments. The production of gold in California has been far in excess of the requirement for coin, and for all other purposes or uses in the United States, and a steady current outward has been the consequence. In two years, from July 1, 1860, to June 30, 1862, however, the heavy outward shipments of cotton and other produce induced a reversal of the current, under which a sum of $62,750,000 in gold was imported, in the face of undiminished production of the gold mines.

	Imports.	Exports.	Excess of Exports.
1854–55	$3,659,812	$56,247,343	$52,587,531
1855–56	4,207,632	45,745,485	41,537,853
1856–57	12,461,799	69,136,922	56,675,123
1857–58	19,274,496	52,633,147	33,358,651
1858–59	6,369,703	63,887,411	57,517,708
1859–60	8,550,135	66,546,239	57,996,104
1860–61	46,339,611	29,791,080	(Excess of Imports.) 16,548,531
1861–62	16,415,052	36,886,956	20,471,904
1862–63	9,555,648	82,364,489	72,808,841
1863–64	13,155,706	105,125,750	91,970,044

The sums here given for the last two fiscal years embrace

large aggregates shipped from San Francisco to England under peculiar circumstances, and not reported as exports by the customs officers; it being claimed by the shippers that the transactions were solely for account of Eastern holders, and that the gold was sent to England merely to secure safety in the transit. But as the exchange drawn against all such shipments was employed or held by these parties, and the gold did not return to the United States, its value should, in the first instance, be set down to the account of exports. The amount so exported in the fiscal year 1862–63 was $18,207,879; and for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864 (1863–64), $35,735,265.

It is undoubtedly true that these sums do not represent ordinary commercial transactions, and that they are covered by exchange or other credits, which, if adjusted, would require the return of the gold to the United States. It is a portion of the large reserve of accrued wealth of citizens of the United States, who have, for safety and without inconvenience, remitted it to England practically as a deposit, content to hold or to place in the market the credits drawn against it. While its export is a disadvantage in some respects, and the fact that such is the course of these important shipments of gold from California for Eastern account is one worthy of public if not of legislative attention, there is an assurance of the strength of the country in the case which is gratifying. Exchange on England and Europe is undoubtedly held now in large surplus above the wants of merchants for current remittance. Evidences of this fact appear in many quarters, independent of this very remarkable remittance of gold. Probably the sum of fifty millions of dollars is within bounds as an estimate of the absolute surplus of exchange and like credits now held in the United States against England and Continental Europe, which sum will return to us in gold when national events permit an adjustment of the commercial and financial balances between Europe and the United States.

The great profits made by dealers in and holders of exchange since gold began to rise to a premium, have created a new class of investors and speculators, whose business it is to hold, as well as to create, exchange for its legitimate purchas-

ers. It has been better than gold to hold and speculate in, because far more convenient, and more easily converted into other exchangeable values. Recently it has been too much the habit to overlook the relation which exchange bears to current commerce, and to regard it as actual and secured property at the price it has borne with gold at 250. It will, doubtless, command the return of gold for such excess as may not be covered by payment for merchandise bought abroad; but that gold, when returned, will be worth little or nothing more than the general currency. A sudden adjustment of mutual credits and debts with foreign countries would as suddenly sweep away what are now deemed to be great accumulated profits invested in gold and exchange.

Reducing the exports of gold for the last two fiscal years above named by the sums sent in this unusual manner from California, and not officially embodied in the statement of exports made at that port, the exports, and excess of exports over imports, are as follows: —

	Exports.	Excess of Exports.
1862 – 63	$ 64,156,610	$ 54,600,692
1863 – 64	69,390,485	56,234,779

These sums of excess of exports thus become almost exactly equivalent to those of each year of the period from 1854 to 1860. It is evident that there is no commercial drain in the case during either year; and this point, whether there is or is not a commercial drain, is of the highest importance in considering the general relation of our own to European finances.

The position that there is no such drain is further confirmed by the events of the quarter ending September 30, 1864; in which period the exports of specie and bullion were small. At New York they were but $ 6,425,005 for the quarter, and but $ 5,782,205 in excess of the specie imports. None was exported at other Eastern ports; and at San Francisco, the total export was $ 11,640,600, of which $ 8,764,600 was of the character mentioned previously, or was shipped to England "on Eastern account." The sum of $ 8,659,000 was thus the amount of regular exports for the quarter, or at the rate of $ 34,636,000 for the year.

We proceed to apply the results of this calculation of gold

and silver exchanges to the aggregates of trade before given, from which it appears that we have, as the measure of the credits nominally placed to our account in Europe in 1862–63, the sum of $97,829,751. The imports are of course in gold values, and require no modification; but the exports require an analysis, and a reduction of some portion of the total to proper equivalents in gold, before it can be decided what the actual value of our credits on the exchanges of that year was. The aggregate as made up is $350,017,338, of which there was in coin and bullion $82,364,489; and in foreign merchandise, given in the values of the original foreign invoices, and therefore not requiring reduction, the sum of $25,959,248. There remain $241,693,601 in value of domestic merchandise exported to balance the portion of the imports not covered by the exports first named, or the sum of $162,071,739. Assuming that the premium on gold is directly represented in the increased price of exports of domestic produce, — an extreme assumption, as will subsequently be shown, — one half the sum named above may be reduced to correspond with a premium of 25 per cent on gold, which was the exact average premium from July 1 to December 1, 1862; $120,846,805 becoming, at gold value, $96,677,444. The second half was exported while gold bore a higher premium,— an average of 55 per cent,— and its equivalent gold value becomes $77,965,681. The domestic produce account is thus $174,643,125, and the total of exports reduced to gold values is $282,966,862, against $252,187,587 of imports; an excess of exports of $30,779,275. Reducing this sum by the amount of the extraordinary gold shipments from California, which reached $18,207,879, the balance is still $12,571,396 on the actual commerce of the year.

This being the first year to which the discrepancies of currency apply, it has been examined with care to ascertain whether the intrinsic values exchanged by the United States with all the world were such as to exhaust our resources, and to put us at especial loss in consequence of the premium on gold and exchange. It is believed that the proof is ample that the effect of such premium was really in our favor rather than against us, since it raised the price of a greater amount of absolute merchandise in our hands than in the hands of those who exchanged with us.

In the preceding calculation it has been admitted that the price of export staples increased directly, and fully kept pace, with the premium on gold; and under certain conditions of trade, or with certain relations of the United States to foreign countries, the values of all exchangeable articles would fall as represented in gold, or rise in paper, until an equilibrium was established. But the exchanges with foreign countries are so small in comparison with the domestic and the total exchanges, that none of the staples of the export trade conform to what would be assumed as the law. The actual prices have been intermediate between the price these articles bore before the price of gold changed, and that to which it might be supposed the increased price of gold would carry them. It must, therefore, either be assumed that the changed price of gold has prostrated all intrinsic values in the United States, reducing them to one half or two thirds their standard, or it must be admitted that the rise in gold has not carried the price of exportable articles with it, or not beyond a point equally distant from either extreme.

The export price of wheat flour at New York for the quarter ending September 30, 1863 (795,503 bbls., value $4,558,342) was $5.73 only per barrel; and for the quarter ending December 31, 1863 (431,590 bbls., value $3,606,073), $8.35 per bbl.; for the quarter ending March 31, 1864 (501,899 bbls., value $3,907,255), $7.78 per bbl.; for the quarter ending June 30, 1864 (509,569 bbls., value $4,105,008), $8.05 per bbl. And for the whole year 1863–64 (2,238,551 bbls., value $16,176,578), an average of $7.23 per barrel. These are the actual values and quantities exported during the period of the most extreme price of gold, yet they are by no means excessive prices as they stand. The premium on gold during each month of this fiscal year, at New York, was as follows: —

July,	1863,	31 per cent.	January,	1864,	54½ per cent.
August,	"	26 "	February,	"	59 "
September,	"	25 "	March,	"	64½ "
October,	"	50 "	April,	"	75 "
November,	"	48 "	May,	"	80 "
December,	"	52 "	June,	"	109 "

Reduced to quarterly averages, they become, respectively,

31, 50, 59½, and 88 per cent, with an average of 57 per cent for the year. Applying the rates quarterly to the statements of exports for like periods, the corresponding prices of flour per barrel are, —

For the 3d quarter of			1863,	$5.73	becomes	$4.37	per bbl.
"	4th	"	"	8.35	"	5.57	"
"	1st	"	1864,	7.78	"	4.87	"
"	2d	"	"	8.05	"	4.28	"
Fiscal year, 1863 – 64,				7.23	"	4.60	"

These reduced or calculated prices are far below those prevailing before the war as export prices; thus, in the fiscal year 1859 – 60, the exports of flour were 2,611,596 bbls., value $15,448,507, rate $5.92 per barrel; and in 1860 – 61, 4,323,756 bbls., value $24,645,849, rate $5.70 per barrel.

The export prices of wheat, the next great export staple, even more decidedly prove that in 1863 – 64 the price of gold was not a representative of all values. The following are the actual export prices taken from the volume of exports at New York, and the calculated gold prices: —

			Export price.		Calculated gold price.		
3d quarter of		1863,	$1.22	per bushel.	94	cents per	bushel.
4th	"	"	1.36	"	90⅔	"	"
1st	"	1864,	1.49	"	93½	"	"
2d	"	"	1.52	"	80⅘	"	"
Fiscal year, 1863 – 64,			1.38	"	87¾	"	"

In this case the depression below standard or average prices resulting from a calculation with gold at the highest premium is quite noticeable. With gold at 88 per cent premium, wheat at gold prices is but 80 cents per bushel, a conclusive proof that the export price it actually bore was at least intermediate between gold and currency rates.

It may be claimed that it is immaterial to the issue, or to the determination of the financial relations of the United States with foreign countries, whether the export staples have risen in currency prices, or fallen in gold prices, since all imports were paid for in gold values. This would be true, as has been said, if the outward carriage of merchandise was of necessity and not of choice, and if the exports followed the imports. In fact, the export movement always had precedence in time, and

the credits drawn against it accrued before any use of them was required for remittance. At no time since the war began, and particularly since the rise in gold began, has the market been bare of exchange, or without a large surplus held for speculative purposes quite as much as gold. Not less than thirty, and perhaps fifty millions of exchange, has been the average held by exporters, importers, bankers, and speculators, since the appreciation of gold began, and indeed since the flood of exports went to foreign countries in 1861 and 1862. Produce in great quantities was shipped in 1862 and 1863, — wheat and flour leading in the former year, and petroleum leading in 1863 and 1864, — solely for the purpose of creating exchange to hold and speculate in, and vast profits were realized on the advance these credits on Europe attained as gold went up to 280. It is well known that the profits on this export trade were and are yet great, stimulating business to an unprecedented degree, and throwing into our own commercial centres four fifths of the profits supposed to accrue to the foreign dealers who sold us a very large volume of imports to be paid for in gold only.

As this point is of the highest interest in considering the financial relation we hold to other countries, it is worthy of the greatest attention, and a fullness of illustration for which we have not room in this article. But let it be imagined that ten millions' worth of exports go out in September, 1863, with gold at 35 per cent premium, the foreign market being unchanged, and the home purchasing market advanced 20 per cent. These credits, it may be supposed, are half of them held three months, and half held six months; then being realized in currency values, through sales for remittance or otherwise. The five millions sold in three months have advanced in the ratio of 120 to 152, and the five millions held to March, 1864, have advanced as 120 to 165. In each case it may be supposed that they are used to cover the cost of imports for the period of exportation mainly, and therefore to realize almost the entire advance to American holders. Such has been the case in fact; and the actual abatement on the export prices of this fiscal year, when the payments for imports have been made, has not exceeded twenty per cent. In many cases the advance realized on the credits these exports created has been such that ten mil-

lions of currency purchases for export have paid fifteen millions in currency of foreign debt, when the credits were actually used.

There may, without doubt, be a reverse side to this picture of prosperity, when exchange and gold and produce values fall back to their former and true relation to the currency, which currency is now little or not at all removed from the standard money of account in intrinsic value. The disturbance of gold values has paid us profits above all the profits ever known in trade for a like period previously, and it continued to pay so long as prices advanced, and exports and credits kept the lead of the obligations to pay imposed by the imports. It was so profitable to ship flour, grain, provisions, and petroleum, that operators took no account whatever of the demand for exchange, and did not think of waiting for such demand. The credits created by a brig-load of petroleum to Havre or Hamburg might, and often did, advance twenty-five per cent in a month; the profit to the producer in the United States, to transporters and exporters, being such that each and all could afford to pay any increase the importer should think proper to put on the prices of the goods for which this exchange at last made payment.

That such has been the actual course of trade, and the realization of profits, is abundantly illustrated by all the current facts of the time, — by the ease and buoyancy of the markets, the accumulation of wealth, and the enormous growth of all departments of foreign trade. The realized wealth of the country assumes too many and too obvious forms to leave a doubt that it is wealth, and not hollow inflation. And, paradoxical as it may appear, the supposed misfortune of the rise in gold, and the supposed dependence it has entailed on foreign countries, has in fact operated to stimulate business, to throw vast profits into the hands of all concerned in production and exportation, and to give us a precedence in the exchanges conducted with foreign countries, that wholly neutralized the misfortune of having to pay high prices for imported goods.

Another consequence of this peculiar relation of gold to currency has all along been apparent in the European monetary centres and in California, where gold was maintained as the money of account. In both England and California this period

of high gold prices has been one of constant financial pressure and difficulty. If their standard can be claimed to have forced a depreciation of ours, it may at least equally be claimed that we have forced them to yield to our basis of business. In England money has not for a long period borne rates of interest so high as for the last year; the Bank of England rate being from six to nine per cent, — an unprecedented condition, considering the length of time it has prevailed. In the eastern United States the interest rates have all this time been but six and seven per cent, or not above the average of ordinary times before the war. In California the rate at bank has been one and a half per cent per month, and in the street two to four per cent per month, — the first equal to twenty per cent yearly, and the last rate named being more than fifty per cent yearly. The consequence has been, that the cost of conducting business has exceeded its profits, both in England and California, extensive failures and general depression being the consequence. Money has become too dear with them, and nothing can relieve them but a decline in gold. The weight of the vast business of the United States surrounds them, and presses with almost irresistible force upon their costly medium of exchanges. If they had accrued wealth in such volume that they were not dependent on business, the matter would be of less consequence; but they must do business and make current profits on it, and failing in this they suffer financial stringency, if not ruin.

It may not readily be admitted that the financial difficulties of England and California are consequences of the price of gold, and the continuance of that standard in competition with our currency standard, but it is a conspicuous fact that the two conditions have so far run parallel with each other. In the case of England, it is evident that it has been very profitable to merchants in the United States to create credits there by sending anything and everything that would sell. England has bought of the United States and of all other nations in too large a proportion to the sales made and the returns realized. We, at least, have made great profits from this outward trade. Merchandise has been handled easily also, on our part; while the British holder of raw staples and the manufacturer paid dearly for their capital employed, and dealt in a currency cost-

ing twice or two and a half times as much as ours. Assuming and confident as their bearing has been in regard to the finances of the United States, it has been a constant and severe strain to preserve coin in the Bank of England, and to continue the business relations which maintain the vast fabric of British trade an intact whole.

In California the disparity of currency operates as a constant inducement to the return of capital to the East, where the exaggerated value of gold may be realized. For many months the dollar in gold, which can scarcely find remunerative investment in California, became two dollars or two and a half in Eastern property, or in national securities paying six per cent interest in gold, — a temptation to investment that must necessarily have great influence. To maintain free capital in a section where it cannot find profitable investment when its holders are free to remain in either part of the Union, and are really residents of the East as well as of the West, is not long possible. California must either yield its distinction of currency, or must witness the transfer of large sums for investment at the East. The business interests and fixed capital of the entire Pacific coast of the United States are small compared with those of the loyal States of the Atlantic coast, and they cannot long maintain a standard peculiar to themselves.

The commercial consequences of the disparity of currency standards between California and the Eastern States have been strikingly similar to those appearing in foreign trade. The high gold prices ruling there for provisions, spirits, oils, and all the standard articles of shipment from the East, have invited a large trade, profitable to the East, but draining the gold of California. The shipment of flour to San Francisco has been renewed, after five years not only of full domestic supply there, but of very large export to England and elsewhere, for a part of this period. Invoices to California from the East now more nearly resemble those of the first five years' occupation of that coast, than those of the trade of the past five years.

The condition of a great people in time of war includes or brings with it many anomalies and departures from ordinary commercial and business rules, and these anomalies must simply be taken and admitted as such. In the present case, the

fears and extreme cautions usual to such periods have done much, while extravagances of speculation and actual conspiracies have done more, to create a factitious price for gold. Absolute danger has combined with absurd ignorance and misrepresentation abroad to discredit the finances and business of the loyal States. Good as well as evil followed the inflation of gold prices; — ease in business, high prices for all exportable articles, profit on holding as well as creating foreign credits, and a business stimulated to intense activity. As a mere speculation, the inflation of gold prices would have repaid the cost of carrying its price up at the stock exchange, from the day it began until it reached the maximum. The decline to par again would bring great losses also; but it is not the business of speculators to provide for anything beyond immediate profits.

High prices of course cause, if they do not enforce, hoarding the precious metals on the part of all who do not engage in speculation; and simple high prices, quite as much as all other causes, have sent all the minor elements of metallic currency into hoards, there to be sealed up by blind fatuity until prices return to par. But this is no novelty even in our history. Satisfied and secure as the great majority of the people feel, there is a class of inevitable and almost willing victims, who, from alarm at one time and sordid love of profit at another, have taken some resources absolutely away, and have hidden others in places of concealment.

An especial peculiarity has been disclosed in the course of specie and bullion shipments from California, which has already been referred to. In this case, the dangers of transit simply turn the current of surplus gold, for the time, from New York to London; and being turned there, its proceeds are probably used or held as credits simply, without returning the gold to the United States. As has been stated, these peculiar shipments amounted to large sums, and they are still continued. In 1862–63 they were $ 18,207,879; in 1863–64, $ 35,735,265; and in the three months ending October 1, 1864, $ 8,750,000. This movement is not to be set down to the account of fear for the public safety, or for the safety of the government; yet it is, nevertheless, one consequence of the public dangers, since it is

fear of piracy that changes the direction of gold shipments from New York, their first and natural destination, to England. It is not in any sense a consequence of commercial or financial conditions, and the results should not go into the calculation of national resources without proper explanation.

And on this point of choice of depositories, it must be borne in mind that circumstances facilitate freedom of action now to a degree quite beyond that known in earlier periods. An aggregate trade of 600 millions of dollars with other nations in 1862–63 rose to 670 millions in 1863–64, notwithstanding the loss of all the seceding States. A trade of such magnitude still in active progress must necessarily afford great facilities for the transfer of values from a nation believed to be in great danger to one known to be safe. During European convulsions restrictions on trade have been almost always the rule, and particularly upon movements of capital and accrued wealth with the design to evade taxation. With the entire absence of restraints, and the vast amount of movable wealth in the country, it is only remarkable that nothing has been disclosed indicating a necessity for care on this point. Capital remains, and seeks investment in unprecedented amounts. Assuming that the whole of this California shipment of gold represents a movement of wealth driven abroad by the insecurity of the country, its total is a small sum in comparison with the voluntary investments of the last three years in the securities the government has put forth, made from the accumulated profits of the people.

Recurring to the question of intrinsic values commercially exchanged between the United States and foreign countries, we re-state the claim that the intrinsic values of our exports were and are greater than a reduction to gold equivalents makes them, and that, their proceeds not being required exclusively or immediately in the payment of debts or balances accrued against us, there has been great positive profit in their shipment, and an accumulation of general wealth resulting fully equal to that which would have accrued from such exports at the usual prices and with no premium on gold. Taking the prices of staple articles exported as they stand, it may reasonably be assumed that the realized price to us was intermediate

between the currency price and its gold equivalent; for instance, the flour exported in 1863–64 was worth, not the $7.23 per barrel which was its average export record, nor the $4.60 which was the gold equivalent of the first-named price, but really it was worth to us their mean, or $5.92 per barrel. Wheat also, exported from New York alone in the fiscal year 1863–64 to the amount of 17,296,102 bushels, reported value $23,866,884, was worth the mean between $1.38, the export price, and 87¾ cents, the gold price, or $1.13 per bushel.

The extreme prices of the fiscal year 1863–64 have been taken to illustrate this point; and it is evident that the exports should not be reduced to gold values to show the true relation of the United States to other countries for either the last or the preceding year. Restoring to the calculation of foreign trade for 1862–63, the first year in which gold rose to a premium, one half the reduction before made on account of currency, the total of which reduction was $67,050,485, the sum to be restored therefore being $33,525,242, and we have a new aggregate of $64,304,507 as the real balance to the credit of the United States on the commercial exchanges of the year ending June 30, 1863.

Next, the exchanges of the fiscal year 1863–64 may be analyzed. The magnitude of the foreign exchanges of this year is extraordinary; the exports being $340,665,580, and the imports $328,514,559; the nominal balance in favor of the United States being $12,151,021. A reduction to gold equivalents reverses this balance, however. Taking from both sides of the account the exports in gold values, which are the specie and bullion exports, $105,125,750, and the foreign merchandise re-exported, value $20,373,409, the remaining sums are, the exports at currency values, $215,166,421, and unadjusted imports, $203,197,731. These exports were not equally divided in the several quarters of the year; the September quarter of 1863 exporting nearly 52 millions, which, being reduced by half the average gold premium of 31 per cent, or 15½ per cent, gives a corrected value of 45 millions. The next or December quarter shows 53 millions of exports with gold at 50 premium, reduced by one half this premium to 42.4 millions. The first quarter of 1864 has 45 millions of exports with gold at 60 pre-

mium, which, reduced 30 per cent, gives 34.6 millions; and the second quarter of 1864 has 65 millions, which, reduced one half the average gold rate of 88 premium, becomes 45.14 millions. Finally, the sum of corrected export values is $167,306,421, which, deducted from the unadjusted imports above named, gives an adverse balance of $35,891,311 in the exchanges of this fiscal year.

It will be observed, however, that unusual commercial causes combined to throw a flood of imports into the United States in the last two quarters of this fiscal year. The universal expectation that increased duties would be laid on importations prompted every importer to send large orders abroad before the close of 1863, the proceeds of which arrived in immense quantities in March and April, 1864. Congress became alarmed at this excessive importation, and passed an act increasing all existing duties fifty per cent from April 19th. Imports continued, however, in great excess, to July 1, at which time a new tariff, with greatly increased rates of duty, took effect, reducing importations so much that the total entered at New York for the succeeding quarter (to September 30, 1864) was but 48 millions, against 73¾ millions in the quarter ending June 30; and of this forty-eight millions nearly one half went into warehouse, much of it being subsequently re-exported. During this quarter, also, the exports at New York alone were 87 millions, of which 5,800,000 was coin and bullion. The specie and bullion sent to foreign ports from California during the same time was $11,640,000, and the total of exports at all ports of the United States was some millions *more than twice the total amount of imports*. Reducing the exports reported in currency values by any reasonable proportion, the balance in favor of the United States on the foreign trade of the quarter would give a greater sum than the balance above stated as falling against us in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864.

In truth, the fiscal year, as made up to end June 30, does not embrace the natural changes of trade which compensate each other. The imports are excessive, and the exports deficient; while in the three months next following (to September 30) the compensating extreme occurs, the imports falling to their minimum, and the exports rising to a maximum. The

calendar year 1864 would alone correctly represent the course of foreign trade for any part of the period it covers, the imports during the first six months being really intended for the markets of the entire year.

The account of foreign exchanges since the war began may now be re-stated, substituting the corrected values or gold equivalents for the fiscal years 1862 – 63 and 1863 – 64 with the following results : —

Fiscal Year.	Exports.	Imports.	Excess of Exports.
1860 – 61	$ 310,856,818	$ 252,075,535	$ 58,881,283
1861 – 62	229,790,280	205,819,823	23,970,457
1862 – 63	316,492,096	252,187,587	64,304,509
			Excess of Imports.
1863 – 64	292,805,580	328,165,314	37,486,591

It might properly be claimed that this last balance should be remitted to the current half of the year 1864 for adjustment. It has been shown that the quarter ending September 30 fully balances it, and that it is naturally and necessarily a part of the period. But the account may be closed with the end of the fiscal year, and still give a favorable result as regards the trade of the four years, the average credit balance for the four years being $ 27,417,415 each year.

It may here be stated, that British trade with the United States exhibits larger annual balances against England than are here shown. This result is derived from the actual valuations made in British ports, with freight and charges added, and a certain further accrued value ; the values of the export invoices being those reported here, and put in our account.

A further fact of importance illustrating the case is that the export and import account of England with all other nations shows large adverse balances each year. The following are the aggregates for four years : —

	1859.	1860.	1861.	1862.
	IMPORTS.			
	£	£	£	£
Merchandise,	179,182,355	210,530,873	217,485,024	225,716,976
Bullion and Specie,	37,070,156	22,978,196	18,747,045	31,656,476
Total,	216,252,511	233,509,069	236,232,069	257,373,452
	EXPORTS.			
British Produce,	130,411,529	135,891,227	125,102,814	123,992,264
Foreign & Colonial Produce,	25,281,446	28,630,124	34,529,684	42,175,870
Bullion and Specie,	35,688,803	25,534,768	20,811,648	29,326,191
Total,	191,381,778	190,056,119	180,444,146	195,494,325

	1859.	1860.	1861.	1862.
Excess of Imports,	£ 24,870,733	43,452,950	55,787,923	61,879,127
In United States values,	$ 120,374,348	210,312,278	270,013,547	299,494,975

It will be seen by this statement that the exchanges of specie and bullion neutralize each other, and that the differences are in merchandise. A part of the difference is due to the system of valuation; which system accepts the outward shipments at "declared real value," or at the invoice prices, while the imports are at "computed real value," derived from prices affixed in British ports. The last-named valuation is thus one with costs and charges added, and the export values are without such addition. But with any reasonable abatement from this cause, there must remain a large difference against England; and the magnitude of these differences increases rapidly in successive years. In 1859, the sum was 120 millions of dollars nearly; in 1860, 210 millions; in 1861, 270 millions; and in 1862, 299½ millions. It is not easy to account for these enormous differences. It might be assumed, perhaps, that they represent actual remittances for the use of British capital abroad, and particularly in the colonies; the merchandise being actually owned by a resident of England, and therefore requiring no return of values in any form to pay for it. But in British trade with the United States large differences appear, too large to be covered by the entire export of gold and silver, or any other articles supposed capable of remittance to actual foreign holders.

Imports into Great Britain from the United States, and Exports to the United States.

	1859.	1860.	1861.	1862.
	£	£	£	£
Imports of Merchandise,	34,294,083	44,727,202	49,289,602	27,715,157
Exports of Merchandise,	24,417,892	22,907,681	11,025,683	19,173,907
Excess of Imports,	9,876,191	21,819,521	38,263,919	8,541,250
Gold Imports,	9,672,981	4,792,582	66,683	10,064,162
Gold Exports,	14,342	1,727,220	7,381,953	37,528
Excess, including gold,	19,534,830	24,884,883	30,948,649	18,567,884
	$	$	$	$
Excess of Mdse. in U. S. val.,	47,800,764	105,606,481	181,197,368	41,339,650
Excess of Mdse. and Gold,	94,548,577	119,442,833	149,791,461	89,868,558

From these results it is evident that exchange with the

United States draws with it the chief excess of imports over exports in the trade of England with the world. The calendar years 1861 and 1862 average $111,125,000 each as the balance against England and in favor of the United States, without gold, and $119,830,000 each, inclusive of the gold exchanged. The statistics for 1863 are not yet accessible in British official reports, from which all these values have been taken; but the two years named suffice to prove that the comparisons and corrections before made, in showing the state of our exchanges, are fully justified and confirmed.

The amount of foreign capital held or employed in the United States, and for the use of which remittances of some class of values must annually be made, has been the subject of some inquiry, but it can only be estimated. The aggregate is undoubtedly large, and the annual payment of dividends, interest, and rents rises to a considerable sum. This annual remittance, exclusive of all absolute transfers of capital, has been variously estimated at from $18,000,000 to $30,000,000, representing a capital of from $300,000,000 to $500,000,000. During the last months of 1861 and the year 1862, a large amount of such investments was sold, and passed from foreign to American hands at a considerable reduction from its nominal value, and no general resumption of investment by British capital has since occurred. In Germany, the last year has developed a moderate investment, which is still not beyond twenty-five or thirty millions probably. It has been stated that the recall of capital employed in the United States to England in 1862 greatly stimulated speculation there in 1863, and led to purchases of cotton and other foreign produce for speculative purposes; purchases which, on the decline of prices within the last three or four months, entailed the recent widespread commercial distress in England. We may safely assume that a nominal capital of seventy-five to a hundred millions was so transferred from foreign hands in 1861 and 1862, being pai for in the vast surplus of exports of those two years, and hence forth held by citizens or residents of the United States.

Taking the highest estimate of the sum of capital the use of which is to be paid for abroad, there cannot now remain more than four hundred millions, involving annual payments to the

amount of twenty-four millions, in gold values. This sum must come out of the balances to our credit in general commerce, and it is, in fact, remitted in the exchange drawn against our exports. It has been shown that the corrected account of exports, in gold values, compared with the imports, gave us an annual credit, inclusive of the extraordinary imports of the first half of 1864, of $27,417,415; and therefore, after all possible demands and abatements are satisfied, there is a small balance still to the credit side.

The great importance of this question of absolute monetary and commercial relations with all other nations has been thought to require the analysis here undertaken. It proves the unsoundness of the belief so generally entertained, that the war has brought on us an exhaustion which renders the high price of gold a commercial and financial necessity. It has been believed by perhaps a majority of the general public, that the currency is depreciated, not that gold has advanced to fictitious values. Yet the evidence is overwhelming, that no commercial necessity for the export of gold to pay heavy balances against us exists, or has existed, since the war began. It is forgotten that in the two fiscal years 1860–61 and 1861–62, no less than $62,750,000 in gold was imported from Europe, all subsequent to the beginning of the war, and that the apparent excess of gold going out in 1863 and 1864 is compensated for by that importation, and by the existing return of a like period in some degree. For the three months to October 1, 1864, gold almost ceased to be exported, except from California, from which it went to England, not as an export, but as a deposit. The last four fiscal years, the period of war, give an annual average export of gold of but $42,175,689; while the previous four years 1857 to 1860 gave an annual average export of $51,386,897. The excess in 1862–63 and 1863–64 is nothing more than would reasonably be expected to follow the importations of 1861.

National resources being, however, to some extent controlled by fears in time of war, it is needful to consider whether any reasonable basis for such fears exists or not. No restriction has been placed on the exportation of gold, and no such check exists in the United States on the stock of gold as is maintained

by the Bank of England in Great Britain. Interest there has been advanced to nine per cent, and has been maintained for months at rates almost unprecedentedly high, in order to prevent exhaustion of gold and suspension of specie payments. Had credits existed in the United States which could be closed by remittance of gold to the relief of British finances, it is not to be supposed that our large remaining stock would not have been freely drawn upon. Why, then, was no gold of consequence sent during the last quarter, when no restriction on its export exists?

A further proof that the premium on gold is the result of alarms and speculations, rather than of commercial transactions, is found in the fact, that, for a year past, exchange has been, at frequent intervals, below par for gold. The fluctuations of the gold premium, and consequently of the relation of currency to exchange, became so great, that drawers finally held exchange at gold rates only, and these have often ruled at 108 to 109, when the par is 109½.* During August the rate was so low as to permit importation of gold; and during the

* Exchange was not quoted at gold rates until July, 1864, during which month the average of best bankers' 60-day bills at New York was 109 @ 109¼; during August the average was 108 @ 108¾; during September, 108⅝ @ 109¼; during October, 108½ @ 109½; and for the first half of November, 109½ @ 109¾. Commercial bills average one per cent less, and short-sight bankers' one per cent more.

The following extract is instructive, as exhibiting the state of exchanges at the date of its publication: —

"The topic of great interest in the market at the moment is the probable turn in foreign exchange. The sudden demand which sprang up on the Continent for American stocks, together with the liberal exports for the last three weeks, have produced a large supply of exchange. Just at this period, on the other hand, nearly all the imports were entered in bond, and but few sold upon the market, thus diminishing the demand for bills, as there was little call for remittance. This has interfered with the execution of German orders, and it is now difficult to sell exchange for anything like its equivalent in gold. If this state of things should continue, there might be a return current of gold from Europe, unless the necessity for this should diminish the orders for investment in American securities. It would seem that the fear of this has had something to do with the advance in the rate of interest at London. We look, however, for a release erelong of a portion of the stock of foreign goods held here unsold, and this would lead at once to the purchase of bills. Some are also of opinion, that many of the importers have held back their remittances, and that considerable amounts are yet to go forward to satisfy for previous sales. We believe that the amount thus due is greatly overrated, and that importers have paid up unusually close as the goods were sold." — *N. Y. Journal of Commerce*, August 8, 1864.

second quarter of the year small shipments of gold, amounting to about $750,000, were made from Liverpool. Bills of exchange, of the class designated commercial, have, during most of the last six months, ruled at 107 to 108, or one and a half to two and a half per cent below par. With the currency rate advancing to keep pace with the premium on gold, every bill of exchange created was as profitable an investment in itself as could be desired, and far more convenient than gold for the purpose of profiting by the rise.

In devoting so much space to the consideration of the foreign trade relations of the country, it is by no means intended to assign them the exclusive position of control of the national resources which is often supposed to belong to them. These external relations of a country so great as ours in natural wealth may even be to a great degree unprofitable and exhausting, and yet be more than balanced by the development of internal resources. The ability to bear taxation, to invest in loans, and to conduct great expenditures, which this war has shown that the loyal States possess, is but in part derived from the trade conducted with foreign countries, — a part less than that due to stimulated activity of production and exchange within our own territory. It is almost always true that steadily rising prices incite and strengthen business, though the cost of conducting it also rises ; and with an enlarged demand from any cause, at home or abroad, the wheels of industry are everywhere set in motion. It was possible, in 1860, to produce as much of manufactures, and even of agricultural staples, with two thirds the number then employed in industry and business, if this less proportion had sufficient inducement through increased rewards. When the war came, perhaps one fifth of the manual labor of the North was withdrawn, but at the same time the remaining portion was aided by constantly increasing improvements in machinery, by the investment of capital anew, and by a thorough infusion of life in every department, due to rising prices and a demand almost without limit. These were the great facts of the case in 1862, and their proportions and influence increased in 1863 and 1864. In their progress, they developed a power very imperfectly reflected or represented in foreign trade ; and it is the aggregate result of this energy, ap-

plied to our immense fields of natural wealth previously but in part opened, that should be considered in analyzing the causes and consequences of this greatly over-estimated fact of gold premium.

Great as the waste of war undoubtedly is, the compensations which this war has brought to the loyal States are even more impressive from the simple magnitude of their proportions. Great cities, from whose population ten, twenty, or even fifty thousand soldiers have been drawn, exhibit in 1864 a more rapid ratio of increase in their population and business over 1860 than was shown by this last-named year over 1856. Admitting that some share of this result is due to unusual concentration from the country districts, and not all to immigration and ordinary growth, it is still true that such concentration is an index of the activity that attends on general prosperity. There are none unoccupied who can or will labor. The number of those requiring charity is surprisingly small,—less than the average in years of undisturbed prosperity; and this fact is in marked contrast with the facts attending such recent periods of deranged business as those of 1857 and 1858. The great cities are, to the most casual and superficial observer, full of evidences of solid material prosperity; and there are no conditions attending this prosperity which can with reason be held to indicate that it is delusive and fallacious. Usually an active business period has been characterized by excessive use of credits, and until recently the credit system constituted a chain of dependence connecting many persons, all employed in business, indeed, from the most remote producer to the most remote consumer. For this reason, mere panics might prove as destructive as the most absolute of losses. It was enough that "confidence was destroyed," to involve every merchant in difficulty and constraint, however solvent he was of himself, or however prosperous his business was in fact. Now this chain of dependence, which has carried so many merchants down in undeserved ruin, no longer exists. There can be no general collapse of credits, either with reason, as in some former cases, or without reason, as in 1857. And this achievement in the adjustment of business relations, which outranks any if not all others ever attained in the United States, is one of the compensations the war has brought

No small proportion of the accumulation of wealth in the last three years has been derived directly from this release of business from the dependence of the old credit system. The capital of a mercantile house can be turned three or five times where it could once before. Profits are realized, reinvested, and realized again, in half the time formerly required to wait the completion of a single transaction under the old *régime* of long credits. The release from risk greatly stimulates activity of original investment, since an enterprise which may be carried to its final issue in the brief periods now required is far more likely to be undertaken, than when a long continued adherence to it was necessary. The number of original producers is larger, for this reason, and the proportion of producers to the numbers engaged in mere exchange is also larger.

We neglect to strengthen ourselves with assurances rightfully belonging to the occasion, if we fail to consider these remarkable and unusual conditions of the prosperous business now, and for two years past, conducted in the loyal States. It has been easy to assert that the existing and obvious activity was a consequence of a redundant currency and speculation; but no competent business man believes his own especial activity a hollow and treacherous condition, which may betray him to ruin at a moment's warning. The generalization, if suggested to him, he applies to others rather than himself.

As to the assumed redundancy of currency, there is perhaps no single fact more widely misapprehended than this. It is known that the actual movement of material productions in 1863 has increased to an unprecedented degree over 1860, and that vastly greater quantities of all the staple articles of internal and foreign exchange are bought, transported, and sold. The measure of this increase may be illustrated by citing the quantities of certain staple articles exported from the United States for a period of five years. These quantities were, of course, bought in the interior, transported over long lines of railroad or canal, and finally shipped in the seaboard cities for European markets. And as cash payments marked every stage of these transactions, and every stage, also, of the great movement of merchandise westward, by which they were paid for as from the East, some conception can be formed of the increase

in money or currency required to conduct the entire system of exchanges.

Leading Export Staples for Five Fiscal Years.

	1859-60.	1860-61.	1861-62.	1862-63.	1863-64.
Wheat, *bu.*	4,155,153	31,238,057	37,289,572	36,160,414	23,680,651
Flour, *bbls.*	2,611,596	4,323,756	4,882,033	4,390,055	3,543,263
Indian corn, *bu.*	3,314,155	10,678,244	18,904,909	16,119,476	4,075,889
Butter, *lbs.*	7,640,914	15,531,381	26,691,247	35,172,415	20,795,195
Cheese, *lbs.*	15,515,799	32,361,428	34,052,678	42,045,054	47,733,337
Pork, *bbls.*	204,763	156,487	309,102	327,852	312,325
Bacon, *lbs.*	25,844,610	50,264,267	141,212,786	218,243,609	110,759,485
Lard, *lbs.*	40,289,519	47,908,911	118,573,307	155,336,596	85,385,387
Tallow, *lbs.*	15,269,535	29,718,364	46,773,768	63,792,754	55,015,375
Candles & Soap,	*lbs.*11,885,820	12,227,797	16,087,003	15,936,017	13,605,962
Petroleum, *gals.*	....	....	*10,834,515	*27,934,944	*28,000,000
Spirits, *gals.*	4,098,730	6,542,464	7,220,874	7,396,925	2,488,742
Tobacco,					
Leaf, *hhd.*	173,844	168,469	116,723	117,213	114,177
Manufact., *lbs.*	3,412,897	14,864,828	4,110,802	7,070,172	3,660,320
Cotton, *lbs.*	1,752,087,640	1,750,000,000	5,064,564	11,384,986	10,840,534

A large list of staples in addition might be cited, with an increased or a sustained magnitude, as regards quantity alone; among them grains, seeds, bread, beef, fish, lard and whale oils, coal, hops, ice, etc. It will be observed that the years 1861 – 62 and 1862 – 63 afford the largest quantities, and that 1863 – 64 has quantities generally three times as great as in 1859 – 60, excluding Southern products. It should be said that 1859 - 60 was quite full in comparison with previous years, exceeding the average on almost all leading articles; yet its disproportion to 1862 – 63 is striking, the relative quantities being less than one to four on an average.

These quantities are, in truth, so much beyond precedent or comparison as to leave no ground for doubt as to the claim that all previous measures of the aids to business must be adjusted anew, and on a larger and more comprehensive scale. They are reproduced at all the primary markets of the West and interior, and on the lakes, the railroads, and canals which serve for transportation eastward. All the statistics of these primary markets and transportation lines are swelled from 1859 to 1863 in the proportion of four or five to one, representing a greatly enlarged consumption within the country, including the

* Calendar years; 1864 estimated for last six months.

immense supplies taken by the armies in the field. The peculiar interest attaching to the measures of exported articles above given is, that they constitute a surplus at a time when it was feared that diminished labor and the waste of war would take all our surplus, and possibly call for importation from abroad. In the light of European history at such periods, how striking becomes the condition of the country in 1862 and 1863, — sending a surplus of unprecedented volume to foreign markets, and sustaining, with triumphant ease and ability at every point, a war of gigantic magnitude, with a force in the field and otherwise withdrawn from productive pursuits of not less than a million of men in the aggregate.

A conspicuous fact deserving attention is found in the migration which continues across the plains of the interior, to the new territories and the gold regions. This current, strange to say, has been swelled rather than diminished by the war. In no former year has so great a number left the Western borders for Idaho, Colorado, Montana, and the associated regions toward the Pacific, as during the current year 1864. The number free to choose new homes, and to engage in enterprises on new lands, exceeds that of any previous year, though few or none of the army have gone, — an impressive proof of the growth of a people whose national existence has been in peril from the desperate revolt of almost one fourth its population in 1860.

The immigration from Europe has also been rising nearly to the position attained in the extraordinarily active period from 1847 to 1856. In 1858 and 1859, there was a decline to 150,000 each year; and in 1861 and 1862, the arrivals were still less. In 1863, however, the arrivals were 200,000; and in 1864 they are nearly 250,000.* The productive power which has been so well sustained in 1862 and 1863 is therefore not likely to fail from exhaustion of population, since the army will return to industry as many as it will withdraw from it

* The official returns made to the State Department of "Passengers arriving in the United States," are known to be short of the actual immigrant arrivals. They were, —

In 1857, 271,558	In 1861, 112,683
1858, 144,652	1862, 114,475
1859, 155,302	1863, 199,811
1860, 179,469	1864, 250,000 nearly.

hereafter. No greater numerical force will be required should the war continue two years longer, and with the lapse of every month the adaptation of Northern industry to the existing condition becomes more complete.

The internal growth of the country is, as has been said, much more important than its external commerce; yet it is difficult to assign terms in any definite form to this internal condition. The development of manufactures, and of all products of industry, is greatest where the exchanges are conducted at least cost to both consumers and producers. The increase of wealth is greatest where this cheap exchange occurs also; and all that is requisite to the accumulation of a large surplus under such circumstances is activity, and freedom from injurious influences in external trade. Most of these requisites have been supplied in an unusually full degree in the business of the loyal States for two years past, and the result is seen in the vast surplus the people have invested in the national securities. They have accumulated the profits of business with an increasing volume in the year 1864; and they are ready, at the beginning of 1865, to invest a sum daily of not less than two millions of dollars from this legitimate surplus. Previous to the issue of the late loans of 1864, this constant resource in the people, and in their accrued profits derived from business, might have been doubted; but now it is a question only how the rates and modes of contracting loans shall be made to harmonize with preceding investments, and not a question whether the people can take the loans required by the continuance of the war.

The force of this statement is such, that it strongly invites to the summary process of reasoning which is impatient of proof in detail. If this proposition is true, all the antecedent facts and conditions must necessarily exist, and it cannot be necessary to prove that they exist. But this claim is too great for universal acceptance, and, whatever vindication subsequent events may afford, we perhaps have no right to anticipate it so far as to assume that the case is closed.

It is admissible, however, to mingle with statements of a definite numerical character some of the evidences afforded by current and common observation. The accepted belief on which

plain business-men act may properly be cited, and it is often the case that the instinctive movements of business better represent the financial condition of the country than closely reasoned arguments can do. Theorists and abstract reasoners have been among the most decisive in asserting that the industry, the currency, and the general finances of the country, must necessarily be greatly disturbed, if not ruined, by the war. Revulsions and prostrations of credit were deemed inevitable; but beyond the first and immediate consequences of the withdrawal of Southern trade to those directly engaged in it, there has been nothing, even of the most temporary character, to derange such credits and business relations as exist. To withdraw half a million of men from industry, and devote them to destructive pursuits, would, it was said, destroy the productive power of the loyal States; but the number of men withdrawn has far exceeded a half-million, yet production has increased threefold. To banish gold and silver from circulation, supplying their place with large issues of government paper, would inevitably, in theory, degrade the currency and drain the country of the precious metals. Many doubtless suppose that these consequences have been realized; but in fact the stocks of coin and bullion held in the United States are greater now than in any year previous to 1861, and a far severer outward drain has been felt in England and France for a year past than has existed in the United States. The rate of interest has been raised, as heretofore stated, at the Bank of England to counteract this drain, twice to the extreme rate of 9 per cent, the average for the year being $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The same extreme measures have been resorted to by the Bank of France to prevent a drain of specie, and also in almost every capital and monetary centre of Europe. No outward gold movement, in fact, is due to the currency which is supposed to have taken the place of gold, but which has, in reality, simply filled the requirement for a greatly enlarged circulation. And as to the supposed depreciation of this currency, the experience of practical men finds that the difference in value of the dollar of account now as compared with 1860 is not greater than the difference of market prices has frequently been within fifty years. Measured in the purchase of lands, city properties, buildings, and all fixed estate,

the difference is scarcely perceptible. In movable property it is greater; and in staples of export, which by shipment may become the equivalent of gold, it becomes greatest as regards domestic products; yet flour and grain, the two leading articles of export, have many times in the history of the United States borne higher prices than they do in 1864, with an insatiable demand abroad which renders them always capable of shipment and conversion into gold.* Imported articles not only bear an extreme price derived from the necessity of paying for them in gold, but such addition as the freedom in marking up prices now admits in every department of business. By common consent, the usual restraints as regards prices and the margin of profits to be charged are very much relaxed, and a large share of the advances attained are simply compensatory as among different classes of dealers, and, being laid on the most liberal principles under a steady advance of the principal articles, the result appears to prove an excessive supply and a great depreciation of the currency in which the prices are paid. Practically, however, this inordinate advance is neutralized to the purchaser under some form of compensation in prices fixed by himself.

As a final result, it may safely be assumed that the substitution of paper currency for gold and silver has brought with it no injurious consequences that have not found an equivalent in positive benefits. Instead of being a calamity of the first magnitude, it has been a relief, — a relief from the constant constraint to convert currency into specie that would otherwise have occurred, and which must soon have been the only alternative to the absolute disorganization of business. The severest trials business has ever known in the United States have been at periods when a real or supposed depreciation of paper currency

* The following are the maximum prices of flour per barrel at New York, of the quality known as superfine, in the several years named. Years of lower prices than six dollars per barrel are not named, except from 1860 to 1862: —

1829,	$ 8.55	1845,	$ 7.00	1853,	$ 7.18	1860,	$ 5.50
1836,	10.12	1847,	8.25	1854,	10.50	1861,	5.50
1837,	11.62	1848,	6.62	1855,	10.18	1862,	5.85
1838,	9.00	1849,	6.00	1856,	8.31	1863,	7.30
1839,	9.12	1850,	6.25	1857,	6.35	1864,	10.50
1841,	7.50						

has brought on a struggle to get possession of gold and silver in exchange for it. In all such struggles the majority fail, and suffer seriously in their failure, because it is always impossible to so convert more than a small share of the currency at any definite time. From this trial, and all the disturbing consequences it brings, we have had release since the war began.

The gold product of the Pacific coast and the new interior districts deserves consideration in any review of the national resources. It is now an established and permanent annual product, not less clearly at the command of the people in emergency than any other. It is mined, owned, and controlled by citizens of the United States, under the protection of the national authority. In the annual aggregates given below, as shipped outward from San Francisco to both foreign and domestic markets, there is a small sum of one or two millions each year included, which cannot be exactly separated, produced in Mexico and British Columbia, and brought from those countries to California. Otherwise the amount of production is each year newly mined on our own territory.

Exports of Treasure from San Francisco.

For 1854,	$52,045,633	For 1860,	$42,325,916
" 1855,	45,161,731	" 1861,	40,676,758
" 1856,	50,697,434	" 1862,	42,561,761
" 1857,	48,976,697	" 1863,	46,071,920
" 1858,	47,548,026	" 6 months to July 1, 1864,	28,993,711
" 1859,	47,640,462		
		Fiscal year, ending June 30, 1864,	51,264,023

This supply of gold is independent of the new production in Colorado and Idaho, and its annually gathered mass really compels the movement abroad which has been already noted. Taking its average at forty-five millions yearly, it will be seen that the average of $42,175,000, before shown to have been exported for each of the past four years, is covered, with three millions to spare on California account, and three and a half millions in the interior, — together six and a half millions, to supply the current requirement of the local or home demand.

It is deemed reasonable to assume, therefore, that the last four years have not exhausted the stock of the precious metals, and that nothing will be likely to do so in future, with the almost cer-

tain continuance of the supply. Indeed, with the developments recently made in mining in the interior, it cannot be a question whether an exhaustion of the precious metals is possible through any course of trade so far known, or under any premium to which speculation or fear may carry the price of gold in the Eastern markets. The commercial report of gold in banks and official depositories in the great cities, on November 1, 1864, shows a fair maintenance of the average stocks of the past three years, and a sum higher, by several millions, than the average of years to 1860.* It is particularly noticeable, that from November 1, 1863, to the same date in 1864, the decline of the commercial reserve of gold at New York is but $4,420,000, while the export of gold and silver in some form to foreign countries during the same period was ninety millions of dollars in excess of the imports. And this excess of exports, as has before been shown, served no purpose of accumulation in European commercial countries, but went from them to the great insatiable depositories of the East, the tropical Indies, and China, in payment for raw staples of manufacture required by the crowded cities of Europe. To India and China alone, the official return of treasure sent from Great Britain gives $39,089,456 in 1861, $61,128,377 in 1862, and $59,480,841 in 1863.

The cumulative force of the remarkable facts which have now been stated can hardly, if it be properly appreciated, fail to produce the conviction, that there is every reason for confidence in the national ability to supply all the means required for conducting the war to a triumphant conclusion, without prostration or exhaustion. The financial conditions which have prevailed in America during the last three years have not only been unprecedented and unexpected, but afford the most striking illustration of the resources and vigor of a free democratic community. They have an important and direct bearing upon political and social theories; but upon these considerations we do not propose now to enter.

---

* The stock of specie in banks and Sub-Treasury at New York is reported to have been: —

On November 1, 1864,	$33,955,867	On November 1, 1861,	$50,700,000
" 1863,	38,370,251	" 1860,	27,900,000
" 1862,	40,801,000	" 1859,	25,300,000

ART. VII. — *History of New England during the Stuart Dynasty.* By JOHN GORHAM PALFREY. Vol. III. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1864. pp. xxii., 648.

THE history of New England is written imperishably on the face of a continent, and in characters as beneficent as they are enduring. In the Old World national pride feeds itself with the record of battles and conquests; — battles which proved nothing and settled nothing; conquests which shifted a boundary on the map, and put one ugly head instead of another on the coin which the people paid to the tax-gatherer. But wherever the New-Englander travels among the sturdy commonwealths which have sprung from the seed of the Mayflower, churches, schools, colleges, tell him where the men of his race have been, or their influence penetrated; and an intelligent freedom is the monument of conquests whose results are not to be measured in square miles. Next to the fugitives whom Moses led out of Egypt, the little ship-load of outcasts who landed at Plymouth two centuries and a half ago are destined to influence the future of the world. The spiritual thirst of mankind has for ages been quenched at Hebrew fountains; but the embodiment in human institutions of truths uttered by the Son of man eighteen centuries ago was to be mainly the work of Puritan thought and Puritan self-devotion. Leave New England out in the cold! While you are plotting it, she sits by every fireside in the land where there is piety, culture, and free thought.

Faith in God, faith in man, faith in work, — this is the short formula in which we may sum up the teaching of the founders of New England, a creed ample enough for this life and the next. If their municipal regulations smack somewhat of Judaism, yet there can be no nobler aim or more practical wisdom than theirs; for it was to make the law of man a living counterpart of the law of God, in their highest conception of it. Were they too earnest in the strife to save their souls alive? That is still the problem which every wise and brave man is lifelong in solving. If the Devil take a less hateful shape to us than to our fathers, he is as busy with us as with them; and if we

cannot find it in our hearts to break with a gentleman of so much worldly wisdom, who gives such admirable dinners, and whose manners are so perfect, so much the worse for us.

Looked at on the outside, New England history is dry and unpicturesque. There is no rustle of silks, no waving of plumes, no clink of golden spurs. Our sympathies are not awakened by the changeful destinies, the rise and fall, of great families, whose doom was in their blood. Instead of all this, we have the homespun fates of Cephas and Prudence repeated in an infinite series of peaceable sameness, and finding space enough for record in the family Bible; we have the noise of axe and hammer and saw, an apotheosis of dogged work, where, reversing the fairy-tale, nothing is left to luck, and, if there be any poetry, it is something that cannot be helped, — the waste of the water over the dam. Extrinsically, it is prosaic and plebeian; intrinsically, it is poetic and noble; for it is, perhaps, the most perfect incarnation of an idea the world has ever seen. That idea was not to found a democracy, nor to charter the city of New Jerusalem by an act of the General Court, as gentlemen seem to think whose notions of history and human nature rise like an exhalation from the good things at a Pilgrim Society dinner. Not in the least. They had no faith in the Divine institution of a system which gives Teague, because he can dig, as much influence as Ralph, because he can think, nor in personal at the expense of general freedom. Their view of human rights was not so limited that it could not take in human relations and duties also. They would have been likely to answer the claim, "I am as good as anybody," by a quiet "Yes, for some things, but not for others; as good, doubtless, in your place, where all things are good." What the early settlers of Massachusetts *did* intend, and what they accomplished, was the founding here of a *new* England, and a better one, where the political superstitions and abuses of the old should never have leave to take root. So much, we may say, they deliberately intended. No nobles, either lay or cleric, no great landed estates, and no universal ignorance as the seed-plot of vice and unreason; but an elective magistracy and clergy, land for all who would till it, and reading and writing, will ye nill ye, instead. Here at last, it would seem, simple

manhood is to have a chance to play his stake against Fortune with honest dice, uncogged by those three hoary sharpers, Prerogative, Patricianism, and Priestcraft. Whoever has looked into the pamphlets published in England during the Great Rebellion cannot but have been struck by the fact, that the principles and practice of the Puritan Colony had begun to react with considerable force on the mother country; and the policy of the retrograde party there, after the Restoration, in its dealings with New England, finds a curious parallel as to its motives (time will show whether as to its results) in the conduct of the same party towards America during the last four years. This influence and this fear alike bear witness to the energy of the principles at work here.

We have said that the details of New England history were essentially dry and unpoetic. Everything is near, authentic, and petty. There is no mist of distance to soften outlines, no mirage of tradition to give characters and events an imaginative loom. So much downright work was perhaps never wrought on the earth's surface in the same space of time as during the first forty years after the settlement. But mere work is unpicturesque, and void of sentiment. Irving instinctively divined and admirably illustrated in his "Knickerbocker" the humorous element which lies in this nearness of view, this clear, prosaic daylight of modernness, and this poverty of stage-properties, which makes the actors and the deeds they were concerned in seem ludicrously small when contrasted with the semi-mythic grandeur in which we have clothed them, looking backward from the crowned result, and fancying a cause as majestic as our conception of the effect. There was, indeed, one poetic side to the existence otherwise so narrow and practical; and to have conceived this, however partially, is the one original and American thing in Cooper. This diviner glimpse illumines the lives of our Daniel Boones, the man of civilization and old-world ideas confronted with our forest solitudes, — confronted, too, for the first time, with his real self, and so led gradually to disentangle the original substance of his manhood from the artificial results of culture. Here was our new Adam of the wilderness, forced to name anew, not the visible creation of God, but the invisible creation of man, in those forms that

lie at the base of social institutions, so insensibly moulding personal character and controlling individual action. Here is the protagonist of our New World epic, a figure as poetic as that of Achilles, as ideally representative as that of Don Quixote, as romantic in its relation to our homespun and plebeian mythus as Arthur in his to the mailed and plumed cycle of chivalry. We do not mean, of course, that Cooper's "Leatherstocking" is all this or anything like it, but that the character typified in him is ideally and potentially all this and more.

But whatever was poetical in the lives of the early New-Englanders had something shy, if not sombre, about it. If their natures flowered, it was out of sight, like the fern. It was in the practical that they showed their true quality, as Englishmen are wont. It has been the fashion lately with a few feeble-minded persons to undervalue the New-England Puritans, as if they were nothing more than gloomy and narrow-minded fanatics. But all the charges brought against these large-minded and far-seeing men are precisely those which a really able fanatic, Joseph de Maistre, lays at the door of Protestantism. Neither a knowledge of human nature nor of history justifies us in confounding, as is commonly done, the Puritans of Old and New England, or the English Puritans of the third with those of the fifth decade of the seventeenth century. Fanaticism, or, to call it by its milder name, enthusiasm, is only powerful and active so long as it is aggressive. Establish it firmly in power, and it becomes conservatism, whether it will or no. A sceptre once put in the hand, the grip is instinctive; and he who is firmly seated in authority soon learns to think security, and not progress, the highest lesson of statecraft. From the summit of power men no longer turn their eyes upward only, but begin to look about them. Aspiration sees only one side of every question; possession, many. And the English Puritans, after their revolution was accomplished, stood in even a more precarious position than most successful assailants of the prerogative of whatever *is* to continue in being. They had carried a political end by means of a religious revival. The fulcrum on which they rested their lever to overturn the existing order of things (as history always placidly calls the particu-

lar form of *dis*order for the time being) was in the soul of man. They could not renew the fiery gush of enthusiasm, when once the molten metal had begun to stiffen in the mould of policy and precedent. The religious element of Puritanism became insensibly merged in the political; and, its one great man taken away, it died, as passions have done before, of possession. It was one thing to shout with Cromwell before the battle of Dunbar, "Now, Lord, arise, and let thine enemies be scattered!" and to snuffle, "Rise, Lord, and keep us safe in our benefices, our sequestered estates, and our five per cent!" Puritanism meant something when Captain Hodgson, riding out to battle through the morning mist, turns over the command of his troop to a lieutenant, and stays to hear the prayer of a cornet, there was "so much of God in it." Become traditional, repeating the phrase without the spirit, reading the present backward as if it were written in Hebrew, translating Jehovah by "I was" instead of "I am," — it was no more like its former self than the hollow drum made of Zisca's skin was like the grim captain whose soul it had once contained. Yet the change was inevitable, for it is not safe to confound the things of Cæsar with the things of God. Some honest republicans, like Ludlow, were never able to comprehend the chilling contrast between the ideal aim and the material fulfilment, and looked askance on the strenuous reign of Oliver, — that rugged boulder of primitive manhood lying lonely there on the dead level of the century, — as if some crooked changeling had been laid in the cradle instead of the fair babe of a Commonwealth they had dreamed. Truly there is a tide in the affairs of men, but there is no gulf-stream setting forever in one direction; and those waves of enthusiasm on whose crumbling crests we sometimes see nations lifted for a gleaming moment are wont to have a gloomy trough before and behind.

But the founders of New England, though they must have sympathized vividly with the struggles and triumphs of their brethren in the mother country, were never subjected to the same trials and temptations, never hampered with the same lumber of usages and tradition. They were not driven to win power by doubtful or desperate ways, nor to maintain it by any compromises of the ends which make it worth having. From

the outset they were builders, without need of first pulling down, whether to make room or provide material. For thirty years after the colonization of the Bay, they had absolute power to mould as they would the character of their adolescent commonwealth. During this time a whole generation would have grown to manhood who knew the Old World only by report, in whose habitual thought kings, nobles, and bishops would be as far away from all present and practical concern as the figures in a fairy tale, and all whose memories and associations, all their unconscious training by eye and ear, were New English wholly. Nor were the men whose influence was greatest in shaping the framework and the policy of the Colony, in any true sense of the word, fanatics. Enthusiasts, perhaps, they were, but with them the fermentation had never gone further than the ripeness of the vinous stage. Disappointment had never made it acetous, nor had it ever putrefied into the turbid zeal of Fifth-Monarchism and sectarian whimsey. There is no better ballast for keeping the mind steady on its keel, and saving it from all risk of *crankiness*, than business. And they were business men, men of facts and figures no less than of religious earnestness. The sum of two hundred thousand pounds had been invested in their undertaking,—a sum, for that time, truly enormous as the result of private combination for a doubtful experiment. That their enterprise might succeed, they must show a balance on the right side of the counting-house ledger, as well as in their private accounts with their own souls. The liberty of praying when and how they would, must be balanced with an ability of paying when and as they ought. Nor is the resulting fact in this case at variance with the *a priori* theory. They succeeded in making their thought the life and soul of a body politic, still powerful, still benignly operative, after two centuries; a thing which no mere fanatic ever did or ever will accomplish. Sober, earnest, and thoughtful men, it was no Utopia, no New Atlantis, no realization of a splendid dream, which they had at heart, but the establishment of the divine principle of Authority on the common interest and the common consent; the making, by a contribution from the free-will of all, a power which should curb and guide the free-will of each for the general good. If they were stern in their

dealings with sectaries, it should be remembered that the Colony was in fact the private property of the Massachusetts Company, that unity was essential to its success, and that John of Leyden had taught them how unendurable by the nostrils of honest men is the corruption of the right of private judgment in the evil and selfish hearts of men when no thorough mental training has developed the understanding and given the judgment its needful means of comparison and correction. They knew that liberty in the hands of feeble-minded and unreasoning persons (and all the worse if they are honest) means nothing more than the supremacy of their particular form of imbecility; means nothing less, therefore, than downright chaos, a Bedlam-chaos of monomaniacs and bores. What was to be done with men and women, who bore conclusive witness to the fall of man by insisting on walking up the broad-aisle of the meeting-house in a costume which that event had put forever out of fashion? About their treatment of witches, too, there has been a great deal of ignorant babble. Puritanism had nothing whatever to do with it. They acted under a delusion, which, with an exception here and there (and those mainly medical men, like Wierus and Webster), darkened the understanding of all Christendom. Dr. Henry More was no Puritan; and his letter to Glanvil, prefixed to the third edition of the "Sadducismus Triumphatus," was written in 1678, only fourteen years before the trials at Salem. Bekker's "Bezauberte Welt" was published in 1693; and in the Preface he speaks of the difficulty of overcoming "the prejudices in which not only ordinary men, but the learned also, are obstinate." In Hathaway's case, 1702, Chief Justice Holt, in charging the jury, expresses no disbelief in the possibility of witchcraft, and the indictment implies its existence. Indeed, the natural reaction from the Salem mania of 1692 put an end to belief in devilish compacts and demoniac possessions sooner in New England than elsewhere. The last we hear of it there is in 1720, when Rev. Mr. Turell of Medford detected and exposed an attempted cheat by two girls. Even in 1692, it was the foolish breath of Cotton Mather and others of the clergy that blew the dying embers of this ghastly superstition into a flame; and they were actuated partly by a desire to bring about a religious

revival, which might stay for a while the hastening lapse of their own authority, and still more by that credulous scepticism of feeble-minded piety which dreads the cutting away of an orthodox misbelief, as if the life-blood of faith would follow, and would keep even a stumbling-block in the way of salvation, if only enough generations had tripped over it to make it venerable. The witches were condemned on precisely the same grounds that in our day led to the condemnation of "Essays and Reviews."

But Puritanism was already in the decline when such things were possible. What had been a wondrous and intimate experience of the soul, a flash into the very crypt and basis of man's nature from the fire of trial, had become ritual and tradition. In prosperous times the faith of one generation becomes the formality of the next. "The necessity of a reformation," set forth by order of the Synod which met at Cambridge in 1679, though no doubt overstating the case, shows how much even at that time the ancient strictness had been loosened. The country had grown rich, its commerce was large, and wealth did its natural work in making life softer and more worldly, commerce in deprovincializing the minds of those engaged in it. But Puritanism had already done its duty. As there are certain creatures whose whole being seems occupied with an egg-laying errand they are sent upon, incarnate ovipositors, their bodies but bags to hold this precious deposit, their legs of use only to carry them where they may safeliest be rid of it, so sometimes a generation seems to have no other end than the conception and ripening of certain germs. Its blind stirrings, its apparently aimless seeking hither and thither, are but the driving of an instinct to be done with its parturient function toward these principles of future life and power. Puritanism, believing itself quick with the seed of religious liberty, laid, without knowing it, the egg of democracy. The English Puritans pulled down church and state to rebuild Zion on the ruins, and all the while it was not Zion, but America, they were building. But if their millennium went by, like the rest, and left men still human,— if they, like so many saints and martyrs before them, listened in vain for the sound of that trumpet which was to summon all souls to a resurrection from the body of this

death which men call life, — it is not for us, at least, to forget the heavy debt we owe them. It was the drums of Naseby and Dunbar that gathered the minute-men on Lexington Common; it was the red dint of the axe on Charles's block that marked One in our era. The Puritans had their faults. They were narrow, ungenial; they could not understand the text, "I have piped to you and ye have not danced," nor conceive that saving one's soul should be the cheerfullest, and not the dreariest, of businesses. Their preachers had a way, like the painful Mr. Perkins, of pronouncing the word *damn* with such an emphasis as left a doleful echo in their auditors' ears a good while after. And it was natural that men who led or accompanied the exodus from existing forms and associations into the doubtful wilderness that led to the promised land, should find more to their purpose in the Old Testament than in the New. As respects the New England settlers, however visionary some of their religious tenets may have been, their political ideas savored of the realty, and it was no Nephelococcygia of which they drew the plan, but of a commonwealth whose foundation was to rest on solid and familiar earth. If what they did was done in a corner, the results of it were to be felt to the ends of the earth; and the figure of Winthrop should be as venerable in history as that of Romulus is barbarously grand in legend.

We are inclined to think that many of our national characteristics, which are sometimes attributed to climate and sometimes to institutions, are traceable to the influences of Puritan descent. We are apt to forget how very large a proportion of our population is descended from emigrants who came over before 1660. Those emigrants were in great part representatives of that element of English character which was most susceptible of religious impressions; in other words, the most earnest and imaginative. Our people still differ from their English cousins (as they are fond of calling themselves when they are afraid we may do them a mischief) in a certain capacity for enthusiasm, a devotion to abstract principle, an openness to ideas, a greater aptness for intuitions than for the slow processes of the syllogism, and, as derivative from this, in minds of looser texture, a light-armed, skirmishing habit of thought,

and a positive preference of the birds in the bush, — an excellent quality of character *before* you have your bird in the hand.

There have been two great distributing centres of the English race on this continent, Massachusetts and Virginia. Each has impressed the character of its early legislators on the swarms it has sent forth. Their ideas are in some fundamental respects the opposites of each other, and we can only account for it by an antagonism of thought beginning with the early framers of their respective institutions. New England abolished caste; in Virginia they still talk of "quality folks." But it was in making education not only common to all, but in some sense compulsory on all, that the destiny of the free republics of America was practically settled. Every man was to be trained, not only to the use of arms, but of his wits also; and it is these which alone make the others effective weapons for the maintenance of freedom. You may disarm the hands, but not the brains, of a people, and to know what should be defended is the first condition of successful defence. Simple as it seems, it was a great discovery that the key of knowledge could turn both ways, that it could open, as well as lock, the door of power to the many. The only things a New-Englander was ever locked out of were the jails. It is quite true that our Republic is the heir of the English Commonwealth; but as we trace events backward to their causes, we shall find it true also, that what made our Revolution a foregone conclusion was that act of the General Court, passed in May, 1647, which established the system of common schools. "To the end that learning may not be buried in the graves of our forefathers in Church and Commonwealth, the Lord assisting our endeavors, it is therefore ordered by this Court and authority thereof, that every township in this jurisdiction, after the Lord hath increased them to fifty householders, shall then forthwith appoint one within their towns to teach all such children as shall resort to him to write and read."

Passing through some Massachusetts village, perhaps at a distance from any house, it may be in the midst of a piece of woods where four roads meet, one may sometimes even yet see a small, square, one-story building, whose use would not be

long doubtful. It is summer, and the flickering shadows of forest-leaves dapple the roof of the little porch, whose door stands wide, and shows, hanging on either hand, rows of straw hats and bonnets, that look as if they had done good service. As you pass the open windows, you hear whole platoons of high-pitched voices discharging words of two or three syllables with wonderful precision and unanimity. Then there is a pause, and the voice of the officer in command is heard reproving some raw recruit whose vocal musket hung fire. Then the drill of the small infantry begins anew, but pauses again because some urchin — who agrees with Voltaire that the superfluous is a very necessary thing — insists on spelling "subtraction" with an *s* too much.

If you had the good fortune to be born and bred in the Bay State, your mind is thronged with half-sad, half-humorous recollections. The a-b abs of little voices long since hushed in the mould, or ringing now in the pulpit, at the bar, or in the Senate-chamber, come back to the ear of memory. You remember the high stool on which culprits used to be elevated with the tall paper fool's-cap on their heads, blushing to the ears; and you think with wonder how you have seen them since as men climbing the world's penance-stools of ambition without a blush, and gladly giving everything for life's caps and bells. And you have pleasanter memories of going after pond-lilies, of angling for horn-pouts, — that queer bat among the fishes, — of nutting, of walking over the creaking snow-crust in winter, when the warm breath of every household was curling up silently in the keen blue air. You wonder if life has any rewards more solid and permanent than the Spanish dollar that was hung around your neck to be restored again next day, and conclude sadly that it was but too true a prophesy and emblem of all worldly success. But your moralizing is broken short off by a rattle of feet and the pouring forth of the whole swarm, — the boys dancing and shouting, — the mere effervescence of the fixed air of youth and animal spirits uncorked, — the sedater girls in confidential twos and threes decanting secrets out of the mouth of one cape-bonnet into that of another. Times have changed since the jackets and trousers used to draw up on one side of the road, and the petticoats on the other, to salute

with bow and courtesy the white neckcloth of the parson or the squire, if it chanced to pass during intermission.

Now this little building, and others like it, were an original kind of fortification invented by the founders of New England. They are the martello-towers that protect our coast. This was the great discovery of our Puritan forefathers. They were the first lawgivers who saw clearly and enforced practically the simple moral and political truth, that knowledge was not an alms to be dependent on the chance charity of private men or the precarious pittance of a trust-fund, but a sacred debt which the commonwealth owed to every one of her children. The opening of the first grammar-school was the opening of the first trench against monopoly in church and state; the first row of trammels and pothooks which the little Shearjashubs and Elkanahs blotted and blubbered across their copy-books, was the preamble to the Declaration of Independence. The men who gave every man the chance to become a landholder, who made the transfer of land easy, and put knowledge within the reach of all, have been called narrow-minded, because they were intolerant. But intolerant of what? Of what they believed to be dangerous nonsense, which, if left free, would destroy the last hope of civil and religious freedom. They had not come here that every man might do that which seemed good in his own eyes, but in the sight of God. Toleration, moreover, is something which is won, not granted. It is the equilibrium of neutralized forces. The Puritans had no notion of tolerating mischief. They looked upon their little commonwealth as upon their own private estate and homestead, as they had a right to do, and would no more allow the Devil's religion of unreason to be preached therein, than we should permit a prize-fight in our gardens. They were narrow; in other words they had an edge to them, as men that serve in great emergencies must; for a Gordian knot is settled sooner with a sword than a beetle. Nothing can be better than Dr. Palfrey's treatment of this question in the cases of Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hutchinson. It is perfectly fair, and yet immitigable, as common-sense always is.

Having already had occasion to speak of Dr. Palfrey in our journal, we have here done little more than epitomize the

thoughts and conclusions to which we have been led, or in which we have been confirmed, by the three volumes already published. There are many passages which we should have been glad to quote; but it is to the praise of his work that its merit lies more in its tone of thought and its weight of opinion, than in pictorial effects. Brilliancy is cheap; but trustworthiness of thought, and evenness of judgment, are not to be had at every booth.

Dr. Palfrey combines in the temper of his mind and the variety of his experience some quite peculiar qualifications for the task he has undertaken. A man of singular honesty of purpose and conscientiousness of action, a thoroughly trained theologian, he ripened and enlarged the somewhat partial knowledge of mankind and their motives which falls to the lot of a clergyman by the experience of active politics and the training of practical statesmanship. Needing office neither as an addition of emolument nor of dignity, his interest in politics was the result of moral convictions, and not of personal ambition. The loss of his seat in Congress, while it was none to himself, was an irreparable one for Massachusetts, to which his integrity, his learning, and his eloquence were at once a service and an honor. In the maturity of his powers, he devoted himself to the composition of the History which he has now brought to the end of its third volume, and to the beginning of a new period. It is little to say that his work is the only one of its kind. He has done it so well, that it is likely to remain so. With none of that glitter of style and epigrammatic point of expression which please more than they enlighten, and tickle when they should instruct, there is a gravity and precision of thought, a sober dignity of expression, an equanimity of judgment, and a clear apprehension of characters and events, which give us the very truth of things as they are, and not as either he or his reader might wish them to be. Moreover, in spite of a certain external incongruity, incidental to the nature of the subject, which obliges him to go from one Colony to another, but which is more apparent than real, there is an essential unity of treatment, such as would be possible only for one who, knowing the facts thoroughly, had weighed and compared them well, and had thus been able to arrive at that neutral point of criticism which harmonizes by combining them all.

Here, it seems to us, lies the originality of Dr. Palfrey's work,—in this congruity of the controlling idea with the admitted event, without violence to either. The historian has his theory and his facts, and the only way in which he can reconcile them with each other is by bearing constantly in mind the human nature of the actors. In this instance there is no temptation to make a hero, who shall sum up in his own individuality and carry forward by his own will that purpose of which we seem to catch such bewitching glances in history, which reveals itself more clearly and constantly, perhaps, in the annals of New England than elsewhere, and which yet, at best, is but tentative, doubtful of itself, turned this way and that by chance, made up of instinct, and modified by circumstance quite as much as it is directed by deliberate forethought. Such a purpose, or natural craving, or result of temporary influences, may be misguided by a powerful character to his own ends, or, if he be strongly in sympathy with it, may be hastened toward its own fulfilment; but there is no such heroic element in our drama, and what is remarkable is, that, under whatever government, democracy grew with the growth of the New England Colonies, and was at last potent enough to wrench them, and the better part of the continent with them, from the mother country. It is true that Jefferson embodied in the Declaration of Independence the speculative theories he had learned in France, but the impulse to separation came from Massachusetts; and the theories had been long since embodied there in the practice of the people, if they had never been formulated in distinct propositions.

We do not mean that Dr. Palfrey, like a great many declaimers about the Pilgrim Fathers, looks upon them all as men of grand conceptions and superhuman foresight. An entire ship's company of Columbuses is what the world never saw. Nor has he formed any theory and fitted his facts to it, as a man in a hurry is apt to cram his travelling-bag, with a total disregard of shape or texture. But he has found that the facts will only fit comfortably together on a single plan, namely, that the fathers did have a conception (which those will call grand who regard simplicity as a necessary element of grandeur) of founding here a commonwealth on those two eternal bases of

Faith and Work; that they had, indeed, no revolutionary ideas of universal liberty, but yet, what answered the purpose quite as well, an abiding faith in the brotherhood of men as children of God; and that they did not so much propose to make all things new, as to develop the latent possibilities of English law and English character, by clearing away the fences by which the abuse of the one was gradually discommoning the other from the broad fields of natural right. They were not in advance of their age, as it is called, for no one who is so can ever work profitably in it; but they were alive to the highest and most earnest thinking of their time. Dr. Palfrey also makes it clear that the thought of separation from the parent state was not only not unfamiliar to the minds of the leaders of New England emigration, but that they looked forward to it and prepared for it as something that might be expedient or necessary according to the turn of events. Apart from contemporary evidence of their hopes and intentions, he finds in the inevitable results of the institutions they founded the proof of what they meant to do.

The present volume brings the history down to one of the limits which the author had originally set to his labors, — the fall of the Andros government. He tells the story of King Philip's war with satisfactory minuteness, quoting the picturesque passages of earlier narrators; he gives us a most interesting and instructive chapter on the early legislation of the Colonies, useful for the final extinction of some old falsehoods, which still give a buzz now and then, like winter flies; and he traces the gradual decline, we will not say of the public spirit, but in the moral courage and principle of those who should have been its inspirers and leaders. We are come now upon a new generation, prosperous in their affairs, and forgetful alike of the trials of the pioneers and of the end for which they thought it light to endure them. The day of compromises and expedients had arrived. This is not the first time in the course of his history that Dr. Palfrey, by his interpretation and comment of the past, has given a new meaning to events that have taken place under our own eyes; and we suspect that it was by no mere study of contemporary documents that he learned how to appreciate the motives of the men to whom they relate. There is an ad-

mirable consistency and candor in his portraits of the leaders of this period of decline; and the reproof of timidity and self-seeking is not unbecoming in the mouth of one who has himself made sacrifices for principle, and never flinched in the service of truth.

In the Preface, Dr. Palfrey bids farewell to his work with an affectionate regret that has something almost pathetic in it. In spite of his farewell speech, however, and the falling of the curtain, we cannot help hoping that he will greet us again in successive last appearances, till he has brought his work down to the end of another of those cycles of which he speaks.

"But the cycle of New England is eighty-six years. In the spring of 1603, the family of Stuart ascended the throne of England. At the end of eighty-six years, Massachusetts having been betrayed to her enemies by her most eminent and trusted citizen, Joseph Dudley, the people, on the 19th day of April, 1689, committed their prisoner, the deputy of the Stuart King, to the fort in Boston which he had built to overawe them. Another eighty-six years passed, and Massachusetts had been betrayed to her enemies by her most eminent and trusted citizen, Thomas Hutchinson, when, at Lexington and Concord, on the 19th of April, 1775, her farmers struck the first blow in the War of American Independence. Another eighty-six years ensued, and a domination of slaveholders, more odious than that of Stuarts or of Guelphs, had been fastened upon her, when, on the 19th of April, 1861, the streets of Baltimore were stained by the blood of her soldiers on their way to uphold liberty and law by the rescue of the National Capital." —p. viii.

In taking leave of Dr. Palfrey, then, as we prefer to say, for the present, we cannot but congratulate him on the real service he has done to our history, and to the understanding of our national character. Patient, thoughtful, exact, and with those sensitive moral sympathies which are worth more than all else to an historian, he has added to our stock of truth, and helped us in the way of right thinking. No doubt there are periods and topics more picturesque, but we think him most sure of lasting fame who has chosen a subject where the deepest interest is a moral one; for while men weary of pictures, there is always that in the deep things of God which sooner or later attracts and charms them.

ART. VIII. — *Religion and Chemistry: or, Proofs of God's Plan in the Atmosphere and its Elements. Ten Lectures delivered at the Brooklyn Institute, Brooklyn, N. Y., on the Graham Foundation.* By JOSIAH P. COOKE, JR., Erving Professor of Chemistry and Mineralogy in Harvard University. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864. 8vo. pp. 348.

To judge these Lectures by their value as a contribution to the literature of natural theology would be to judge them unjustly, since, as a well-devised course of popular lectures calculated to interest and instruct the general reader, they are not wanting in merit, and they evince no ordinary skill in the author as a lecturer on general science.

It is not, however, as a course of scientific lectures that this work has any claim to originality, or challenges critical notice. Its ostensible object is to present unassailable arguments for the doctrines of natural religion from the facts of chemistry alone.

Natural history and anatomy have hitherto furnished the principal grounds to the theologian for the speculation of final causes, since these sciences exhibit many instances of a complex combination of causes in the structures and habits of organic bodies, and at the same time a distinct and peculiar class of effects, namely, those which constitute the well-being and perfection of organic life; and from these causes and effects, regarded as means and ends in the order of nature, the arguments and illustrations of natural theology have been chiefly drawn. But the facts of these sciences are not merely the most useful to the theologian; they are indeed indispensable, and occupy a peculiar position in his argument, since they alone afford the class of effects on which, assumed as ends, the speculation of final causes ultimately rests.

It is only by assuming human welfare, or with this the welfare also of other sentient beings, as the end for which the universe exists, that the doctrine of final causes has hitherto found any support in natural science. The novelty, therefore, of the plan proposed in Professor Cooke's Lectures is alone sufficient to claim our attention. "At the time," says the author, "when these Lectures were written, Mr. Darwin's book

on the Origin of Species, then recently published, was exciting great attention, and was thought by many to have an injurious bearing on the argument for design. It was, therefore, made the chief aim of these Lectures to show that there is abundant evidence of design in the properties of the chemical elements alone, and hence that the great argument of natural theology rests upon a basis which no theories of organic development can shake."

On turning, however, to the arguments themselves, in which we might, from this advertisement, have justly expected an exposition of a new order of final causes, we find that, after all, the author has not departed from the beaten track of natural theology, but still bases his arguments on the assumed relation of means to ends in the adaptations of the general physical and chemical properties of matter to the conditions of organic life, though he limits his consideration of this topic to the properties of the constituents of the atmosphere in their relations to human welfare. It is not easy to see how the author could have proceeded otherwise; still, it does not appear from this that there is any evidence of design in the properties of the chemical elements alone, since it is in the relation of these to the welfare of organic beings that the evidence, such as it is, consists. With neither term of this relation can the theologian dispense, yet it is with this relation that the theories of organic development are also concerned; and we cannot understand how the great argument of natural theology is made to rest on a basis which no theories of organic development can shake, by showing, as the author very clearly does, how numerous and intimate are the dependencies of organic life on the actual and most special properties of the materials of our atmosphere. For these theories themselves attempt to account for the special adaptations of organic life to its conditions of existence, and claim to succeed even better in this department of natural history than in that which relates to the internal and more general characteristics of organization. This paralogism doubtless arose from the author's failing to distinguish with sufficient care the philosophical value of the natural evidences from their devotional uses. It is doubtless true that the properties of the chemical elements alone are sufficient to inspire a very devout mind with

a profound sense of the wisdom and power of God, even though the sciences of natural history should lose their traditional value in natural theology.

But the spontaneous, almost impulsive, transition by which the student of nature, and especially the naturalist, passes from the interests which direct his studies to a devotional frame of mind, bears little resemblance to that logical "transition of the understanding" by which natural theology would connect the interests of science with those of religion, and, by substituting an elaborate dogmatism in place of a simple faith, effect, as it were through the compulsion of reason, what is competent alone to the spontaneity of feeling.

As the author follows other modern writers in regarding natural theology as a speculative science, or as a philosophical explication of our primary and natural religious beliefs, — an attempted exposition of their logical grounds, rather than a positive proof of their validity, — he does not undertake to defend the arguments of this science as essential to natural religion; and his general treatment of its doctrines evinces a liberal spirit, and a disposition to deal fairly with the claims of scientific speculation, which cannot fail to exert a salutary influence.

What we have further to say applies, therefore, rather to natural theology as a positive science, than to our author's use of its formulas and methods in presenting the religious aspects of chemistry.

Though it is still maintained by theologians that the arguments for design are properly inductive arguments, yet the physical proofs of natural theology are not regarded by many modern writers as having any independent weight; and it is in mental and moral science that the facts are sought which will warrant the induction of design from the general phenomena of nature. It is hardly considered logical, even by the theological writers of our day, to conclude, with Paley, "that the works of nature proceed from intelligence and design; because, in the properties of relation to a purpose, subserviency to a use, they resemble what intelligence and design are constantly producing, and what nothing [which we know] except intelligence and design ever produce at all." For it is denied by the phys-

ical philosopher that causes and effects in natural phenomena can be interpreted into the terms of natural theology by any key which science itself affords. By what criterion, he would ask, can we distinguish among the numberless effects, that are also causes, and among the causes that may, for aught we can know, be also effects, — how can we distinguish which are the means and which are the ends? What effects are we warranted by observation in calling final, or final causes, or the ends for which the others exist? The belief on other grounds that there *are* final causes, that the universe exists for some purpose, is one thing; but the belief that science discloses, or even that science can disclose, what this purpose is, is quite a different thing. The designation of those effects as final in nature which contribute to human desires or human welfare, or even to the welfare of all sentient beings, cannot be legitimately made for the purposes of this argument, since human and other sentient beings are not the agents by which these supposed ends are attained; neither can the causes which bring these effects to pass be regarded as servants obedient to the commands of the agents to whom these effects are desirable. The analogy of natural production to human contrivance fails them at the very outset; and the interpretation of natural causes and effects as means and ends, virtually assumes the conclusion of the argument, and is not founded on any natural evidence. These considerations are overlooked by most writers on this subject, who, in addition to a legitimate faith in final causes, assume the dogma that these causes are manifest or discoverable. They begin with the definition, sometimes called an argument, "that a combination of means conspiring to a particular end implies intelligence," and they then assume that the causes which science discovers are means, or exist for the sake of the effects which science accounts for; and from the relation of means to ends, thus assumed, they infer intelligence.

The definition we have quoted contains, however, more than is really implied in this argument, since the relation of means to ends in itself, and without further qualification, implies intelligence, while a combination of means conspiring to a particular end implies a high degree of intelligence; and it is with this, the degree of intelligence manifested in the phenom-

ena of nature, that scientific discourses on the natural evidences are really dealing, though sometimes unconsciously. These discourses really aim, not so much to prove the existence of design in the universe, as to show the wisdom of certain designs which are assumed to be manifest. But for this purpose it is requisite to translate the facts of science, and those combinations of causes which are discovered to be the conditions of particular effects, into the terms of the argument, and to show that these combinations are means, or exist for the sake of the particular effects, for which, as ends, the universe itself must be shown to exist, — a task for which science is obviously incompetent.

Waiving these fundamental objections to the argument for design, which, let us repeat, are not objections to the spiritual doctrine of final causes, or to the belief that final causes exist, we will turn to the objections which modern writers of natural theology themselves allow.

It is essential to the validity of Paley's argument, that "design," or the determination of effects by the intelligence of an agent, be shown to be not merely the only known cause of such effects, but also to be a real cause, or an independent determination by an efficient agent. If intelligence itself be a product, if the human powers of contrivance are themselves effects, it follows that designed effects should be ascribed, not to intelligence, but to the causes of intelligence; and the same objection will hold against the theologian's use of the word "design," which he urges against the physicist's use of the word "law." "It is a perversion of language," says Paley, "to assign any law as the efficient operative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent, for it only is the mode according to which the agent proceeds; it implies a power, for it is the order according to which this power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the 'law' does nothing, is nothing." By substituting the word "design" for the word "law" in this quotation, we have the materialist's objection to the theologian's perversion of language. This objection was entirely overlooked by Paley, who seems to have thought it sufficient for the purposes of his argument to consider only the phenomena of the visible material

universe. But later writers have seen the necessity of basing the argument for design on the psychological doctrine that intelligence is a free, undetermined power, and that design is the free, undetermined act of this power. Without this assumption, which indeed Paley himself virtually makes, it would be as unphilosophical to refer the course of nature to the determination of intelligence, as it is to refer it to the determination of the abstraction which the materialist prefers, or to the "agency of law."

"That intelligence stands first in the absolute order of existence, — in other words, that final preceded efficient causes, — and that the universe is governed by moral laws," are the two propositions, the proof of which, says Sir William Hamilton, is the proof of a God; and this proof "establishes its foundation exclusively on the phenomena of mind." Without this psychological proof, the order of adaptation cannot be logically referred to the order of design; and the resemblance of human contrivances to the adaptations of nature can only warrant the conclusion that both proceed from similar conditions, and by a power of whose efficiency human intelligence and physical laws are alike manifestations, but whose nature neither human intelligence comprehends nor physical laws can disclose.

Even such a result, which is all that the unaided physical sciences can compass, is not altogether barren of religious interest, though it is made so by the materialist's attempt to define the nature of power by assigning to physical forces an absolute efficiency. The spiritualist, on the other hand, if we allow his psychological proof that intelligence stands first in the absolute order of existence, and is a free, undetermined power, is logically competent to interpret the order of nature as a designed order. Yet to him physical proofs of design have little or no value, and can only serve as obscure and enigmatical illustrations of what is far more clearly apparent in the study of mind. And though logically competent to interpret the order of design, if his spiritual doctrine be true, yet the difficulties which we first mentioned, and waived for the nonce, are difficulties as insuperable to the psychologist as to the physicist. He gains no criterion from his studies by which to distinguish, in the order of natural phenomena, which are

the means and which are the ends, or where the relation of means to ends is to be found, among the infinite successions of effects which are also causes, and of causes which may, for aught he can know, be also effects. His faith in final causes is not a guide by which he can determine what the final causes are by which he believes the order of nature to be determined.

These theoretical objections to a philosophy, which assigns physical reasons for a faith in final causes, are by no means the most important objections. The practical influences and effects of such philosophizing are, we believe, more obnoxious to the true interests of religion than its methods are to the true principles of philosophy, and fully justify an examination of its arguments. For bad arguments may go for nothing, while good ones necessitate their conclusions; and we think it fortunate for the purity of religious truth that theologians have succeeded no better in this direction.

Not only do the peculiar doctrines of natural theology add nothing to the grounds of a faith in final causes; they, in effect, narrow this faith to ideas which scarcely rise in dignity above the rank of superstitions. If to believe that God is what we can think him to be is blasphemy, what shall we call the attempt to discover his intentions and to interpret his plans in nature? If science were able to discover a much closer analogy than it does between the adaptations of nature and the designs of human contrivance, would it be any less derogatory to the dignity of the Divine nature to attempt by such analogies to fathom his designs and plans, or to suppose that what appears as a designed order is really any clew to the purposes of the Almighty? And when, even transcending this degree of presumption, theology would fix a limit to the researches and hypotheses of science, on the ground that they tend to subvert religious doctrines, or the assumed results of a religious philosophy, we are warranted — nay, constrained, from practical considerations — to question the grounds of its pretensions, to allow it no longer to shield its falseness and weakness behind the dignity and worth of the interests to which it is falsely dedicated. It is from the illegitimate pretensions of natural theology that the figment of a conflict between science and religion has arisen; and the efforts of religious thinkers to coun-

teract the supposed atheistical tendencies of science, and to give a religious interpretation to its facts, have only served to deepen the false impression that such a conflict actually exists, so that revolutions in scientific theories have been made to appear in the character of refutations of religious doctrines.

That there is a fundamental distinction between the natures of scientific and religious ideas ought never to be doubted; but that contradiction can arise, except between religious and superstitious ideas, ought not for a moment to be admitted. Progress in science is really a progress in religious truth, not because any new reasons are discovered for the doctrines of religion, but because advancement in knowledge frees us from the errors both of ignorance and of superstition, exposing the mistakes of a false religious philosophy, as well as those of a false science. If the teachings of natural theology are liable to be refuted or corrected by progress in knowledge, it is legitimate to suppose, not that science is irreligious, but that these teachings are superstitious; and whatever evils result from the discoveries of science are attributable to the rashness of the theologian, and not to the supposed irreligious tendencies of science. When a proof of special design is invalidated by the discovery that a particular effect in the operations of nature, which previously appeared to result from a special constitution and adjustment of certain forces, is really a consequent of the general properties of matter, — when, for example, the laws of planetary motion were shown to result from the law of universal gravitation, and the mathematical plan of the solar system was seen to be a consequent of a single universal principle, — the harm, if there be any, results from the theologian's mistakes, and not from the corrections of science. He should refrain from attributing any special plan or purpose to the creation, if he would find in science a constant support to religious truth. But this abstinence does not involve a withdrawal of the mind from the proper religious interests of natural science, nor weaken a legitimate faith in final causes. Even the Newtonian mechanism of the heavens, simple, primordial, and necessary as it seems, still discloses to the devout mind evidence of a wisdom unfathomable, and of a design which transcends interpretation; and when, in the more complicated order

of organic life, surprising and beautiful adaptations inspire in the naturalist the conviction that purpose and intelligence are manifested in them,—that they spring from a nature akin to the devising power of his own mind, — there is nothing in science or philosophy which can legitimately rebuke his enthusiasm, — nothing, unless it be the dogmatism which would presumptuously interpret as science what is only manifest to faith, or would require of faith that it shall justify itself by proofs.

The progress of science has indeed been a progress in religious truth, but in spite of false theology, and in a way which narrow theologians have constantly opposed. It has defined with greater and greater distinctness the boundary between what can be discovered and what cannot. It has purified religious truth by turning back the moral consciousness to discover clearly in itself what it had obscurely divined from its own interpretations of nature. It has impressed on the mind of the cautious inquirer the futility, as well as the irreverence, of attempting a philosophy which can at best be but a finer sort of superstition, a real limitation to our conceptions of final causes, while apparently an extension of them.

But instead of learning these lessons from the experience of repeated failures, theologians have constantly opposed new hypotheses in science, until proof has compelled a tardy assent, and even then they have retreated to other portions of science, as if these were the only refuge of a persecuted faith.

Humility and cautiousness, and that suspension of judgment in matters about which we really know so little, which a recent theological writer has recommended, in view of the pending controversy on the origin of organic species and adaptations, are virtues, which, had they been generally cultivated by theologians, would have rendered this controversy harmless at least, if not unnecessary.

ART. IX. — 1. *The Herald and Genealogist.* Edited by JOHN GOUGH NICHOLS, F. S. A. Vol. I. London: John Bowyer Nichols and Sons. 1863. pp. 594.

2. *The New England Historical and Genealogical Register and Antiquarian Journal.* Vol. XVIII. Part 3. (July, 1864.) *Report of the Standing Committee on Heraldry.*

3. *A Manual of Heraldry, Historical and Popular, with Seven Hundred Illustrations.* By CHARLES BOUTELL, M. A. 1863.

WIT has often been levelled against the pursuits of genealogists and family historians, and has often found a fair mark in them for its shafts. He must be of poor blood himself who is proud to trace his descent through a long line of inconspicuous or worthless nobodies, or who brushes the dust off his grandfathers' tombs in a spirit of vain and trivial curiosity, instead of the simple reverence of filial piety. Besides, as the worthy and valorous knight, Don Quixote de la Mancha, says, "the brave man carves out his fortune, and every man is the son of his own works." But, on the other hand, an honorable man himself may well take pleasure in a line of honorable ancestors, and the most consistent democrat among us will find nothing inharmonious with his principles in tracing his origin to those who were good men and brave in their day. At any rate, it seems to be almost an instinct in civilized man to seek to know who were his ancestors; and in our country, above all, we gratify our longing for a past and for a history, by following up our family names till we have found their original home in the Old World.

Nowhere of late years has the science of genealogy been more zealously pursued than in New England. To one familiar with the subject, the claim of the Virginia and South Carolina "chivalry," that they represented the gentlemen of England, while the Yankees were no better than base-born churls, was as amusing as it was false. But the repeated assertion of the claim has led to some special investigations in a limited field, of which we propose to present some of the results to our readers. Heraldry may be used as an assistance in genealogical and historical studies; and we propose to in-

quire by whom, and by what right, and to what extent, coats of arms have been used in New England.

We must premise that coats of arms are hereditary family emblems, originally assumed by the men-at-arms, or knights of the age of chivalry, as a mode of distinguishing the mailed warrior whose face was concealed by his helmet. Originally, also, these arms were assumed at the pleasure of the bearer; but as soon as they became the badge or mark of a class, the privilege of conferring them was reserved to the crown. Henry V. declared by proclamation, that no one should assume arms unless he had them by inheritance or by gift of the proper authorities, except those who bore arms with the king at Agincourt. Care was taken, by visitations made by the heralds to each county, to obtain and preserve lists of all such persons as claimed the right; and the establishment of Heralds' College by Richard III. led to a fixed plan for English heraldry. The rule now in force there is plain and simple; every man is entitled to his coat of arms who can prove his descent in the male line from any one recorded in the Heralds' Visitation, or from any one to whom arms have since been granted by the heralds. At present any one can also obtain a coat of arms for himself and his male heirs, by applying at the Heralds' College in London, and paying a stated fee.

It will thus be seen that there are many degrees of "gentlemen of coat-armor," from those whose ancestors used heraldic devices when they first became hereditary, down to the last recipient of the Earl Marshal's favor within the current month. In England, indeed, the use of coats of arms is so common that it ceases to attract notice; but it is probable that even there the easy mode of buying a regular coat of arms is less favored than the cheap method of assuming one.

As the use of arms in America is not infrequent, it is well to determine what rules ought to govern it, so that we may not be liable to the reproach of appropriating other people's property. Strange as it may seem, coats of arms are property, and, like a man's name, a species of property jealously guarded by the rightful holder. As only one individual originally received or assumed a particular coat of arms, and the right of inheritance belongs solely to his lineal descendants, not only

are others of the name not entitled to the same arms, but their assumption of the coat is a false claim of descent from the original owner. When an American ignorantly adopts the coat of arms of a family of his name in England, he not only asserts by the act that he can prove that he is allied to that family, but to the particular branch which has attained to a certain social rank. It is common for persons to plead as an excuse that the arms belong to the name; but this is a total mistake, arising from popular ignorance of the subject. No name as such is entitled to a coat of arms; the right was originally acquired by an individual, or the grant made to him, and has descended solely to his heirs.

If we in America desire to adopt English coats of arms, we must, in doing so, conform to the rules of English heraldry. Applying this test to existing examples, and carrying back our investigations throughout our Colonial history, we shall find that, though of late years there have been numerous barefaced assumptions of arms without probability or even possibility in their favor, still we have always had, in New England at least, a certain number of families whose claims to bear arms are sufficiently substantiated.

For the first century our ancestors were Englishmen in name and fact. Many of the first settlers used coats of arms on their seals, and every considerable collection of manuscripts of this date affords examples of them. Thus the Winthrop Papers, now publishing by the Massachusetts Historical Society, give us arms used before 1650 by the families of Winthrop, Humphrey, Downing, Peters, Williams, Hopkins, Haynes, Underhill, Hooke, Ward, Mayhew, Davenport, Godfrey, Child, Cotton, Harrison, White, Nye, Maverick, Parker, Bellingham, Fenwick, and Norton. The probate offices present also a chronological series of examples. A few pedigrees contemporaneous with the settlement of the country remain to us, as those of the Norton, Miner, Chute, Phippen, and other families, printed in the New England Historical and Genealogical Register. Within the past twenty years, the revived interest in genealogy has led to investigations in England which have given families here a right both to a pedigree and a coat of arms.

Thus far we are on firm ground; if there is any improper

assumption of arms in these cases, it must have occurred in England two centuries ago. The circumstances of the case entirely forbid this supposition. Our ancestors were accustomed to give a certain respect to social position, and would have detected and punished any attempt at fraud. Their religious principles were also diametrically opposed to any desire to assume false honors. In fact, we can feel more confident of the accuracy of these coats, than of most of those recorded in recent books on heraldry.

After 1700, however, there was a chance for error to creep in. Many men became enriched by commerce; many of the young men travelled abroad; many new settlers were attracted to the prosperous Colonies. From this date till 1750, we find the number of coats of arms increasing; and we meet with them not only on seals and tombstones, but in paintings, and in engravings on silver plate. After 1750, until the present century, we find everywhere the handiwork of one or more itinerant artists, who seem to have given a coat to every applicant, without authority or reason. A little care and investigation will, however, enable us to frame rules by which these inventions may be distinguished from true coats of arms.

In cases where there is no instance of the use of a coat by an original settler, but one appears in use in the second or third generation, we must remember that earlier examples may have been mislaid or destroyed. It can hardly be believed that any man whose father or grandfather was born in England would assume a coat of arms without a positive knowledge of its accuracy, and his right to it. Still less can we believe that armorial bearings would have been used on his tombstone, in the sanctity of consecrated ground, had they been open to the reproach of falsehood. Thus the tombstone of Rev. Gershom Bulkeley of Wethersfield, who died in 1713, and that of his son Edward Bulkeley, who died in 1748, show the Bulkeley arms; and it is but recently that a letter has been found of Rev. Peter Bulkeley, father of Gershom, dated in 1643, and bearing the same coat.

In investigating any particular case, due regard must be had to the special circumstances. Thus we do not know that Andrew Belcher used a coat of arms, but his son Jonathan, the

Governor, did; and it was put on public documents as his privy seal, besides being engraved beneath his portrait. The case of Lieutenant-Governor Dummer was a similar one, until recently we discovered the arms he used on a seal that belonged to his father. In both of these cases, the rank of the individuals and the publicity with which the arms were used forbid the suspicion that they were borne without warrant.

Again, the families who constituted our Colonial gentry often, if not usually, intermarried. We can feel reasonably sure that families who matched with the Winthrops, the Clarks, the Leveretts, the Belchers, the Dudleys, the Browns, the Mountforts, the Sewalls, and others of the gentry, were also entitled to coats of arms. The offices held by individuals, their position in the Church, the relative place they held on college catalogues, are all to be taken into account, in determining the probable validity of any coat for which we have only the authority of a painting a century old.

There is one point of some importance to be considered in examining seals dating back to the seventeenth century, and that is to be certain that they belonged to the person using them. This is especially the case in regard to seals attached to wills and deeds. Very often it happened that the armorial seal belonged to the notary, or to some witness; in other cases, it was the property of a relative. Thus the will of Joshua Scottow, dated in 1697, bears a seal charged with six lioncels. This seal belonged to his father-in-law, Thomas Savage, whose tombstone, inscribed with this coat of arms, still stands in the King's Chapel burying-ground, in Boston. We know by the will of Thomas Savage, Jr., that he inherited his father's seal ring, and bequeathed it to his son. This ring undoubtedly Scottow borrowed when he signed his will. So the seal of Governor Stoughton was used by his son William, his daughter Rebecca Tailer, and by Thomas Cooper and John Nelson, who married two of his granddaughters. In the case of John Major, whose will was dated in 1702, the seal he used belonged to a witness, William Milborn. A comparison of the wills of Sarah Harris, 1702, and John Winchcombe, 1716, gives us the arms of Thomas Newton, who drew up and witnessed both papers, being a notary-public.

It therefore appears that it will not do to accept every example as positive proof that an individual intended to claim a particular coat of arms; but where we find the one used belonged to a family of his name, there is fair ground for supposing that he bore it, even when there is but one remaining example of its use.

It affords a curious satire on family pride to find as the result of our investigations that there is a total uncertainty as to who will prove to have been the bearers of arms in the past. We are not surprised to find the arms of Winthrop, Bradstreet, Dudley, Leverett, Vassall, Haynes, and others of our magistrates and rulers, but it is a little unexpected to find seals in families who never possessed any great distinction. Thus we find Samuel Eells of Hingham, 1705, used a shield charged with three eels; a coat of arms palpably his own, and probably borne by no other family in New England.

In considering such memorials as survive in engravings on plate, we have to exercise a careful scepticism, as it is a not unfair supposition that the same causes which lead people now to assume arms without right may have existed a century or more ago. Such wealth as was implied in the use of silver plate was not unlikely to be accompanied by a certain ostentation. Each particular instance of this sort must be judged on its own merits. In later times much silver was thus marked, and, with all our scepticism, it must be received as weighty evidence; for it must be recollected, that, however indifferent we may be to the rules of heraldry, our ancestors were familiar with them. They knew who were entitled to arms, and they expressly recognized the social divisions of English life.

Lastly, we have paintings of all grades of authority, from the Leverett picture, dating in 1645, to the latest productions of our Boston artists. These require the closest scrutiny, being the most numerous and least valuable witnesses as a class. We have seen a large oil-painting of the Bulkeley arms, which would be satisfactory even if we had not several other corroborative proofs. We have seen water-colors of the Oliver, Lynde, Fitch, Curwin, Prescott, and other family arms, which were evidently not copied from any printed book. On the other hand, as we have said, after the Revolution, or possibly after 1750, one or more artists traversed the country, painting arms from some heraldic dictionary.

From certain peculiarities of style, it seems probable that Nathaniel Hurd, an engraver of Boston, the earliest one in the Colony, made several book plates about 1750. From the form of the shield he employed, it will probably be feasible to identify many of these paintings of arms as his work. But it is also, we think, a distinguishing mark of his, that he writes under the painting a description of the person to whom the arms were granted. Such particulars he could not have derived from any work then in print. Such works as Edmondson and Burke have issued were not then extant. Gwillim, Morgan, Kent, Osborne, and a few other writers on the subject, had given some examples of coats of arms; but we doubt if any alphabetical catalogue of arms borne by English families, such as Burke now gives us, was then extant. Nor can we imagine that there was then in New England any considerable collection of English local histories, or similar works, from which such information could be gathered. We are rather inclined to believe that Hurd, and perhaps one or two of his contemporaries, merely drew from seals, documents, or tradition existing here.*

A wide field for investigation is opened by those cases in which a man is described in deeds or wills of early date as

* At the same time with Hurd, and previous to him, there were apparently two or three successive generations of the Gore family in Boston, who painted coats of arms. The latest was the brother of Governor Christopher Gore, a sign-painter. There is a book still extant, containing coats of arms of many Boston families, each painting with a date, the earliest being that of Dean Winthrop, in 1701. Under what circumstances this collection was made, it is difficult to say. The names are Winthrop, Middlecot, Frost, Joy, Stoddard, Evance, Roberts, Checkley, Sargent, Shrimpton, Phips, Spencer, Brattle, Legg, Norden, Richards, Paul, Apthorp, Foster, Hawkins, Saltonstall, Dyre, White, Taylor, Addington, Norton, Paige, Cook, Leverett, Belcher, Lemon, Huse, Brown, Hutchinson, Gee, Thatcher, Sweetser, Dudley, Brinley, Chute, Savage, Phillips, Pell, Yeomans, Wade, Mountfort, Borden, Pickman, Tyng, Dummer, Tilestone, Frizell, Waldron, Cushing, Boarland, Winslow, Kilby, Clarke, and MacAdams. The description of the individuals bearing these coats is in every case so particular, as to satisfy any one that they were actually drawn at the date annexed, — from 1701 to 1735. They contain in the impalements proofs of several marriages heretofore surmised, but not proved; in short, no one from our present records could have painted these coats, and no one at present would select these particular names as those of the prominent Boston families. Three quarters of these coats can be proved to have been used before these drawings were made; it is surely a fair argument to assume that the other quarter were also copied from existing originals.

"gentleman." As during the period between 1650 and 1750 these States were English Colonies, it is fair to believe that our ancestors followed in this respect the English custom, and we have a right to count these names as designating a portion of the recognized gentry.

In the present state of our knowledge, it would be premature to give any list of families which used coats of arms in Colonial times. Such collections belong to historical societies; and the New England Historic-Genealogical Society, by instituting a Standing Committee on Heraldry, has announced its intention to pursue the matter.

Enough has been ascertained to make it clear that we can now point out at least one hundred and fifty families who began to use coats of arms during the Colonial period, and are as fully and clearly entitled to use them as any family in England. Whenever any champion of the Southern chivalry will present an equally extensive list of Virginians or Carolinians, we will try to furnish a supplement.

We are glad to take this occasion to represent the folly of unwarranted assumptions of arms at the present day. No act of silly pride or vanity can be more absurd in a republic like ours. The only value of these emblems is their historic value. And he is not merely foolish, but dishonest, who pretends to the right to bear arms, and thus falsifies one of the sources of history. Let the use of new-invented arms on seal rings and coach-panels be left to our new-invented "aristocracy," the shoddy millionnaires of our great cities.

We have in what precedes derived our examples mainly from the founders of Massachusetts. This, we frankly own, proceeds from our ignorance of the early history of the other New England Colonies. The field to be investigated is a wide one; but we do not doubt that we shall have numerous auxiliaries when the subject is once understood.

If researches be made thoroughly on the basis we have recommended, we shall have an Armorial of New England, more accurate and valuable than its English prototype. Any one who consults Burke's Landed Gentry will be struck with the large number of families which can trace their ancestry only to the time of the Civil War. In New England all of our

old families can easily be traced back thus far. Probably nine tenths of our native-born citizens of English descent can trace their pedigree for seven or eight generations with perfect accuracy. It would be impossible for an English herald to say to-day how many families were entitled in 1650 to use coats of arms, or how many are to-day thus distinguished. The large Dictionaries like Burke's, Edmondson's, and Berry's contain lists of all dates and of all degrees of authority. We can prepare a list of New England families, in which we will record none which has used a coat of arms for less than one hundred years, and we will fortify our claims by evidence conclusive to every inquirer.

And here we close, or rather with one word more we close, though the subject is far from being exhausted. Our last word is of thankfulness that all these heraldic distinctions, all these marks of class privilege, of social division, of hereditary distinction, are, except for the purposes of the historian in reconstructing the picture of our Colonial life, utterly gone, vanished from among us; and that the American gentleman is one who receives his patent of gentility from no Heralds' College, but who, grateful for honest parentage, proves his gentle blood by virtue and fair manners.

> "Man is a name of honor for a king,
> Additions take away from each chief thing."

ART. X. — 1. *Democracy in America.* By ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. Translated by HENRY REEVE. Edited, with Notes, by FRANCIS BOWEN. Third Edition. Cambridge: Sever and Francis. 2 vols. Post 8vo. 1863.

2. *Dissertations and Discussions, Political, Philosophical, and Historical.* By JOHN STUART MILL. Article on "Democracy in America." Boston: William V. Spencer. 1864.

THE controversy between the supporters of oligarchy and those of democracy, which has raged with greater or less heat ever since the middle of the last century, has drawn fresh vigor

from the spectacle of the American war. Both sides have found in this great struggle, not only, to use the pulpit phrase, "an occasion to improve," but an endless supply of illustrations for the enforcement or elevation of their respective theories. The one sees, both in the causes of the struggle and in the manner in which it has been conducted, a series of conclusive proofs of the failure of popular government; the other finds in the incidents of each hour some new justification of its confidence in popular fortitude, honesty, and sagacity.

And the discussion has been exacerbated by the fact, that neither party has been a disinterested spectator of the contest. By the friends of democracy abroad, the convulsion through which the American commonwealth is passing is felt to be a crucial test of the soundness of those political opinions of which they have long been the champions, and with which their political fortunes are inseparably linked. To its friends in America it has come home as a personal calamity. It has either wasted their substance, or made their hearths desolate, or, which is often as hard to bear as either, it has inflicted lasting wounds on their pride. In the eyes of the party of aristocracy, too, it is not simply the political unity of the North American continent which is debated on Southern battle-fields, but the stability of their own order, the continuance of that form of social organization in which they have been bred, and with the security and perpetuation of which all that they hold precious in life is indissolubly connected. To them the defeat of the South signifies the triumph of that "principle of equality" from the spread of which they look not only for their own degradation, but, often honestly enough, for great danger to national liberty, and even to civilization itself.

And to appreciate thoroughly the intensity of the interest which this conflict of ours excites, we must keep in mind the width of the area over which its material consequences have been felt. There is no shore so distant that the waves of this great tempest have not broken on it. The term *orbis terrarum perturbatio*, which, as applied by Cicero to the great civil war of his day, was but a rhetorical exaggeration, may be bestowed on this one of ours with literal accuracy. The course of the great tides of commerce has been turned by it; the industry of whole

nations has been revolutionized by it. From John O'Groat's to the base of the Great Snowy Range, there is no country to which its probable results and probable duration are not questions of tremendous moment.

One result, for which students of political philosophy will be thankful, has flowed from the increased sharpness which the events of the day have lent to the discussion, and that is the clearness and frankness with which the opposing parties have been led to enunciate their views. We doubt if the enemies of democracy ever before revealed their objections to it, and their anticipations as to its effects, with as much candor as since our war broke out. We now know, with a tolerable approach to exactness, what we did not know before, the kind of thing they believe it to be, and the kind and amount of evil they expect to proceed from its unchecked working. Excitement caused by the vicissitudes of the armed struggle has loosened the tongues of a great many men who were previously kept silent by caution or indolence, or from never having taken the trouble to put their conclusions into shape. When democracy was prosperous, many only shook their heads when it was mentioned who now make a clean breast of it, and tell the world in good set phrases what they have been thinking about it for years.

And, on the other hand, its friends have been roused by the same causes into more vigorous defence of it than they ever ventured on before. There are many persons in America to-day who five years ago looked grave over universal suffrage, or expressed private doubts of its success, but who are now to be found in the ranks of its most enthusiastic defenders, breathing defiance of aristocrats and aristocracy from every pore, and consigning every form of political organization in which power does not flow directly from the people, in yearly or biennial driblets, to unutterable failure and confusion.

There has, however, in our opinion, been one great mistake made by some advocates of the democratic cause in their manner of conducting the controversy. It consists in ascribing *all* the attacks which have been recently made on democratic institutions to aristocratic malignity, to a blind, perverse pride of caste, or to stupid, over-reasoning prejudice against our politi-

cal and social organization simply because it is different from something else. There is no doubt, in England especially, a vast amount of ignorant depreciation of democracy by persons who have no better reason for objecting to it than a vague notion that it is vulgar, and a vast deal by others who hate it from the purely selfish consideration of the probable effect of its spread on their own social position or that of their families, or from the apprehension that it would introduce changes in manners which their temperament and education lead them to regard as obnoxious.

But in addition to these, democracy has had in this controversy a number of opponents — a small number, we admit — against whom we must employ better weapons than railing, whose character and arguments are both unquestionably respectable, and whose hostility to it is based on conclusions carefully formed, and which are enunciated, not certainly without feeling, but without rancor or irritation. They are thinkers who look on politics — ours as well as their own — in the clear white light of reason, and who, while differing from us as to the means of promoting it, share all our solicitude for the welfare of the human race. Nobody who has been familiar with the political literature of Europe for some years back can have failed to perceive the struggle between their hopes and fears which shows itself whenever these men speak of democracy, the ill-disguised apprehension with which they concede that its march is now irresistible, and the nervous industry with which they occupy themselves in providing breaks and buffers to restrain or direct its course. But it will not do, all will admit, to open on these men the batteries with which it might be proper to assail the bands who fight under the standard of the "Southern Independence Club," and swear by such prophets as Mr. Roebuck or Mr. Lindsay.

The opinions of this class of persons about democracy may, we think, be fairly summed up as follows. They think the spread of democracy (meaning thereby the ascendency of "the principle of equality," to use M. de Tocqueville's phrase, both in politics and in society) over every Christian country, at least, to be certain at no very distant day. They believe that no precaution can be taken and no barrier created which will

do more than postpone this result, and then for a very brief period. They think that this seems to be the remedy decreed by Providence for the removal of the great blot on our civilization, the physical misery and moral degradation of the lower classes. And they admit that the establishment of democracy, whether it take the shape of a republic or of a Cæsarean despotism, would doubtless be largely instrumental in securing for the bulk of the population a certain amount of coarse enjoyments, such as good shelter, good food, and good clothing, and a limited amount of education. But they hold that every democracy, however free at the period of its establishment, gravitates strongly towards subjection to a single absolute ruler, after a period of great corruption and disorder, and that it derives this tendency from certain inherent defects; and what these defects are, they fancy they are able to point out by an examination of what they see, or think they see, in the United States.

What they believe they learn about democracy from what they see here is, that it is fatal in the long run to any high degree of excellence in the arts, science, literature, or statesmanship; that it is hostile to every form of distinction, and thus tends to extinguish the nobler kinds of ambition, to create and perpetuate mediocrity, to offer a serious bar to progress, and even to threaten civilization with stagnation; that, by making equality of conditions the highest political good, it makes civil liberty appear valuable only so long or so far as its existence is compatible with equality; that it converts the ideal of the worst trained and most unthinking portion of the community into the national standard of capacity, and thus drives the ablest men out of public life; that it sets up mere success in the accumulation of money as the proof and test of national prosperity, and elevates material luxury into the great end of social progress; that it takes from manners all their grace and polish and dignity, makes literature feeble and tawdry, and oratory bombastic and violent; that it infuses bitterness into party struggles, while removing the barriers which in aristocratic societies soften and restrain its expression; and, finally, that, by the pains it takes to preserve the equality of conditions, it forces every member of the community to engage as soon as

he reaches manhood in an eager scramble for wealth, thus rendering impossible the existence of a class with sufficient leisure to devote themselves to the cultivation of the arts and sciences, or to speculative inquiry in any field of knowledge.

We do not mean to say that all of the foregoing charges are brought against democracy by any one of its enemies, but the whole of them may be found in a very small number of the speeches, articles, and treatises of one sort or other, which the political movements of the last fifteen years have called forth both in England and on the Continent; and it will be confessed by any candid American observer, that there are various phenomena, both social and political, to be witnessed in the United States which do give color to a large proportion of them. There is hardly one of them for which some foundation, or something like foundation, may not be found in some phase or other of American society or government.

If we asked an American of conservative tastes and opinions to say frankly what he thought of this picture, he would probably take exception to a very large portion of it; he would accuse it of gross exaggeration at least; and if asked to sketch the changes for the worse which, in his opinion, had taken place in American society within the last fifty or sixty years, he would present us with something different, but different rather in degree than in kind. He would say that there had been since the beginning of the century a great deterioration in the character, attainments, and social standing of the men sent by the Free States to fill the various offices of government. (For the purposes of this discussion, we leave the Slave States out of the argument, and for obvious reasons.) The men who now occupy the judicial bench, fill the national and State legislatures, and sit at the council boards and in the mayoral chairs of the great cities, are inferior in training, ability, education, and social position to those who filled the same positions fifty or sixty years ago. Forensic eloquence has, he would say, consequently undergone a corresponding change for the worse. It is neither so chaste, so simple, nor so forcible as it was at the time of the foundation of the government, and for many years after. The art of debating has all but died out, for it is an art which needs acute and ready intellect, saturated with reading and experience

and trained in fence, to sustain it. Speeches in Congress and in the legislatures on important questions are now, for the most part, long essays, written out previously, often full of irrelevancy and commonplace, and repeated altogether, or in a great degree, from memory, to inattentive audiences. If the orator is forced by circumstances to depart from his prepared course, and defend himself and his opinions extemporaneously against an extemporaneous attack, his scanty mental resources force him in the great majority of cases to fall back on personal vituperation. And the small amount of previous thought or culture which is revealed in the legislative discussions is, he would add, very remarkable. Hardly any subject seems important enough or exciting enough to call out anything much better than the philosophy of hotel parlors or the logic of newspaper articles. And what is worse than all this, legislation is confessedly more hasty, more reckless, and more ill-digested than formerly. And none of these things can be ascribed to any diminution in the number of men of culture and ability produced by the country in our day as compared with a former one. Their number bears, there is little doubt, a very much larger proportion to the population than it ever did. But they are unceremoniously thrust aside from public life, and are generally found either toiling in commerce or in the professions, or else killing time and ambition in social trifling or in foreign travel.

Of the present as compared with the former condition of the bar, too, he would say, that not only has etiquette disappeared from it, but in a large number of the States the relations of judge and counsel are marked by a familiarity which, on one side at least, is mingled with a good deal of contempt. Admission to the profession has come to be, not a proof of fitness, but a political right; and the result is, that its ranks are crowded by needy aspirants, not after forensic distinction, but after money, whose want of learning and preparation for their duties, and entire exemption from the once powerful restraints of professional opinion, are fast destroying the reputation for lore, ability, and integrity which a former generation achieved for the American bar.

And if you direct his attention to the social condition of the

country, he will tell you that, while the habits of the American population are much more luxurious than they were half a century ago, while there is far more money in circulation, and while most of the pleasures of life are placed within the reach of a much larger class than in the earlier days of the Republic, the manners are not only less ceremonious, but less dignified and refined; that there is not only less punctiliousness, but less courtesy and grace in social intercourse; that the family bond is not so strong as it used to be; that there is less respect for authority, not only in the household, but in the state; that both the father and the judge find themselves much less important and less respected personages than they once were; that dress and manners have less weight and importance than formerly, and that there has grown up within thirty years a sort of affectation of carelessness in attire, in demeanor, and even in language; that the English of the bulk of the population is not so pure, nor their accent so refined, as those of the fathers; that more is now read, but less is digested, than in the last generation; and that in short, on the whole, there is both in externals and in mental characteristics less *finish* to be found amongst Americans of the present day than amongst those of half a century ago.

It matters not for our present purpose which of these portraits of American society is the more faithful. We are content to accept either of them as true, since the explanation which we propose to offer for the phenomena which they bring before us will, if it be of any value whatever, be as applicable to the first as to the last. But the moment we address inquiries as to the cause of these phenomena to any of the political sects of the present day, who are fairly entitled to the credit of either observing or thinking, we find ourselves launched on a sea of contradiction. If we apply to a "conservative," he will, if advanced in years, probably acknowledge the occurrence of the changes we have enumerated above, and will, in nine cases out of ten, assure us that it is foreign immigration that has done it all; that, if no Irish or Germans had ever come to the country, no changes for the worse, either in government or society, would ever have taken place. If we ask an Englishman of any but the radical school, or any of those native political phi-

losophers who import their opinions with their gloves and pomatum, and study science in Sir Archibald Alison and the Quarterly Review, they will tell us that whatever of decay or deterioration is visible in anything American is the direct and palpable consequence of universal suffrage, that democracy has ruined the country, and that the only road to improvement lies through revolution.

When we come to inquire to what extent the social or political condition of the Northern States has been influenced or modified by foreign immigration, we find ourselves dealing with a subject on which all those writers whose opinions are largely affected by their taste are agreed; and most of those who in America venture on political speculation belong to this class. If we take up the hundred laments over the degeneracy of our political condition, which issue from them every year in books, newspapers, speeches, and sermons, we shall find that in nine cases out of ten it is ascribed to the great influx of ignorant foreigners which has been going on for the last thirty years. In many, perhaps most, of the controversies which are carried on with European critics touching the state and prospects of the republic, this argument is put very prominently forward. Any coarseness, corruption, or recklessness, either of conduct or language, which shows itself in the management of our public affairs, and attracts the attention of foreign critics, is apt to be ascribed by the native advocate to the malign influence of the human drift which the convulsions and misfortunes of European society have cast on our shores.

We suspect that much of the prevalence of this theory is due to the fact, that those who most frequently put it forward in print live in the great cities, where foreigners are most numerous, where they are in the habit of acting in masses, and where their influence is most easily seen and felt. It is there that the evils which flow from their presence are most palpable; and those who have under their eyes its effects on the local government are apt to draw from the spectacle the most lugubrious inferences as to the condition of the rest of the country. But the estimate of the weight and extent of foreign influence upon politics and society, based on the impressions thus formed, is not confirmed by a careful consideration of the facts.

The whole number of foreigners who have entered the country between 1790 and 1860 is 5,296,414; and of these, 5,062,000 entered since the year 1820, or an average of 126,500 a year during forty years, being of course a mere driblet when compared to the native population. The immigration since 1860 has been very large; and the number actually resident in the whole of the United States in that year was about 4,000,000, or less than one seventh of the entire population. But it is not since 1860 that the political or social deterioration which we are discussing has shown itself. One might imagine, on listening to some of the accounts one hears of the extent to which foreigners are responsible for the vices of American politics, that at least half the inhabitants of the Free States had for many years been persons of European birth, and that the intelligent and educated natives of the country had had a severe struggle, under universal suffrage, to retain any share in the government, and had been long threatened with seeing the management of a political system, which requires a large amount of virtue and knowledge on the part of those who live under it to enable it to work successfully, pass into the hands of a class of men bred in ignorance and degraded by oppression. But when it is taken into account that the foreign immigration has flowed slowly during a great number of years, that a large proportion of it has, of course, been composed of women and children, and that the small number of voters which it in any one year has contributed to the electoral body have been scattered over the Union from Maine to California, and have been divided into different camps by difference of language, religion, and nationality, and have been generally too ignorant and helpless to devise or pursue a common policy, it is easy to see that the current notion of the extent of their influence on national politics and on political life has been greatly exaggerated.

The only instance, we believe, in which the foreigners can be said to have combined to make their influence felt at the elections, occurred during the "Know Nothing" movement; but this was the result of a direct attack on their own privileges and standing. On all other occasions, we find them serving under American leaders, and assailing or defending

purely American ideas; and so far from seeking position or influence by banding together, their great aim and desire are, as is well known, to efface all marks of their foreign origin, and secure complete absorption in the American population. And how do they accomplish this? Not by imposing their ideas on the natives, or dragging them down to their level, but by adopting native ideas and manners and customs, educating their children in American habits, or, in other words, raising themselves to the American level. In fact, there is nothing they resent so keenly as any attempt to place them in a different category, or ascribe to them different interests or motives, from those of Americans. If they were conscious of the power of making themselves felt as a separate body, this would hardly be the case. So far from seeking to obliterate the distinction between themselves and Americans, they would endeavor to maintain and perpetuate it.

It may be said, however, that, although the foreign element in the population may not influence American politics in a way sufficient to account for the political changes of the last half-century directly by its votes, it does influence them indirectly by the modifications it effects in the national character through intermarriage and social intercourse. The effect upon temperament of intermixture of blood is very much too obscure a subject, in our opinion, to be safely made the basis of any theory of national progress or decline, even by those who attach most importance to it, and profess to know most about it. But even if we accord it all the force they claim for it, time enough has not yet elapsed to enable us to judge of its effects in this country. This much is certain, that the great features of the American character do not seem to have undergone any sensible change since the Revolution. The American of to-day, as an individual, presents very much the same great traits, moral and intellectual, which his father and grandfather presented before him; the main difference between the three generations being, that the present one displays its idiosyncrasies on a very much wider field. A chemical analysis (as it has been termed) of natural character is, however, something from which no sound thinker will ever hope to arrive at conclusions of much value for any purposes not purely speculative.

As regards the influence exercised on American life by foreigners through the medium of social intercourse, we doubt very much if anybody has ever attached much importance to it who has given the matter any serious consideration. All that seems necessary to remove the idea that it has been instrumental in modifying either American opinions or manners, is to call attention to the class of society from which the immigrants are generally drawn, and to the social position which they occupy in this country. If we except a few lawyers, a few doctors, a few professors and teachers, and a few merchants in the large cities, eager to make money enough to enable them to return with fortunes to their native country, it may be said that ninety-nine out of every hundred foreigners who come to the United States with the intention of settling here are drawn from the ranks of the European peasantry; — Germans, entirely ignorant of the English language; and Irish, who, as well as the Germans, are separated from even the poorest of the native population by an entirely different standard of living, and a wide difference of habits and of religion. There is between them and even the lower grades of American society a barrier, which is none the less formidable for not being recognized by law. They fill, all but exclusively, the menial callings, and intermarriage between them and pure-blooded Americans is very rare. And, as we have said, so far from acting as propagators of foreign opinions or manners, the whole energy of the newcomers is spent, for years after their arrival, not in diffusing their own ways of thinking and feeling, but in strenuous and generally successful efforts to get rid of them, and adopt those of their American neighbors.

When we come to consider the European explanation of the defects which show themselves in the political and social system of the United States, — and it is an explanation which large numbers of Americans belonging to the wealthier classes have of late years been disposed to accept as the true one, — that they are the direct and all but inevitable result of the spread of democracy, we are met on the threshold by the authority of a great name, of which we desire to speak with all possible respect. That theory of the cause of the decline in the character and ability of public men in America, and the

consequent increasing corruption which marks our public life, of the decrease of respect for law and authority, and of the growing absorption in the pursuit of money, which, before the war at least, were so generally observed and deplored, undoubtedly owes to M. de Tocqueville most of its weight and authority. His "Democracy in America" was and is perhaps the most remarkable contribution to the philosophy of politics in modern times. It solves some of the most puzzling problems of a novel condition of society, and one of which the European world, prior to the appearance of his book, knew very little, with an ease and dexterity which it is impossible, even for those who mistrust many of his conclusions, not to admire. And the book is throughout evidently the product of laborious thinking and conscientious and painstaking observation, controlled by a sound philosophic method. Probably no one, and certainly no foreigner, was ever so successful in sketching American character, in catching the spirit of American life, and in revealing the nature and tendency of American ideas.

He has framed a theory of the influences and tendencies of democracy, partly *a priori* by deductions from the principles of human nature, and partly from his observations of social phenomena in France and America; and this is, we believe, the process now recognized as the only one that is trustworthy in the conduct of inquiries in social science. But the conclusions thus drawn depend inevitably for their soundness on the accuracy of the observations on which they are partly based, and by which alone their accuracy can, at present, be tested. If the peculiar state of opinions, feelings, and manners, and peculiar tone of thought, which M. de Tocqueville found in America, be not really altogether the result of equality of conditions, or of democratic institutions, that portion of his speculations which is dependent on the correctness of this assumption of course falls to the ground; and a very large portion of them is dependent upon it.

Nevertheless, to assume that those social phenomena which are peculiar to America are solely the result of democracy, is to attempt the solution of social problems by what Mr. Mill calls the "chemical method," the imperfection of which we cannot do better than describe in his own words.

"If so little can be done by the experimental method to determine the conditions of an effect of many combined causes in the case of medical science, still less is this method applicable to a class of phenomena more complicated than even those of physiology, — the phenomena of politics and history. There the plurality of causes exists in almost boundless excess, and the effects are for the most part inextricably interwoven with one another. To add to the embarrassment, most of the inquiries in political science relate to the production of effects of the most comprehensive description, such as the public wealth, public security, public morality, and the like, — results liable to be affected directly or indirectly, either in *plus* or in *minus*, by nearly every fact which exists or event which occurs in human society. The vulgar notion that the safe methods on political subjects are those of Baconian induction, that the true guide is not general reasoning but specific experience, will one day be quoted as among the most unequivocal marks of a low state of the speculative faculties in any age in which it is accredited. Nothing can be more ludicrous than the sort of parodies on experimental reasoning which one is accustomed to meet with, not in popular discussions only, but in grave treatises, when affairs of nations are the theme. 'How,' it is asked, 'can an institution be bad, when the country has prospered under it?' 'How can such or such causes have contributed to the prosperity of one country, when another has prospered without them?' Whoever makes use of an argument of this sort, not intending to deceive, should be sent back to learn the elements of some one of the more easy physical sciences. Such reasoners ignore the fact of the plurality of causes in the very case which affords the most signal example of it." — *Logic*, Vol. II. pp. 489, 490, Eng. ed.

To make American society what it is, no one cause has sufficed, and what number or combination of causes has been instrumental in creating the phenomena which attract so much of the attention of political philosophers, it is impossible in the existing state of political science to determine.

It would be very unjust to M. de Tocqueville to leave it to be understood that he himself was not fully aware of all this. In fact, he expressly acknowledges in more than one place the existence of a plurality of causes for all the phenomena of American society, as well as that of other countries. He recognizes the immense influence "which the nature of the country, the origin of its inhabitants, the religion of the early settlers, their

acquired knowledge, their previous habits, have exercised and do exercise independently of democracy upon their mode of thought and feeling." (Vol. II. p. iv., Bowen's ed.) And he in various places warns his readers that the phenomena he is discussing are either due to other causes than "the principle of equality," or are rather American than democratic. But he seems frequently to forget this in the course of his reasoning, and on almost every page draws conclusions as to the probable condition of democratic society in general from what he describes as American society, or else draws these conclusions from general principles, and verifies them by an examination of American institutions or manners. The effect of either of these processes on the mind of the ordinary reader is, of course, very similar. We have not space to quote as fully as would be necessary, if we quoted at all, in support of these comments; but any one who consults the chapters entitled, respectively, "Why Americans are more addicted to Practical than to Theoretical Science," "The Literary Characteristics of Democratic Times," "Why American Writers and Orators often use an Inflated Style," "Of Parliamentary Eloquence in the United States," "Why the Americans are so Restless in the midst of their Prosperity," as well as most of the subsequent ones, will find the remarks we have made on the author's method of reasoning fully borne out. And the discussions of the nature and tendencies of democratic institutions which have been created in Europe by the war prove, we think, all but conclusively, that, whatever may have been his own state of mind in writing, De Tocqueville's influence on European opinion has been to a certain extent misguiding. Hardly one book or article in newspaper or magazine has appeared on American affairs, in which any attempt is made to extract lessons from our condition for English guidance, which does not take it for granted, not only that democracy has produced everything that is considered objectionable in American society, but that democratic institutions transferred to any other country would give rise to precisely the same phenomena. A very large portion of the intense hostility of the upper classes to the United States is due to the prevalence amongst them of this delusion.

We cannot, for our part, help believing that any speculation as to the causes of the peculiar phenomena of American society, in which its outward circumstances during the last eighty years do not occupy the leading position, must lead to conclusions radically erroneous, and calculated to do great injustice not only to the American people, but to democracy itself. At these, nevertheless, M. de Tocqueville has only glanced, and most of those who have followed him in discussing democratic tendencies have overlooked them altogether.

If we inquire what are those phenomena of American society which it is generally agreed distinguish it from that of older countries, we shall find, we are satisfied, that by far the larger number of them may be attributed in a great measure to what, for want of a better name, we shall call "the frontier life" led by a large proportion of the inhabitants, and to the influence of this portion on manners and legislation, rather than to political institutions, or even to the equality of conditions. In fact, we think that these phenomena, and particularly those of them which excite most odium in Europe, instead of being the effect of democracy, are partly its cause, and that it has been to their agency more than to aught else that the democratic tide in America has owed most of its force and violence.

If we examine closely the history of the Northern Colonies, we shall find that, just as their founders left England in search of religious liberty, but were careful not to suffer it within their jurisdiction, so also, although they were most of them animated by republican sentiments, and although a commonwealth was doubtless their ideal polity, "the principle of equality" never obtained any recognition, either in fact or in theory, amongst them or their descendants, down to the time of the Revolution. The distinction between the gentleman and the common man not only existed in New England till the end of the last century, but it was recognized in forms of address, a mode of making it peculiarly repugnant to democratic feeling. Nor, so far as we can learn, was "the principle of authority" much weaker in the Colonies, at any period of their history, than in England. The civil functionaries in Boston and Plymouth were held in a respect very little if at all short of that which was rendered to such dignitaries in London.

The clergy exercised an influence over both manners and politics which, it is very certain, they never secured in the mother country. And the family bond, in spite of the very different conditions by which it was surrounded in the New World, was not, we believe, weaker than in the Old. Down to the time of the Revolution the *paterfamilias* was still a power in society, and exercised an amount of control over the life and conduct of his children, and received from them an amount of homage, which are no longer seen. Etiquette, both public and private, was still an object of attention and respect. Members of the Colonial legislatures were really representatives, and not, as now, delegates; and to sit amongst them was an honor to which persons without an established social position did not readily aspire. Legislation, too, though it might be based on erroneous principles, was rarely so reckless or so hasty as at present. And, though last not least, the religious organizations subjected nearly every member of the community to a discipline so rigid and exacting, that it has left marks on the New England mind and character which will probably not be effaced as long as the race lasts.

How was it that this state of things lasted so long? How was it that the ideas brought by the Colonists from the Old World retained their force for a century and a half, in spite of the facts that communication with the mother country was rare, slow, and difficult, that she exercised little or no influence at that time through her literature, for literature had not then been popularized, that the life led by the Colonists was such as to bring the idea of equality into the fullest prominence, that hereditary wealth was almost unknown amongst them, and that their social condition necessarily fostered individualism? How was it that that democratic tide which, within the last fifty years, has overwhelmed everything, during the previous hundred and fifty gave so few signs of its rising?

The *Saturday Review*, in an attempt it made about a year ago to answer these questions, ascribed the rapid progress of democracy in America since the Revolution to the stoppage at that period of the supply of younger sons of gentlemen, which, according to the writer, was then beginning to flow into the country, and would, if the separation had not taken place,

have continued to flow in ever since. Another explanation frequently offered by speculators of the same school is, that the change was due to the removal of the social influence of the monarchy, which, as long as the connection with the mother country lasted, prevented the republican form of government, which in reality already existed, from producing its natural effect on manners and ideas.

Both of these theories, however, receive a severe blow from the course of events in Australia. This colony was established on a thoroughly aristocratic basis. It received and continues to receive a larger contribution of "younger sons" than has fallen to the lot of any other, and great numbers of them went out with sufficient capital to enable them to maintain their social position. The land-laws, too, encouraged the appropriation of large tracts of country to their exclusive use as sheep-pastures, and for a long while rendered capital almost as essential to success in life there as in England. And the colony had that which we are now taught to consider the essential basis of aristocratic society, a servile class, in the convicts, and, more than this, it has remained up to the present in social and political dependence on England; yet in spite of all these things the progress of democracy there has been steady and rapid. Universal suffrage has been established throughout the island; the property qualification for members of the legislatures has been abolished; the vote is taken by ballot, and the press and public life are almost exact counterparts of those of the United States, and all this within eighty years of the first settlement of the country.

We are far from asserting that the idea of the equality of men, which, according to Professor Maine, was extracted from the Roman juridical maxim that "men were *born* equal," converted, by a not uncommon transformation, by the French literary men of the eighteenth century into a political dogma, and by them transmitted to the Virginian lawyers, had nothing to do, after its manipulation by the Jeffersonian school, with the spread of democracy in the United States. But it could, after all, amongst a people so intensely practical as the Americans, and so averse from speculation in politics, have effected very little, if the field had not been prepared for it by other

causes. It could never have embodied itself either in political or social movements of the popular mind, had it not been made ready for its reception by influences of vastly more potency than a foreign dogma can ever have amongst a people of Anglo-Saxon origin.

The agency which, in our opinion, gave democracy its first great impulse in the United States, which has promoted its spread ever since, and which has contributed most powerfully to the production of those phenomena in American society which hostile critics set down as peculiarly democratic, was neither the origin of the Colonists, nor the circumstances under which they came to the country, nor their religious belief; but the great change in the distribution of the population, which began soon after the Revolution, and which continues its operation up to the present time.

Population during the first hundred years of Colonial history was kept from spreading widely by its smallness, by the Indians, and by the attraction of the sea-coast, which furnished a ready means of intercommunication. The very feebleness of the Colonists in point of numbers constituted a strong motive for keeping closely together. The aborigines, who still held the forests all around them, were a standing menace to their security, and could only be kept in check by constant and watchful co-operation. Moreover, labor was too scarce to make the opening of roads into the interior an easy task; and even when opened, they furnished but sorry facilities for traffic. The weight of this consideration can be better appreciated by remembering that until the present century America was completely dependent on Europe, not only for the luxuries, but for most of the comforts and conveniences and many of the necessaries of life. During the Colonial period, and especially during the early part of it, most of the clothing and tools of the inhabitants were brought from England; which fact, of course, in itself furnished a strong reason for not wandering far from the coast. Accordingly we find that, at the outbreak of the Revolution, the Colonies consisted of a string of settlements along the shore, lying a few miles apart, and carrying on most of their intercourse by water. Even the pioneers had rarely penetrated inland more than fifty or a hundred miles, and generally along the rivers only.

Now these obstacles to expansion performed for the Colonists precisely the same office which is performed in older countries by want of space, and exercised much the same influence on their social progress. It produced comparative density of population; and the effects of density of population, wherever it is not accompanied by very great numbers, as in large cities, are well known. It strengthens public opinion, represses individualism, tightens the social relations, and thus gives fixity to old customs and ideas, and stability to authority. It did all this and more for the early settlers. They landed from Europe in companies, with a social organization already formed; and the difficulty of scattering enabled them to preserve it, and preserve the ideas on which it was based, for over a century, in spite of the fact that their daily life was one which tended powerfully to develop the spirit of independence and self-reliance, — more so, in fact, than that of our backwoodsmen at the present day, for most of the appliances by which modern invention mitigates the hardships of pioneering were then wanting. The Church retained its hold on the young and on the old; the opinion of the community kept even the strongest natures in subjection, and all the more readily, because in those days the community to each of its members was the world. It was difficult to leave it, and there was no appeal from its judgments.

The history of colonization in all ages and climes tells much the same story. Wherever the colonists are prevented by any cause from scattering, and congregate from the outset in communities, the colony remains a tolerably faithful reflection of life and manners in the mother country.

The completeness with which the individual in the Greek republics was merged in the state or city, rendered the notion of individual action or individual existence, apart from the community to which he belonged, abhorrent to him. He never thought of himself in any character but that of a citizen. Consequently, we find that Greek colonization meant simply the production on a foreign shore of as faithful an image of the metropolis as circumstances would permit. The Colonists, far from scattering in search of fortune, massed themselves together in towns; and the result was that the Greek ideas and traditions and customs, both political and religious, were pre-

served with the most extraordinary fidelity; and this is rendered all the more remarkable from the fact that the elements of which ancient colonies were composed were at least as heterogeneous as those of the colonies of modern times.* The Roman colonies, except the military ones of later days, were founded under the influence of the same feeling, and remained, however far removed from the great city, her living images, — "effigies parva, simulacraque populi Romani."

In those modern colonies which have, for any reason, been prevented from scattering widely, we witness much the same phenomena. The South American, who is gregarious by temperament, and who is cooped up on the edge of his great rivers by the impenetrability of tropical forests, remains to this day simply an indolent Spaniard, as conservative, as hostile to novelties or movement, as any peasant or shop-keeper in Aragon. And if we travel through Lower Canada, we find that the *habitans*, whose French horror of solitude, as well as the conquest of the country by the British, has kept them congregated in the old settlements, have preserved until very recently the social organization under which the first emigrants left their country. They continued to be the only faithful picture of the France which the revolution destroyed, and even yet any one who wishes to get an accurate knowledge of the feelings, relations, and ideas which formed the basis of the old *régime* would find them in far better preservation on the banks of the St. Lawrence than on those of the Loire or the Garonne.

The Revolutionary struggle in America produced the usual effect of great civil commotions. It unsettled industry, broke up families, reduced large numbers to poverty, and diminished production; and, by habituating large bodies of men to the

* Seneca's account of the causes which led to emigration in ancient times is curious, from its applicability to the emigration of our own day. "Nec omnibus eadem causa relinquendi, quærendique patriam fuit. Alios excidia urbium suarum, hostilibus armis elapsos, in aliena, spoliatos suis, expulerunt; alios domestica seditio submovit; alios nimia superfluentis populi frequentia, ad exonerandas vires, emisit; alios pestilentia, aut frequens terrarum hiatus, aut aliqua intoleranda infelicis soli vitia ejecerunt; quosdam fertilis oræ et in majus laudatæ, fama corrupit; alios alia causa excivit domibus suis." — *Consol. ad Helviam.* Cap. 6. War, revolution, overpopulation, pestilence, earthquakes, poverty of soil, and a vague desire of bettering their condition, are the causes that still send men forth in quest of "fresh fields and pastures new."

change and license of camp life, rendered the even tenor of the way which they had previously pursued in their homes no longer tolerable. Then came the usual *sequelæ* of a long war. When peace was concluded, a spirit of restlessness was diffused through the country, and an eagerness for adventure, which the *fama fertilis oræ* that then began to be wafted from the West, intensified from day to day. The emigration westward set in with a vigor which had never before been witnessed; and thenceforward, for a short period, new States were rapidly added to the confederation. Kentucky came in in 1792; Tennessee, in 1796; Ohio, in 1802; but here there was a pause. The movement was checked evidently by the material difficulties which attended any further advance. Either it had reached a point at which remoteness from civilization became inconvenient or disagreeable, or else the drain on the population of the Eastern States had exhausted all that portion of it which was fit for pioneering. During the next fourteen years there was no new State added to the Union, except Louisiana, which was admitted in 1812; but in 1816 the stream appears to have again begun to flow into the wilderness. Indiana was admitted that year; Mississippi followed in 1817; Illinois, in 1818; Alabama, in 1819; and Missouri, in 1821. Now, as this increase was contemporaneous with the spread of steam navigation on the great rivers, it is fair to presume that it was in a large degree due to it. There was then another pause of fifteen years, at the close of which the influence of the railroads which were then getting into operation began to show itself; and from this time forward, the movement of population into the Western wilds has steadily increased from year to year, being swelled by the affluent from abroad which has poured into the United States between the years 1820 and 1860 the enormous number of 5,062,414 persons. Arkansas, Michigan, Texas, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and Kansas have thus been added to the Union in rapid succession. We omit from consideration the Pacific States, California, Oregon, and Nevada.

But it must be constantly borne in mind that this wonderful diffusion of population over the wilderness which seventy years ago lay between the seaboard States and the Mississippi Valley,

could not have taken place without the application of steam to locomotion. In the absence of this invention, the number of new settlements must always have borne a small proportion to the old ones. The portion of the community in which habits and modes of thought were tolerably fixed, in which experience was highly valued, traditions were held in reverence, and on which the past had left traces of greater or less depth, would have so largely exceeded the portion engaged in the work of actually reclaiming the wilderness, that it would either have held the latter in political and moral subjection, and have imposed its ideas and manners on it, or would, at all events, have remained impervious to its influence. The West, instead of creating, as it has done, a social type in many respects distinct, would have remained completely under Eastern influence, and have simply reproduced the society from which it had sprung, its manners, ideas, and aspirations.

But with the assistance of steamboats and railways, and of immigration from Europe, the pioneering element in the population, the class devoted to the task of creating new political and social organizations as distinguished from that engaged in perfecting old ones, assumed a great preponderance. It spread itself thinly over a vast area of soil, of such extraordinary fertility that a very slight amount of toil expended on it affords returns that might have satisfied even the dreams of Spanish avarice. The result has been very much what we might have concluded, *a priori*, that it would be. A society composed at the period of its formation mainly of young men, coming from all parts of the world in quest of fortune, released from the ordinary restraints of family, church, and public opinion, even of the civil law, naturally and inevitably acquires a certain contempt for authority and impatience of it, and individualism among them develops itself very rapidly. If you place this society, thus constituted, in the midst of a wilderness, where each member of it has to contend, tools in hand, with Nature herself for wealth, or even subsistence, the ties which bind him to his fellows will for a while at least be rarely anything stronger than that of simple contiguity; and the only mutual obligation which this relation suggests strongly is that of rendering assistance occasionally in overcoming material difficulties, — in

other words, the simplest bond which can unite human beings. Each person is from the necessity of the case so absorbed in his own struggle for existence, that he has seldom occasion or time for the consideration and cultivation of his social relations. He knows nothing of the antecedents of his neighbors, nor they of his. They are not drawn together, in all probability, by a single memory or association. They have drifted into the same locality, it is true, under the guidance of a common impulse, and this a selfish one. So that the settler gets into the habit of looking at himself as an individual, of contemplating himself and his career separate and apart from the social organization. We do not say that this breeds selfishness,—far from that; but it breeds individualism.

If the members of such a society are compelled to work hard for the gratification of their desires, to meet and overcome great difficulties and hardships and dangers, the result is naturally the production of great energy, of great audacity, and of a self-confidence that rises into conceit. And in this self-confidence is almost always contained a prodigious contempt for experience and for theory. The ends which such men have had in view having all been attained without the aid of either, they cannot see the use of them. They have found their own wits sufficient for the solution of every problem that has presented itself to them, so that deference to the authority of general maxims framed by persons who never found themselves placed in similar circumstances wears an air of weakness or absurdity.

And the devotion to material pursuits, which is necessary at the outset, is made absorbing in a country like the West, by the richness of the prizes which are offered to shrewd speculation and successful industry. Where possible or even probable gains are so great, the whole community gives itself up to the chase of them with an eagerness which is not democratic, but human. It would not, we think, be difficult to show that the existence in old countries of an idle class, content with moderate and secured fortunes, and devoted solely to amusement and the cultivation of art or literature, is largely due to the immense difficulty of making profitable investments. In those countries the capital accumulated by past generations is so large, and every field of industry is so thronged, that a very

large number of those who find themselves possessed of a sum of money are forced to relinquish all hope of increasing it. For we know that whenever, as during "the railway mania" in England, or Law's Mississippi schemes in France, the chance, real or imaginary, is offered of drawing such prizes as every day fall to the lot of hundreds in America, men of every grade and calling rush after them with an ardor which no training or tastes or antecedents seem sufficient to restrain. The desire for wealth is one of the constant forces of human society, and if it seems to assert its sway more imperiously here than in Europe, it is not because it is fostered by the equality of conditions, but because its gratification is surrounded by fewer obstacles.

If to strong individualism, contempt for experience, and eagerness in pursuit of material gain, we add want of respect for training, and profound faith in natural qualities, great indifference as to the future, the absence of a strong sense of social or national continuity, and of taste in art and literature and oratory, we have, we believe, enumerated the leading defects which European writers consider inherent in democratic society. But these, too, are marked peculiarities of all societies newly organized in a new country. We know them to be so by actual observation, for which modern colonization has afforded us abundant facilities; while it is safe to say that trustworthy illustrations of them have never been discovered in any society which was simply democratic and not new. There is no feature of life in new States in America more marked than the general belief of the people in their own originality, and their respect for this quality. The kind of man they most admire is one who has evolved rules for the conduct of life out of his own brain by the help of his own observation; and they entertain a strong distrust of men who have learned what they know by a fixed course of study, mainly because persons who have passed the early part of their lives in learning out of books or from teachers are generally found less fitted to grapple with the kind of difficulties which usually present themselves in Western life, than those who were compelled to learn to conquer them by actual contact with them. So that the "self-made man," as he is called, meaning the man who has surmounted, with little or no aid from education, those ob-

stacles by which the larger portion of the community find themselves hampered and harassed, is looked on as a sort of type of merit and ability.

The process by which the ideas that govern private life are transferred to the conduct of public affairs, is not difficult to understand. In a new community, in which there is not much time for either study or reflection, it would be difficult always to convince the public, even if any other kind of man were to be had, that the kind of man who displays most ability in the conduct of his own business is not the fittest to take charge of that of the public. That other qualities than those necessary for success in the career in which everybody else is running should be needed for legislation, is an idea which meets with no acceptance until enforced by experience. And in a really frontier village, in which no disturbing influences are in operation, it will probably be found that the prosperous management of a dry-goods store will be taken as strong indication of ability to fill the post of Secretary of the Treasury, and deal with the most intricate problems of national finance. But the successful politician in a new country, where deference for experience or culture has not yet grown up, is, after all, the man who has most facility in expressing the ideas which are filling the heads of his neighbors.

It may be taken as a general rule, that those who cannot look very far back do not look very far forward. Experience is the nurse of forethought. Youth is rarely troubled about to-morrow. Age is far-seeing, because it remembers so much. And communities made of the materials we are describing, as they have no past, are apt to be very careless about the future. The sense of political continuity, of the identity, for political purposes, of each generation with the one which has preceded it and the one which is to follow it, and of the consequent responsibility of each for the acts and promises of the other, is rarely deeply rooted in a state which has no past to dwell on. We are therefore not surprised to find that the doctrine of the absence of all right on the part of one generation to enter into any obligations that would bind its successor, — a doctrine utterly subversive of what is called "public faith," and which, if carried out to its full extent, would reduce the intercourse

of civilized nations to the mere interchange of compliments or abuse, — was first openly preached and acted on in Mississippi, the person who now represents Southern statesmanship to the world being its author. But it is a doctrine which grows naturally in a new society. The reverse of it conflicts strongly with the notions of the proper limits of accountability, which are derived from the relations of individuals. There is little in the analogies presented by the relations of a man either with his family or his fellows, in such a society, to suggest the expediency or propriety of his helping, as a citizen, to repay money which was borrowed before he was born. And we think it will generally be found that, when a state formed by colonization, as carried on in modern times, displays a proper disposition with regard to the public liabilities, it is rather owing to the feeling of local pride than to a deep sense of responsibility. When a loan contracted by the government of California, a few years ago, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the people, when the question was submitted to them, at once shouldered the debt. But it was spoken of in their newspapers as a very remarkable display of virtue, as something of which the State might fairly be proud. There was evidently at the bottom of these congratulations an opinion that, in the absence of any legal obligation, the moral one was not sufficiently strong to be imperative.

The belief that the production of an inflated, bombastic style of speaking and writing is one of the necessary results of democracy is very wide-spread, and is supported by M. de Tocqueville with more than usual confidence. He says: —

"I have frequently remarked that the Americans, who generally treat of business in clear, plain language, devoid of all ornament, and so extremely simple as to be often coarse, are apt to become inflated as soon as they attempt a more poetical diction. They then vent their pomposity from one end of a harangue to the other; and to hear them lavish imagery on every occasion, one might fancy that they never spoke of anything with simplicity.

"The English less frequently commit a similar fault. The cause of this may be pointed out without much difficulty. In democratic communities, each citizen is habitually engaged in the contemplation of a very puny object, namely himself. If he ever raises his looks higher,

he perceives only the immense form of society at large, or the still more imposing aspect of mankind. His ideas are all either extremely minute and clear, or extremely general and vague; what lies between is a void. When he has been drawn out of his own sphere, therefore, he always expects that some amazing object will be offered to his attention; and it is on these terms alone that he consents to tear himself for a moment from the petty, complicated cares which form the charm and the excitement of his life." — Vol. II. p. 94.

But democracy produces this effect only in so far as it deprives writers and speakers of a high order of education, or draws them from a class which cannot or do not receive it. The uneducated or half-educated in all countries, and under every form of government, and in every condition of society, fall into an exaggerated and inflated style whenever they attempt to treat on paper or in public of any question not purely personal in its nature. The uncultivated Englishman or Frenchman is guilty of precisely the same rhetorical faults as the uncultivated American; and the only reason why American bombast makes more impression on European observers than that of their own countrymen is that there is more of it, as a class of persons who in Europe are hardly ever called on to address the public are in America tempted or obliged to do so very frequently. Rhetorical exaggeration is, in fact, an indication, not of a certain political or social state, but of a certain state of mental culture. How it is that taste is not a natural gift, and what kind of training is necessary for its acquisition, it is not necessary to discuss here. It is enough to know that, without training, no people, except perhaps the Greeks, has ever exhibited it. America itself furnishes a very striking illustration of the unsoundness of M. de Tocqueville's theory. A pure written and spoken style is found only in the democratic States of the Northeast, because there the writers and speakers are often either drawn from a cultivated class, or are under their influence. The literature and oratory of the aristocratic States of the South, on the contrary, are marked by an exaggeration, violence, and affectation so barbarous, that it may safely be said that no orators or writers who have ever figured in history have fallen to the same level. And it is a striking proof of the extent to which the European public has

been led astray on these subjects, that an English legal periodical of high standing, commenting a few months ago on the absurdity of the harangue delivered by Muller's counsel in New York, assigned as one of the excuses for Southern secession the natural disgust felt by "cultivated gentlemen" at the grotesqueness, absurdity, and inflation which democracy infused into writing and public speaking at the North. An assertion displaying greater ignorance of the peculiar characteristics of the North and of the South, it would be hard to meet with.

It may be said, however, that if democracy either deprives the highly educated class of all influence, and thus prevents their establishing an authoritative standard of taste, or if it places the half-educated in all the prominent positions in public life, so that it is they who give the oratory of the country its peculiar character, it is really as much responsible for the national tendency to bombast as if it produced it by its direct action. But the answer to this is, that nearly all the extravagance and inflation of speech or composition which are now to be met with in America are contributed either by the South or West, both of which are just in that stage of mental culture in which inflation of language is produced as naturally as weeds on a rank soil. The intense and necessary absorption of the West in the work of developing the material resources of the country puts high cultivation out of the question, but it does not do away with the necessity of government. Members of Congress have still to be elected; State Legislatures have still to meet; and weighty questions have to be discussed by somebody, — and, in default of people of taste, they have to be discussed by people who have no taste, by men who labor under the usual weakness and delusion of the uneducated, that simple and straightforward language is not fit for use in dealing with great public affairs. If it be asked how it is that this class so largely preponderates in Congress, and in public life generally, as to present itself to the world as a fair specimen of the highest culture that democracy can produce, we reply that the new States have now for many years acquired a great preponderance over the older ones in population and wealth and resources, and consequently political preponderance also. Upon this great mass of powerful, energetic rusticity, — we do

not use the word as a term of reproach, — the cultivation of the East has so far been able to make but very little impression. And this preponderance has been so overwhelming, that the West has succeeded to a certain extent in propagating in the East its ideas and manners, both political and social. It has succeeded in diffusing to some degree, even in New England, its contempt for and indifference to refinement or culture, its mistrust of men who have made politics a study, and its faith in the infallibility of majorities, not simply as a necessary political assumption, but as an ethical fact. Its influence in Congress is of course paramount, and its influence on the government every year increases. It now supplies our Presidents, a large body of our legislators, and a large portion of our army. It gives its tone to the national thought, and its direction to the national policy. And as might be expected, it has, with its rude, wild energy, its excess of animal life, completely overwhelmed the thinkers of the older States, and driven most of them into private life, and taken upon itself to represent American democracy to the world. American democracy is thus made answerable by superficial observers for faults which flow not from its own nature, but from the outward circumstances of some of those who live under it.

We need hardly say, that we are very far from asserting that the state of society which we have been describing as "Western" can be predicated literally either of the whole West or of any part of it. There is probably not a village in it of which our picture is true in every particular. There are doubtless to be found in every district many departures from the general type which we have sketched, many modifications effected by the presence of cultivated people, or by the extraordinary intelligence and unusually favorable antecedents of the inhabitants. What we have endeavored to portray is the general features of society in new countries which have been subjected to the ordinary agencies of frontier life, and exempted from the disturbing influences of older and more finished organizations. And in so far as our sketch is inaccurate as applied to the new States of the Union, to the same extent will our description of their influence on the East require modification. The study of society is not one of the exact sciences; and the

utmost that the most careful inquirer can hope for is an approximation to the truth. This is all that we pretend to have achieved in the present instance, but it is sufficient for our purpose.

In so far as the influence exercised by that portion of the population which is immersed in the cares and toils of frontier life on the national character, or manners, or politics, or literature, or oratory, has been deteriorating or obstructive, it is, of course, fair matter for regret to all friends of rational progress. But those who are most disheartened by the contemplation of its effects may find abundant consolation in the consideration that its action is but temporary, and that every day that passes weakens its force and hastens its disappearance. The greatest fault of new countries is their newness, and for this the great remedy is time. As soon as the population gets settled in its seat, and its attention has ceased to be distracted by a multiplicity of prizes, and its energies to be absorbed in the mere struggle for shelter and food, the polishing process begins. This struggle, if it have hardened the hands, and tanned the foreheads, and roughened the manners of those engaged in it, has also most certainly developed qualities which, if they do not themselves constitute national greatness, are its only sure and lasting foundation. No friend of democracy who has watched the course of the West in this war can help feeling his blood stirred and his hopes strengthened by the vigor with which it has thrown itself into the strife, and the great richness of the blood and brain which it has sent into the arena. All the great generals of the war are Western men. No higher capacity for organization, for conceiving great enterprises, and conducting them with courage and fortitude, accuracy and punctuality, has been displayed than in those mushroom communities which yesterday were not. And if we turn from the military to the political field, we find everywhere the most striking proofs of the sagacity, foresight, patriotism, and tenacity of their population. We wish we could say there had been exhibited in the East so general, profound, and just an appreciation of the remoter bearings of this great contest, of its possible influence on society and government, as has been exhibited in the West.

There are no fundamental characteristics of "an imperial

race," which the people of the new States have not revealed; and those who know them best see in the progress they are now making every reason to feel satisfied that the great material strength which they are developing will be, erelong, controlled and directed by a very high order of cultivation, both intellectual and æsthetic, and perhaps richer, more varied, and more original in many of its manifestations than any that has been seen in modern times. If the West should in future answer all the demands made on it by civilization with the alacrity and success with which it has answered those made on it by the political crisis through which we are now passing, the human race would, in a very short time, be even more indebted to it than the nation is already.

If, indeed, the defects which foreign observers see, and many of which Americans acknowledge and deplore, in the politics and society of the United States were fairly chargeable to democracy, — if "the principle of equality" were necessarily fatal to excellence in the arts, to finish in literature, to simplicity and force in oratory, to fruitful exploration in the fields of science, to statesmanship in the government, to discipline in the army, to grace and dignity in social intercourse, to subordination to lawful authority, and to self-restraint in the various relations of life, — the future of the world would be such as no friend of the race would wish to contemplate: for the spread of democracy is on all sides acknowledged to be irresistible. Even those who watch its advance with most fear and foreboding confess that most civilized nations must erelong succumb to its sway. Its progress in some countries may be slower than in others, but it is constant in all; and it is accelerated by two powerful agencies, — the Christian religion and the study of political economy.

The Christian doctrine that men, however unequal in their condition or in their gifts on earth, are of equal value in the eyes of their Creator, and are entitled to respect and consideration, if for no other reason, for the simple one that they are human souls, long as it has been preached, has, strange to say, only very lately begun to exercise any perceptible influence on politics. It led a troubled and precarious life for nearly eighteen hundred years in conventicles and debating clubs, in the

romance of poets, in the dreams of philosophers and the schemes of philanthropists. But it is now found in the cabinets of kings and statesmen, on the floor of parliament-houses, and in the most secret of diplomatic conferences. It gives shape and foundation to nearly every great social reform, and its voice is heard above the roar of every revolution.

And it derives invaluable aid in keeping its place and extending its influence in national councils from the rapid spread of the study of political economy, a science which is based on the assumption that men are free and independent. There is hardly one of its principles which is applicable to any state of society in which each individual is not master of his own actions and sole guardian of his own welfare. In a community in which the relations of its members are regulated by status and not by contract, it has no place and no value. And the natural result of the study and discussion which the ablest thinkers have expended on it during the last eighty years has been to place before the civilized world in the strongest light the prodigious impulse which is given to human energy and forethought and industry, and the great gain to society at large, which results from the recognition in legislation of the capacity, as well as of the right, of each human being to seek his own happiness in his own way. Of course no political system in which this principle has a place can long avoid conceding to all who live under it equality before the law; and from equality before the law to the possession of an equal share in the making of the laws, there is, as everybody must see who is familiar with modern history, but a very short step.

If this spread of democracy, however, was sure, as its enemies maintain, to render great attainments and great excellence impossible or rare, to make literary men slovenly and inaccurate and tasteless, artists mediocre, professors of science dull and unenterprising, and statesmen conscienceless and ignorant, it would threaten civilization with such danger that no friend of progress could wish to see it. But it is difficult to discover on what it is, either in history or human nature, that this apprehension is founded. M. de Tocqueville and all his followers take it for granted that the great incentive to excellence, in all countries in which excellence is found, is the pat-

ronage and encouragement of an aristocracy; that democracy is generally content with mediocrity. But where is the proof of this? The incentive to exertion which is widest, most constant, and most powerful in its operation in all civilized countries, is the desire of distinction; and this may be composed either of love of fame or love of wealth, or of both. In literary and artistic and scientific pursuits, sometimes the strongest influence is exerted by a love of the subject. But it may be safely said that no man has ever yet labored in any of the higher callings to whom the applause and appreciation of his fellows was not one of the sweetest rewards of his exertions. There is probably not a masterpiece in existence, either in literature or in art, probably few discoveries in science have ever been made, which we do not owe in a large measure to the love of distinction. Who paints pictures, or has ever painted them, that they may delight no eye but his own? Who writes books for the mere pleasure of seeing his thoughts on paper? Who discovers or invents, and is willing, provided the world is the better of his discoveries or inventions, that another should enjoy the honor? Fame has, in short, been in all ages and in all countries recognized as one of the strongest springs of human action, —

> "The spur that doth the clear spirit raise
> To scorn delight and live laborious days," —

sweetening toil, robbing danger and poverty and even death itself of their terrors.

And what is there, we would ask, in the nature of democratic institutions, that should render this great spring of action powerless, that should deprive glory of all radiance, and put ambition to sleep? Is it not notorious, on the contrary, that one of the most marked peculiarities of democratic society, or of a society drifting towards democracy, is the fire of competition which rages in it, the fevered anxiety which possesses all its members to rise above the dead level to which the law is ever seeking to confine them, and by some brilliant stroke or other become something higher and more remarkable than their fellows? The secret of that great restlessness, which is one of the most disagreeable accompaniments of life in democratic countries, is in fact due to the eagerness of everybody to

grasp the prizes of which in aristocratic countries only the few have much chance. And in no other society is success more worshipped, is distinction of any kind more wildly flattered and caressed. Where is the successful author, or artist, or discoverer, the subject of greater homage than in France or America? And yet in both the principle of equality reigns supreme; and his advancement in the social scale has gone on *pari passu* in every country with the spread of democratic ideas and manners. Grub Street was the author's retreat in the aristocratic age; in this democratic one, he is welcome at the King's table, and sits at the national council-board. In democratic societies, in fact, excellence is the first title to distinction; in aristocratic ones, there are two or three others which are far stronger, and which must be stronger, or aristocracy could not exist. The moment you acknowledge that the highest social position ought to be the reward of the man who has the most talent, you make aristocratic institutions impossible. But to make the thirst for distinction lose its power over the human heart, you must do something more than establish equality of conditions; you must recast human nature itself.

Nor does the view which M. de Tocqueville takes, and which Mr. Mill in his "Dissertations and Discussions" seems to share, of the character of the literature which democratic societies are likely to call for, or have supplied to them, derive much support from experience. Mr. Mill says, that in a democratic society

> "There is a greatly augmented number of moderate successes, fewer great literary and scientific reputations. Elementary and popular treatises are immensely multiplied; superficial information far more widely diffused; but there are fewer who devote themselves to thought for its own sake, and pursue in retirement those profounder researches, the results of which can only be appreciated by a few. Literary productions are seldom highly finished; they are got up to be read by many, and to be read but once. If the work sells for a day, the author's time and pains will be better laid out in writing a second, than in improving the first."

There could scarcely be a better answer to this than the immense sale which the works of both Mr. Mill himself and of M. de Tocqueville meet with here and in England. They

are both philosophical and highly finished, and yet they are read and studied by thousands in the two countries in which democracy is either triumphant or rapidly spreading. Illustrations of the same kind might, if we had space, be indefinitely multiplied. We will mention only one other. If we take that branch of literature, history, in which more than most others accuracy and research are essential, in which painstaking and industry and careful attention to details are absolutely necessary to give the result any real value, what do we find? Why, that it is a field of inquiry which, until democratic times, was barely scratched over, and that it is for the gratification and instruction of this much despised democratic "many" that it has been for the first time deeply ploughed and carefully cultivated. There is, we believe, hardly a single historical work composed prior to the end of the last century, except perhaps Gibbon's, which, judged by the standard that the criticism of our day has set up, would not, though written for "the few," be pronounced careless, slipshod, or superficial. Grote, Hallam, Motley, Prescott, Martin, Niebuhr, Mommsen, the most laborious, accurate, and critical historical inquirers the world has yet seen, have been produced by a democratic age, and have written for a democratic public. Compare them as to thoroughness and completeness with any of their predecessors of any age, and you are astonished by the contrast; and yet millions read and admire them. So also the first attempt to apply the historical method to the study of the philosophy of law has been made within two or three years, and the result is a work of extraordinary profundity, which is in everybody's hands. We might, by looking into other branches of knowledge, produce innumerable examples of the same kind, all going to show, in our opinion, that although there is, and will always be in every democratic community, an immense mass of slipshod, careless writing and speaking, the demand for accuracy, for finish, perhaps not in form, but certainly in substance, for completeness in all efforts to discover truth or enlighten mankind, so far from diminishing, grows with the spread of knowledge and the multiplication of readers.

There are some, however, who, while acknowledging that the love of distinction will retain its force under every form of so-

cial or political organization, yet maintain that to excel in the arts, science, or literature requires leisure, and the possession of leisure implies the possession of fortune. This men in a democratic society cannot have, because the absence of great hereditary wealth is necessary to the perpetuation of democracy. Every man, or nearly every man, must toil for a living; and therefore it becomes impossible for him to gratify the thirst for distinction, let him feel it ever so strongly. The attention he can give to literature or art or science must be too desultory and hasty, his mental training too defective, to allow him to work out valuable results, or conduct important researches. To achieve great things in these fields, it is said and insinuated, men must be elevated, by the possession of fortune, above the vulgar, petty cares of life; their material wants must be provided for before they can concentrate their thoughts with the requisite intensity on the task before them. Therefore it is to aristocracy we must look for any great advance in these pursuits.

The history of literature and art and philosophy is, however, very far from lending confirmation to this opinion. If it teaches us anything, it teaches us that the possession of leisure, far from having helped men in the pursuit of knowledge, seems to have impeded them. Those who have pursued it most successfully are all but invariably those who have pursued it under difficulties. The possession of great wealth no doubt gives facilities for study and cultivation which the mass of mankind do not possess; but it at the same time exerts an influence on the character which, in a vast majority of cases, renders the owner unwilling to avail himself of them. We owe to the Roman aristocracy the great fabric of Roman jurisprudence; but, since their time, what has any aristocracy done for art and literature, or law? They have for over a thousand years been in possession of nearly the whole resources of every country in Europe. They have had its wealth, its libraries, its archives, its teachers, at their disposal; and yet was there ever a more pitiful record than the list of "Royal and Noble Authors." One can hardly help being astonished, too, at the smallness and paltriness of the legacies which the aristocracy of the aristocratic age has bequeathed to this democratic age which is succeeding it. It has, indeed, handed down to us many glorious

traditions, many noble and inspiring examples of courage and fortitude and generosity. The democratic world would certainly be worse off than it is if it never heard of the Cid, or Bayard, or Du Guesclin, of Montrose, or Hampden, or Russell. But what has it left behind it for which the lover of art may be thankful, by which literature has been made richer, philosophy more potent or more fruitful? The painting and sculpture of modern Europe owe not only their glory, but their very existence, to the labors of poor and obscure men. The great architectural monuments by which its soil is covered were hardly any of them the product of aristocratic feeling or liberality. If we except a few palaces and a few fortresses, we owe nearly all of them to the labor or the genius or the piety of the democratic cities which grew up in the midst of feudalism. If we take away from the sum total of the monuments of Continental art all that was created by the Italian republics, the commercial towns of Germany and Flanders, and the communes of France, and by the unaided efforts of the illustrious obscure, the remainder would form a result poor and pitiful indeed. We may say much the same thing of every great work in literature, and every great discovery in science. Few of them have been produced by men of leisure, nearly all by those whose life was a long struggle to escape from the vulgarest and most sordid cares. And what is perhaps most remarkable of all is, that the Catholic Church, the greatest triumph of organizing genius, the most impressive example of the power of combination and of discipline which the world has ever seen, was built up and has been maintained by the labors of men drawn from the humblest ranks of society.

Aristocracy applied itself exclusively for ages to the profession of arms. If there was anything at which it might have seemed hopeless for democracy to compete with it, it was in the raising, framing, and handling of armies. But the very first time that a democratic society found itself compelled to wage war in defence of its own ideas, it displayed a force, an originality, a vigor and rapidity of conception, in this, to it, new pursuit, which speedily laid Europe at its feet. And the great master of the art of war, be it ever remembered, was born in obscurity and bred in poverty.

Nor, long as men of leisure have devoted themselves to the art of government, have they made any contributions worth mentioning to political science. They have displayed, indeed, consummate skill and tenacity in pursuing any line of policy on which they have once deliberately fixed; but all the great political reforms have been, though often carried into effect by aristocracies, conceived, agitated, and forced on the acceptance of the government by the middle and lower classes. The idea of equality before the law was originated in France by literary men. In England, the slave-trade was abolished by the labors of the middle classes. The measure met with the most vigorous opposition in the House of Lords. The emancipation of the negroes, Catholic emancipation, Parliamentary reform, law reform, especially the reform in the criminal law, free trade, and, in fact, nearly every change which has had for its object the increase of national happiness and prosperity, has been conceived by men of low degree, and discussed and forced on the upper classes by men busy about many other things.

We are, however, very far from believing that democratic society has no dangers or defects. What we have been endeavoring to show is, that the inquiry into their nature and number has been greatly impeded by the natural disposition of foreign observers to take the United States as a fair specimen of what democracy is under the most favorable circumstances. The enormous extent of unoccupied land at our disposal, which raises every man in the community above want, by affording a ready outlet for surplus population, is constantly spoken of as a condition wholly favorable to the democratic experiment, — more favorable than could possibly offer itself elsewhere. In so far as it contributes to the general happiness and comfort, it no doubt makes the work of government easy; but what we think no political philosopher ought to forget is, that it also offers serious obstacles to the settlement of a new society on a firm basis, and produces a certain appearance of confusion and instability, both in manners and ideas, which unfit it to furnish a basis for any inductions of much value as to the tendencies to defects either of an equality of conditions or of democratic institutions.

Art. XI. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — *A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Secret Sessions of the Conference Convention for proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, held at Washington, D. C., in February, A. D.* 1861. By L. E. Chittenden, one of the Delegates. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1864. 8vo. pp. 626.

Although the "Peace Conference," as it was termed, held in Washington in February, 1861, had no great effect upon the course of national affairs, and the public attention was speedily turned from it by the rapid succession of events of greater concern, yet its assembling and proceedings were among the most remarkable political incidents of the period, and hold a prominent place in its historical record. Mr. Chittenden has, therefore, performed a good work in publishing this Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Conference. Besides its value as an account of the Convention, it has a still greater value as a record of the opinions held and declared by representative men from both sections of the country in regard to the state of the nation just before the beginning of the civil war, and to the measures which were required by the exigencies of the moment. The volume is a most striking monument of the conditions of feeling and thought then existing. It is a landmark set at the boundary between the old and the new order of things, between peace and war, between the past and the present. It serves to measure the changes which have been wrought in sentiment and conviction during the last four years. It indicates the progress in the political education of the nation which has been effected under the stern tuition of war.

The Convention assembled in pursuance of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of Virginia on the 19th of January, inviting the States to appoint Commissioners to meet in Washington "to unite in an earnest effort to adjust the present unhappy controversies in the spirit in which the Constitution was originally formed, and consistently with its principles, so as to afford to the people of the Slave-holding States adequate guaranties for the security of their rights." Fourteen Free States and seven Slave States were represented by one hundred and thirty-one Commissioners, appointed by the Legislatures or Governors of the respective States. Seven States had already, at the time of its assembling, seceded from the Union. The readiness of the Free States to accede to the proposal of Virginia affords a convincing indication of the disposition of their people to satisfy the South, and to avert, if possible,

the calamities with which the course of the Southern leaders then threatened the nation. The North had not yet unlearned its old and deep-worn habit of "compromise" and "conciliation." Although it had declared over and over again, in the most authoritative manner, that it proposed no interference with slavery, although this was one of the cardinal doctrines of the party which had triumphed in Mr. Lincoln's election, although Mr. Lincoln himself had accepted this doctrine in the frankest terms, yet this election was made the pretext by the Southern conspirators for carrying out their long-cherished scheme of a slave-empire, on the vague plea that the rights of the South were thereby endangered and invaded.

The real question at issue was not interference with slavery, but whether it should be extended; and under the pressure of Southern threats and Northern fears, Congress had proceeded at the session subsequent to Mr. Lincoln's election to organize three new Territories without a word respecting slavery, "and in such manner as left the South in full possession of all the rights accruing to her from the Federal Constitution, as expounded in the Dred Scott decision." It proposed to admit New Mexico (then including Arizona) with such a Constitution as its people might adopt, whether it established slavery or not. It passed a resolve proposing an amendment to the Constitution, which, being ratified by the required proportion of the States, would preclude Congress from the exercise of any power of interference with slavery in the States. The whole North was ready to join in the call for a Convention of the States, to consider such amendments to the Constitution as would secure the South in the possession of its rights. It was in the temper to yield many of the legitimate fruits of its political triumph. It made effort after effort to preserve peace and the Union, but in vain; for the South demanded the whole or nothing. It would rule or ruin.

The very call for the Peace Convention was an indication of its spirit. Virginia invited, not the States of the Union, but "the States of this Confederacy," "to afford the people of the Slave-holding States adequate guaranties for the security of their rights." As if new guaranties were needed, or could be given. What the South really required of the North was, as Mr. Greeley has well said, "co-operation, complicity, in the work of extending, diffusing, and fortifying slavery." It required the North to sacrifice not only its political, but its moral principles, to yield up the defence of freedom and the rights of free speech and free labor, to stifle its conscience, and to deny its convictions.

The Peace Conference had hardly assembled before it became obvious that the great majority of its Southern members had come in the

spirit neither of loyalty to the Constitution, nor of confidence in the loyalty to it of the North. It appeared that they would insist upon certain concessions, and, if these were not granted, would not pledge themselves or their States to await any overt act of aggression upon their rights before seceding from the Union. The Southern members held the threat of disunion and of war over the Northern, in case their demands were not complied with. On the ninth day of session, a report was presented by the majority of a committee which had been appointed, of one member from each State, recommending the adoption of seven proposed Articles of Amendment to the Constitution. These articles were based in great measure upon the propositions of Mr. Crittenden, made some time previously in the Senate of the United States, and known as the Crittenden Compromise. Stripped of verbiage, they were, in fact, to the following effect: — that slavery should be recognized in terms in the Constitution, thereby nationalizing it; that slavery should not only be permitted, but established and guaranteed under the national sanction, in all Territories of the Union south of 36° 30′; that Congress under the Constitution should have no power to regulate or interfere with slavery, either in the States or Territories, or in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States; that these amendments and the clauses in the original Constitution referring to slavery should not be amended or abolished without the consent of all the States; that Congress should provide for payment to the owner for fugitive slaves the recovery of whom was prevented or obstructed.

Everything in these amendments was toward the making of slavery national, the forcing of the North to become partners in a great slaveholding Union. It was a scheme for the commission of the most outrageous iniquity toward mankind. It was a deliberate insult to the conscience of the non-slaveholding portion of the Union. It was the attempt to establish a slave despotism over the North. A minority of the committee refused to join in such a report. On their behalf, a report was submitted, proposing that the Conference should recommend to the States to apply to Congress to call a Convention for the proposing of amendments to the Constitution, in accordance with the provision in its Fifth Article. Mr. Seddon of Virginia (now the Secretary of War in the Confederate Administration) submitted also a minority report, taking still more extreme Pro-Slavery ground than the report of the majority.

The debate upon these reports showed that there was no possibility of harmonious action in the Convention. Its members were divided into four parties, two from each section of the country; — the extreme Pro-Slavery men, led by Mr. Seddon, whose loyalty to the Union was

not to be secured by any possible concession; the Border-State Slavery men, led by Mr. Wickliffe of Kentucky, who were loyal to a Pro-Slavery Union; the Northern Democratic Pro-Slavery men, ready for any concession to the demands of the South; and the Northern Anti-Slavery men, who were heartily loyal to the Union as it was, but who would concede no new guaranties to slavery under the Union.

"In my deliberate judgment," said Mr. Seddon, "the Union and the Constitution as they now stand are unsafe for the people of the South, — unsafe without other guaranties, which will give them actual power instead of mere paper rights." — "You cannot demand anything of us at the North," replied Mr. Boutwell of Massachusetts, "that we will not grant, unless it involves a sacrifice of our principles. These we shall not sacrifice. . . . . If the Constitution and the Union cannot be preserved and effectually maintained without these new guaranties for slavery, the Union is not worth preserving. . . . . But the North will never consent to the separation of the States." — "At the South," said Mr. Guthrie of Kentucky, "we ask for our rights *under the Constitution.* If the question is decided against us, *we know how to take care of ourselves.*" Here was the old slave-driving tone so familiar once in Congress; and it was answered by the old whine and cringe of the Northern "whipped spaniels." "I have read," said Mr. White of Pennsylvania, "and carefully considered all the proposed amendments. . . . . I think they are rather to the advantage of the North. I believe the people of the North will hasten cheerfully to adopt them." — "These are noble propositions," declared Mr. Granger of New York; "they are such as the people expect and want." — "The country is divided," said Mr. Rives of Virginia. "A people have separated from another people. *Coercion is not a word to be used in this connection.*" — "Virginia *will not permit coercion,*" was the insolent declaration of Mr. Seddon. And in presence of this spirit, Commodore Stockton of New Jersey was base enough to say, "Do you talk here about regiments for invasion, for coercion, — you gentlemen of the North? You know better; I know better. For every regiment raised there for coercion, there will be another raised for resistance to coercion."* Nor was even this the lowest depth to which the Northern dirt-eaters descended. One of the

---

* The infamous letter of Franklin Pierce to Jefferson Davis of January 6, 1860, contains a similar declaration, made with a view to the Presidential nomination of that year.

"I have never believed," said the Ex-President, "that actual disruption of the Union can occur without blood; and if, through the madness of Northern Abolitionists, that dire calamity must come, the fighting will not be along Mason's and Dixon's line merely. It will be within our own borders, in our own streets, between

Commissioners from New York, whose name we do not give, out of respect to his later services to the Union, made the infamous assertion that New England would readily sacrifice its principles to its material interests. "I know the people of New England well," said he. "Once show them that it is necessary to adopt these propositions of amendment in order to secure the permanence of the government and to keep up the property and other material interests of the country, and they will adopt them readily. You will hear no more said about slavery or platforms." It was well that he added, "I speak as a merchant." Happily there were other men from New York who had better thoughts, and who did not allow such recreancy to go unrebuked. "The world is governed by ideas, and not by material interests," said Mr. Smith. "No sentiment, no opinion, ever took a firmer hold of the Northern mind, ever struck more deeply into it, ever became more pervading, or was ever adopted after maturer consideration, than this, — that it is impolitic and wrong to convert free territory into slave territory. With such convictions, the North will never consent to such conversion." "The contest," he added, "is between the owners of slaves on the one side, and all the *freemen* of this great nation on the other. It is a contest between the great opposing elements of civilization, whether the country shall be possessed and developed and ruled by the labor of slaves or of freemen."

But even such a protest against the disgraceful opinions of some of the Northern Commissioners, and even the plain, manly, and effective presentment of Northern views made by other members of the Conference, were not enough to prevent the Southern members from being persuaded that there was a strong party at the North ready to submit to whatever exactions might be required of them, — ready even to assist the South in opposition to the national authority if exerted in behalf of the integrity of the Union, — ready even to maintain the right of secession. Three times in the course of the sessions of the Conference, propositions were introduced in effect to deny the right of a State to secede from the Union; and three times, by aid of the majority of the Commissioners from Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Ohio, these propositions were voted down. Upon the men who made such speeches as those we have quoted from, and who cast such

---

the two classes of citizens to whom I have referred. Those who defy law and scout Constitutional obligations will, if we ever reach the arbitrament of arms, find occupation enough at home."

Such was the degradation of the Pro-Slavery Democrats of the North! It was plain to see that either despotism or civil war was at hand. Out of such slime has sprung the breed of Copperheads.

votes as these, rests not only lasting disgrace, but the heavy burden of responsibility for promoting that delusion in the South which led them to fancy that the nation was already lost to all sense of dignity and honor, and would consent to be broken up without resistance. These men were the Northern agents of secession, the real promoters and fosterers of war. God be thanked that the people had not sunk so low as to follow their counsels or adopt their policy.

The majority report of the committee, after undergoing some amendment, was finally adopted by the Conference on the 27th of February, and the Conference adjourned. Its recommendations were not acted upon by Congress, and, as we have said, no distinct influence upon public action or opinion is to be ascribed to its proceedings.

We cannot too highly commend Mr. Chittenden's excellent Report of the Debates. His work is executed in a very able and satisfactory manner; and it is fortunate that, as the Convention refused to employ a competent stenographer for the purpose, so careful, thorough, and complete a Report was made by one of its own members.

---

2. — *History of the Anti-Slavery Measures of the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth United States Congresses*, 1861–64. By HENRY WILSON. Boston: Walker, Wise, and Company. 1864. 12mo. pp. xv., 384.

SENATOR WILSON has added another to his many good services to the nation and to the cause of freedom, by the preparation and publication of this volume. The rapid succession, during the last three or four years, of military events of the utmost interest and importance, has, in some measure, drawn away the public regard from the less striking, but not less important, legislative events of the period. Such a record as is here presented of Congressional debate and action is well fitted to arrest attention, and to show the great progress that has been made in rendering the laws of the country consistent with the principles upon which its institutions are founded. While Mr. Chittenden's volume, which we have just noticed, contains the report of the last declarations and efforts of the supporters of slavery, by which the legislation of Congress had for two generations at least been mainly directed, this volume, with a striking contrast, offers to view the first successful efforts of the defenders of the rights of man and of free labor to put an end to slavery, and to destroy that power which, after long degrading the country, finally sought to ruin the government which it had been accustomed to control.

The Thirty-seventh Congress, the first session of which was held on

July 4, 1861, will have a place in our history inferior to that of no other Congress. Its members represented twenty-five States; and though a large majority of them were worthy representatives of the patriotism and spirit of the loyal North, and were possessed with the deepest aversion to slavery, there was a not inconsiderable minority who were not only opposed to the Administration, but held opinions in respect to the war and to slavery more conformed to those of the Rebels than to those of true lovers of the Union. The questions which were forced upon this Congress, by the condition of the nation, for discussion and decision, were of a novelty and importance beyond all precedent. They related not only to the carrying on of a civil war of unparalleled magnitude, not only to the maintenance of the government against a Rebellion, the nature and proportions of which were of the most alarming character, but also to the principles upon which the whole political fabric rested, and to the measures requisite for the future security, peace, and prosperity of the nation.

To deal successfully with these various questions called for a statesmanship that should be calm in a period of storm, foreseeing in the midst of perplexities and obscurities, steady in the midst of alarms. And although there were no men in either branch of Congress who would, by general consent, be numbered among the rare statesmen of genius who are endowed with commanding power of intellect and strength of personal character, yet the proceedings of this Congress give evidence of a very high degree of legislative judgment and capacity among its members. Politics had become more distinctly a branch of morals than in common times. Moral principles were involved in political action, and afforded a safe and intelligible test of its character. At such a period, when events have roused the moral energies and touched the conscience of a people, great acts may be accomplished by men not great in themselves, but lifted to a noble height by the wave of popular emotion. Great statesmanship may be exhibited by those who are not great statesmen.

The Congress had much to learn before it advanced with that vigorous course of legislation by which its memory will be perpetuated. Its first steps were timid and irresolute. As it gained experience, and was instructed by the lessons of the war, the moral convictions of its members invigorated their political action, and were embodied in a series of practical measures of a far-reaching and decisive character.

Senator Wilson's volume is concerned with those measures alone that relate to slavery. In this field the Thirty-seventh Congress accomplished an extraordinary work. The most important of its enactments for freedom was the prohibition of slavery in all the territories of the

United States. This was the true healing of the nation. The old quarrel could be closed only in this way; any other settlement would but have smothered, not quenched, its fires. This provision for freedom was accompanied by legislation directly against slavery. Slavery was no longer to shelter itself under the national flag. An act was passed, by which the slaves in the District of Columbia were emancipated, and slave-holding in the national capital made forever impossible. The Congress, moreover, enacted that all slaves used for military purposes by the Rebels should be forever free. It pledged the faith of the nation to aid loyal States to emancipate the slaves therein. It authorized the employment of persons of African descent in the military service. It passed the laws necessary to carry into effect the treaty with Great Britain, concerning the suppression of the slave-trade. It provided for the enrolment and drafting of black men as well as white, the law having previously excluded the black from the privilege of enrolment and service in the militia. It began the work of making the laws of the country in respect to persons consistent with the intention of the Constitution, and worthy of a free people. And these are only a portion of the Anti-Slavery measures enacted by this memorable Congress. The work thus begun was carried forward by the Thirty-eighth Congress. Its details are to be found in the book before us. They deserve to be studied by every one who desires to comprehend the inevitable necessity of the revolution through which we are now passing for the preservation of all that makes the national institutions dear and precious and inspiring, or who would understand the actual nature of the new era of the Republic.

Something yet remains to be done; and the Thirty-eighth Congress, now assembled for its last session, has the opportunity to consummate the crowning act, by which the nation shall be wholly redeemed to freedom and to peace, and by which, at length, the contradiction between its principles and its conduct shall be abolished. If the House of Representatives passes the joint resolution submitting to the people an amendment to the Constitution prohibiting slavery in the United States, it will have done all in its power to remove forever the great cause of dissension and the only source of civil war. Freedom will be the forerunner of peace, and the cement of Union. The question now rests with the opposition members of the House of Representatives, whether the honor of this measure shall belong to the Thirty-eighth or to the Thirty-ninth Congress; for the recent elections have rendered it almost certain that the next Congress will pass this measure, if the present does not. The people have declared their will, and it remains for Congress to execute it. So much has been gained through war.

Senator Wilson's volume has a personal interest in addition to its historical value. It is the monument of his own sincere allegiance to the cause which is now triumphant, through a period when loyalty to freedom and to the nation meant readiness to bear the trial of injustice, obloquy, and misinterpretation for their sake.

---

3. — *The Political History of the United States of America during the Great Rebellion, from November* 6, 1860, *to July* 4, 1864, *including a Classified Summary of the Legislation of the Second Session of the Thirty-sixth Congress, the Three Sessions of the Thirty-seventh Congress, the First Session of the Thirty-eighth Congress, with the Votes thereon, and the important Executive, Judicial, and Politico-Military Facts of that eventful Period, together with the Organization, Legislation, and General Proceedings of the Rebel Administration.* By EDWARD MCPHERSON, of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, Clerk of the House of Representatives of the United States. Washington, D. C.: Philp and Solomons. 1864. 8vo. pp. viii., 440.

THIS volume is a compilation of documents illustrative of the history of the United States from 1860 to 1864. It is of great value for reference and consultation, for it contains a vast mass of material, judiciously selected, compactly arranged, and conveniently classified, carefully printed, and provided with a lucid table of contents and a good index. It is fitted to be of service to the politician and to the historical student, and it will be found a desirable, almost an indispensable, supplement to the methodical histories of the Rebellion. It affords the means of authenticating statements concerning policy and opinion, as well as of tracing the course of the most important acts of administration and of legislation.

No one can study this volume without being forcibly impressed, by the cumulative evidence it presents, with the intelligence, the self-possession, and the spirit which the people have manifested during the Rebellion, with the integrity and capacity of the administration, with the inherent force and vigor of our institutions, and with the transcendent importance of the principles involved in our struggle for union, freedom, and law. As time goes on, and the nature of our contest becomes more clearly manifest and better understood, the interest of the documents contained in this work will become greater and more general. They will take their place among the most important documents of all history.

We would suggest to Mr. McPherson, that his book would be improved by the addition of a brief chronological table of the events of the

period to which it relates; and that in a new edition a few errors in dates and of the press, which now are found in its pages, should be corrected.

---

4. — *Memoirs of* Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D., *written by himself.* In Two Volumes. New York: Sheldon and Company. 1864. pp. 653.

Horace seems to pity the forgotten captains who lived before Agamemnon, because they wanted a *vates sacer* fitly to set forth their exploits. But the epithet *sacer* is susceptible of a double meaning, and we suspect that Leonidas would have applied the word in a very different sense to Mr. Glover, if he had ever met him in the Elysian Fields; for so strong a dose of oblivion has seldom been administered to an heroic memory as the twelve books of that gentleman's well-meant epic. After all, however, there are more fatal things even than commonplace poets, and Dr. Bentley was no doubt right in saying that no man could be thoroughly written down but by himself.

It is generally unwise for people to write about themselves, for there is nobody of whom they know so little. George Sand, speaking of Rousseau's Confessions, says very shrewdly that whoever makes himself his hero becomes unconsciously a romance-writer; and Goethe hinted at the same thing when he called his autobiography *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (which might be paraphrased Fancy and Fact) out of his life. If no man be a hero to his valet, so every man becomes something very like a valet when he dresses himself up for presentation to the world. To be sure, if one has been wooing the world all along, he deserves nothing better than such a theatric apotheosis. The value of memoirs depends very much upon the amount of his memory which the writer devotes to other people. The more a man talks about himself, the less interesting he becomes; and ill-manners in this respect may be as unpleasantly displayed to posterity as to one's own contemporaries. We seem to be justified in forgetting one who is so amply remembered by himself, and almost feel animosity toward a memory which, like a sulky, seems made expressly to convey only a single person. The best memoirs are diaries, in which the events of the day are written down while they are fresh; for then other persons and things have some chance of attention even from the vainest men. But when a vain man, at the close of a long life, writes from recollection, the years, as he looks backward, become a series of mirrors, reflecting only the image of himself in a long perspective of unreal sameness. Had the Duke of St. Simon

written retrospectively, his narrative would have been mainly made up of his jealousies of precedence and other littlenesses, of no consequence even to a parish clerk with the turf once kindly over him; but the photographs of his fatal eyes, whose duplicates he preserved, have given him a precedence beyond the wildest fancy of gentleman-usherhood as the Tacitus of memoir-writers. How men and things looked to John à Nokes a hundred years ago, is worth knowing in proportion to the goodness of his eyes; but how he looked to himself is quite another affair. Gray says that any fool may write a valuable book, if he will only tell what he heard and saw with veracity.

We expected General Scott's autobiography with no little interest. A man whose life covers nearly the whole of our history as a nation, who has been himself an actor in many important events, and who has mingled with the men who have been eminent for the last half-century, must surely have something to tell us well worth hearing. But the book is one of the washiest we ever read. Compared with it, General Heath's memoirs are thrilling, and Ely's journal a thing to cheat us of our pillows. If the General's reputation can stand a watering like this, it must be above proof. A great part of the book reminds one of a collection of certificates to the efficacy of a quack medicine. The General has gathered into it every puff, great and small, that he ever received. Every trifle connected with himself becomes important. He remembers his "tall charger" and his "splendid uniform" (though he is so unkind as not to tell us the name of his tailor); his A. M. at Princeton, which "rounded off the triumphs of the day"; his invitation to visit the Marquis of Tweedale, and to a public dinner in New York. The dressing of a wound becomes a "great effort of science." After the lapse of fifty years, he still remembers with pleasure all that noisy publicity which is the severest penalty of fame.

There are entertaining things in the book, especially the introduction, whose show of learning reminds one of Mr. Jenkinson's Sanconiathon, Manetho, Berosus, and Ocellus Lucanus. And this again gives a little liveliness even to the index, where we find "Moses and Joshua as autobiographic writers, *introduction*, xi." It is plain that General Scott would change the familiar quotation, and would weigh the merits of Hannibal by *quot libros* he left behind him. There is something very droll in his finding it necessary to quote the examples of Sulla the Dictator and Cato the Censor in favor of writing memoirs; but perhaps something was due to the LL.D. of the title-page.

A single point calls for more serious animadversion. General Scott gives us his views on the slavery question. There is nothing new in them; we have the usual moral mush about being wrong in the abstract

and right in the special case; but there is a restatement of the old error that emancipation at the South was retarded by anti-slavery agitation at the North, — the simple fact being that slavery renewed its lease of life in the Border States, and especially Virginia, by the rise in the value of slaves, which brought enormous profit to the trader.

General Scott is a truly distinguished man, and his countrymen have never been slow to recognize it. A soldier of tried gallantry, a leader of conspicuous skill, an able organizer, he has been no less successful as a negotiator and healer of differences where courage was to be tempered with prudence. It is a pity that he had not also that reserve which is the complement of a great character. Fame, where it has any substance, may be safely left with those who come after. Even Envy, it has been keenly said, is a lover of the dead; and one, the great events of whose life are parts of the history of his country, should have been willing to trust his memory to his country's keeping. As it is, we can only hope that she will kindly forget his works in consideration of his deeds.

---

5. — *The History of Cape Cod.* Vol. I. *The Annals of Barnstable County, including the District of Marshpee.* Vol. II. *The Annals of the Thirteen Towns of Barnstable County.* By FREDERICK FREEMAN. Boston. 1860, 1862. 8vo. pp. 803, 803. Portraits 15, 17.

As regards the writing of New England local history, we are in the last days of grace, and such portions of it as are not very soon committed to the press will be lost forever. The last twenty years have done more toward obliterating traditions than the whole previous century. Until within the lifetime of the present generation, the annals of our towns and villages hardly needed to be put on paper, so minute and vivid were the reminiscences of early days that passed from mouth to mouth and from parent to child, and so numerous were the memorials of the fathers, each of them the nucleus of a circumstantial narrative. History and genealogy formed a large part of the conversation among friends and neighbors. All this is changed now. Old landmarks are passing away, and Young America recognizes no geography but that of the Railroad Guide. With steam-carriage and telegraph, with daily news from the whole world finding its way to every farm-house, and especially with the intense and agonizing excitement incident to our second war of freedom, the past is no longer dwelt upon as it was wont to be, and its living chroniclers look in vain for successors in a generation that is giving itself to the making of fresh history.

Mr. Freeman's History has, therefore, the merit of timeliness. Its

materials were collected before the war began. Had the work been postponed but a few years, it must needs have been much less complete. It preserves many details both of general and of local interest, the evidence of which might have soon perished. It is enriched by contributions from that race of reverent inheritors of oral tradition which is so fast disappearing.

Mr. Freeman has performed his work, not as a task, but as a privilege. A loyal son of Cape Cod, he is erecting a monument of filial piety, and he is too good a workman to build it of rough-hewn stones or untempered mortar. His conscientious regard for truth and fact appears in every portion of these volumes. The two volumes are virtually two separate works, covering the same period of time and the same territory, touching each other at numberless points, yet preserved from mutual overlapping and repetition by the author's good taste and diligent care, while they both equally manifest the extent of his researches, and his keenness and tact as an investigator. The first volume comprises the history of Cape Cod considered as a geographical unit, as inhabited by a community in many respects *sui generis*, — by a people more closely affiliated, indeed, to the original stock of the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay Colonies, than are the dwellers in any other portion of the Commonwealth, and endowed with peculiar attributes growing out of their relations to land and water, their pursuits, and their peninsular separation from the rest of the States. The second volume is a series of histories of the thirteen towns that constitute Barnstable County. Each of these histories contains a minute description of the situation, boundaries, surface, natural divisions, and separate settlements and neighborhoods of the town, with selections from its annals, sketches of the lives and characters of its prominent citizens, and genealogies of its principal families, the text being relieved of the less readable matter by numerous and copious foot-notes. Both volumes are illustrated by portraits of the "village fathers," as well as of men of extended celebrity who have been born on the Cape.

The history of Cape Cod has a national interest and value. In the time of the Revolution, no section of the country was more loyal to the new government, or more prompt in its offerings of men and money to the common cause. The records of its town-meetings at that period are replete with genuine patriotism, and are an index of the indomitable spirit to which, more than to any of the ordinary instrumentalities of warfare, our people were indebted for their independence. We see in these memorials what it was that could not be conquered by the whole force of the British empire. On yet another ground, the contents of the town histories are of more than a merely local importance. The

Cape, while it has never failed to retain an intelligent, hardy, enterprising, and prosperous population, has been rendered illustrious by its emigrants. The bar and bench of Massachusetts and Maine, the higher departments of maritime service in New England, and the commerce of Boston, have been indebted for a singularly large proportion of their distinguished names to the old Cape families; and we may here trace not a few of the pedigrees which were honored from the first, but have branched out into a wider fame in the last and the present generation.

We are glad to give emphatic commendation to the ability and thoroughness with which Mr. Freeman has executed his praiseworthy task.

6.—1. *The Province of Jurisprudence determined, being the First Part of a Series of Lectures on Jurisprudence, or, the Philosophy of Positive Law.* By the late JOHN AUSTIN, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law. Second Edition. London: John Murray. 1861. 8vo.

2. *Lectures on Jurisprudence, being the Sequel to "The Province of Jurisprudence determined." To which are added Notes and Fragments now first published from the Original Manuscripts.* By the late JOHN AUSTIN, &c., &c. London: John Murray. 1861. 2 vols. 8vo.

JOHN AUSTIN is conspicuous among the most distinguished jurists of the present century. His reputation, great at his death, has since steadily increased, and will deservedly continue to increase. And yet his reputation is even more one of promise than of fulfilment. What he did was little in comparison with what he designed. The three volumes before us, two of them in a fragmentary and unfinished condition, comprise all that he has left us by which to judge him.

Incomplete, however, as his works are, we gain from them the highest opinion of Mr. Austin's juridical talents. If the reputation they now give their author had at once followed the publication of his first book, it might have stimulated him to put his great designs into execution, and produce something worthy of his ability. He at one time planned a most extensive work, to be entitled "The Principles and Relations of Jurisprudence and Ethics." In this he intended to show the relations of positive morality and law to each other, and of both to their common standard.

He designed also to treat of the subject of his present work, "The Philosophy of Positive Law," in an exhaustive and thorough manner. He has written a masterly sketch of the scope and method of treatment of his work, but he fell far short of completing the work itself. Had Mr. Austin devoted himself to this subject with zeal, and applied to it his wonderful skill of analysis and method, he might have produced

a work which would have marked an era in modern legal history, and given a strong impulse to scientific legal study in England and America.

Few men of the present century have been better fitted for such a task than Mr. Austin. He possessed the requisite degree of perseverance; and he united the two qualities essential to success, — an amplitude of grasp by which he could embrace the great principles of legal science in their proper relations, and the power of extending them into their minutest details with the utmost precision of rigorous logic. But he lacked that spirit of self-assertion and self-sustaining resolution, which was needful to enable him to bear up against the indifference of the world. He was, indeed, one of those men by nature extremely sensitive and proud, who, while they affect to despise, in reality more than all others need the spur of public approbation and applause to urge them to exertion. The indifference with which his efforts to advance his science were received, and his failures at the bar and in the lecture-room, from excess rather than deficiency of merit, broke his spirits, and for reasons which make his course pardonable, but by no means praiseworthy, he abandoned the prosecution of his work.

This, as we have said, the world has great cause to regret, for Mr. Austin was fitted by nature and education to be a great jurist. The chief characteristics of his mind were thoroughness and logical accuracy. He had not, like Mr. Maine, that combination of talents which would have made him eminent in whatever branch of literature he might have selected. He lacked his brilliancy of touch; he lacked his penetrating genius and originality of thought. He stood second to no one, however, as a precise and definite reasoner, and in the power of skilful and scientific arrangement. These traits, which were the basis of his excellence, were also from undue development the cause of his ill-success in life, and of certain rather serious defects in his writings. He was unable and unwilling to do any work in the rapid, and therefore incomplete, manner which the practice of the law frequently requires, and he was consequently, notwithstanding his acknowledged talents, an unsuccessful lawyer. This same thoroughness in excess constitutes a great blemish in his style. He took no pains, he says, to make his style popular or polished. Sacrificing everything to secure clearness and precision, he is frequently redundant, labored, and obscure.

Mr. Maine has shown, what indeed needed no showing, that classical finish is not incompatible with perfectly precise legal writing. It would not be fair to criticise very harshly the style of such unfinished works as those of Mr. Austin, — the most complete of which he intended to rewrite, — were it not for one peculiarity. The more attention Mr. Aus-

tin bestows upon his work, the more objectionable it becomes. His style was, we judge, naturally free and graceful, and it seems to have been only by great labor that he succeeded in making it in his most finished works crabbed and tedious. He exhibits a relentless hostility to the pronoun, which he strives to banish from his writings, preferring in its stead to repeat the substantive, or even a long and intricate phrase. Among his enumerated merits, "he shrank," says his biographer, "from no repetitions," — which, we are free to confess, we consider a most dubious virtue. He seems frequently to try to see in how many different forms he can express the same idea, and he succeeds to such an extent as fully to satisfy the reader with his power, but by no means with its exercise. Take an example at random: after two definitions of the same concept, he adds, "In other words, it affects to expound them as they should be: or, it affects to expound them as they ought to be: or, it affects to expound them as they would be if they were good or worthy of praise: or, it affects to expound them as they would be if they conformed to an assumed measure"!

An idea, in Mr. Austin's hand, passes through as many changes of form as Proteus in the grasp of Menelaus. Occasionally such Homeric touches as this are to be met with: "In pursuance of that purpose and agreeably to that manner, I stated the essentials of a law or rule. In pursuance of that purpose and agreeably to that manner, I proceed to distinguish laws set by men to men from Divine laws." If Mr. Austin's first volume were tapped of its circumlocutions and repetitions, it would shrink like a man recovering from the dropsy.

We have spoken somewhat at length of Mr. Austin's style, because it is a more than usually serious defect in a work of such a character as his. Few things, we think, have had more tendency to confine the study of law to lawyers, and thus to lessen its salutary influence, than the vicious style in which most legal works have been written. Compared, indeed, with the ordinary legal style, that of Mr. Austin is highly polished and classical.

"The Philosophy of Positive Law" constitutes the subject and scope of Mr. Austin's treatise.

He first determines the province of jurisprudence. He then distinguishes general from particular jurisprudence, or the principles of law common to all systems from any particular system of law now or formerly obtaining. He next analyzes certain notions pervading the science of law, such as person and thing, act and forbearance, legal duty and legal right. Leaving this prefatory but necessary matter, Mr. Austin proceeds to the two main departments under which he arranges the body of his subject. Under the former of these two departments he

considers law with reference to its sources and with reference to the modes in which it begins and ends. In the second department he considers law with reference to its purposes and with reference to the subjects about which it is conversant.

The principles upon which his former division is based are the following. Laws may be set immediately by the sovereign, or by a party in subjection to the sovereign, and may thus be considered as emanating from different *sources*. Again, the author of a law may establish the law as properly legislating, or he may establish the law as properly judging, and not as properly legislating. These are the two different *modes* by which a law may be established or abrogated.

As pertinent to this part of the subject, Mr. Austin treats of the common error of confounding the occasions of laws, or the motives to their establishment, with the sources from which they flow. Thus, prevalent customs or the opinions of legal writers, which, until made laws by the judge, are nothing more than rules of positive morality, are supposed by the classical Roman jurists, by Blackstone, and by many others, to exist as positive laws.

Mr. Austin next treats of the second and principal of his two main departments, which embraces the purposes of law, and the subjects about which it is conversant.

Certain rights and duties, with certain capacities and incapacities to take rights and to incur duties, determines certain persons, as subjects of law, to certain classes, and invests such persons with certain conditions or *status*. These conditions or *status* are the appropriate matter of the Law of Persons, or (less ambiguously) the Law of Status, which is conversant about persons as bearing or invested with conditions.

The Law of Things is the body of the law remaining after the Law of Persons has been subtracted from it. The Law of Things is conversant about rights and duties, capacities and incapacities, in so far as they are abstracted from, or are not constituent elements of, *status* or condition. As the Law of Things is conversant about principles which are more general than those contained in the Law of Persons, and which are limited by the latter, the Law of Things would naturally precede the Law of Persons, as the rule precedes the exception. But it is obvious that these distinctions are mostly artificial, and instituted for convenience merely, and are not very deeply based on any fundamental differences in the subject-matter.

The main division of the matter of the Law of Things which Mr. Austin makes, rests upon the distinction of rights and of duties into primary and sanctioning, or those not arising and those arising from delicts or crimes.

Primary rights with primary relative duties Mr. Austin distributes under four sub-departments. Rights *in rem* (or rights availing against the world at large), as existing *per se* or as not combined with rights *in personam.* Rights *in personam* (or rights availing against determinate persons), as existing *per se*, or as not combined with rights *in rem.* Such of the combinations of rights *in rem* and rights *in personam* as are particular and comparatively simple. Such universities of rights and duties as arise by universal succession.

Under the second department of the Law of Things, Mr. Austin treats of sanctioning rights (all of which are rights *in personam*), and sanctioning duties, together with delicts or injuries which are the causes of sanctioning rights and duties.

The Law of Persons, the latter of Mr. Austin's main divisions, he distributes into three sub-departments, — Private conditions, Political conditions, Anomalous or miscellaneous conditions. Private conditions he also divides into two classes, Domestic and Professional.

Mr. Austin, though following mainly, as we have seen, the divisions of the Civil Law, has greatly modified them, and has introduced some fundamental improvements into that celebrated system.

Mr. Austin's subject of inquiry differs entirely from that of Mr. Maine in his celebrated work on Ancient Law. Mr. Austin treats of law as from the nature of the science it must necessarily be, naturally using as his principal exemplar that most œcumenical of all systems, the Civil Law. Mr. Maine endeavors to discover what particular forms history shows law to have passed through, from the earliest and rudest to the most refined legal conceptions. Both agree, however, in treating of law as it is or has been, not as it ought to be. The former treats of the science, the latter of the ancient history, of jurisprudence; neither touches, except incidentally, upon the science of ethics, or law and morality as they ought to be.

The first volume of Mr. Austin's works is taken up with the definition of positive law, the appropriate subject-matter of jurisprudence, and in determining the marks by which it is distinguished from other laws, properly and improperly so called, to which it is related by resemblance or analogy. Mr. Austin divides all law into four classes, the Law of God, Positive Law, Positive Morality, and Metaphorical Laws. This is not of course intended to be a logical division, as the law of God, positive law, and positive morality are in great part the same thing.

Mr. Austin then determines the nature or essence common to all laws properly so called. A law proper he defines to be a species of command, imposing a duty, enforced by a sanction, and obliging generally to acts or forbearances of a class. This definition, it is perhaps

needless to remark, answers only to the notions of mature jurisprudence. It is not now entertained by the generality; and the farther back we penetrate into primitive history, the less resemblance do the notions connected with law bear to the refined conception of the present times.

Mr. Austin, having defined law proper in its broad signification, proceeds to determine the characters by which the law of God is distinguished from other laws. He then divides the law of God into revealed and unrevealed law, and passes to the index, or signs by which the latter is disclosed to man. This question, which belongs rather to the science of ethics than of jurisprudence, Mr. Austin discusses at great length. In his Preface, he apologizes for the space which he devotes to an irrelevant subject; but excuses himself on account of the interest and importance it possesses. Mr. Austin is a disciple of the school of Bentham, and adopts the theory of utility as the index to unrevealed Divine commands. He offers little that is new on this often-debated question; and nothing, we may add, to us very convincing.

He then proceeds to determine the distinguishing marks of positive moral rules, or of positive morality; that is, such of the laws or rules set by men to men as are not armed with strictly legal sanctions. Positive morality is a phrase invented by Mr. Austin, which admirably serves to mark a department of law before dimly and uncertainly defined. Positive morality Mr. Austin divides into two classes, — the positive moral rules which are laws imperative and proper, and the positive moral rules which are laws set by opinion merely. The former class, which are laws proper, are commands guarded by a sanction, which are imposed by men upon men, but not by men as political superiors; the latter, which are laws improperly so called, are simply rules set by public opinion. International law, so called, Mr. Austin places under the latter of these classes, as consisting merely of opinions current among nations generally, and therefore not law properly so called. When he styles international law positive morality, he of course does not refer to such portions of it as have been judicially or legislatively determined by the several nations. Most great nations have adopted the greater part of international law as their own, enforcing it by their own tribunals against other nations. This, however, so far as regards its sanction, should not be considered as international, but national or civil law.

Mr. Austin next devotes a very brief space to figurative laws, or laws which are laws merely by a metaphor.

Lastly, he determines the characters and marks of positive law, — that is, law simply and strictly so called, which forms the matter of the science of strict jurisprudence. The essential distinction of a positive law is this: "Every positive law is set by a sovereign person or a sovereign

body of persons to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or (changing the expression) it is set by a monarch or sovereign number to a person or persons in subjection to its author." Mr. Austin then analyzes the various conceptions which are connected with this idea of law, among others treating of the whole subject of the nature of sovereignty, and investigating the questions of the origin and various forms of government.

It may not be out of place here to distinguish briefly the various sciences with which the science of jurisprudence is connected. Positive law is the subject-matter of the science of jurisprudence itself. Positive morality might be made, as Mr. Austin well suggests, the subject of the science of positive morality. Both sciences should treat of laws as they are, or have been, not as they ought to be. The science of ethics, or in "Benthamese" of deontology, determines the test of both positive law and positive morality, and treats of law as it ought to be. It thus has two departments, the former of which is commonly styled the science of legislation, the latter the science of morals, or simply morals.

We can only speak of the rest of Mr. Austin's treatise in terms of general, but of the highest commendation. His remaining Lectures, from their fragmentary state, as well as from the nature of their subject, cannot be supposed to recommend themselves very strongly to the general reader; but they should be read repeatedly by every student of law. The power with which he grasps, and the skill with which he unravels, any topic, however baffling, call forth constant surprise and applause. As a random instance, his few pages on the subject of vested and contingent rights offer the only satisfactory clew we have ever met to that labyrinthine subject. Simply as commentaries on the civil law, or even on Blackstone, these Lectures are very valuable. Nothing can be more amusing than to witness the intermittent castigation which Mr. Austin administers to the latter, at short periods, for his loose and inaccurate mode of reasoning.

We recommend to those persons who are in the habit of holding up Blackstone as a model, and who repeat the current phrase, that to read Blackstone is a necessary part of a gentleman's education, the following criticism. "Neither in the general conception, nor in the detail of his book," says Mr. Austin, "is there a single particle of original and discriminating thought. He had read somewhat (though far less than is commonly believed); but he had swallowed the matter of his reading without choice and without rumination. He owed the popularity of his book to a paltry but effectual artifice, and to a poor superficial merit.

He truckled to the sinister interests and to the mischievous prejudices of power. . . . . And to this paltry but effectual artifice he added the allurement of a style which is fitted to tickle the ear, though it never or rarely satisfies a severe and masculine taste; for that rhetorical and prattling manner of his is not the manner which suited the matter in hand. It is not the manner of those classical Roman jurists who are always models of expression, though their meaning be never so faulty. It differs from their unaffected, yet apt and nervous style, as the tawdry and flimsy dress of a milliner's doll from the graceful and imposing nakedness of a Grecian statue."

We will only add, that we trust an American edition of Mr. Austin's works will soon be published. His first volume contains matter peculiarly important to the American people, and which might tend somewhat to replace our present vague and misty ideas connected with law and morality by precise and definite conceptions. The all-important distinction between positive law and positive morality, which is there clearly and ably marked, needs to be constantly held up and enforced among us. For the confusion of these two distinct conceptions is one of the greatest dangers to which a democracy is liable. Our reformers of the present day aim to obtain reform not so much through and in the law as over and in defiance of it. Of the law itself, they have frequently the greatest ignorance, and not seldom joined with the contempt which naturally accompanies ignorance. The work of legislation is, moreover, abandoned by us to inferior men, who are for the most part incapable of understanding, much less of framing, a law. The people thus tend to separate into two classes, one of which urges and applauds the violation of any law in favor of their ideas of morality, the other of which looks upon all past laws with stupid reverence, and obstinately opposes all change, however loudly called for by the voice of reason and humanity.

---

7. — *Introduction to the Study of International Law, designed as an Aid in Teaching and in Historical Studies.* By THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, President of Yale College. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864. pp. 439.

IN his Preface to the edition of 1860, Dr. Woolsey said, "The work is not written for lawyers, but to introduce students, especially students of history, into a science which has very close relations to the history of Christian states, and in general to that of civilization." No accredited text-book, adapted to such uses, then existed, we believe, in the English language; for, if Dr. Wheaton's excellent "Elements" might

once have served that purpose, it has now, through the sedulous industry of its commentator, achieved that dropsical growth to which every successful law-book is doomed. The admirable Lectures of Kent merely form a portion of a great organic work, and would otherwise hardly meet all the wants of an historical student.

Dr. Woolsey hit on a fortunate time for the preparation of his work. Without knowing it, we were on the eve of a crisis which was to throw into high relief the whole surface of international law, and particularly to force upon general observation and discussion many of the nice questions between belligerents and neutrals. This country was about to leave its natural, and, as it had hoped, permanent attitude of a looker-on, and to appear for the first time as the leading actor in a war of the most startling military and naval dimensions. From being a spectator, it has become the great spectacle of the time. Subjects, which with us for nearly half a century had only casually caught the eye, have thrust themselves between the student and his chosen pursuits. He must now think and talk about international topics. Even the leaders in our newspapers strive to enlighten the public on these great concerns, or, if unequal to that, heat their prejudices and foment their hate.

This hand-book, composed with scrupulous impartiality and painstaking fidelity, is a valuable addition to the current stock of manuals at the command of our teachers and students. At first sight, indeed, it might seem as if the book would have better met the wants of the present hour, if written in full vision of those wants. Not so. The author secured a fair point of view, and gave the unbiased judgment of a calm observer, while he has enabled himself, in his second edition, to refer the prominent questions of this later day to their proper place in the original scheme of his work. He himself says, in his new Preface: "A war, as just and necessary as it is vast in its proportions, has burst upon the country, and has given rise to new questions touching neutral and belligerent rights, in discussing which this nation, so tenacious formerly of the neutral ground, has seemed inclined to go over to the other position. Naturally, some of these points are looked at in the present edition of this work, with the feeling, it is hoped, that the law of nations must be represented as it is, and that no temporary bias can be permitted to exert any influence in the statement of any doctrine." Though a hasty survey of the volume might fail to detect the author's watchful attention to these points, we can say, after having collated the two editions paragraph by paragraph, that he has materially increased the value of his book by his unobtrusive and temperate additions. A dignified tone is preserved throughout. There is no making others out to be Pharisees, in order to avoid the honest confession of the publican.

Principles and rules are laid down, with entire indifference to what Brobdignag or Liliput may think about them. In a text-book for the study or the lecture-room, this is an indispensable merit.

International law is the fruit of principles of right applied to the mutual dealings of nations. In its riper state, therefore, it implies a high degree of rational intercourse and enlightened morality. As it were vain to expect these where Christian ideas had not found a wide acceptance, civilized Europe alone could, in any large sense, produce and develop the law of nations. Two historical facts lie at its basis, nationality and intercourse. Starting with these, we have a logical holding-ground for the science; and if either of them were simple, logic might carry the science rapidly forward. But each of them enters the field of view, like all other historical facts, in local and traditionary colors, that appear to be burned into its substance. Force becomes use, and use pretends to right; the legislator must admit human frailty to a place by the side of pure reason. In order to make sure of the gold, he must tolerate the ore. Grudgingly and slowly he gives ground before facts which will sweep him away, unless he can stoop to a compromise with them. But if he yields, he yields under protest, and never surrenders his vested right to a future occupation of the territory. These difficulties appear as soon as you attempt to apply the radical axiom, that every state is a substantive unit, equal in right to every other. The complex facts that surround each single case soon bring you, as in ordinary ethics, into the region of casuistry; and your easy postulate, like the formula of friction, has to bend itself to every new object it encounters. Besides, the law of nations has its special difficulties. Nations, like corporations, are apt to act as if they had no soul. And governments, the agents of nations, have the additional heartlessness of conscientious trustees. To make this worse, the main sanction of international right (short of force, which is no sanction except for the stronger party) is the public opinion of the world, the organs of which are alien to each other and mutually remote. The individual conscience is wholesomely backed by the presence of a cloud of near witnesses; but the international moral sense (so to speak) must appeal from the judgments of neighbors. And to what court? Selfishness in personal matters must face the scrutiny of the market-place; selfishness in national affairs echoes and re-echoes itself in the market-place into a cry of patriotism, till it becomes a sin to doubt and a virtue to strike. To be sure, the relations of nations in time of peace, being mostly formal and conventional, move on smoothly enough. Passion is caged and principle tame. But when the great axiom, that peace and not war is normal, (the object of war being presumably and properly the recovery of peace,) is to be applied to an

actual state of war, you have to reckon with the demon of force, which would fain be a law and the only law to itself. Fortunately, — when the question is of civilized nations that have tasted the sweets of prosperous peace, — the conflict of force with force, the balancing of temptation by its consequences, the exhausting abatements of glory, the surfeit of mutual destruction, and the misery of hope deferred, compel the parties to consent to mitigations of the cruel code. Each concession of this kind is a stepping-stone to more. Christian charity gets a fairer hearing, and, even when ejected from the present, asserts her claim to the future. The positive law adapts itself more yieldingly to theoretical justice and amity. Human interest pleases itself with the comeliness of its new robes, and the merchant's canvas becomes the flag of an ever-lengthening truce. The rights of neutrals carry it more and more over the claims of belligerents; and the duties of neutrals are enforced against commercial greed and listless sloth by the dread of a return to belligerent necessities. Still the end is very far off, and in the long delay there will be too frequent need to put up with positive rules that are just better than no rules, and to be content to bargain for the half-right and the half-true.

The philosopher will steer his course between the pandemoniac and the millennial view of international relations, though the shocking collisions between civilized and uncivilized, or between Christian and heathen nations, which, in the absence of a common theory of right, tend to throw men back upon ruder notions, may excuse the splenetic tone of tender-hearted men, who see more clearly in what the law of nations is below Christianity than in what it is above barbarism. One of the most learned and pious, but also one of the most eccentric, of modern historians, indulges in these words: "The law of nations, clear and consistent when expounded by grapeshot and shrapnel-shell, Congreve-rocket or Colt-revolver, furnishes irrefragable arguments in support of any right claimed by power and prosperity, and an irrefutable vindication of any wrong inflicted upon weakness or misfortune." Too many individual outrages give some color to this extravagant accusation; but it is poor wisdom to cut away the only anchor you have, because it did but just save you from the breakers. The true statement is, not that the world is so bad that it cannot frame a good law of nations, but that it is so bad that it cannot do without a good law of nations.

A lawyer, fresh from reports and the bar, is likely to overrate the positive side of international law, — to stand upon precedents and bend principles to them. The closet-philosopher is exposed to the opposite danger, that of judging cases by *a priori* rules, and giving logic final

jurisdiction over experience. The legal mind is too apt to take the world as it is; the speculative mind, too apt to see only what it should be. Happily, the rapid shifting of the great nations back and forth between neutral and belligerent ground, forces upon the attention of both two sets of facts and connections which illustrate and limit each other. Philosophy has to cover them all with its generalizations, and practice must avoid all unpleasant contradictions. The author of the book before us, though perhaps his tastes and habits would rather incline him to the more scientific and hopeful side of his subject, does justice to the claims of positive law. He lays down his maxims, but he does not expect to square the world at once to them. So far as the ways of the world agree with right reason, he rejoices, and when they do not, he hopes. Thus his leaning to neutral rights and his humane readings of belligerent rules are justified to him, not only by the better instincts, but by the improving practice of the nations.

Sometimes, perhaps, the reader may wish that the author had tarried a little longer on this or that topic, even at the cost of curtailing here or there a discussion of less interest. The subject of Recognition, for instance, has assumed unwonted prominence since the publication of the first edition. On this head the author's principles are very well laid down, but his illustrations, though apposite, are cursory. The three interesting letters of "Historicus" (a writer who seems to have escaped the notice of Dr. Woolsey) may claim the double merit of having thrown speculative and historical light on an important matter, and of having helped to choke the cry for a precipitate recognition of the Confederate States. On another point, the adoption of international by municipal law, the general principle is very broadly stated, and might perhaps have been guarded by a distinction or two.

We must not ask, in a manual of a science so wide in its sweep as that of international law, a full exposition of every branch of it. The great question is how to compress, rather than how to expand. Still, if the author had had room for a few additional paragraphs in his sections on the freedom of the high seas, they would not have been unwelcome. He starts with the rational principle, that "the high sea is free and open to all nations," a truth which is vital to the interests of every commercial power. In his commentary, however, he has not discussed some of the delicate questions recently raised by the appearance on the ocean of Confederate cruisers, built in neutral ports and sailing under an insurgent flag. Smarting under these singular if not irregular depredations, men have brought out with great eagerness and force the objections to the recognition of the public character of such vessels. Possibly some points have been over-urged. The doctrine, for instance,

that a portless or thoroughly blockaded power can have no belligerent *status*, has been defended on the ground that it is impossible to bring in prizes for judgment. But where is it settled that cruisers shall not sink or burn their prizes, when only enemy's property is in question, and it is impossible to take the captures in? In the war of 1812, we made no ceremony with encumbrances of this sort. It may be granted that it is a cruel and barbarous license, and that the code of naval warfare needs a thorough revision. But, as yet, there is no right to monopolize the ocean under the plea of civilizing it. Or, again, the captor may take a ransom-bill and bond the prize, in which case he needs no port or court but that of the other party. The doctrine seems to encounter even greater difficulties when applied to a blockaded than to a shoreless country. The state of blockade is temporary and contingent; and if belligerent rights the ocean over depend upon the fact for the day or hour of an effective blockade, a nation may, according to the accident of the day or hour, be or not be a belligerent power. And perhaps the question may be admissible whether the blockading party, being itself the cause of the closure of the ports, can rest its case on an impossibility of its own creating. These suggestions are thrown out merely as contributions to the discussion. How much they are worth, is yet uncertain. But it is a curious fact, that within a few months a movement has been made to secure for Switzerland a recognized place as a naval power. Certain Swiss residents in the Austrian city of Trieste have petitioned the Federal Council of their native land that it would enter into negotiations with other powers for the recognition of Swiss neutrality *by sea*. It is already recognized by land. The matter is under consideration. The federal authorities have lately established a consulate in Japan; and it may need some day the protection of an armed vessel, as much as the establishments of England and the United States. A fair and brief discussion of this question and the others that lie near it, with no eye to past wrongs or future claims, it was perhaps premature for the author to give us. Many inches deep of diplomatic dust will probably gather on the controversy before it is dismissed.

Our author discusses the Trent question, and approves of the surrender of the Confederate agents. He denies that cruisers belonging to a power which is "trying to become a state" are, other things being equal, to be regarded as pirates. "A pirate never ends his war with mankind, they fight for peace." While he admits that the law of nations (at least as interpreted by the course pursued by the United States towards the Spanish colonies in America) does not deny to a revolted colony the character of a belligerent, he contends that, in theory, a

neutral power ought not to grant equal privileges to a rebellious province and to a constituted state; the latter being already in the family of nations, and the former being only a candidate for admission. Is this quite certain? While, again, he registers the law as to the irresponsibility of neutral governments for the contraband trade of their subjects, he sympathizes strongly with Phillimore, who would tighten rather than ease neutral obligations on these points; and he would hold the neutral power to great diligence in preventing all acts that overstep the boundary-line between contraband traffic and belligerent co-operation. These are some of the topics which he has handled in the new edition. Adhering to his regard for the humane mitigations of war, he retains his disapproval of the destruction of public buildings and of the seizure, without compensation, of the property of passive non-combatants. In a similar spirit, number thirty-eight of the instructions for the government of our armies requires the commanding officer to give receipts on taking the property of unoffending owners who have not fled away.

This volume contains two Appendices. The first consists of "a brief selection of works and documents bearing on international law," which is quite useful, though hardly full enough. We cannot altogether subscribe to the high eulogium pronounced on Phillimore's Commentaries. Without wishing to detract from its merits, we find some truth in the criticism of "Historicus," who calls it "a digest of opinions and authorities, rather than a scientific disquisition on the topics to which they refer." The second Appendix is a copious list and description of the chief modern treaties. This must be very serviceable to historical students, and it would be more so had greater care been taken to aid the eye by diversities of type.

The style of the book is grave and plain, without pretension and without special finish. The publication is timely, and the work cannot fail to do good service.

---

8. — *Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical.* By John Stuart Mill. In Three Volumes. Vol. I. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1864.

The articles contained in these volumes were originally printed in English reviews and magazines. A collection of them was first made in London, and was published in 1859. The present is the first American edition, and it comprises all the contents of the English one, together with four articles which have appeared since the date of that

publication. These four articles are "The Contest in America," printed in February, 1862; "The Slave Power," being a review of Professor Cairnes's book of that name, printed in October, 1862; "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," printed in December, 1859; and "Utilitarianism," printed in successive numbers of Fraser's Magazine for 1862 and 1863; — "the whole being thus issued here," as it is stated in the Advertisement to the American Edition, "with the express sanction and approval of the author." The form and style of workmanship of this edition leave nothing to be desired; and the four new articles above named are a very great addition to the interest of the collection. The two which relate to our own country are already familiar to American readers, and the enlightened interest which they show in the great ideas and principles that dignify the cause of our country has endeared the name of their writer to the American people, and prepared a general welcome in this country for his other writings, even in quarters where the admirable qualities by which they are distinguished had not previously been familiar.

The article entitled "A Few Words on Non-Intervention" was written in the latter part of the year of the Italian war, when the policy of France had brought the subject in question prominently into view. The article makes no comments directly on the events of that war, but it improves the opportunity — since "we have heard something lately about being willing to go to war for an idea" — to make some important suggestions upon the general subject. Mr. Mill sharply condemns the manner and phraseology in which it is common with the English to express their policy of non-intervention, but in general he approves of their action. He claims for England that she has generally pursued a foreign policy worthy of a powerful and enlightened nation, shaping its course with due reference to the general interests of mankind. He utters some noble words on the subject of the Suez Canal, and laments that the English have suffered themselves to be betrayed by a single leading statesman "into a line of conduct, on an isolated point, utterly opposed to our habitual principles of action." He condemns the failure of England and France to unite in forbidding the armed intervention of Russia in Hungary. He seems, however, to approve of the general policy of England in the East and of France in Algiers, and lays down the broad proposition that, "to characterize *any* conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the law of nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject. A violation of great principles of morality it may easily be; but barbarians have no rights as a *nation* except such as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one. The only moral

laws for the relation between a civilized and a barbarous government are the universal rules of morality between man and man."

We cannot assent to the soundness of these statements. It is not allowable in political ethics to disown the nationality of the Chinese, or the Hindoos, or any other so-called barbarous people, while they are in point of fact united under a common government. It is not a mere assemblage of individuals with which the English are dealing in China, but a nation, a people represented by rulers. The rulers may be treacherous, and the nation not trustworthy, and these facts may justify a course of conduct quite inadmissible under those international customs prevalent in Christendom, which are technically known as "international law," but they do not change the facts of the case, nor take a great people out from the operation of the moral rules which are to govern the relations of nations.

As among civilized nations, Mr. Mill disapproves of the policy of interfering to assist another government in keeping its own citizens in subjection, and also, in general, of interfering to help the people of another country in a struggle for free institutions against their own native government, "but the case of a people struggling against foreign yoke, or against a native tyranny upheld by foreign arms," is different. "Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent." And again, intervention is held to be rightful in the case of a long civil war where the parties are so equally balanced that there is no probability of a speedy issue, or no hope that either party, if victorious, can keep the other one down excepting by "severities repugnant to humanity, and injurious to the permanent welfare of the country."

The article on "Utilitarianism" is one of very great interest, as being the latest and fullest expression of Mr. Mill's views on the fundamental questions of morals. It is a paper of ninety pages in length, in which the writer treats clearly and with much force of argument of the meaning of the principle of utility in morals, its sanctions, the proof of which it is capable, and the connection between justice and utility. This last point is treated in a truly admirable manner. The same subject of "Utility" is touched upon and discussed with more or less of fulness in previous essays, viz. in those on Bentham and on Coleridge, and in the reviews of Professor Sedgwick's Lectures, of Whewell on Moral Philosophy, and of De Tocqueville's "Democracy in America," Mill succeeds in answering many of the standard arguments against "Utilitarianism," and especially he meets and fairly demolishes the main part of what is brought forward by Whewell and Sedgwick. Towards these writers he shows an asperity and curtness

of which he makes mention in the Preface to this collection, and which is justified by the ignorance that they display of the real points in dispute, the looseness with which they use language, and the unworthy superciliousness of their tone.

Yet, in our judgment, Mr. Mill, upon the whole, fails in his argument. He attempts to show that "happiness," or "utility," which is defined as meaning "tendency to happiness," is the standard of morality. "By happiness," he says, "is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure." "Pleasure and the freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends, and all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain." As to the proof of the principle of "utility," Mr. Mill remarks that "questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof in the ordinary acceptation of the term." The only proof that can be given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. In like manner, the sole evidence which it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it. Each person does desire his own happiness so far as he deems it attainable. "The general happiness, therefore, is a good to the aggregate of all persons."

It is necessary, however, to show that people not only desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. The opinion is expressed that all desirable things, e. g. virtue, power, money, are desired only as being either ingredients of happiness or means to happiness. "And now, to decide whether this is really so, whether mankind do desire nothing for themselves but that which is a pleasure to them, or of which the absence is a pain, — we have evidently arrived at a question of fact and experience, dependent, like all similar questions, upon evidence. It can only be determined by practised self-consciousness and self-observation, assisted by observation of others. I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon, — in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact; that to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility."

Elsewhere it is said: "Unquestionably it is possible to do without happiness; .... it often has to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr,

for the sake of something which he prizes more than his individual happiness. But this something — what is it, unless the happiness of others, or some of the requisites of happiness? It is noble to be capable of resigning one's own portion of happiness or chances of it; but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is not its own end; and if we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it would earn for others immunity from similar sacrifices?"

And again it is said: "I must again repeat what the assailants of utility seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned; as between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility."

"The principle of utility," he says, "may be described as supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons. . . . . What is the principle of utility, if it be not that 'happiness' and 'desirable' are synonymous terms? If there is any anterior principle implied, it can be no other than this, that the truths of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happiness, as of all other measurable quantities."

Such are some of the leading statements upon this subject made by Mr. Mill.

Now it is to be observed that the proof which is offered of the principle of utility shows nothing more than that each man desires *his own* happiness. "No reason," it is said, "can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness." It amounts to nothing to add, that "therefore the aggregate of men desire the general happiness"; since it is not shown that any one individual desires anything more than his own happiness. Where is the evidence that the happiness of one man is as desirable as the happiness of another? that "happiness" — meaning thereby the happiness of anybody and everybody, and not merely the happiness of the agent himself — and "desirable" are synonymous? that the happiness of all persons is commensurate, so that "the truths of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation" of it? It is not true, therefore, that the principle of utility of *which any proof is given* "requires a man, as between his own happiness and that of others, to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator."

Again, we apprehend that there is a certain *inadequacy* in the standard adopted by Mr. Mill, which extends to his whole discussions. When it is said, that "there is nothing desired except happiness"; that "those who desire virtue for its own sake desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united"; and that "desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are .... two different modes of naming the same psychological fact," — one is aware of the same sort of error that is observable in the reasonings of what is called the "Selfish School" of moralists; namely, that of straining and misusing language, looking at things from a wrong point of view, and (if one may say so without begging the question) measuring things by a standard which is inapplicable.

And again, inasmuch as Mr. Mill identifies the utilitarian standard with the "golden rule," it may be pertinent to say that he quotes but half of the entire rule of human conduct laid down by Jesus. That rule was twofold, — "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Without seeking to bring theology or religion into the discussion, one may take occasion of Mr. Mill's reference to this rule to say that his reasoning upon morals is emasculated by losing sight of certain considerations which are suggested in the first branch of the above-named rule.

It would seem that man naturally conceives of a Power in the universe greater than himself, and of himself as subject to laws proceeding from that source. There follows in his mind the desire to conform to these laws, and to import into his character and the conduct of his life the order and the beauty which he sees in external nature.

As Dr. Walker says, "We are placed here subject to certain relations and dependencies, conditions and laws. These constitute the truth of things, and our duty consists in conforming our thought and action, all our life, to the truth of things." In other words, our duty consists in conforming our lives to the laws of our being. Conformity to these laws seems to be the standard of morality. What these laws are, and what conduct is or is not conformable to them, is matter to be passed upon by the rational faculty and determined by the sound judgment of mankind, in view of any given facts. If men differ upon these questions, these questions only share the fate of all others; yet, no doubt, a sufficient certainty is attainable.

Mr. Mill contends for the application of the inductive system to ethics, and with good reason. He admits, at the same time, the propriety of "deducing from the laws of life and the conditions of exist-

ence what kinds of action tend to produce happiness." It would seem not difficult to arrive in both ways at the result, that it is a duty of man to promote the general welfare, and to limit his own desires by reference to the welfare of others. Reasoning inductively, we shall find ample evidence of the obligation of many other duties, e. g. those of justice and veracity, in their tendency to promote the general welfare, and we may therefore rightly use that tendency as a criterion, *where it is applicable.* But it is not applicable, without a distortion of language, in all cases; and it is the neglect to observe this fact, among other reasons, which gives to Mr. Mill's speculations on morals a certain crudeness and a certain painful appearance of inadequacy.

We have heard it objected to Mr. Mill as a thinker, that he is wanting in imagination. It is curious to find that he makes the same criticism upon Bentham, and that he discusses a similar objection made by Professor Sedgwick upon Locke. Mr. Mill truly says, that "the word 'imagination' is currently taken in such a variety of senses, that there is some difficulty in making use of it at all without risk of being misunderstood." In speaking of Bentham, he says: "The imagination which he had not was that to which the name is generally appropriated by the best writers of the present day, — that which enables us by a voluntary effort to conceive the absent as if it were present, the imaginary as if it were real, and to clothe it in the feelings which, if it were indeed real, it would bring along with it. This is the power by which one human being enters into the mind and circumstances of another. This power constitutes the poet in so far as he does anything but melodiously utter his own actual feelings," &c. In the article on Alfred de Vigny, Mr. Mill quotes from one of the works of that writer the signs by which Stello, one of his characters, recognizes himself as a poet: "Because," says Stello, "there is in Nature no beauty nor grandeur nor harmony which does not cause in me a prophetic thrill. . . . . Because I feel in my inmost being an invisible and undefinable power, which resembles a presentiment of the future, and a revelation of the mysterious causes of the present," — "a presentiment," Mr. Mill goes on to say, "which is not always imaginary, but often the instinctive insight of a sensitive nature, which, from its finer texture, vibrates to impressions so evanescent as to be unfelt by others; and by that faculty, as by an additional sense, is apprised, it cannot tell how, of things without, which escape the cognizance of the less delicately organized. These *are* the tests, or some of the tests, of a poetic nature." Here, then, is something besides that imagination which was above defined, going to "constitute a poet"; and it is this sort of thing, called by Mr. Mill "the instinctive insight of a sensitive nature," which is probably meant

when Mr. Mill is charged with a want of imagination. In this sense, we think the charge is well founded. A larger measure of this gift would probably have prevented him from adopting some of his conclusions on the subject of morals. Upon this subject, like a true Englishman, he "warns imagination off the ground," and will have nothing to do with the class of suggestions furnished by the fine faculty above referred to. And yet, on every subject which is a part of the science of man, there is especial need of resorting to these delicate sources of suggestion by which, as from "the convolutions of a smooth-lipped shell," we get from the universe

> "Authentic tidings of invisible things;
> Of ebb and flow, and ever-during power;
> And central peace, subsisting at the heart
> Of endless agitation."

We have left ourselves no room to speak of the other essays in these volumes. We can only say that they all repay a careful reading, by the interest of the subject, the fair and instructive manner in which they are written, and the noble qualities of mind which find expression in them.

9.— *The Works of* Francis Bacon, *Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, and Lord High Chancellor of England.* Collected and edited by James Spedding, M. A., of Trinity College, Cambridge; Robert Leslie Ellis, M. A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; and Douglas Denon Heath, Barrister-at-Law, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Volume X. *Being Translations of the Philosophical Works,* Vol. III. Boston: Taggard and Thompson. 1864. Crown 8vo. pp. 628.

This volume completes the reprint of Mr. Spedding's edition of Bacon's Works, begun in 1860, but carried steadily forward, in spite of the disturbed condition of business and the enhanced prices induced by the war. The mechanical execution of these fifteen volumes is such as befits the standard edition of a great English classic. In form and size of volume, and in style of typography, the American reprint is much superior to its English original. It is in every respect a work which deserves the warmest commendation, and its completion is one of the most satisfactory literary events of the year.

This is not only the best edition of Bacon's Works, but it is not likely that there will ever be a better. The editors have done their work with exemplary fidelity, judgment, and learning, and have at length satisfactorily fulfilled the great trust committed by Lord Bacon "to the next ages."

Until the publication of this edition, it was hardly possible to gain a correct view of the scope of Bacon's philosophy, and the relations of its different parts. The contradictory opinions held by men of intelligence concerning his system are proof how little it was really understood. Henceforward no difficulty of this sort will exist, save only as it springs from the occasional obscurity of Bacon's own thought, or the imperfect character of the form he gave to it, or the incomplete condition in which he left portions of the work which he had sketched out. Bacon's fame will henceforth owe much to Mr. Spedding and his coadjutors. This edition of his works is at once the monument of his genius and the most honorable tribute to his greatness.

We learn with pleasure that the publishers of the American reprint propose to reprint in corresponding style the "Letters and Life of Francis Bacon," by Mr. Spedding, which is an almost indispensable supplement to the Works, and of which but two volumes have as yet been issued in England. It is when completed to contain, indeed, not the least interesting portion of Lord Bacon's writings, comprising all of what Mr. Spedding terms his "Occasional Works," — Letters, Speeches, Tracts, Memorials of all sorts. These of course furnish the material for Bacon's biography, and are more important than all his other writings as illustrations of his personal traits, his moral character, and his relations to his contemporaries. The same admirable editorial qualities that Mr. Spedding has shown in the other portions of the work are exhibited in the volumes already published of this last division of it. We hope that the reprint will soon afford us the opportunity to speak at length of their interest and value.

---

10. — 1. *Sacred and Legendary Art.* By Mrs. Jameson. *Containing Legends of the Angels and Archangels, the Evangelists, the Apostles, the Doctors of the Church, St. Mary Magdalene, the Patron Saints, the Martyrs, the Early Bishops, the Hermits, and the Warrior Saints of Christendom, as represented in the Fine Arts.* Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 2 vols. 32mo. pp. xv. and 417, 426. [Blue and Gold.]

2. *Legends of the Monastic Orders, as represented in the Fine Arts. Forming the Second Series of Sacred and Legendary Art.* By Mrs. Jameson. Corrected and Enlarged Edition. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 32mo. pp. xv. and 489. [Blue and Gold.]

Mrs. Jameson had already acquired an honorable rank as a writer when she began the preparation of her works on Christian Art; yet

they gave to her a new and wider popularity, and it is on them that her reputation will mainly rest. Her mind had been enriched by various study and travel; her style had been matured by long practice; and she had outgrown many of the faults manifest in her earlier productions. With these advantages, and after much special preparation, she entered on a field which had been scarcely touched by any previous writer; and she treated her attractive theme with a good judgment, a wealth of appropriate learning, and a purity of taste, which will secure for her work a permanent place in literature.

These volumes form an admirable legendary, in which the most popular of the legends of the mediæval Church are given as derived from the best authorities, while through these legends the art of the Middle Ages is illustrated, and the ideas and sentiments by which it was inspired — ideas and sentiments that are unfamiliar to the modern and Protestant world — are clearly exhibited and sympathetically reproduced. Her complete work (including the "Legends of the Madonna") is an invaluable hand-book to the student of Christian Art, and scarcely less valuable to the student of the forms under which religious thought has manifested itself in the modern world.

The engravings with which the original editions of these volumes were illustrated make them too expensive for general circulation, and too cumbrous for the use of travellers, but the present very neat pocket edition brings them, in a convenient form, within the reach of all who may desire to possess them. We hope that their reception may be such as to induce the publishers to complete the series by reprinting in the same form the recent work on the artistic representation of Our Lord, begun by Mrs. Jameson, and completed since her death by Lady Eastlake.

---

11. — *Azarian: an Episode.* By Harriet Elizabeth Prescott, Author of "The Amber Gods," etc. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1864. 16mo. pp. 251.

The volume before us is characterized by that venturesome, unprincipled literary spirit, defiant alike of wisdom and taste, which has been traceable through Miss Prescott's productions, from "Sir Rohan's Ghost" downward. We looked upon this latter work, at the time of its publication, as the very apotheosis of the picturesque; but "Sir Rohan's Ghost," "The Amber Gods," and even "The Rim," compared with "Azarian," are admirably sober and coherent. Miss Prescott has steadily grown in audacity, and in that disagreeable audacity which seems to have

been fostered rather by flattery than by remonstrance. Let her pray to be delivered from her friends.

What manner of writing is it which lends itself so frankly to aberrations of taste? It is that literary fashion which, to speak historically, was brought into our literature by Tennyson's poetry. The best name for it, as a literary style, is the ideal descriptive style. Like all founders of schools, Tennyson has been far exceeded by his disciples. The style in question reposes not so much upon the observation of the objects of external nature as the projection of one's fancy upon them. It may be seen exemplified in its youthful vigor in Tennyson's "Dream of Fair Women"; it is exemplified in its effete old age in Mr. Alexander Smith and Miss Prescott, *passim.*

The writer of a work of fiction has this advantage over his critic, that he can frequently substantiate his cause by an *a posteriori* scheme of treatment. For this reason, it is often difficult to fasten down a story-teller to his premises, and then to confront him with his aberrations. For each successive delinquency he has the ready excuse of an unimpeachable intention. Such or such a glaring blot is the very key-stone of his plan. When we tell Miss Prescott that some one of her tales is marvellously void of human nature and false to actual society, she may meet us with the reply that a correct portraiture of nature and society was not intended. She may claim the poet's license. And superficially she will have the best of it. But woe to the writer who claims the poet's license, without being able to answer the poet's obligations; to the writer of whatever class who subsists upon the immunities, rather than the responsibilities, of his task.

The subject of "Azarian" is sufficiently dramatic. A young orphan-girl — a painter of flowers by profession — allows herself to become engaged to a young Greek physician resident in Boston. Ruth is warm-hearted and patient; Azarian is cold-hearted, selfish, and an amateur of the fine arts, especially that of flirting. He wearies of Ruth before marriage, — slights, neglects, and drives her to despair. She resolves on suicide; but when on the brink of destruction, she pauses and reconciles herself to life, and, the engagement with Azarian being broken off by tacit agreement, to happiness.

What is the central element of the above data? The element of feeling. What is the central element of the tale as it stands written? The element of words. The story contains, as it need contain, but few incidents. It is made of the stuff of a French *étude.* Its real interest lies in the history of two persons' moral intercourse. Instead of this, we are treated to an elaborate description of four persons' physical aspect and costume, and of certain aspects of inanimate nature. Of hu-

man nature there is not an unadulterated page in the book, — not a chapter of history. From beginning to end it is a succession of forced assaults upon the impregnable stronghold of painting; a wearisome series of word-pictures, linked by a slight thread of narrative, strung together, to use one of Miss Prescott's own expressions, like "beads on a leash." If the dictionary were a palette of colors, and a goose-quill a brush, Miss Prescott would be a very clever painter. But as words possess a certain inherent dignity, value, and independence, language being rather the stamped and authorized coinage which expresses the value of thought than the brute metal out of which forms are moulded, her pictures are invariably incoherent and meaningless. What do we know of Ruth and Azarian, of Charmian and Madame Saratov? Next to nothing: the little that we know we learn *in spite* of Miss Prescott's fine writing. These persons are localized, christened (we admit in rather a pagan fashion), provided with matter-of-fact occupations. They are Bostonians of the nineteenth century. The little drama in which they have parts, or something very like it, is acted every day, anywhere between the Common and the river. There is, accordingly, every presumptive reason why we should feel conscious of a certain affinity with them. But from any such sensation we are effectually debarred by Miss Prescott's inordinate fondness for the picturesque.

There is surely no principle of fictitious composition so true as this, — that an author's paramount charge is the cure of souls, to the subjection, and if need be to the exclusion, of the picturesque. Let him look to his characters: his *figures* will take care of themselves. Let the author who has grasped the heart of his purpose trust to his reader's sympathy: from that vantage-ground he may infallibly command it. In what we may call subordinate points, that is, in Miss Prescott's prominent and obtrusive points, it is an immense succor. It supplements his intention. Given an animate being, you may readily clothe it in your mind's eye with a body, a local habitation, and a name. Given, we say, an animate being: that is the point. The reader who is set face to face with a gorgeous doll will assuredly fail to inspire it with sympathetic life. To do so, he must have become excited and interested. What is there in a doll to excite and interest?

In reading books of the Azarian school, — for, alas! there is a school, — we have often devoutly wished that some legal penalty were attached to the use of description. We have sighed for a novel with a *dramatis personæ* of disembodied spirits. Azarian gives his name to two hundred and fifty pages; and at the end of those pages, the chief fact with which he is associated in our minds is that he wore his hair in "waves of flaccid gold." Of Madame Saratov we read that she was the

widow of a Russian exile, domesticated in Boston for the purpose of giving lessons in French, music, and Russ, and of educating her boys. In spite of the narrowness of means attributable to a lady who follows the profession of teaching, she lives in a splendor not unworthy of the Muscovite Kremlin. She has a maid to haunt her steps; her chosen raiment is silks and velvets; she sleeps in counterpanes of satin; her thimble, when she sews, is incrusted at the base with pearls; she holds a *salon*, and treats her guests to draughts of "richly-rosy" cordial. One of her dresses is a gown of green Genoa velvet, with peacock's feathers of gorgeous green and gold. What do you think of that for an exiled teacher of languages, boasting herself Russian? Perhaps, after all, it is not so improbable. In the person of Madame Saratov, Miss Prescott had doubtless the intention of a sufficiently dramatic character,— the European mistress of a *salon*. But her primary intention completely disappears beneath this thick *impasto* of words and images. Such is the fate of all her creations: either they are still-born, or they survive but for a few pages; she smothers them with caresses.

When a very little girl becomes the happy possessor of a wax-doll, she testifies her affection for it by a fond manipulation of its rosy visage. If the nose, for instance, is unusually shapely and pretty, the fact is made patent by a constant friction of the finger-tips; so that poor dolly is rapidly smutted out of recognition. In a certain sense we would compare Miss Prescott to such a little girl. She fingers her puppets to death. "Good heavens, Madam!" we are forever on the point of exclaiming, "let the poor things speak for themselves. What? are you afraid they can't stand alone?" Even the most clearly defined character would succumb beneath this repeated posing, attitudinizing, and changing of costume. Take any breathing *person* from the ranks of fiction, — Hetty in "Adam Bede," or Becky Sharp the Great (we select women advisedly, for it is known that they can endure twenty times more than men in this respect), — place her for a few pages in Miss Prescott's charge, and what will be the result? Adieu, dear familiar friend; you melt like wax in a candle. Imagine Thackeray forever pulling Rebecca's curls and settling the folds of her dress.

This bad habit of Miss Prescott's is more than an offence against art. Nature herself resents it. It is an injustice to men and women to assume that the fleshly element carries such weight. In the history of a loving and breaking heart, is that the only thing worth noticing? Are the external signs and accidents of passion the only points to be detailed? What we want is Passion's self, — her language, her ringing voice, her gait, the presentment of her deeds. What do we care about the beauty of man or woman in comparison with their humanity? In a

novel we crave the spectacle of that of which we may feel that we *know* it. The only lasting fictions are those which have spoken to the reader's heart, and not to his eye; those which have introduced him to an atmosphere in which it was credible that human beings might exist, and to human beings with whom he might feel tempted to claim kinship.

When once a work of fiction may be classed as a novel, its foremost claim to merit, and indeed the measure of its merit, is its *truth*, — its truth to something, however questionable that thing may be in point of morals or of taste. "Azarian" is true to nothing. No one ever looked like Azarian, talked like him, nor, on the whole, acted like him; for although his specific deeds, as related in the volume before us, are few and far between, we find it difficult to believe that any one ever pursued a line of conduct so utterly meaningless as that which we are invited, or rather allowed, to attribute to him.

We have called Miss Prescott's manner the descriptive manner; but in so doing we took care to distinguish it from the famous realistic system which has asserted itself so largely in the fictitious writing of the last few years. It is not a counsel we would indiscriminately bestow, — on the contrary, we would gladly see the vulgar realism which governs the average imagination leavened by a little old-fashioned idealism, — but Miss Prescott, if she hopes to accomplish anything worth accomplishing, must renounce new-fashioned idealism for a while, and diligently study the canons of the so-called realist school. We gladly admit that she has the talent to profit by such a discipline. But to be real in writing is to describe; such is the popular notion. Were this notion correct, Miss Prescott would be a very good realist, — none better. But for this fallacious axiom we propose to substitute another, which, if it does not embrace the whole truth, comes several degrees nearer to it: to be real in writing is to express; whether by description or otherwise is of secondary importance. The short tales of M. Prosper Mérimée are eminently real; but he seldom or never describes: he conveys. It is not to be denied that the great names in the realist line are associated with a pronounced fondness for description. It is for this reason that we remind Miss Prescott of them. Let her take Balzac's "Eugénie Grandet," for instance. It will probably be affirmed that this story, the interest of which is to the full as *human* as that of her own, is equally elaborate in the painting of external objects. But such an assertion will involve a mistake: Balzac does not *paint*, does not copy, objects; his chosen instrument being a pen, he is content to *write* them. He is literally real: he presents objects as they are. The scene and persons of his drama are minutely described. Grandet's house, his sitting-room,

his habits, his appearance, his dress, are all reproduced with the fidelity of a photograph. The same with Madame Grandet and Eugénie. We are exactly informed as to the young girl's stature, features, and dress. The same with Charles Grandet, when he comes upon the scene. His coat, his trousers, his watch-chain, his cravat, the curl of his hair, are all dwelt upon. We almost see the musty little sitting-room in which so much of the action goes forward. We are familiar with the gray *boiserie*, the faded curtains, the rickety card-tables, the framed samplers on the walls, Madame Grandet's foot-warmer, and the table set for the meagre dinner. And yet our sense of the human interest of the story is never lost. Why is this? It is because these things are all described *only in so far as they bear upon the action*, and not in the least for themselves. If you resolve to describe a thing, you cannot describe it too carefully. But as the soul of a novel is its action, you should only describe those things which are accessory to the action. It is in determining what things *are* so accessory that real taste, science, and judgment are shown.

The reader feels that Miss Prescott describes not in accordance with any well-considered plan, but simply for the sake of describing, and of so gratifying her almost morbid love of the picturesque. There is a reason latent in every one of Balzac's tales *why* such things should appear thus, and such persons so, — a clear, well-defined reason, easily discoverable by the observing and sympathetic eye. Each separate part is conducive to the general effect; and this general effect has been studied, pondered, analyzed: in the end it is produced. Balzac lays his stage, sets his scene, and introduces his puppets. He describes them once for all; this done, the story marches. He does not linger nervously about his figures, like a sculptor about his unfinished clay-model, administering a stroke here and affixing a lump there. He has done all this beforehand, in his thoughts; his figures are completed before the story begins. This latter fact is perhaps one of the most valuable in regard to Balzac. His story exists before it is told; it stands complete before his mind's eye. It was a characteristic of his mind, enriched as it was by sensual observation, to see his figures clearly and fully as with the eye of sense. So seeing them, the desire was irresistible to present them to the reader. How clearly he saw them we may judge from the minuteness of his presentations. It was clearly done because it was *scientifically* done. That word resumes our lesson. He set down things in black and white, not, as Miss Prescott seems vaguely to aim at doing, in red, blue, and green, — in prose, scientifically, as they stood. He aimed at local color; that is, at giving the facts of things. To determine these facts required labor, foresight,

reflection; but Balzac shrank from no labor of eye or brain, provided he could adequately cover the framework of his story.

Miss Prescott's style is evidently the point on which she bases her highest claims to distinction. She has been taught that, in possessing this style, she possesses a great and uncommon gift. Nothing is more false. The fine writing in which "Azarian" abounds is the cheapest writing of the day. Every magazine-story bears traces of it. It is so widely adopted, because to a person of clever fancy there is no kind of writing that is so easy, — so easy, we mean, considering the effect produced. Of course it is much easier to write in a style which necessitates no looking out of words; but such a style makes comparatively little impression. The manner in question is easy, because the writer recognizes no standard of truth or accuracy by which his performances may be measured. He does not transcribe facts, — facts must be counted, measured, weighed, which takes far too much trouble. He does not patiently study the nature and appearance of a thing until he has won from it the confession of that absolute appreciable quality, the correct statement of which is alone true description; he does not commit himself to statements, for these are dangerous things; he does not, in short, extract; he affixes. He does not consult the object to be described, so recognizing it as a fact; he consults his imagination, and so constitutes it a theme to be elaborated. In the picture which he proceeds to make, some of the qualities of the object will certainly be found; but it matters little whether they are the chief distinctive ones, — any satisfy his conscience.

All writing is narration; to describe is simply to narrate things in their order of place, instead of events in their order of time. If you consult this order, your description will stand; if you neglect it, you will have an imposing mass of words, but no recognizable *thing*. We do not mean to say that Miss Prescott has a wholly commonplace fancy. (We use the word commonplace advisedly, for there are no commonplaces so vulgar as those chromatic epigrams which mark the Tennysonian prose school.) On the contrary, she has a fancy which would serve very well to garnish a dish of solid fiction, but which furnishes poor material for the body of the dish. These clever conceits, this keen eye for the superficial picturesque, this inborn love of *bric-à-brac* and sunsets, may be made very effectively to supplement a true dramatic exposition; but they are a wretched substitute for such. And even in *bric-à-brac* and sunsets Miss Prescott's execution is crude. In her very specialty, she is but an indifferent artist. Who is so clever in the *bric-à-brac* line as M. Théophile Gautier? He takes an occasional liberty with the French language; but, on the whole, he finds

his best account in a policy of studious respect even for her most irritating forms of conservatism. The consequence is, that his efforts in this line are unapproachable, and, what is better, irreproachable. One of the greatest dangers to which those who pursue this line are liable is the danger that they may fall into the ridiculous. By a close adherence to that medium of expression which other forms of thought have made respectable, this danger is effectually set at naught. What is achieved by the paternally governed French tongue may surely be effected by that chartered libertine, our own. Miss Prescott uses far too many words, synonymous words and meaningless words. Like the majority of female writers, — Mrs. Browning, George Sand, Gail Hamilton, Mrs. Stowe, — she possesses in excess the fatal gift of fluency. Her paragraphs read as if in composition she completely ignored the expedient of erasure. What painter ever painted a picture without rubbing out and transposing, displacing, effacing, replacing? There is no essential difference of system between the painting of a picture and the writing of a novel. Why should the novelist expect to do what his fellow-worker never even hopes to acquire the faculty of doing, — execute his work at a stroke? It is plain that Miss Prescott adds, tacks on, interpolates, piles up, if we may use the expression; but it seems very doubtful if she often takes counsel of the old Horatian precept, — in plain English, to scratch out. A true artist should be as sternly just as a Roman father. A moderate exercise of this Roman justice would have reduced "Azarian" to half its actual length. The various descriptive passages would have been wonderfully simplified, and we might have possessed a few good pictures.

If Miss Prescott would only take such good old English words as we possess, words instinct with the meaning of centuries, and, having fully resolved upon that which she wished to convey, cast her intention in those familiar terms which long use has invested with almost absolute force of expression, then she would describe things in a manner which could not fail to arouse the sympathy, the interest, the dormant memories of the reader. What is the possible bearing of such phrases as "vermeil ardency," or "a tang of color"? of such childish attempts at alliteration — the most frequent bugbear of Miss Prescott's readers — as "studded with starry sprinkle and spatter of splendor," and the following sentence, in which, speaking of the leaves of the blackberry-vine, she tells us that they are "damasked with deepening layer and spilth of color, brinded and barred and blotted beneath the dripping fingers of October, nipped by nest-lining bees," — and, lastly, "suffused through all their veins with the shining soul of the mild and mellow season"?

This is nothing but "words, words, words, Horatio!" They express nothing; they only seem to express. The true test of the worth of a prose description — to simplify matters we leave poetry quite out of the question — is one's ability to resolve it back into its original elements. You construct your description from a chosen object; can you, conversely, from your description construct that object? We defy any one to represent the "fine scarlet of the blackberry vine," and "the gilded bronze of beeches," — fair sentences by themselves, which express almost as much as we can reasonably hope to express on the subject, — under the inspiration of the rhapsody above quoted, and what follows it. Of course, where so much is attempted in the way of expression, something is sometimes expressed. But with Miss Prescott such an occasional success is apt to be what the French call a *succès manqué*. This is the fault of what our authoress must allow us to call her inveterate bad taste; for whenever she has said a good thing, she invariably spoils it by trying to make it better: to let well enough alone is indeed in all respects the great lesson which experience has in store for her. It is sufficiently felicitous, for instance, as such things go, to call the chandelier of a theatre "a basket of light." There stands the simple successful image. But Miss Prescott immediately tacks on the assertion that it "pours down on all its brimming burden of lustre." It would be bad taste again, if it were not such bad physiology, to speak of Azarian's flaccid hair being "drenched with some penetrating perfume, an Oriental water that stung the brain to vigor." The idea that a man's intellectual mood is at the mercy of his *pommade* is one which we recommend to the serious consideration of barbers. The reader will observe that Azarian's hair is *drenched:* an instance of the habitual intensity of Miss Prescott's style. The word *intensity* expresses better than any other its various shortcomings, or rather excesses. The only intensity worth anything in writing is intensity of thought. To endeavor to fortify flimsy conceptions by the constant use of verbal superlatives is like painting the cheeks and pencilling the eyebrows of a corpse.

Miss Prescott would rightfully resent our criticism if, after all, we had no counsel to offer. Of course our advice is to take or to leave, but it is due to ourselves to produce it.

We would earnestly exhort Miss Prescott to be *real*, to be true to something. In a notice of Mr. Charles Reade recently published in the Atlantic, our authoress indulged in a fling at Mr. Anthony Trollope for what she probably considers his grovelling fidelity to minute social truths. But we hold it far better to be real as Mr. Trollope is real, than to be ideal after the fashion of the authoress of "Azarian." As in the writing of fiction there is no grander instrument than a potent imagination, such

as Mr. Hawthorne's, for instance, so there is no more pernicious dependence than an unbridled fancy. Mr. Trollope has not the imagination of Mr. Reade, his strong grasp of the possible; but he has a delicate perception of the actual which makes every whit as firm ground to work upon. This delicate perception of the actual Miss Prescott would do well to cultivate: if Mr. Trollope is too distasteful to her, she may cultivate it in the attentive perusal of Mr. Reade, in whom there are many Trollopes. Let her not fear to grovel, but take note of what is, constitute herself an observer, and review the immeasurable treasures she has slighted. If she will conscientiously do this, she will need to invent neither new and unprecedented phases of humanity nor equally unprecedented nouns and adjectives. There are already more than enough for the novelist's purpose. All we ask of him is to use the material ready to his hand. When Miss Prescott reconciles herself to this lowly task, *then* and then only will she find herself truly rich in resource.

---

12. — *Lindisfarn Chase. A Novel.* By T. Adolphus Trollope. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1864. 8vo. pp. 274.

This is a fair specimen of a second-rate novel, a species of work which commands a certain degree of respect; for second-rate novels are the great literary feature of the day. It is the work of a man who has no vocation for his task except a well-practised hand, and who would yet find it very hard that he should not write his novel with the rest. In the present condition of literature, when novel-writing is at once a trade and a pastime, books of this class are inevitable. Let us take them for what they are worth. Both in England and in this country they find an immense public of excellent persons, whose chief delight in literature is the contemplation of respectable mediocrity. Such works as "Lindisfarn Chase" are plentiful, because they are so easy to write; they are popular, because they are so easy to read.

To compose a novel on the model before us, one must have seen a good many well-bred people, and have read a good many well-written novels. These qualifications are easily acquired. The novel of a writer who possesses them will be (if it is successful) a reflection of the manner of his social equals or inferiors and of his literary superiors. If it is unsuccessful, the reason will probably be that the author has sought inspiration in his social superiors. In the case of an attempted portraiture of a lower order of society, a series of false representations will not be so likely to prove fatal, because the critics and the reading public are not so well informed as to the facts. A book like "Lindisfarn Chase" might almost be written

by recipe; so much depends upon the writer's familiarity with good society, and upon his good taste; so little depends upon his real dramatic perception. The first requisite is to collect a large number of persons, so many that you have no space to refine upon individuals, even if you should sometimes feel dangerously tempted to do so; to give these persons pleasant, expressive names, and to scatter among them a few handfuls of clever description. The next step is to make a fair distribution of what may be called pre-historic facts, — facts which are referred to periods prior to the opening of the tale, and which serve, as it were, as your base of supplies during its progress. According as these facts are natural and commonplace, or improbable and surprising, your story is an ordinary novel of manners, a sober photograph of common life, or a romance. Their great virtue is to relieve the writer of all analysis of character, to enable him to forge his interest out of the exhibition of circumstance rather than out of the examination of motive. The work before us affords an instance to the point.

Mr. Trollope desires to represent a vicious and intriguing young girl; so he takes an English maiden, and supposes her to have been educated in Paris. Vice and intrigue are conjured up by a touch of the pen. Paris covers a multitude of sins. Mr. Trollope fills his young lady's mouth with French phrases and allusions, assures us that she was a very hard case, and lo! she does service as a complex human creature. Margaret Lindisfarn is a weak repetition of Thackeray's Blanche Amory. *Heu quanto minus!* Mr. Trollope is very far from possessing even his brother's knowledge of the workings of young girls' hearts. Young girls are seldom so passionless as Margaret Lindisfarn. Beautiful, wealthy, still in her teens, she is represented as possessing the deep diplomatic heart of an old gentlewoman who has half a dozen daughters on her hands. But granting that it is possible that she should be as coldly selfish as she is made out to be, why refer it all to Paris? It is surely not necessary to have lived in Paris to be heartless. Margaret is full of grace and tact, and is always well-dressed: a residence in the French capital may have been required to explain these advantages. She is cold-hearted, scheming, and has her beautiful eyes perpetually fastened upon the main chance. We see no reason why these attributes should not have been of insular growth. The only definite character we are able to assign to the book is that of an argument against educating English youth in Paris. A paltry aim, the reader may say, for a work of art of these dimensions. He will say truly: but from such topics as this is the English fiction of the present day glad to draw inspiration.

13. — *Emily Chester. A Novel.* Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1864. 16mo. pp. 367.

This book is so well-meaning, that we are deterred by a feeling of real consideration for its author from buying back, in the free expression of our regret at misused time, the several tedious hours we have spent over its pages. It is emphatically a dull work; and yet it is a work in which many persons might discern that arch-opponent of dulness, — a questionable moral tendency. It is almost, we think, a worthless book; and yet it is decidedly a serious one. Its composition has evidently been a great matter for the author.

This latter fact commands our sympathy and tempers our severity; and yet at the same time it arouses a strong feeling of melancholy. This is the age of conscientious poor books, as well as of unscrupulous clever ones; and we are often appalled at the quantity of ponderous literary matter which is kept afloat in the market by the simple fact that those who have set it afloat are persons of a well-meaning sort. When a book is both bad and clever, the critic who pulls it to pieces feels that the author has some consolation in the sweetness of his own wit for the acerbity of that of others. But when a book is destitute of even the excellence of a pleasant style, it is surrounded with an atmosphere of innocence and innocuousness which inspires the justly indignant reviewer with compassion for the hapless adventurer who has nothing to fall back upon.

We have called "Emily Chester" a dull book, because the author has chosen a subject and a manner alike certain to make it dull in any but the most skilful hands. She has told a story of character in a would-be psychological mode; not of every-day character, such as is employed by Mr. Trollope and Miss Austen, but of character which she must allow us to term exceptional. She has brought together three persons; for although in the latter part of the book other names occur with some frequency, they remain nothing but names; and during three hundred and fifty close pages, we are invited to watch the moral operations of this romantic trio. What a chance for dulness is here!

She has linked her three persons together by a simple dramatic mechanism. They are a husband, a wife, and a lover. Emily Chester, the wife, is a beautiful and accomplished young woman. When we have said this, we have said as much about her as we venture positively to assert; for any further acquaintance with her is the result of mere guess-work. Her person is minutely described. At eighteen she has a magnificently developed figure. We are told that she has a deep sense of the beautiful; we gather generally that she is good yet proud, —

with a stern Romanesque pride, — passionate yet cold, and although very calm and stately on all occasions, quite free from petty feminine affectations; that she is furthermore earnestly devoted to music, and addicted to quoting from the German. Is she clever? We know not. The author has evidently intended to make her very perfect, but she has only succeeded in making her very inane. She behaves on all occasions in a most irreproachable, inhuman manner; as if from the hour of her birth she had resolved to be a martyr, and was grimly determined not to be balked of her purpose. When anything particularly disagreeable happens, she becomes very pale and calm and statuesque. Although in the ordinary affairs of life she is sufficiently cheerful and voluble, whenever anything occurs a little out of the usual way she seems to remember the stake and the torture, and straightway becomes silent and cold and classical. She goes down into her grave after a life of acute misery without ever having "let on," as the phrase is, that there has been anything particular the matter with her. In view of these facts, we presume that the author has aimed at the creation of a perfect woman, — a woman high-toned, high-spirited, high-souled, high-bred, high and mighty in all respects. Heaven preserve us from any more radical specimens of this perfection!

To wish to create such a specimen was a very laudable, but a very perilous ambition; to have created it, would have been an admirable achievement. But the task remains pretty much what it was. Emily Chester is not a character; she is a mere shadow; the mind's eye strives in vain to body her forth from the fluent mass of talk in which she is embodied. We do not wish to be understood as attributing this fact of her indistinctness to the fact of her general excellence and nobleness; good women, thank heaven, may be as vividly realized as bad ones. We attribute it to the want of clearness in the author's conception, to the want of science in her execution.

Max Crampton and Frederick Hastings, who are both very faulty persons, are equally incomplete and intangible. Max is an eccentric millionnaire, a mute adorer of Miss Chester; mute, that is, with regard to his passion, but a great talker and theorizer on things in general. We have a strong impression of having met him before. He is the repetition of a type that has of late years obtained great favor with lady novelists: the ugly, rich, middle-aged lover, with stern brows and white teeth; reticent and yet ardent; indolent and yet muscular, full of satire and common-sense. Max is partly a German, as such men often are, in novels. In spite of these striking characteristics, his fine rich ugliness, his sardonic laugh, his enormous mental strength, the fulness of his devotion and of his magnanimity, he is anything but a living,

moving person. He is essentially a woman's man; one of those impossible heroes, whom lady novelists concoct half out of their own erratic fancies and half out of those of other lady novelists. But if Max is a woman's man, what is Frederick Hastings? He is worse; he is almost a man's woman. He is nothing; he is more shadowy even than Emily. We are told that he had beauty and grace of person, delicacy, subtlety of mind, womanly quickness of perception. But, like his companions, he utterly fails to assert himself.

Such are the three mutually related individuals with whom we are brought into relation. We cannot but suppose that, as we have said, the author intended them for persons of exceptional endowments. Such beauty, such moral force and fervor, as are shadowed forth in Emily; so sublime and Gothic an ugliness, such intellectual depth, breadth, strength, so vast an intellectual and moral capacity generally, as we are taught to associate with Max: these traits are certainly not vouchsafed to the vulgar many. Nor is it given to one man out of five thousand, we apprehend, to be so consummate a charmer as Frederick Hastings.

But granting the existence of these almost unique persons, we recur to our statement that they are treated in a psychological fashion. We use this word, for want of a better one, in what we may call its technical sense. We apply it to the fact that the author makes the action of her story rest, not only exclusively, but what is more to the point, avowedly, upon the temperament, nature, constitution, instincts, of her characters; upon their physical rather than upon their moral sense. There is a novel at present languidly circulating in our literature — "Charles Auchester" — which is generally spoken of by its admirers as a "novel of temperament." "Emily Chester" is of the same sort; it is an attempt to exalt the physical sensibilities into the place of monitors and directors, or at any rate to endow them with supreme force and subtlety. Psychology, it may be said, is the observation of the moral and intellectual character. We repeat that we use the word in what we have called its technical sense, the scrutiny, in fiction, of *motive* generally. It is very common now-a-days for young novelists to build up figures *minus* the soul. There are two ways of so eliminating the spiritual principle. One is by effectually diluting it in the description of outward objects, as is the case with the picturesque school of writing; another is by diluting it in the description of internal subjects. This latter course has been pursued in the volume before us. In either case the temperament is the nearest approach we have to a soul. Emily becomes aware of Frederick Hastings's presence at Mrs. Dana's party by "a species of animal magnetism." Many writers would have said

by the use of her eyes. During the period of her grief at her father's death, Max feels that he is "constitutionally powerless" to help her. So he does not even try. As she regains her health, after her marriage, "her morbid sensitiveness to outward influences" returns with renewed vigor. Her old constitutional repulsion towards (*sic*) her husband increases with fearful rapidity. She tries in vain to overcome it: "the battle with, and denial of, instinct resulted as such conflicts inevitably must." The mood in which she drives him from her, in what may not be inappropriately termed the "balcony scene" on the Lake of Como, arises from her having been "true to her constitutional sensitiveness." Max recognizes the old friendship between his wife and Hastings to have been the "constitutional harmony of two congenial natures." Emily's spirit, on page 245, is bound by "human law with which its nature had no correspondence." We are told on page 285, that Frederick Hastings held Emily fascinated by his "motive power over the supersensuous portion of her being."

But it is needless to multiply examples. There is hardly a page in which the author does not insinuate her conviction that, in proportion as a person is finely organized, in so far is he apt to be the slave of his instincts, — the subject of unaccountable attractions and repulsions, loathings and yearnings. We do not wish to use hard words; perhaps, indeed, the word which is in our mind, and which will be on the lips of many, is in these latter days no longer a hard word; but if "Emily Chester" is immoral, it is by the fact of the above false representation. It is not in making a woman prefer another man to her husband, nor even in making her detest a kind and virtuous husband. It is in showing her to be so disposed without an assignable reason; it is in making her irresponsible. But the absurdity of such a view of human nature nullifies its pernicious tendency. Beasts and idiots act from their instincts; educated men and women, even when they most violate principle, act from their reason, however perverted, and their affections, however misplaced.

We presume that our author wishes us to admire, or at least to compassionate, her heroine; but we must deny her the tribute of either sentiment. It may be claimed for her that she was ultimately victorious over her lawless impulses; but this claim we reject. Passion was indeed conquered by duty, but life was conquered by passion. The true victory of mind would have been, not perhaps in a happy, but at least in a peaceful life. Granting the possibility of Emily's having been beset by these vague and nameless conflicting forces, the one course open to her was to conquer a peace. Women who love less wisely than well engage our sympathy even while we deny them our appro-

bation; but a woman who indulges in a foolish passion, without even the excuse of loving well, must be curtly and sternly dismissed. At no period of Emily's history could she have assigned a reason to herself (let alone her disability to make her position clear to her husband) for her intense loathing of Max Crampton! We do not say that she could not have defended her position; she could not have even indicated it. Nor could she have given a name to the state of her feelings with regard to Hastings. She admits to herself that he does not engage her heart; he dominates merely "the supersensuous portion of her being." We hope that this glittering generality was not of Emily's own contrivance. Sore distressed indeed must she have been, if she could not have made herself out a better case than her biographer has made for her. If her biographer had represented her as *loving* Frederick Hastings, as struggling with her love, and finally reducing it from a disorderly to an orderly passion, we should have pledged her our fullest sympathy and interest. Having done so well, we might have regretted that she should not have done better, and have continued to adorn that fashionable society of which she was so brilliant a member. She was in truth supremely handsome; she might have lived for her beauty's sake. But others have done so much worse, that we should have been sorry to complain. As the case stands, we complain bitterly, not so much of Emily as of the author; for we are satisfied that an Emily is impossible. Even from the author's point of view, however, her case is an easy one. She had no hate to contend with, merely loathing; no love, merely yearning; no feelings, as far as we can make out, merely sensations. Except the loss of her property, we maintain that she has no deep sorrow in life. She refuses Hastings in the season of her trial. Good: she would not marry a man whom she did not love, merely for a subsistence; so far she was an honest woman. But she refuses him at the cost of a great agony. We do not understand her predicament. It is our belief that there is no serious middle state between friendship and love. If Emily did not love Hastings, why should she have suffered so intensely in refusing him? Certainly not out of sympathy for him disappointed. We may be told that she did not love him in a way to marry him: she loved him, then, as a mother or a sister. The refusal of his hand must have been, in such a case, an easy rather than a difficult task. She accepts Max as irresponsibly as she refuses Frederick, — because there is a look in his eyes of claiming her body and soul, "through his divine right of the stronger." Such a look must be either very brutal or very tender. What we know of Max forbids us to suppose that in his case it was tainted with the former element; it must accordingly have expressed the ripened will to serve, cherish,

and protect. Why, then, should it in later years, as Emily looked back upon it, have filled her with so grisly a horror? Such terrors are self-made. A woman who despises her husband's person may perhaps, if she is very weak and nervous, grow to invest it with numerous fantastic analogies. If, on the contrary, she is as admirably self-poised as Mrs. Crampton, she will endeavor, by the steady contemplation of his magnificent intellect and his generous devotion, to discern the subtle halo (always discernible to the eye of belief) which a noble soul sheds through an ignoble body. Our author will perhaps resent our insinuation that the unutterable loathing of Max's wife's for him was anything so easily disposed of as a contempt for his person. Such a feeling is a very lawful one; it may easily be an impediment to a wife's happiness; but when it is balanced by so deep a conviction of her partner's moral and intellectual integrity as Mrs. Crampton's own mental acuteness furnished her, it is certainly not an insuperable bar to a career of comfortable resignation. When it assumes the unnatural proportions in which it is here exhibited, it conclusively proves that its subject is a profoundly vicious person. Emily found just that in Hastings which she missed in her husband. If the absence of this quality in Max was sufficient to unfit him for her true love, why should not its presence have been potent enough to insure her heart to Frederick? We doubt very much whether she had a heart; we mistrust those hearts which are known only by their ineffable emptiness and woe. But taking her biographer's word for it that she had, the above little piece of logic ought, we think, effectually to confound it. Heart-histories, as they are called, have generally been considered a very weary and unprofitable species of fiction; but we infinitely prefer the old-fashioned love-stories, in which no love but heart-love was recognized, to these modern teachings of a vagrant passion which has neither a name nor a habitation. We are not particularly fond of any kind of sentimentality; but Heaven defend us from the sentimentality which soars above all our old superstitions, and allies itself with anything so rational as a theory.

14.—1. *Eliana: being the hitherto Uncollected Writings of* CHARLES LAMB. Boston: William Veazie. 1864. 16mo. pp. 437.
2. *The Seer; or, Common-Places Refreshed.* By LEIGH HUNT. 1864. 2 vols. 16mo. pp. 334, 290.

IT is not difficult to explain the wide-spread popularity of Charles Lamb's writings, in spite of the disadvantageous circumstances under which they were composed, and the obvious limitations of his genius.

Few of his poems or of his dramatic productions rise above mediocrity, and they might all be dropped from his collected Works without affecting much his place in English literature; but he was a genial and appreciative critic, a humorist who seldom forgot the limits which taste and good breeding impose, a satirist without one drop of bitterness, and an essayist who is unequalled in his own field of literary endeavor, while back of all this was a personal history of the most touching interest, and a personal character which no one can know without loving and honoring the man, as well as being attracted toward the writer. When Talfourd published his first selection from Lamb's Letters, nearly thirty years ago, every reader felt a new interest in the gentle Elia, and this feeling was deepened and strengthened when the mournful story of his domestic life was, for the first time, fully revealed by the publication of the "Final Memorials of Charles Lamb," nearly twelve years afterward. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say, that his reputation has been steadily rising ever since the veil was thus lifted from his personal history, and his Essays could be read in the new light thrown on them by his life and letters. How far this personal element enters into the estimate of his writings, is seen in the somewhat extravagant praise lavished on them by his more ardent admirers; and it finds a curious illustration in the epigraph which the editor has prefixed to his Uncollected Writings, — "The king's chaff is as good as other people's corn." This homely motto, however, is not inaptly chosen, since it indicates with sufficient exactness the general character of the volume, and at the same time shows how the collection will be received by a numerous class of readers. Nobody, indeed, will be sorry to get something more of Charles Lamb, and nobody can help liking an editor who likes Charles Lamb; but the publication raises a question in literary ethics. Is it fair to reprint, after an author is dead and cannot protest, productions which he rejected from his own edition of his works? We think not.

The preparation of this volume has been avowedly a labor of love; and in its pages are included nearly all those of Lamb's uncollected writings which are mentioned in his Life and Letters, beside some papers which are undoubtedly from his pen, though they are not referred to in his correspondence, and were apparently unknown to his biographer. These papers are distributed into six general divisions, of which the largest and most attractive comprises about thirty Essays and Sketches, drawn from the London Magazine and other periodical publications, and having all the characteristics of Lamb's peculiar genius, — his genial wit, his acuteness of criticism, his quaintness, and his simple and graceful style. As a whole, they are inferior to the essays in his collected

works; but several are so good that it is not easy to see why they were not reprinted by himself. Certainly the charming little autobiographical sketch of himself, the inimitable memoirs of Liston and Munden, the quaint and discriminating character of "The Good Clerk," which may be regarded as in part a chapter of his own experience, and the "Letter to an Old Gentleman whose Education has been neglected," are no inadequate expression of his powers. Next to these, the most characteristic of Lamb's productions, we have an absurd little farce, entitled "The Pawnbroker's Daughter," written subsequently to "Mr. H.," but never brought on the stage. It contains two or three good points, though it is, on the whole, unworthy of the writer, and would probably have shared the fate of his other dramatic pieces, if it had been submitted to the criticism of a miscellaneous audience. Following this is a sort of prose version of the Odyssey, founded on Chapman's translation, and similar in plan and execution to the well-known "Tales from Shakespeare." The fourth division contains six short Tales, written in Lamb's best style, but with very little incident and scarce any attempt at characterization, and deriving all their interest from the simple and natural manner in which the story is told. In this respect two of the Tales, "Susan Yates, or First Going to Church," and "Arabella Hardy, or the Sea Voyage," have much merit. Of the Poems, which form the next division, it is only necessary to say that they are neither better nor worse than most of Lamb's other attempts in the same line. The last division gathers up a few unimportant letters, not contained in either of Mr. Talfourd's collections.

From a volume by Charles Lamb it is pleasant to turn to one by his friend, Leigh Hunt. Between the two writers there are many points of resemblance. Lamb had the stronger and healthier nature, but as a critic Hunt is not less genial and appreciative, and is far more catholic in his tastes; as an essayist his style is as fluent, polished, and graceful; while as a poet he is superior to his friend. The great charm in his works, however, is not found in the qualities which chiefly attract us in Elia, but in the largeness of his sympathies, and his constant endeavor to find good and pleasantness in everything. Nowhere is this characteristic more apparent than in "The Seer," the only collection of his miscellaneous essays, we believe, which has never before been reprinted in this country. The papers comprised in it, like those in the "Indicator" and the "Companion," were originally published in a periodical form; and though dealing with diverse topics, they are marked by all his peculiar excellences, and are among the best of his later productions. Indeed, we remember few of his essays which are better of their kind than the papers on "Breakfast," "Sun-

day in London," and "A Journey by Coach"; while the purely critical papers are keen and discriminating, and exhibit in large measure that ability to appreciate merit wherever it may be found which Lord Macaulay noted as one of the special characteristics of Hunt's critical essays. All of the papers, however, may be read with pleasure, and many of them are rich with suggestive thought. Hunt never attempts to exhaust a subject, but he seizes on some single topic, which he illustrates with various learning, and adorns with a lively fancy; and no one can read these volumes without feeling how admirably the writer has succeeded in his single object of showing "that the more we look at anything in this beautiful and abundant world with a desire to be pleased with it, the more we shall be rewarded by the loving Spirit of the universe with discoveries that await only the desire."

---

15. — *Familiar Letters from Europe.* By Cornelius Conway Felton, late President of Harvard University. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 16mo. pp. 392.

The letters which are printed in this volume were written by the late President Felton during a visit to Europe in 1853 and 1854. To those who had the privilege of familiar intercourse with their author, they will serve as a pleasant memorial of one of the most genial and warm-hearted of men. They recall his kindly presence, his cheerful humor, his quick sympathy, and many other of the delightful traits of his character. Written with the ease and frankness of domestic confidence, they are full of the marks of the ready intelligence, the wide cultivation, and the solid scholarship for which Mr. Felton was distinguished. Written without thought of publication, they have an unstudied worth above the value of more labored compositions.

The greater part of the volume is occupied with letters from Greece, and in these the special qualities of the writer show to peculiar advantage. The mingling of description with reflection, of picturesque and animated narrative with the classical reminiscences suggested by the scenes and incidents of the journey, of personal experience and historical allusion, gives to the journal of his tour a rare combination of literary excellence. The favorite studies of a lifetime had fitted him to travel in Greece with the greatest advantage. His letters bear the impress of his delight in finding himself among the scenes which had so long been familiar to him in the pages of the poets, the historians, and the orators of this the chosen land of his affections.

Whoever, without leaving home, desires to see Athens, and Thebes,

and Argos, and Thermopylæ, whoever would visit Modern Greece in company with one whose imagination is filled with her ancient glories, and who has confidence in her future career, will find in this too brief volume the means of gratifying his desire, and will learn to cherish the memory and respect the name of one whose untimely death has left an irreparable void in the society of which he formed so important a part, and by whose members he was so much beloved.

---

16. — *The Journal and Letters of* Samuel Curwen, *an American in England from* 1775 *to* 1783; *with an Appendix of Biographical Sketches.* By George Atkinson Ward. Fourth Edition. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1864. pp. xxiv., 678.

It is not hard to feel pity for many of the loyalists of the Revolution, but our sympathy belongs of right to better and braver men. There is always a kind of pathetic interest in a losing cause, and sentimentalists are never wanting who make picturesqueness of attitude the test of soundness of principle.

> "Pitied by gentle hearts Kilmarnock died,
> The brave, Balmerino, were on thy side."

Yet no men were ever engaged in a worse cause than the Jacobites, and few ever chose their side from meaner motives than the men whose musical names are so temptingly sonorous in heroic verse. Kilmarnock or Balmerino (for the story is told of both and fits either) said that, "if Mahomet had set up his standard in the highlands, he would have joined it, for he must eat." The case of our American loyalists was different, inasmuch as they espoused the side of the established order; but the motive was in most cases an equally selfish one, though with them the selfishness was passive merely, while with the Jacobites it was active and ran some risk. They mostly chose the side they thought likely to succeed, and therefore most wholesome for their estates. To us the most interesting of our sufferers by the Revolution were some of the country clergy, who had little to save and nothing to gain, and who set brave examples of dogged otherwise-mindedness. Mr. Ward in his Preface quotes the familiar hyperbole of Lucan, *Victrix causa* and the rest, but the real question is whether God only permitted or was pleased with the victory. The sufferers for righteousness' sake are sure of victory in the memory of mankind, and their images are borne in the triumphal procession which sooner or later celebrates the accomplishment of their ends. The spilt milk of history is no more worth regret than any other; and as for the lost milk-and-water, the less said of it the better.

Something more, perhaps, may be granted in excuse for Mr. Curwen, than for many others of his fellow-refugees. He was already sixty when the dispute came to a crisis in the battle of Lexington. He had a comfortable estate and a dignified social position, and it was natural enough that the thing of all others which he dreaded should have been disturbance. But after all, his main apology is, that he kept a diary which is not only entertaining but instructive. We are thankful to whoever opens a window for us that looks out on a hundred years ago.

The contents of the book are too familiar to our readers to need any analysis here, but there are one or two points which the time of its publication force more keenly on the attention. Mr. Curwen in going to England thought he was going *home*, as our countrymen at that time fondly called the old country. But he soon found that he was an alien and a stranger among a people of the same race and speaking the same mother tongue. He finds out for the first time that he is an American, and *therefore* a stranger; that the mother country is west of the Atlantic; and he does not quite like to have his countrymen beaten, though they are rebels. He becomes dimly conscious that America and England mean very different things, and that two nations of the same blood, language, laws, and literature may be fundamentally hostile to each other. He does not say so, but we can hardly believe that King, Lords, and Commons were so impressive as he expected on a nearer view; and the low moral tone of London society must have been profoundly shocking to a man bred in New England. The homesickness begins to draw westward, and it is of the spirit no less than of the heart. Curwen's homelessness was one of ideas as well as things.

> "Homeless among a thousand homes he stood,
> And by a thousand tables pined and wanted food," —

but it was no hunger for material bread. He is unhappy, listless, forced to interest himself in trifles, and to look upon life as a play of which he is a weary spectator. Here we have a picture of what will be the fate of multitudes of our countrymen after the present Rebellion is subdued. They will be exiles without the hope of a home, for in the Old World an American is always less *hospes* than ξένος. But Curwen had no sense of guilt, while for many of these their condition will be wretched even compared with the last dreary days of Burr in Paris, foul with poverty, a tainted conscience, and the sense of great gifts thwarted by mean aims. At the same time, the example of Curwen should teach us that there must be multitudes in the South guilty only of weakness, and who may be wisely pardoned by a country for the first time conscious of its glorious strength.

17. — *Lectures on the Elements of Comparative Anatomy.* By THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY, F. R. S. — *On the Classification of Animals, and on the Vertebrate Skull.* London: Churchill. 1864. 8vo. pp. 303.

PROFESSOR HUXLEY gives us with this volume the first instalment of a series which he tells us he hopes to complete some day, and which will eventually form a comprehensive, systematic work on Comparative Anatomy. Although the fragility of literary promises is proverbial, and the experience of the past in such affairs would lead us to fear that, if Mr. Huxley's be fulfilled at all, it will be at a day when most of us shall be slumbering in our graves, yet so great are Mr. Huxley's vigor and activity, and the vivacity of his mind gives the impression that he possesses such good "viability," that we have strong hopes of not being disappointed in his case.

Mr. Huxley is a young man, under forty we believe. Yet he has made valuable contributions to almost every province of anatomical science. His labors in Histology, the morphology of Mollusks and Articulates, and the structure of Acalephs, are among his most important special claims to our respect; but he has left the mark of the strong grasp he takes on many other subjects. If naturalists were divided as politicians are, Mr. Huxley would be said to belong to the left wing. He inclines generally to that view of the phenomena of life which makes them result directly from the general laws of matter, rather than from the subordination of those laws to some principle of individuality, different in each case. He disapproves of the common reasoning from final causes in biology, and says, that when Cuvier thought he was reasoning from them in his reconstruction of the fossil Vertebrata, "he mistook the nature of his own mental processes." He has faith in the doctrine of Transmutation of Species; and the instant Mr. Darwin's book appeared, he published an earnest plea that it might have a fair and respectful hearing. He is perhaps best known in this country by two small books bearing on this very subject, which were reprinted in New York a couple of years ago; — one entitled "Six Lectures to Workingmen on the Origin of Species"; the other, "Three Essays on Man's Place in Nature," etc. In these we see, as in all his writings, his love of coming rapidly to a definite settlement of every question, deciding either Yes or No, if that be possible; or if not, pointing out exactly what kind of data we must have before we can draw a fair conclusion. He concludes the former of the two little works above mentioned, which is an admirably written account of the present state of the great problem, by accepting Mr. Darwin's hypothesis, *provided* it

shall be found compatible with the fact of sterility between animals of different species. As things now stand, we cannot tell whether it is compatible or not.

In the second work, he gives us an example of radicalism truly refreshing in an Anglo-Saxon. As to "the doctrine of creation by jerks," he renounces it altogether, and jovially says that, if we admit the transmutation hypothesis at all, we must apply it even unto majestic man, and see in him the offspring of some great ape, pregnant with Futurity. Probably our feeling on this point, more than anything else, will make many of us refuse to accept any theory of transmutation. This is indeed not the place to discuss the question, but we think it could be easily proved that such a feeling has even less foundation than any other aristocratic prejudice. It behooves us at any rate to examine a little into its grounds, when we see it in such serious danger of shortly being trampled under foot as we do at the present time. A doctrine like that of transmutation of species, which as fast as it is buried in one form reappears in another, and shows itself each time more robust and vivacious than before, cannot but be treated with some respect; and when we find that such naturalists as Asa Gray, Lyell, Owen, Schleiden, Vogt, Von Baer, Kölliker, many of whom but a few days ago were publicly opposing it, are now coming round, one by one, to espouse it, we may well doubt whether it may not be destined eventually to prevail. Perhaps, by accustoming our imagination to contemplate the possibility of our ape descent now and then, as a precautionary measure, the dire prospect, should it ever really burst upon us, will appear shorn of some of its novel horrors, and our humanity appear no less worthy than it was before.

The result of Professor Huxley's discussion of the composition and development of the skull, in this volume, is such as to make him give a conclusion strongly adverse to that theory which regards it as a series of modified vertebræ. The whole history of this celebrated theory is very interesting to one who likes to watch the play of the two great intellectual tendencies which, since men began to speculate, have shared the world between them, and filled it with the sound of their contention, and which we may call the synthetic tendency and the analytic tendency. Of course such a division is not absolute, for every mind must be at the same time both analytic and synthetic; nevertheless, as in every question we generally find two sides, and the advocates of one may be called synthetic as compared with their opponents, the distinction, so long as we bear in mind that it is only relative, is both convenient and natural.

Our sensible perceptions present to us nothing but an endless confu-

sion of separate things; our reason whispers that all these things are connected, and that what appears superficially confusion is at bottom perfect order and harmony. The analytic men seem to hear the voice of the senses best, the synthetic men that of the reason. "L'univers," says D'Alembert, "pour qui saurait l'embrasser d'un seul point de vue, ne serait, s'il est permis de le dire, qu'un fait unique et une grande verité." It is with the hope of one day reaching this sublime point of view that Science struggles ever forwards, spurred passionately on over the slow and difficult approaches by her synthetic followers, while her analytic ones moderate her speed and keep her from wandering away from the right path. To get her to the goal, the services of both are indispensable, for either class is infirm alone, and needs the other to make up for its shortcomings. The synthetists are theorists, who require their knowledge to be organized into some sort of a unity. They see resemblances better than differences. The analysts are actualists, who are quite contented to know things as isolated and individual, who see differences better than resemblances. On the one hand, the men of intuition, whose eye leaps over the steps at once to the goal; on the other, the men of demonstration, whose eyes are fixed so steadfastly upon the steps that they often do not see the goal at all.

The important part intuition or imagination plays in Science has of late been so fully recognized and so ably vindicated, that no more need be said about it. But the imaginative temperament, if left unchecked to deal with science, would run into endless excesses. Men of this cast of mind are impatient. Their desire of unity is so fervid, that they leap eagerly to embrace any apparent simplification of things, however absurd it may be at bottom. They are so fond of short cuts as often to drive through perfect stone-walls of fact, as if they were blind, but without the caution of the blind. For the scope of any individual mind is very narrow; we can see vividly but a very few things, and practically ignore the existence of the rest. If we are of a synthetic mould, we build these few up into a more or less comfortable system; and then, without reflecting that what to our consciousness shuts out all individual eccentricity may yet, when tested by a wider synthesis, prove to be one egregious eccentricity from beginning to end. We are too apt to resent the criticisms of practical men on our plans as assaults upon the very spirit of truth itself. We forget what the proverb says, "The longest way round is the shortest way home."

The vertebrate theory of the skull was the creation of synthetic minds. In its first form it was strongly opposed by Cuvier, who may be taken as the representative of analytic minds. It was then revived by Owen as part of a scheme which in the mind of its author was cer-

tainly synthetic, namely, that of a common plan of vertebrate structure existing in the Creative Mind, and underlying all the special contrivances by which the various creatures are fitted for their different modes of life. This scheme would be now considered by many as tending to multiply original principles in nature, and consequently as not synthetic enough. We are pretty sure that Mr. Huxley would be one of these objectors to it, and so far forth would be more synthetic than Professor Owen; but in the present work he criticises it entirely on analytic grounds.

It was in the first years of this century, in the midst of a very general intellectual ferment, that the notion that the skull was of the same nature as the back-bone arose simultaneously in the minds of several inquirers, working independently of each other. Schelling had said, "To philosophize upon nature is to create nature"; and it was armed with this superb maxim that Oken and his disciples proceeded to develop the idea which Oken himself and Goethe had originated. Their results were extravagant and untenable. The head was supposed by them to repeat the rest of the body. We find in Oken, for example, the hyoid bone described as the sacrum of the head, while the lower jaw is the leg, and the tympanic bone the shoulder-blade thereof; and wild as such opinions now appear, they carried everything before them for a time in Germany. In France, the thought seems to have struck M. Duméril about the same time; but it is related that, after he had broached it in the Academy, some member made a mild jest about his "thinking vertebra," which so abashed him that he let the matter drop. Étienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire worked out his version of the theory a few years later. His views were far more sober than those of the Germans; but, according to Cuvier, he had reached them without paying sufficient respect to the facts. It was too rash a synthesis, and this great man combated it to the last day of his life.

Few will deny that Cuvier succeeded in demolishing the particular edifices which Geoffroy and the Germans had reared; but he did not wholly scatter the ruins and plant on the foundation, so the theory was not permanently buried. One can imagine the mixed feeling of wonder and impatience with which this man regarded the airy flights of his mystical opponents, as he calls them, — he who never let his fancy overstep the stones which observation and reasoning kept laying down, surely and slowly, one by one, before it. To quote Mr. Huxley, "The fresher one's study of the wilder Okenians, the more one has become weary of wading through empty speculations upon 'connation' and 'coalescence,' 'irrelative repetition' and 'transposition,' the *Dei ex machina* who are called in to solve every difficulty," (this is one of Mr. Huxley's side-kicks at Professor Owen,) — "the more heartily does one

sympathize with the sarcastic vigor with which Cuvier annihilates the products of their exuberant fancy. Nor is it possible to peruse without admiration the sagacious reasoning by which he was led to determinations which, in the majority of cases, have been accepted by those who have followed him."

Now, in the face of all this, and while admitting that Cuvier has done more than any one man for natural history, it would seem not only paradoxical, but suicidal, to deny that his was a mind of the very highest type. Nevertheless, we cannot help thinking that, if his imagination had been bolder, his stupendous analytical powers would have carried him farther than they did. As it is, his word has less authority when he says "No" than when he says "Yes." He surrounded Science with barriers which we are sure she must one day transcend. He thought that with observation, description, and classification her work was done. Looking through history, and seeing that the best of systems triumphed but for a day, he concluded that systems and syntheses were radically vicious, and deduced "this fundamental axiom of the positive sciences, that facts well observed are for them the only durable acquisition." He considered that every animal forms a complete whole (*un tout unique et clos*), intended to play a definite part in nature, for which part a certain harmony in its organization becomes necessary. Animals, therefore, *essentially differ* from each other, and the resemblances they may show are accidental, and accrue from the similarity of purpose for which they are created. Any other "law" or necessity than that coexistence of organs entailed by these "conditions of existence," Cuvier resented as infringing the Creator's freedom, as implying, in his own words, "*le défaut de liberté dans l'action du principe organisateur.*" According to him, a classification is "a sort of dictionary," the "surest way of expressing the properties of beings in the fewest terms, and of stamping them easily upon the memory." And yet he considers that a perfectly natural classification would be "*toute la science.*" Now, we are sure that Biological Science, eternally grateful as she must be to Cuvier, will not consent to stop at these limits. Her function is not merely to note Resemblance, but to find Unity. Below the *fact* of resemblance she will seek till she lays bare the *ground* of resemblance; she will regard classification as her starting-point rather than her goal; and, far from spurning all "system," she will proclaim that the creation of a perfect system is the very end of her existence. If Cuvier had lived two centuries earlier, he would have been satisfied with knowing the coincidences that Kepler had discovered in the planetary orbits, and would have said, as Leibnitz actually did say, that Newton was impious to try to find their cause.

We had hoped to give some account of Mr. Owen's ingenious and beautiful, though unsatisfactory, theory of the skull. But we find we have no room. Suffice it to say, that of the few who dared to occupy the ruins which Cuvier had left smoking, and tried to build thereon, he met with most success; and many naturalists who looked with suspicion on his edifice found it on the whole so fair that they left it undisturbed. Now comes Professor Huxley, strong with the battering-ram of Embryology, and lays it low. His arguments seem final against the view that the segments of the skull are literal vertebræ. But does such a decision throw us back upon Chaos again? We think not. We think that the undeniable analogy of these segments to true vertebræ will some day be shown to be a true affinity. Both backbone and skull will be affiliated upon some uniform mode of force (working in either under slightly different conditions), in accordance with the principles of a synthesis which is now slowly shaping itself in biology. This synthesis asserts that organic forms, like the forms of the waves of the sea, are the *result* of the common properties of matter. It is but one feature of a still wider synthesis, towards which few will deny that a current seems setting from every quarter of Science, and which may be briefly described as declaring the Self-Competency of Nature.

Now it is certain that this synthesis is, hypothetically at least, atheistic in its tendency, and, as such, its progress causes much alarm to many excellent people. But is this alarm well grounded? Grant that the theory leaves much of our moral experience unaccounted for, and is but a partial synthesis,—grant that at present it turns its back upon the Supernatural,—may it not, nevertheless, serve an excellent purpose, and in the end, by introducing order into the Natural, prove to be a necessary step in the way to a larger, purer view of the Supernatural? Perhaps it may never be established; but if it is, it will do away at any rate with that eternal muddling together of Natural and Supernatural which has prevailed hitherto. God will no longer be made to appear as on a level with Nature and acting as a mere rival to her forces. It will no longer be possible to say, with Professor Owen, that the "general polarizing or vegetative vital force" is "*in antagonism with* the special adaptive force by which the Sovereign of the Universe attains his ends, and promotes the interests of the animal"; nor, with Dr. Whewell, that, although the idea of a final cause is applicable as a fundamental idea to our speculations concerning organized creatures *only*, yet "we find abundant reason to believe that there *is* a purpose in *many other* parts of Creation." But is it likely that then, any better than now, we shall be able utterly to stifle our idea of final cause, or go off satisfied with an answer to *How?* when the question we asked was *Why?* May it not be that, find-

ing Nature a great closed sack, as it were, *tota, teres, atque rotunda*, without any *partial* inlets to the Supernatural, without any *occasional* Ends *within* her bosom, we shall be driven to look for final causes on some deeper plane underlying the whole of Nature at once, and there shall find them? Both sides will then be satisfied, and the exclusively naturalistic tendency of modern thought will have its justification. However, let us not meddle with prophecy,— it is dangerous; but let us return to the solid earth, and examine a little into the details of Mr. Huxley's volume.

Perhaps the most original feature of his discussion of the separate cranial bones lies in his application of the long neglected discovery of Kerckring, that the human petro-mastoid part is primitively composed of three distinct bones, to the identification of the bones of the side of the head in the lower Vertebrata. These three "peri-otic" bones he calls respectively "pro-," "epi-" and "opisth-" otic, and he finds them largely developed everywhere, most frequently either separate or with the marks of an original separation between them. It is in his pursuit of these bones that he makes those determinations that differ most from those of his predecessors. Thus, in bony fishes he makes the exoccipital and alisphenoid of Cuvier and Owen, as well as their petrosal, belong to the ear capsule, while their mastoid is his squamosal, he recognizing of course no separate mastoid. The quadrate and quadratejugal of birds and reptiles retain these names. Mr. Huxley considers them to have no representatives in the mammalian cranium. Cuvier identified the quadrate with the tympanic in man, and his interpretation has been generally followed. "But," says Huxley, "the tympanic is always a membrane bone, whereas this [the quadrate] is always a cartilage bone. The tympanic directly supports the tympanic membrane, while this bone sometimes gives no direct attachment to the tympanic membrane at all. The tympanic of Mammals again becomes smallest in those Mammalia which most nearly approach birds and reptiles, and is never known to articulate, by a movable joint, with the *malleus*, which, as we have seen, is the representative of the *os articulare* of the mandible of the lower Vertebrata. It is impossible, therefore, that the quadrate bone should be the homologue of the tympanic of Mammalia. On the other hand, it corresponds altogether with the quadrate bone of Fishes, which is united in like manner with the pterygoid arcade, and is similarly connected by a movable joint with the articular piece of the mandible; and this quadrate bone of Fishes is, I have endeavored to show, the homologue of the *incus* of the Mammalia. I make no question that, as Reichert long ago asserted, the Bird's *os quadratum*, and therefore that of the Reptile, is the equivalent of the mammalian *incus*." (p. 229.) We think all this is

still somewhat problematical. Mr. Huxley, although inclined to consider that histological development is as good a test of homology as morphological development, admits himself that we cannot yet be positive on this point. M. Hollard, in the *Ann. des Sciences Naturelles* for the past year, has been led by the study of development in the salmon to homologize the interoperculum with the incus, and the hyo-mandibular, symplectic, and preoperculum, taken together, with the styloid process. If this were so, the quadrate and metapterygoid (Cuvier's *tympanal*) would seem to answer to nothing better than to the tympanic. However, more work needs to be done before this question can be settled.

We are sorry that the lack of space will prevent our giving anything like an analysis of the Lectures on Classification. We will merely subjoin a list of Mr. Huxley's primary divisions and classes of animals.

PROTOZOA: *Gregarinida, Infusoria, Rhizopoda (?), Spangida.*

CŒLENTERATA: *Hydrozoa, Actinozoa.*

MOLLUSCOIDA: *Polyzoa, Brachiopoda, Ascidioda.*

MOLLUSCA: *Lamellibranchiata, Branchiogasteropoda, Pulmogasteropoda, Pteropoda, Cephalopoda.*

ANNULOIDA: *Scolecida (?), Echinodermata.*

ANNULOSA: *Annelida, Crustacea, Arachnida, Myriapoda, Insecta.*

VERTEBRATA: *Pisces, Amphibia, Reptilia, Aves, Mammalia.*

Mr. Huxley admits that much of this is provisional. His review of the classes is admirable for clearness and condensation. The diagrams of dissections which illustrate his descriptions add greatly to the value of the book, and we shall doubtless find most of them gracing the pages of elementary treatises for twenty years to come. The woodcuts with which the Lectures on the Skull are furnished are also as good as they are abundant.

In taking leave of a book in most respects so admirable, it is unpleasant to find fault; but we must say a word in condemnation of the uniformly rude, and even malignant, tone in which Mr. Huxley speaks of Professor Owen. It is a way he has with all opponents,* but espe-

* Some readers may remember a little "spat" which Mr. Huxley had within the past year with Dr. Hunt and Mr. Blake of the Anthropological Society, concerning the pamphlet of the former on "The Negro's Place in Nature." However contemptible Dr. Hunt's *animus* may have been, Huxley's tone was unjustifiable. *Apropos* of the Anthropological Society, we cannot resist citing an episode of the debate which took place therein about the negro, on the occasion of the same pamphlet. Straws show how the wind blows. MR. BURKE is saying that our superiority to the negro is parallel to our superiority to the white peasant.

MR. MCHENRY. No; it is not.

MR. BURKE. I differ from you in opinion very widely.

MR. MCHENRY. And I do from you. I am afraid you are an abolitionist, sir.

MR. BURKE. This gentleman is at liberty to have his own opinions, and of

cially with Owen, who is savagely sneered at by name and by allusion on every possible occasion. It is a state of things discreditable to Science, when, to use the words of an English critic, people go to Professor Huxley's lecture-room with somewhat of the same spirit as that with which they would flock to a prize-fight.

We very much wish that this volume might be republished in this country, and that our students of medicine, at least, might get a smattering, however small, of scientific anatomy. But we fear the day has not yet arrived. Meanwhile, those who would like to see the book, and who cannot afford to buy it, will find the Lectures reported in the Medical Times and Gazette for the first months of 1864.

---

18. — *Icones Muscorum, or Figures and Descriptions of most of those Mosses peculiar to Eastern North America which have not been heretofore figured.* By William S. Sullivant, LL. D. With one hundred and twenty-nine Copperplates. Cambridge: Sever and Francis. London: Trübner & Co. 1864.

Ordinarily a special and technical work like this, upon a particular and somewhat neglected branch of botany, would not call for notice here. This does so because of its rare perfection as a work of art as well as of science. The volume is an imperial octavo, in typography worthy of the University Press. The plates are devoted for the most part each to the illustration of a single species, — the Moss being delineated first of the natural size, whether large, like the Peat-mosses, with which the series begins, or minute, like the ephemeral *Phasca* which follow, — then in magnified views and analyses of part after part, until the whole structure is clearly revealed. Numerous and, from their greatly enlarged size, predominating as are the detailed figures, yet they are so skilfully managed as to avoid the appearance of crowding or confusion. Each plate tells its story gracefully as well as accurately. We may well suppose that Bruch and Schimper's *Bryologia Europæa* has served as a model; but these plates are more exquisite, mainly because upon copper instead of stone, and on the whole are probably unequalled. The author assigns the whole credit to his draughtsman, Mr. August Schrader, whom he has sedulously trained to the work, and

---

course he will let me have mine. I contend that the difference is one of degree only.

Mr. McHenry. I pity you; you do not know better. &c., &c., &c.

Does not this sound like our own blessed land in the good old times? Mr. McHenry expressed the sense of the majority of the meeting.

to the engraver, Mr. William Dougal. But we are confident that much is due to his own facile pencil, as well as to his superintendence. Having by this and by other works done so much for the before neglected department of botany to which he has devoted himself, we may fairly call upon him to do more, and to render the study of our mosses popular, or at least practicable to our botanical students in general, and even to amateurs, by means of a general account of the North American species, more full and easy than that which he has already contributed to Gray's Manual, and with figures of a considerable portion of the commoner Mosses.

---

19. — *An American Dictionary of the English Language.* By Noah Webster, LL. D. Thoroughly revised and greatly enlarged and improved by Chauncey A. Goodrich, D. D., LL. D., &c., &c., and Noah Porter, D. D., &c., &c. Springfield: G. & C. Merriam. 1864. 4to. pp. lxxii., 1768.

The good Dr. Webster would be startled if he could see a copy of his Dictionary shorn of all his Semitic etymologies, and fuller of pictures than a primer. In many respects, however, this new edition is an improvement on its predecessors, and in the etymological part it is undoubtedly the best English Dictionary existing. But we cannot help thinking that the general plan is a bad one. If it were intended to make it a complete dictionary of the English language, it should have been fuller; if a convenient volume for reference, less full. A complete dictionary would be a history of the language, for it would contain every word that had ever been used, with its changes and the dates of them, — would be, in short, what Grimm's great work will be for Germany, and Littré's for France. The volume before us contains a great many obsolete and unusual words, — some that have been used, perhaps, only once; it incorporates provincialisms from Halliwell and Bartlett, and yet by no means exhausts the stock whether of archaisms, oddities, or vulgarisms. Then for the illustrations (except where they are geometrical figures or the like), they are not only worthless, but a positive nuisance. They make the book bigger and the print smaller. They are ugly, poorly engraved, and fitter for a spelling-book than a dictionary. What can be the need of giving us a picture of the dial of a clock in a country where every house contains one? of the American flag, looking as no banner ever looked out of a wood-cut or a patriotic poem? of the Colossus of Rhodes bestriding the harbor, while the small print beneath assures us there is no authority for supposing that he ever bestrode it at all? We can conceive of people who would be pleased with

the drawing of a cork, but who would care for the picture of a cork-screw, as we have it here? All the prints, moreover, are repeated again with some additions at the end of the volume, thus increasing the number of pages by seventy of pure impertinence. As illustrations they are mostly childish and often erroneous. A palpable owl sat for the portrait of *Falco peregrinus*, and the *Merganser* has a hooked beak, though the accompanying description says, rightly enough, that it should be straight. Surely this is a book with pretty pictures for baby to learn his letters by, and not a dictionary. At best, the greater part of the illustrations belong more properly to an encyclopædia than a lexicon; and since a single volume cannot suffice for both, it would be better not to do at all what must be done inadequately. As it is, the wood-cuts of machinery, to take a single example, are too small to be of any use, and yet large enough to be very much in the way.

Of course, into such a sea of words we have only dropped our lead here and there, without choice, and generally we have found safe holding-ground. But one or two animadversions occur to us. We think that the illustrative quotations are not so well chosen as they might be, and that they are used too often in cases where no such helps to the understanding are needed. One can hardly turn to a page of Dr. Johnson's Dictionary without finding some pithy or pregnant sentence; but here a majority of the citations we have chanced upon strike us as trivial. For example, we open at random on the verb *to drum*, and find "drumming with his fingers on the arm of his chair. *W. Irving.*" Again, words are given which are not in any sense English, and which do not become so because they have been used by such a writer as Sir Thomas Browne (who, by the way, might have furnished a grandly imaginative illustration of the word *drum*), a writer who was in the habit of coining a word out of Latin or Greek as he wanted it. Nor should Feltham be cited as an authority at all. He is a thoroughly third-rate writer, and his style is measly with Latinisms, if such barbarous stuff as *superbiate*, *superinsaniate*, *subhumerate*, *indulciate*, *replenty*, *temulentive*, may be called so. These words, it is true, have not been taken up in the editorial drag-net, but such a school-boy as this should not be appealed to at all. With Browne it is otherwise, for he was a master of English when he chose to translate himself into it.

In turning over the leaves, we are struck with the huddles of scientific warts with which the fair body of our language is getting studded. We suppose there is no help for it, that we must submit to have

> "Those rugged names to our like mouths grow sleek";

but we cannot help shuddering when we think how endless are the

plants, stones, and what-not yet to be named on land, that the sea has as many more, and that some improvement of the microscope may show the impalpable air as populous. And then the terrible name of the discoverer may be inflicted on some innocent herb or mineral. Fancy Gerstaeckeria or Schlagintweitite! We see no good reason why these innocents should be "Nicodemused into nothing" any more than their betters. But if the process go on at the present rate, we shall have to dredge for our English among this scientific silt of the dictionary. We are inclined to think that it would be better to arrange such words under a separate alphabet, or even in a volume by itself, so that we may get the wholesome roots of our mother tongue untainted with all this apothecary stuff. The words which have grown from living germs, and those which have been made and stuck together, should be kept apart.

We have already spoken in praise of the etymological part of the work, done by Dr. Mahn of Berlin. It is remarkably well done, weeded of all surplusage and Babel impertinence, — sometimes, we think, left almost too naked. We have noticed a few etymologies which we think questionable; but these are matter of opinion, and generally we have had no English dictionary nearly so good in this respect. But can that be called *American* which is done in Germany, or for which an American pays his money? We think the nationality of the title-page should be a little less exclusive.

Among the definitions, we have stumbled upon some which seem to us either inadequate or utterly mistaken. Under the verb *lay*, we have as one of the meanings, "to prevent from manifesting itself, as a spirit." We suppose "from *further* manifesting itself" is meant. "Davy Jones's locker" is said to mean the ocean, and W. Irving cited as authority. "Fall of timber" is defined as the "act of *felling* or cutting down." Ben Jonson would have been surprised to hear that Volpone's *fricace* was "an unguent prepared by *frying* things together." Under *insane*, the third definition is "making mad; causing madness," with the quotation from Shakespeare,

> "Or have we eaten of the *insane* root
> That takes the reason prisoner."

This is making the master of language say, "have we eaten of the maddening root that maddens." Insane here merely means *unwholesome*. Worse than this, we find under *gracious* the third definition, "beautiful, graceful"; and again a verse credited to Shakespeare, —

> "So hallowed and so gracious is that *tune!*"

In what play this line occurs, we cannot say; but there is another so

like it in Hamlet that we suspect a sophistication. Under *gust* we have: "2. Gratification of any kind, particularly that which is exquisitely relished; enjoyment." The illustration is from Pope,

"Destroy all creatures for thy sport or gust,"

who is also made wrongfully guilty of tautology. *Gust* means here the pleasure of eating as distinguished from that of merely hunting, and belongs under definition number one, "the sense or pleasure of tasting; relish." One of the meanings of *gust* is not given at all, — the *act* of tasting. Again, where Chapman says,

"The roots of hills and *herby* valleys,"

he is made to mean "covered with *herbs*." Covered with herbage, grassy, was, of course, what he intended. Under the word *card* we do not find the definition *chart*, which was one of the commonest of its obsolete meanings. Under *renew* we find: "2. To begin again.

The last great age *renews* its finished course. *Dryden.*

3. To repeat either exactly or almost exactly; to go over again.

The birds their notes *renew*. *Milton.*

4. To furnish again; as to *renew* a loan, a note, or the like." In the first two instances, both Milton and Dryden mean precisely the same thing, and *to take up again* would be the better definition. The true etymology of the word in these cases is not *re* and *new*, as we are told by the Dictionary, but the French *renouer*, from a wholly different root.

We have said that some of the etymologies did not satisfy us. We chance upon one too ridiculous to be passed by. "Pry, *v. i.* [probably contracted from *per-eye*, to eye or look through.]"! We have noted a few others; but as we do not pretend to have read the volume through, we content ourselves with saying that there is need yet of more careful revision in this respect.

Among the appendices to the Dictionary is one both curious and useful, by Mr. W. A. Wheeler, being "a vocabulary of the names of noted fictitious persons and places." It is in some sort what may be called a dictionary of literary allusion. We have noticed very few oversights in it, and we think even the most omnivorous reader will be surprised at its fulness and accuracy. It is a truly valuable addition to the Dictionary; for many names become proverbial, surviving the books, and especially the plays, from which they are borrowed.

This Dictionary, so far as we have observed, is printed with great accuracy, a high merit in these days, when the press all over the world, with few exceptions, is growing every day more careless.

20. — *Lyra Anglicana; or a Hymnal of Sacred Poetry selected from the best English Writers, and arranged after the Order of the Apostles' Creed.* By the Rev. George T. Rider, M. A. New York: Appleton. 1864. 12mo. pp. xiv., 288.

This pretty volume is neither better nor worse than most of its kind. There are a few fine poems in it, and a great deal of mere mechanic stuff, — all the worse for pretending to be pious. Doggerel is called sacred, which would tempt the blandest critic to be profane. When we think what religion is and what poetry is, and what their marriage ought to be, a great part of what is published as religious poetry seems to us a scandalous mockery. If one wish to satisfy himself how utterly without true feeling and poetic merit such verses are, let him but change the sacred names in them for others without such lifelong associations, and consider what chance they would run of being read. There are many pieces in this volume that Mr. Rider himself could not tolerate if they were printed as secular poetry. It is really time that a protest should be uttered against this stupid hallucination which lets rhymesters vent themselves on the Highest and Holiest, who would not be tolerated on more worldly topics. Mr. Rider's selection is, we think, better than most; and his Preface is as fine and incomprehensible as language can make it.

Since writing thus far, we have received another selection of the same kind by Mr. Rider, from American poets. It has the same editorial merits and the same essential defects as its predecessor. The selection shows great catholicity of spirit. But we must object to Mr. Rider's use of the word Puritan in his Preface. "To the Puritan," he says, "the Beautiful was recognized in none of its spiritual relations. The Beautiful was rather a sorceress, — an unwholesome mirage of experience that called for the exorcist." We are not sure that we understand the whole of this. The "unwholesome mirage of experience" utterly defies us. Mr. Rider probably means that the Puritans had a dread of the sensuously beautiful; for surely he would not say they did not recognize the beauty of holiness. This might be true of the Independents, — though we should remember that Cromwell saved Raphael's cartoons, — but is not true of the Puritans properly so called. George Herbert, a truly sacred poet, and the best of the kind in English, was a Puritan, and wrote, as Mr. Rider ought to know,

> "Religion stands on tiptoe in this land,
> Ready to pass to the American strand."

Spenser, to whom Mr. Rider alludes, and whom his printers have transformed into the Hon. W. R. Spencer, was also a Puritan. He surely

"recognized the Beautiful in its spiritual relations." In writing upon theory, an author should keep as clear as may be of any allusion to illustrative facts. They are very unmanageable. If we understand the meaning of words, we think it would take Mr. Rider a great while to prove Shakespeare a "Christian poet," as he calls him.

21.—*"Their Majesties' Servants." Annals of the English Stage from Thomas Betterton to Edmund Kean. Actors — Authors — Audiences.* By Dr. Doran, F. S. A., &c., &c. In Two Volumes. New York: Widdleton. 1865. pp. 424, 422.

Two volumes of rather slipshod gossip, written in a style which is bad even for a Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries. The book, however, is not without entertainment, and Dr. Doran's judgment of the merits of particular plays is more than commonly discriminating. He does justice to stout old Colley Cibber, a clever playwright and an honest man, still spotted with the filthy mud of Pope. But he gives us no vivid impression of the styles of the great actors. We turned to Garrick, for example, only to be disappointed. Lichtenberg's description and criticism of him are far better than all Dr. Doran gives us put together.

These volumes are very prettily printed, but disfigured by more errors of the press than we remember to have met with in the same number of pages, even in this day of careless work. In the two pages, 40 and 41 of Volume I. we have marked six misprints, and there are many others quite as bad, or worse. Sometimes the blunders are of the most offensive kind, as "Zanger" for "Zanga." Mr. Alvord has considerable reputation as a printer, but he will surely lose it unless he employs better proof-readers; for correctness in printing is like what prudence is said to be among the virtues, a prosy thing in itself, but without it all the rest are worthless.

22.—*The Irvington Stories.* By M. E. Dodge. Illustrated by F. O. C. Darley. New York: James O'Kane. 1865. pp. 256.

Very pleasant little stories, written in good simple English, with just enough improbability in them to suit the minds of children, for whom the age of fancy and fable renews itself in every generation. They are not sermons in words of two syllables, they are not prosy; but what is gracious and lovely in childhood is appealed to indirectly, and with something of motherly tenderness in the tone. Good books for children are so rare, and books to make little spoonies so common, that we are glad to say a word in praise of one so graceful and pleasing.

23. — *Enoch Arden.* By Alfred Tennyson, D. C. L., Poet-Laureate. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. pp. 59.

Enoch Arden. By Alfred Tennyson. Boston: J. E. Tilton and Company. 1865. pp. 78.

These two illustrated editions of "Enoch Arden," prepared for the holidays, show the great advance that has been recently made in America in the arts subsidiary to book-making. They very fairly rival the books of a similar class produced in England. They are not intended so much for the delight of the connoisseur of book-making as a fine art, or of the true bibliophilist, as to meet the demand of the general public for ornamental books which may serve as pretty gifts. And for this end each of these volumes will answer, and both, save for an important consideration in respect to one of them, which we shall presently notice, might well be popular.

The illustrated volume of poems has of late years been the favorite style of gift-book. A vast deal of expense, labor, skill, and taste has been expended on the production of these annuals, but after all few of them deserve to outlive their year. They serve their purpose as ornaments for the drawing-room table, but keep their prettiness only a little longer than a Parisian *bonbonière*, and not so long as a Sèvres cup. They are trinkets of a passing fashion. 'A really fine book is a fine thing, to last for centuries. There are some illustrated books which the most fastidious amateur prizes among the treasures of his exclusive library. Rogers's Poems, and his "Italy" are kept in remembrance by the exquisite illustrations with which they are adorned. But these pictorial gift-books are got up for a transient sale, are not intended to last over a year, and must then give way to a newer novelty. This would be a pity, if men of genius commonly illustrated them. In the rare cases in which such men have been employed in the work, the book, in spite of its holiday air, which unfits it too often for sober use, does attain a certain immortality. The edition of Tennyson's Poems illustrated by Hunt, Rossetti, and Millais is one of these exceptions. Will either of these editions of "Enoch Arden" be another?

The question can be easily answered as regards one of them, — that illustrated by Mr. Billings. The artist himself would perhaps be surprised that it should be asked, for he has plainly had no idea of the sort himself. His illustrations display all the facility of conception, all the skill in mechanical treatment, which long practice has given him; they show delicate and unaffected sentiment, but they are not inspired with imaginative insight, they reveal nothing that the poem does not tell in words, and do not render its simplicity of pathos or its depth of ten-

derness. They are pretty little pictures, on which a severe criticism would be unjust.

But the illustrations in the other edition — "the author's edition" — profess, at least, to be of a higher order, and subject themselves consequently to a more exacting criticism. Here, however, we are met with a difficulty. The wood-cuts, owing, no doubt, in part to the novelty in America of the style of work attempted, obviously represent very imperfectly the original designs, thus putting criticism at fault. We can hardly believe that such a skilful imitation of Japanese art as the illustration entitled "The Island Home" can be due to the artist's intention, even though the monogram in the corner betrays a love of quaintness which appears unpleasantly in some of his other designs. In the work of some rare men, quaintness is found united with simplicity and strength; but it is more commonly the indication of weakness, and a vain effort after originality.

There is poetic feeling in one or two of Mr. La Farge's designs, there is a touch of imagination here and there in Mr. Vedder's work, there is simple, natural sentiment in several of Mr. Hennessey's drawings; but the series as a whole is not distinguished by the unmistakable strokes of genius, and some of the designs are positively bad. The artists are young men, and their work has the characteristics of youth. It reminds us of better things. "Enoch's Supplication" is studied from Blake's designs for the Book of Job, while others of the illustrations show the influence of the school of Millais.

This is not strange. Originality and imagination are not commonly to be bought or hired in the market. There are few Gustave Dorés, still fewer William Blakes. Simplicity and truthfulness are, however, virtues which may go far to supply the place of higher qualities, and are essential to the value and excellence of a work of art. It is the want of these which is the only unpardonable sin. Mr. La Farge, Mr. Vedder, and Mr. Hennessey give proof of talents which may secure them an honorable place as artists, if they will seek and possess themselves of these prime virtues, which they seem at present to prize too low.

We cannot dismiss these volumes without the expression of our regret that Messrs. Tilton and Company should have issued the editions of "Enoch Arden" which have lately appeared bearing their imprint. In so doing, they have violated the comity of the trade, and have done their best to injure the interests, not only of Mr. Tennyson's recognized American publishers, but also of Mr. Tennyson himself, and of all other English authors whose works are reprinted by arrangement in this country. They have done this wrong and committed this dishon-

orable action knowingly, for Mr. Tennyson had publicly declared: "It is my wish that with Messrs. Ticknor and Fields alone the right of publishing my books in America should rest."

The liberal terms which some of our publishing houses have made with foreign authors for the privilege of reprinting their books, have been made with confidence that this privilege would be respected by other publishers as vesting them with a right to exclusive publication. This is the general understanding of the trade. It is this understanding that makes property in such books valuable. In disregarding this consideration, Messrs. Tilton and Company have made an attack on private property for which there is no justification. Although there is no law by which it may be punished, we trust that the trade and the public of book-buyers will unite to show their sense that privateering of this sort deserves no mercy.

---

24. — *The Market-Book, containing a Historical Account of the Public Markets in the Cities of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Brooklyn, with a brief Description of every Article of Human Food sold therein, the Introduction of Cattle in America, and Notices of many remarkable Specimens.* By THOMAS F. DE VOE, Member of the New York Historical Society, etc. In Two Volumes. Vol. I. New York. 1862. 8vo. pp. 621.

THE author of this book subscribes his modest Preface, "Thomas F. De Voe, *Butcher*," a title which, in connection with that which graces his title-page, gives assurance of the solid character of his book. He is an author in spite of himself. Having been led to make some researches in the archives of the New York Historical Society to gratify his own curiosity as to the antiquities of his profession, he was induced to prepare a paper on this subject, and to read it before the Society in acknowledgment of its services to him. His labors were so warmly received that the expanding of his paper into a book was simply a development in the order of nature. The book itself is best described by the following sentence from its second title-page: "This volume contains a history of the public markets of the city of New York, from its first settlement to the present time, with numerous curious and remarkable incidents connected therewith, the introduction of cattle, supplies, trading, prices, and laws; sketches of the old burgher butchers, and the licensed butchers of modern times; together with a compilation of facts of every sort and character relating to the subject."

Not the least edifying portions of this book are those in which the

chronicle runs parallel with that of Diedrich Knickerbocker; it is sometimes hard to say whether the literal record of the days of Van Twiller and Kieft or the mock-heroic history is the more grotesque. Some idea of the relative value of commodities of the market and the loom in 1638 may be formed from a legal transaction of that date, described as follows: "Cornelius Petersen appeared before the Secretary Van Tienhoven, and declared with true Christian affirmation, in lieu of a solemn oath, that it was true that he had purchased a hog from Ann Jackson, in payment of which she took from his store so much of purpled cloth as was sufficient for a petticoat." It is easy enough, as every one knows, by mere excerpts such as this from antique records and documents to insure a certain kind and measure of interest for a book treating of local habits, customs, and institutions; but our author succeeds not less in giving entertainment to his readers as he approaches our own times, and narrates the results of his own observation and experience within familiar precincts.

The book is really a curious one, and to be commended to the student of manners and customs. We trust that Mr. De Voe will not disappoint us of a second volume. Some of the material which he collects and preserves is of a kind to amuse and entertain, if not greatly to instruct posterity.

LIST OF SOME RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. Martin's History of France. The Age of Louis XIV. By Henri Martin. Translated by Mary L. Booth. Boston: Walker, Wise, and Company. 1865. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. xxii., 563; viii., 543.

2. History of the Peace; 1815–1854; with an Introduction, 1800–1815. By Harriet Martineau. Boston: Walker, Wise, and Company. 1864. 2 vols. Post 8vo.

3. The Correlation and Conservation of Forces: a Series of Expositions by Prof. Grove, Prof. Helmholtz, Dr. Mayer, Dr. Faraday, Prof. Liebig, and Dr. Carpenter. With an Introduction by Edward L. Youmans, M. D. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1865. 12mo. pp. xlii., 438.

4. Essays: Moral, Political, and Æsthetic. By Herbert Spencer. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1865. 12mo. pp. 386.

5. Arctic Researches and Life among the Esquimaux: being the Narrative of an Expedition in Search of Sir John Franklin, in the years 1860, 1861, and 1862. By Charles Francis Hall. New York: Harper and Brothers. 8vo. pp. 595. With Map and Illustrations.

[A very curious and entertaining narrative, with excellent illustrations.]

6. Harper's Hand-Book for Travellers in Europe and the East. By W. Pembroke Fetridge. With Maps. Third Year. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1864. 12mo. pp. xxiv., 619.

[A compact and well-designed Guide-Book; but so full of errors, irrelevancies, and the marks of ignorance, as to be practically worthless. If put into the hands of a competent person to revise unsparingly, it might be made a useful book for travellers in Europe.]

7. Military, Medical, and Surgical Essays prepared for the United States Sanitary Commission. Edited by William A. Hammond, M. D., Surgeon-General United States Army, etc. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 8vo. pp. viii., 552.

[A most valuable series of essays, the preparation and publication of which are not the least among the good works of the Sanitary Commission.]

8. The American Annual Cyclopædia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1863. Volume III. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1864. 8vo. pp. iv., 865.

[History does not easily consent to an alphabetical arrangement. The execution of the book seems better than its plan. Why not give us an American Annual Register?]

9. Apologia pro Vita sua: being a Reply to a Pamphlet entitled, "What, then, does Dr. Newman mean?" By John Henry Newman, D.D. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1865. 12mo. pp. 393.

[An important contribution to the knowledge of religious opinion in England, and interesting as a study of a strongly marked and peculiar character.]

10. The Poetical Works of John Milton: with a Life of the Author; Dissertations, Notes, and a Verbal Index to all the Poems. By Charles Dexter Cleveland. Philadelphia: Frederick Leypoldt. 1865. 12mo. pp. 688.

[The editor has succeeded in his aim "to make the most useful edition" of Milton's English poems.]

11. The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living. By Jeremy Taylor, D. D. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1864. 12mo. pp. xix., 451.

The Rule and Exercises of Holy Dying. By Jeremy Taylor, D. D. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1864. 12mo. pp. xxvii., 373.

[The most accurate and tasteful edition ever published of these excellent books.]

12. The Poems of Winthrop Mackworth Praed. Revised and Enlarged Edition. With a Memoir by the Rev. Derwent Coleridge. New York: W. J. Widdleton. 1865. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. 440, 430.

13. Looking Toward Sunset. From Sources old and new, original and selected. By L. Maria Child. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. Sq. 12mo. pp. ix., 455.

[A very pleasing volume.]

14. Following the Flag. From August, 1861, to November, 1862, with the Army of the Potomac. By Carleton. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 16mo. pp. viii., 336.

15. A Tribute to Starr King. By Richard Frothingham. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 16mo. pp. 247.

16. Studies for Stories. By Jean Ingelow. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1865. 16mo. pp. 404.

17. Diary of Mrs. Kitty Trevylyan: a Story of the Times of Whitefield and the Wesleys. By the Author of "Chronicles of the Schonberg-Cotta Family," etc. With a Preface by the Author for the American Edition. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1865. 12mo.

18. John Godfrey's Fortunes, related by himself. A Story of American Life. By Bayard Taylor. New York: G. P. Putnam; Hurd and Houghton. 1865. 12mo. pp. viii., 511.

19. The Lost Love. By the Author of "John Drayton." Philadelphia: T. B. Peterson and Brothers. [1864.] 12mo. pp. 400.

[A very fair novel, but hardly likely, as is asserted on the title-page of this edition, to carry the name and fame of its writer down to the latest posterity. It is not to be confounded with "A Lost Love," a story that deservedly ranks among the best modern fictions.]

20. Cabiro. A Poem. By George H. Calvert. Cantos III. and IV. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1864. 16mo. pp. 87.

21. Young America. A Poem. By Fitz Greene Halleck. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 16mo. pp. 49.

NOTE TO ARTICLE III. No. CCIV.

West Wickham, London,
August 14, 1864.

To the Editors of the North American Review.

Gentlemen: — In an able article upon the origin of our notions of Space and Time, contained in your current number, the solution of this problem, proposed by me in a work called the "Analogy of Thought and Nature," is alluded to in terms conveying an impression so different to that which I at least intended to convey, that I ask the favor of a few lines in your pages to state more clearly my views on this subject. And I do this with the less diffidence, because my solution has a direct bearing upon a question hitherto little considered, but which must, I think, be admitted to be of great importance in metaphysical inquiries, namely, the constructive action of thought.

Your reviewer alleges that I resolve the idea of Space into a "sensuous imagination," because I have said that "the thought of Space is no sooner formed than it resolves itself into the opposite thoughts of Centre and Circumference." I allow that my too unguarded employment of these words justifies the criticism, and the more so, that I have not drawn in my book with sufficient clearness the distinction between Space and Motion which I am about to draw here; but I cannot allow that it justly applies to my conceptions as I apprehend them.

Every thought involves an act of *will*, — we will to think. But of what do we think when we thus will? what forms the substance of our thoughts? I reply, *motions*, — either produced directly by the action of our wills, or called forth by sensations or emotions, i. e. agencies independent of our proper wills, by which they are affected. The will to produce motion is a power of which it is impossible to suppose ourselves deprived so long as we retain conscious being. All thoughts not traceable to sensations or emotions are expressions of or reflections upon motions. And all thoughts about our sensations or emotions resolve themselves into the reproduction, rearrangement, or analysis by the aid of language of the motions called forth in us by sensation or emotion. Now, if this be a true account of thought, it cannot be surprising that our first thought, the logical condition of all that follow, is the thought of *that in which motion is possible*, — a thought which, according to the principle of opposition pervading all thought, falls into two great opposites: 1. The thought of Space, that in which *coexistent motions* are possible; 2. The thought of Time, that in which *successive* motions are possible. These opposite conditions unite in the thought

of *a motion willed*, which must be thought of as willed in Space and Time; while each of these falls within itself into a new opposition; — the thought of Space into that of *Centre* and *not Centre*, which unite in the thought of motions emanating from any assumed centre; the thought of Time into the opposition of *Past* and *Future*, which unite in the thought of the present.

The unions thus produced necessarily begin to assume what your reviewer calls a "sensuous image"; the complete absence of such an image belonging solely to the principle of Will, of which we become conscious only by intuition, not by presentation. For since this power acts by determining itself, and every determination is, as Spinoza said, a negation, every such determination must partake of the character of a *thing*, that is, of that which being determined both *qualitatively*, or as to the direction of the motions concerned in its production, and *quantitatively*, or as to their magnitude, may become an object to sense.

But until this double determination has been effected we have only objects of thought, not of sense; though the objects of sense may be used as illustrations, to shadow forth the more subtile conceptions of thought. Thus I justify the use of *Centre* and *Circumference* in reference to Space. God has been said to be a Being who has his centre everywhere and his circumference nowhere. So the *centre* of Space is only the point assumed by the will as the origin of motion, which may be taken anywhere, — and its *circumference* is determined only by the distance to which the motion is willed to extend. There is no true "image" in this thought, because there is no expression either of Quality or Quantity; no particular movement willed, but only an unlimited place for motion: and the word *circumference* is used only to denote that this possibility of motion is thought of as equally possible in all directions.

I am, with much respect, yours,

EDW. VANSITTART NEALE.

[The passage referred to by Mr. Neale is contained in the North American Review for July, 1864, p. 114, and is expressed as follows: — "To a limited extent, E. V. Neale accepts Trendelenburg's psychological theory (Analogy of Thought and Nature, 1863, pp. 28, 29): 'As Trendelenburg has shown, ... all attempts to explain the thought of Space made by the profoundest thinkers either imply the thought of Space, or fall into absurdity. .... The thought of Space is no sooner formed, than it distinguishes itself into two *opposite* thoughts, that of centre and circumference; which imply, while they deny each other.' Such a 'thought of Space' is clearly a sensuous image of Extension."

Nothing could be farther from literary justice, or from our own intention, than to quote an isolated passage from Mr. Neale's work, and wrest it to an interpretation at variance with the general tenor of the context. But, notwithstanding the above explanations, we are constrained to adhere to our former criticism. The passage in question was selected at random as representative of an error pervading the entire work, — an error which is ingrained into its fundamental theory. The distinctions which we endeavored to establish between Space and Extension are everywhere overlooked or neglected in it, especially the distinction between them as to imaginability. Though intended "to shadow forth the more subtile conceptions of thought," all sensuous symbolism of Space inevitably materializes it, and yields only illustrations of Extension. The circle or sphere, with a centre and circumference bearing definite and fixed relations to each other, is inadmissible even as an illustration of absolute and limitless vacuity; for it determines that which is, on pain of contradiction, indeterminable. A "centre of Space" may be "taken anywhere"; but, once taken, it is fixed, and conceivable only by the sensuous imagination as an element of a limited, geometrical figure. Such a conception, therefore, far from symbolizing Space, which is a bare, void condition of things, yields only a concrete image of Extension. The idea of Space can be arrived at only by pursuing a very different route.

The error of Mr. Neale is, as we conceive, enveloped in the germinal principle of his theory. Motion, as the *a priori* condition of the "constructive action of thought," upon which he lays so much stress, is logically posterior to the thing moved, and the thing moved is logically posterior to Space and Time, the conditions of things in general. Hence motion is not the first fact, or "substance of our thoughts." Indeed, motion, being a mere predicate, and not a subject, manifestly cannot stand alone at all, as an object of thought. The influence of Trendelenburg is powerfully apparent in Mr. Neale's work; and both writers confound motion with activity in general. All motion is activity, but all activity is not motion; activity is a generic term, of which motion, or the activity of matter, and the activity of mind, for which we have no generic name, are the species. Hence to explain all facts, physical and mental, by means of motion alone, evidently materializes philosophy, however unintentionally, and renders the confusion of imagination and pure intellection (and consequently the confusion of Space with Extension) a logical necessity of the procedure. The "constructive action of thought," viewed as the activity of mind representing matter and creating new combinations of it, throws much light upon the nature of the sensuous imagination, and in this respect philosophy owes much

to Trendelenburg and his school; but viewed as *entire* activity of thought, it is only a fragment put for the whole. Mr. Neale's work is ingenious and very suggestive; and, despite a certain want of lucidity caused by deficient analysis, is a valuable contribution to metaphysical literature. Its aim and scope enlist our sympathy and respect; and we trust it is the harbinger of other works.

We are obliged, by the necessity for brevity, to omit further remarks on Mr. Neale's note; but perhaps enough has been said to substantiate our former criticism.]

APPENDIX.

THE SEMI-CENTENARY OF THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

THE completion of the fiftieth year of the existence of the North American Review is an event of such importance in its career, and of such interest in relation to the periodical literature of America, as to justify special commemoration. Few if any other quarterly or monthly periodicals in this country have attained so long a continuance of life, and no other similar publication has been more ably sustained, or received more constant and cordial support from the public.

The long line of its one hundred volumes contains the record of a period full of changes in the political and social, as well as the literary, conditions of the country, and through this series of years the Review has done good service, not only in maintaining and advancing the standard of American letters and scholarship, but also in defending the principles on which American institutions rest, and in illustrating their value and adaptation to the needs of free society. It has not been unfaithful to the pledge implied in its great name, and those among its founders who still survive to receive the respect of their countrymen may look back with honorable satisfaction to the share they had in the establishment of a journal which has held so high a place, and acquired so creditable and well-deserved a reputation.

The history of the North American Review, if written in full, would be the history of the progress of American literature for fifty years. The earlier years of this century were years of small things in letters. The intellectual energies of the people were employed in other than literary pursuits. Not one American author had yet won for himself enduring popularity or distinction. There were no greater names in our national

literature than those, now perhaps too much neglected, of Trumbull, Dwight, and Charles Brockden Brown. Irving had published in 1809 his Knickerbocker's History of New York, but his triumphs had scarcely begun. Everett left college in 1811; Prescott, in 1814; Bancroft, in 1817. In Boston there was more literary cultivation and activity than in other parts of the country. Buckminster and Channing had raised the style of pulpit eloquence, no less than the character of religious thought. The Anthology Club brought together a good number of clever men, and the "Monthly Anthology" was by far the best magazine that had been published in America. But the Anthology ceased to appear in 1811, and a journal of wider scope and higher character was required to meet the needs of the times.

What those needs were, and with what design the North American Review was established, are set forth in the following extract from an essay by Mr. William Tudor, the founder of the Review.

"The powerful influence of the French Revolution and the universal interest it excited in all civilized countries, not only pervading the literature of every nation, but marshalling all the world in its contagious quarrels, had for well-known reasons an extraordinary dominion in this country. Political sympathies and antipathies gave a bias to all our opinions. In addition to which, we were so young in the career of literature, we ran so much risk of adopting barbarisms both in taste and sentiment, from the passionate vehemence of party feelings, and the presumption of rash pretenders, that many sound scholars saw no other mode to avert the threatened evils, than to show unlimited deference to the great standards of English learning. In following this course, they sometimes confounded the ideas of time and space; and blended the respect that was due to what was consecrated by the former, with a deference to opinions protected only by the latter, which might be often prejudiced, interested, and unsound. The danger that might thus arise is obvious; it may be compared to the apprehension that is felt in some countries respecting those who believe in the Papal supremacy, which if it could be confined to spirituals would be almost a matter of indifference, and is only dreaded on account of its opening a passage to the insidious entrance of political influence and the possession of temporal power. The admiration that was so justly felt for the illustrious names of English literature and politics in past ages, was often blindly given to their living descendants, whose infirmities were invisible at a

distance. These feelings sometimes produced a little too much severity in judging our own productions, and rather more submission to foreign criticism than impartial justice would have dictated in either case. The consequence was occasionally a want, or rather a suppression, of national feeling and independent judgment, that would sooner or later have become highly injurious.

"To counteract the tendency of this state of things, which, if I have not succeeded in describing it very clearly, will still be understood by many persons, was one of the chief motives in establishing this *Review*. The spirit of the work was national and independent as regarded foreign countries, yet not falling under the dominion of party at home; and the tone of it, in these respects, is I think different from that of any preceding journal. This tone it has always preserved, with one or two slight exceptions, and I do not know how far my vanity will be pardoned in making a claim to some agency in establishing it, as the only one I have to any merit connected with that work.

"The citizens of the United States are not yet emancipated, nor can they expect to be for some time to come, from a degree of dependence on foreign opinion in everything regarding literature. Yet criticism is every day gaining ground among us, obtaining wider influence as it displays greater talent, and the period is perhaps not very distant when foreign literary decisions will be sought for principally under the impulse of curiosity; and our own tribunals will be esteemed the supreme authority." *

The circumstances attending the establishment of the North American are stated in a communication which the present editors of the Review have had the pleasure of receiving from the Hon. Willard Phillips, and which they have much satisfaction in being permitted to publish. Judge Phillips says: —

"In December, 1814, and January, 1815, an association was formed for starting a literary periodical, consisting of John Thornton Kirkland, then President of Harvard College, Edward T. Channing, afterward Professor in that institution, myself, and I think one or two others, of which, however, I am not certain. The title proposed was 'The New England Magazine and Review,' and I was to be editor of it. Articles of association were adopted, and sundry meetings were held, the records of which were made by Mr. Channing as secretary, and, as I have been told, a copy of them is still extant. In this stage of our

* Miscellanies, by the Author of "Letters on the Eastern States," (Boston, 1821, 12mo,) p. 56.

progress Dr. Kirkland learned that a similar publication had been projected by Mr. William Tudor, then just returned from his travels in Europe,* a gentleman in high esteem for his social and literary accomplishments. The field was thereupon left open to Mr. Tudor, under whose editorship the first number of 'The North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal' was published, in May, 1815.†

"At the end of the first year Mr. Tudor passed the Review to our original association, offering to continue his editorship another year gratuitously, the articles to be contributed or procured by us. The association was then remodelled, and as remodelled consisted of John Gallison, the reporter of the early decisions of Judge Story in the Circuit Court of the United States; ‡ Nathan Hale, editor of the Boston Daily Advertiser, and well known for his indefatigable industry, his ability and probity, and the active part he took in divers public improvements; Richard H. Dana, who still survives with merited honors;

---

* Subsequently author of the Life of James Otis, and Consul of the United States at Rio Janeiro.

† It was to come out every alternate month. After September, 1818, it appeared quarterly, and after April, 1821, "Miscellaneous Journal" was dropped from the title.

‡ John Gallison was a young man of uncommon force of character, moral excellence, and intellectual distinction. He died in Boston, in 1820, at the early age of thirty-two. He had won the affection and respect of a large circle of friends, and his life had given such promise that his death was regarded as a public loss. A brief memoir of him was written by Dr. Channing, and is to be found in the volume of Channing's Discourses, Reviews, and Miscellanies, published in 1830. In speaking of his views on the subject of war, Dr. Channing states the following facts, which give evidence of the superiority of Mr. Gallison's judgment and intelligence, and have a special interest at the present day. "He believed that society had made sufficient advances to warrant the attempt to expunge from the usages of war the right of capturing private property at sea. He believed that the evils of war would be greatly abridged, and its recurrence checked, were the ocean to be made a safe, privileged, unmolested pathway for all nations, whether in war or peace; and that the minds of men had become prepared for this change, by the respect now paid by belligerents to private property on shore, a mitigation of war to be wholly ascribed to the progress of the principles and spirit of Christianity. His interest in this subject led him to study the history of maritime warfare, and probably no man among us had acquired a more extensive acquaintance with it. Some of the results he gave in an article in the North American Review [July, 1820] on Privateering, and in a Memorial to Congress against this remnant of barbarism. To this field of labor he certainly was not drawn by the hope of popularity; and though he outstripped the feelings of the community, his efforts will not be in vain. He was a pioneer in a path in which society, if it continue to advance, will certainly follow him, and will at length do justice to the wisdom as well as purity of his design."

An article on the "Character of Mr. Gallison," written by Mr. Phillips, appeared in the North American for April, 1821. — Eds.

Edward T. Channing; William P. Mason, successor to Gallison as reporter; myself, and Jared Sparks, whose name has been familiar to the public from that day to this. Mr. Sparks, then Tutor in Harvard College, acted as editor [from May, 1817], and Mr. F. C. Gray, though not taking any responsibility in the conduct of the work, was almost as constant in his attendance at our meetings as the others I have named, and a frequent contributor of valuable communications.

"When the Review came into our hands it was in need of the most rigid economy in its pecuniary means. No pay was offered for articles, and the allowance of twenty-five per cent commission to the publishers seemed to weigh heavily upon it. This commission I proposed to save by taking the copies from the printers to my office, and with such assistance as I could command they were addressed and despatched to subscribers, this labor not being then so onerous as we could have wished. But the former publishers, Messrs. Wells and Lilly, afterwards liberally offered to continue to be publishers gratuitously for one year.

"We held meetings weekly at Gallison's rooms, at which our own articles and those of friends and correspondents were read and criticised and decided upon. Some of our literary friends attended our meetings by invitation to read their own contributions, or to hear those of others upon subjects in which those invited were skilled and supposed to take interest. We also solicited articles upon particular subjects from literary friends at a distance. These meetings were kept up with much interest, vivacity, and harmony, and the zeal and spirit of our association were by degrees infused into our correspondents, and resulted in the increase of our subscription list, and in contributions of articles.

"The work was conducted in this manner for some time. In May, 1818, Mr. Channing became editor, assisted by the same coadjutors, excepting Mr. Sparks, who then, if I remember rightly, left Cambridge for Baltimore.

"I leave the subsequent history of the Review to others."

The history of the Review is taken up at the point where Judge Phillips leaves it by the Hon. Edward Everett, in the following interesting communication, which the editors owe to his kindness.

"I assumed the editorship of the North American Review in January, 1820, having been requested to take charge of it when I returned from Europe in October, 1819.

"The Review was at that time still the property of the association of gentlemen mentioned by Judge Phillips, by whom I was invited to be-

come the editor. They had been in the habit of holding stated meetings to consider the articles offered for insertion, and this practice was for a while kept up in my time. But it was attended with inconvenience; I lived in Cambridge, the other members lived in Boston; contributions did not abound; often came in at the last moment, and when it would have been impossible, while the press was stopping, to call a special meeting of the Club. Under these circumstances the sole editorship gradually passed into my hands.

"When I assumed the conduct of the journal, it barely paid its expenses, yielding no *honorarium* to editor or contributors. The subscription was stationary; five or six hundred, if I remember rightly, at the outside. It rose so rapidly under the new *régime*, that three editions were published of one or more of the numbers of the new series, and two of some others. I acted as editor for the years 1820, 1821, 1822, 1824, eight volumes.* The editorship was then assumed by Mr. Sparks, but on his going to Europe, I again, at his request, took charge of the Review during his absence.

"The Review had, from its foundation, received the contributions of the most respectable scholars and writers of this neighborhood, and of a few from other parts of the United States. This continued more and more to be the case in my time. There was scarcely a person of liter-

---

* The character that the Review sustained under the editorship of Mr. Everett is indicated by the following remarks, which appeared as a foot-note to an article by Lord Jeffrey, on the Sketch Book, in the Edinburgh Review for August, 1820.

"While we are upon the subject of American literature, we think ourselves called upon to state, that we have lately received two numbers, being those for January and April last, of 'The North American Review or Miscellaneous Journal,' published quarterly at Boston, which appears to us to be by far the best and most promising production of the press of that country that has ever come to our hands. It is written with great spirit, learning, and ability, on a great variety of subjects; and abounds with profound and original discussions on the most interesting topics. Though abundantly patriotic, or rather national, there is nothing offensive or absolutely unreasonable in the tone of its politics; and no very reprehensible marks either of national partialities or antipathies. The style is generally good, though with considerable exceptions, — and sins oftener from affectation than ignorance. But the work is of a powerful and masculine character, and is decidedly superior to anything of the kind that existed in Europe twenty years ago.

"It is a proud thing for *us* to see Quarterly Reviews propagating bold truths and original speculations in all quarters of the world; and when we grow old and stupid ourselves, we hope still to be honored in the talents and merits of those heirs of our principles, and children of our example."

After the lapse of nearly fifty years the North American may reciprocate the good wishes of the Edinburgh, with the hope that at the end of the century it may still flourish, and, emulating its early honors, may once more display the same qualities which gave it distinction and influence at the beginning. — Eds.

ary, scientific, or professional eminence in this part of the country that did not, first or last, appear as a writer in the North American Review. Among those who wrote at least one article, — most of them more than one in my time, — I may mention among the deceased, Chief Justice Shaw, Mr. Webster, Judge Story, Dr. Bowditch, Mr. John Pickering, Mr. John Gallison, Professor Farrar, Mr. F. C. Gray, Mr. Henry Wheaton (then of New York), Mr. W. J. Spooner, Mr. W. H. Prescott, Drs. John Ware and Enoch Hale, Professor Sidney Willard, Mr. Nathan Hale, General T. Lyman, Professor Kingsley of New Haven, and my brother, Mr. A. H. Everett, then *Chargé d'Affaires* at the Hague and Brussels. These all have passed away; *omnes composui.* Of those who remain, and who rendered me valuable assistance by writing at least one article, many of them several, I may name Messrs. Willard Phillips and W. Powell Mason, and J. G. Palfrey, (members of the Club,) W. C. Bryant, Professor Theophilus Parsons, President Sparks, Mr. J. G. Cogswell, Mr. J. C. Gray, Mr. Justice Metcalf, Mr. Edward Brooks, Dr. Jacob Bigelow, Mr. G. B. Emerson, Dr. N. L. Frothingham, and Mr. Caleb Cushing. The late Mr. William Sturgis wrote a very valuable article on the Northwest Coast of America. The too unhappily remembered Professor J. W. Webster wrote two or three articles on scientific subjects of considerable value. During my first editorship my most frequent and efficient contributor was my brother, A. H. Everett, who continued to render me the most essential aid during Mr. Sparks's absence in Europe. At this time the twin brothers, the Messrs. Peabody, rendered me invaluable aid. Their articles were always punctually sent in, were always well written in pure, unaffected, idiomatic English, always interesting and instructive. Mr. Caleb Cushing was also one of my most valuable contributors.

"During my first editorship, I was just entering on my duties as a Professor at Cambridge, and when I resumed the conduct of the journal, I was a member of Congress, and of course, on both occasions, I had other arduous duties upon my hands. Being obliged to depend upon my own pen for too large a proportion of the matter that filled the pages of the Review, I often wrote hastily, now and then *musâ invitâ;* but the public was favorable, and allowance was made for the circumstances in which I was placed. On one occasion, being desirous of reviewing Dean Funes' History of Paraguay, Buenos Ayres, and Tucuman, published at Buenos Ayres in 1817, in 3 vols., 8vo, and having no knowledge of Spanish, I took lessons for three weeks of good Mr. Sales, and at the end of that time the article was written. There is, however, nothing remarkable in this, for a person having some knowledge of the Latin, French, and Italian.

"The foregoing enumeration of contributors, both deceased and living, is incomplete, and relates chiefly to my first editorship. It is hardly necessary to say, that I have never ceased to feel a deep interest in the journal. I continued to be a frequent contributor to it till I went to Europe a second time, in 1840. Since that time, under the pressure of official and other duties and cares, I have very seldom written an article, (the last was in January, 1856, being a review of the sixth edition of Mr. Wheaton's International Law,) the rather as the succeeding generation, in the number and ability of its writers, and the higher standard of periodical literature, has made all assistance from its predecessors unnecessary."

The following letter, with which the editors have been favored by the Hon. J. G. Palfrey, continues the history of the Review, with a series of pleasant reminiscences.

Boston, 1864, December 7.

To the Editors of the North American Review.

"My dear Sirs: — You desire me to acquaint you with some of my 'recollections of the foundation of the Review, of its early course, and of its history' while I was its editor. If I am to relate that 'which I saw, and part of which I was,' I must perforce be egotistical.

"The first number of the Review was issued in May, 1815, when I was a youth in College, and of course was not so situated as to be informed respecting the circumstances of the enterprise.

"Before the autumn of 1819, my only connection with the work was that of an occasional contributor. My first essay in it, I believe, was in May, 1817, — a review of Professor Willard's 'Hebrew Grammar,' discussing the origin and value of the Masoretic punctuation. In another piece, in the next following number, on the first series of 'Tales of my Landlord,' the authorship of Scott's novels being still unknown, I argued the identity of the author of 'Marmion' and 'the author of Waverley' from the identity of the manner of presenting battle scenes in the novels and in the poems.* Another contribution of mine, a little later, had for its subject the poem by Mr. Eastburn and Mr. Sands of New York (*quis desiderio sit modus?*) entitled,

* Shall I set down a little incident relating to this matter? In the summer of 1819, I dined at Kingston, Upper Canada, with the officers of a Scottish regiment. One of the theories of the day was, that "the author of Waverley" was Sir Walter's brother, who was paymaster of that regiment. He was not at the table; but I sat next to an officer named *Dalgetty*. (Whether his other name was *Dugald*, I did not learn.) The coincidence was suggestive.

'Yamoyden, a Tale of Philip's War.' I find it, without surprise, to have been a specimen of quite exuberant youthful rhetoric, but it was not too far behind the taste of the time to be received with favor.

"Glancing at the contents of the work in the early days to which I have hitherto referred, I find them illustrated by names which were already, or have since been, recognized as among our greatest in literature, in science, or in other walks of the public service. Let me (*absit invidia!*) specify some of them. It was through these pages that, in 1817, Bryant burst into fame with his 'Thanatopsis,' and 'Lines to a Waterfowl.' John Adams contributed a series of papers on the Order of Jesuits. Gulian Verplanck wrote on the 'History of the New Netherlands'; Daniel Webster, on the Battle of Bunker Hill, and on the third volume of Wheaton's 'Reports'; Judge Story, on Hoffman's 'Course of Legal Study,' and on Maritime Law. President Kirkland furnished two articles on University Education; Mr. (afterwards President) Quincy, one on the Commerce of the United States, and one on Agriculture; William Jones Spooner, and Francis William Winthrop, both of whom death took away early from the prospect of a brilliant course, showed in this work some of the qualities that still keep their memory green in some hearts. John Pickering discussed in two papers his favorite subjects of Education and Philology. Andrews Norton treated the Inaugural Discourse of his friend, Professor Frisbie, and the Life and Writings of Dr. Franklin. Richard H. Dana wrote a few times. Francis C. Gray was a frequent contributor. Dr. Gilman (afterwards of Charleston, South Carolina) produced a series of most spirited metrical versions of Satires of Boileau. From Europe, where he was studying, George Ticknor sent one article or more. Prescott, I believe, did not so early profit the Review with any work of his. Years afterwards, when I was editor, with that strict method that characterized him, he used to give me one article a year, — neither more nor less, except in one year, when, instead of the article of customary length, he gave me two, covering together the normal number of pages.

"When, in the autumn of 1819, Mr. Edward T. Channing, having been appointed Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory at the University, withdrew from the charge of the work, I first became an associate of the gentlemen who owned it, and by whom, as in the previous period, arrangements continued to be made, and contributions to be examined. At this time the immediate supervision of the Review was intrusted to Mr. Edward Everett, then just returned from Europe, who presently raised and extended its reputation by the numerous productions of his fluent and scholarly pen. The publication was now changed from

bi-monthly to quarterly; and, miscellaneous matter being excluded, the work took the form of the English Reviews.

"After three or four years more, it came to be felt as a burden by men, all of whom had now other engrossing pursuits and objects; and Mr. Sparks, who had come back to Boston from Baltimore, where he had lived three years, was disposed to take it under his sole charge. In the autumn of 1823, the editorship and (by purchase) the property of the Review were accordingly transferred to him, and the association was disbanded. While he was editor, that increase of the circulation of the work, which had been so great from the beginning of Mr. Everett's connection with it, was continued. He introduced into it the new feature of the 'Critical Notices.' Before his time, unless my memory misleads me, nothing had been paid for the literary contributions. The writers were mostly young, and their pens were moved by the impulses which are apt to stimulate young scholars. In those days too, though there was less scholarship than now, literary eminence or promise constituted, relatively to other things, a higher claim than it does now to social position. Boston was then a place of little wealth, and of simple habits and tastes. It was provincial, but it was hearty, and it esteemed learning and literary ambition.

"After the voluntary system of contribution was disused, the pay was always uniform, so far as I know, however famous or obscure the contributor. It had never been higher, when, in 1843, I relinquished the management of the Review, than a dollar for the page of *small pica* type, and two dollars for the page of *long primer* used in the 'Critical Notices.'

"Mr. Alexander H. Everett, who had been Minister of the United States to the Spanish Court, bought the work of Mr. Sparks in the summer of 1830, and became its editor; and in the same manner it came into my hands after the publication of the last number of the year 1835. I had occasionally written for it in the preceding years, and during part of the time of Mr. Sparks's absence in Europe, in 1825, I had had charge of it as editor. I may mention, as an occurrence which can scarcely be supposed to have escaped my memory, that on the first night after the property of the work became mine, a large portion of the stock of back-numbers was consumed by fire, — not a cheerful beginning.

"It would be impertinent for me to specify the embarrassing circumstances in which I conducted the work for seven years. I will, however, remind you that, during more than half of that period, I was at the head of one of the professional schools of the University, lecturing and teaching eleven times every week, and one of the three Sunday

preachers in the University Chapel; and that, within the same time, I wrote and published two volumes of an elaborate treatise on the Hebrew Scriptures. It is not unreasonable to presume that I should have managed the North American Review more to my own satisfaction and to that of the public, had fewer occupations of a different nature divided my attention. Its circulation, however, was not understood to have declined between the time when I received it and the time when, with a confident hope of seeing it inspired with new life, I parted with it to Professor Bowen.

"At all events, whatever deficiency there was, was my own. I had coadjutors of the first quality. The former editors, Channing, Sparks, and the brothers Everett, and the later editors, Bowen and Andrew P. Peabody, all gave me valuable contributions from time to time. Among eminent persons now living who helped me were Professor Peirce; Admiral (then Lieutenant) Davis; Governor Cass, who sent me results of his observations in Egypt and in Mexico; Willard Phillips; Caleb Cushing; George S. Hillard; William H. Gardiner; William H. Prescott; George W. Greene, of Rhode Island, then living in Italy; Dr. Worcester, the lexicographer; Richard H. Dana, Jr.; Oliver Wendell Holmes; Charles Francis Adams; Mrs. Fanny Kemble Butler; Mrs. Robinson, the very learned and accomplished wife of the distinguished traveller in the Holy Land, who gave me some papers of the utmost curiosity on the poetry of Southeastern Europe; President Wayland; Charles Sumner; Ralph Waldo Emerson; and Henry W. Longfellow. Among those now dead were Moses Stuart; Andrews Norton; Rufus Choate; Captain Slidell McKenzie, of the Navy; Colonel Whiting, of the Army; Cornelius C. (since President) Felton; Henry Ware, Jr.; James H. Perkins, of Cincinnati, a short-lived man of rare ability; John Pickering; Franklin Dexter; Henry R. Schoolcraft, the Indian explorer; George Sumner; Henry D. Gilpin, of Philadelphia, President Van Buren's Attorney-General, a scholar of various and elegant culture; Professor Kingsley, of New Haven; Nathan Hale; Dr. Robinson; and the twin brothers (Oliver William Bourne and William Bourne Oliver) Peabody.

"Since I am in the garrulous vein, let me dwell for a moment on the recollection of these two men of beautiful genius. They died about the same time, sixteen years ago. I knew them well almost all their lives. I was their schoolmate and playmate for two years, and their college contemporary for three years more; and our relations were kept up with some intimacy as long as they lived. So like were they, that I never knew them apart. To my perception, the resemblance was perfect in face, form, mien, voice, movement, and manner. Their hand-

writing was peculiar, but the handwriting of each was to me undistinguishable from that of the other. Both were copious writers in poetry and prose. Their style of thought and of writing was very marked. It had a character of delicacy, tenderness, grace, vivacity, and humor altogether its own. It could not be mistaken for the style of any other person but the twin brothers. But it seemed absolutely the same in both.

"As I turn over the ancient pages that revive the figure that they made when they came to be corrected for the press, here and there an editorial embarrassment and distress, with its extrication or disaster, recur to my memory. When promises proved deceptive, — as editorial experience shows that they sometimes will, — and the unprovided quarter-day for a public appearance was approaching with a step every moment sounding louder on the excited nerve, there was no succor for which I looked with more confident hope than that which my admirable friend, President Felton, was always able and ready to afford. His prompt and important kindnesses to me in this way constitute not one of his highest claims, but one of his substantial claims to my grateful and affectionate remembrance.

"Sometimes, on the contrary, there was an *embarras de richesses.* The longest paper I ever inserted in the Review was the learned and able one (in the number for January, 1838) on Prescott's 'Ferdinand and Isabella,' then just issued. The preparation of the article had been delayed till the number was almost due, and as I had perfect confidence in the writer, I began to print soon after he began to write, and he kept on just before me, sending instalments of his manuscript day by day. What with the fertility of his mind, the extent and interest of the subject, and his ardor for his friend, his work grew to unexpected proportions as he proceeded; Alps on Alps arose; I had made no sufficient provision of paper for such an affluence of discussion, and the printer reported that his stock was out, while the manuscript continued to flow in. I sent him to buy paper wherever it could be found; and, luckily for the credit of my punctuality and for the gratification of the public, who would not have been willing to lose a line of such a composition, the market proved to be sufficiently supplied.

"Some other *contretems* of a different kind come up to my remembrance. For the July number of 1836, my old friend, Judge Bullard of Louisiana, had furnished me a carefully argued paper on the relations between Mexico and Texas. From certain premises, largely set down, he proved that Texas was the certain prey of General Santa Anna, then in hot march upon it. Whether or not from some misgivings of my own as to the result, I held back the printing of this article

till June. At last, however, it was all, or nearly all in type, when one fine morning came news of Houston's rout of the Mexican host at San Jacinto. Here was a skein to unravel. Judge Bullard's premises had to stand, — they were a fixed quantity; — but his conclusion had to be superseded. The curious reader may learn what kind of a piece of work I made of it — I have not refreshed my own memory as to this — by turning to the article.

"When Antonio Gallenga was in this country under the name of Luigi Mariotti, he furnished me a few articles for the Review, which were full of life and of knowledge. He had not then learned to write English as he has written it since, and his pieces required a good deal of working over to rid them of inaccuracies as to idiom, though frequently, on the other hand, his turns of phrase had striking idiomatic force and beauty. In the April number of 1838, he contributed a paper which I published, on the life and death of Marie Louise, ex-Empress of France. I was so simple as to presume, on this showing, that she had paid the debt of nature. Whether he was equally ignorant on the subject, I am to this day uninformed, though, all things considered, I may be pardoned for having my strong suspicions. Certain it is, that some years later the living Austrian may have read the story of her death in the North American Review.

"For another and a deeply mortifying mishap, I have myself to blame, and I have never ceased to take myself severely to task for it. Fifteen years ago, there was in Boston an Englishman of some literary note, who had lived in Belgium. After writing for me two or three times, and very unexceptionably and agreeably, he offered me a piece on the Belgian Revolution, which I readily accepted. I was overwhelmed with other engagements at the time, in the midst of a course of semi-weekly lectures, of which nearly every one was written after its predecessor was delivered; the Belgian Revolution, to my heedless view, was as free from elements of offence, as the Equator seemed to Sidney Smith; and, as to the mere execution of the piece, I knew the person in question to be an educated and practised writer. In these circumstances, I was misled into an indiscretion of which I was never guilty at any other time, before or afterwards. I allowed the piece to go to the press without examination, and it appeared in my number for January, 1841. I did not read it, or think of it again, when it was in print. Judge what were my amazement and dismay when, two years later, a friend pointed out to me that it had been made the vehicle of an indecent affront to one of the most eminent of European statesmen, — a man as admirable for all personal qualities of mind and character, as conspicuous for the honors of a great public career. The case admitted of

no apology. If apology had been possible, the time for it had passed by. There was nothing for me but to bear my chagrin and shame in silence.

"I have tried carefully to recollect myself for these slight statements. But I cannot answer for the absolute exactness of all of them.

"Faithfully yours,

"JOHN G. PALFREY."

The Review passed into the hands of Mr. Francis Bowen at the close of 1842, and was edited by him until the close of 1853. It gave conspicuous proof during this period of the industry, ability, and various acquisition of the editor, and of the excellence of the contributors by whom he was assisted. On Mr. Bowen's appointment as Professor of Moral Philosophy in Harvard University, he was succeeded in the charge of the Review by the Rev. Andrew P. Peabody, D. D., who continued to edit it until the close of 1863. The character it has sustained during these years is well known to the present generation of readers. Its history since Dr. Palfrey retired from its editorship is too recent to be narrated with propriety in detail. On the list of its contributors during this period may be found the eminent names of Motley, Holmes, Asa Gray, H. W. Torrey, A. H. Clough, R. H. Dana, Jr., T. W. Higginson, E. P. Whipple, and J. Foster Kirk, — a worthy continuation of a catalogue which begins with such names as Irving, Bryant, Prescott, Ticknor, and Bancroft.

The last twenty years have wrought great changes in the conditions of literature in America, corresponding to the changes in our social and political conditions. The natural results of the continued working of our institutions have shown themselves in the development of a marked national character, in such a diffusion of property, comfort, and intelligence among the mass of the people as no other nation has ever known. The activity which is the combined result of external circumstances and free institutions has been exhibited not less in intellectual than in material progress. Common schools have made a nation of readers, and literary production has kept pace with cultivation. American literature is now independent, conscious of its strength, aware of its defects, and stimulated to excellence by such rewards as were never before or

elsewhere offered to success in literary achievement. But in many respects our literature is still unsatisfactory as an expression of the national character. It displays too frequently the want of simplicity and thoroughness. It is too often deficient not only in form and finish, the results of a high standard of taste, but in the more substantial qualities of thought and learning. It is defaced by the pretensions and worthless productions of an ignorance often unconscious of its own incapacity. It is not yet worthy of its unrivalled opportunities.

But the present war is deepening the thoughts of men, and has given to the people a fresh and stronger conviction of the worth of truth, and of the fact that education, in its largest and highest sense, is the only means by which our institutions can be securely maintained and successfully worked. Literature must share, is already sharing, in the new and better impulses of the times. As one of the great instruments of education a demand is made upon her, a demand which she will answer, for greater sincerity, simplicity, directness, and thoroughness.

It is sometimes said that the days of the Quarterlies is passed, that in these days of speed men cannot wait, as their predecessors could well do, for an opinion, three months after the event, and cannot find time to read the careful essay on matters which have been already discussed and settled by the daily or monthly press. No doubt the excellence and the wide diffusion of newspapers and monthly magazines have rendered the comparative position of the Quarterly Review very different from what it formerly was. But it still has a definite place to fill, and a valuable work to perform. To say nothing of its lighter functions, it addresses itself to the limited, though still large class in the community, who are themselves the leaders and formers of popular opinion; to those who are not averse to serious thought on the most important topics of the times; to those who desire to know and be instructed by men who have made a study of special subjects, and are willing to communicate the results of their studies to the public. The Quarterly need not always follow, it may precede the daily press. It may not, perhaps, control, but it may hope sometimes to rectify public opinion. And one of its most impor-

tant functions is more purely literary; it is to hold up a high standard of thought, of learning, of style, and by vigorous and independent criticism to improve, so far as lies within its power, the public taste. It is no trivial work thus to help in the formation of a literature worthy of the nation.

And to perform this work the Review must rely not only on the efforts of those who have it immediately in charge, but on the assistance and support of men who are competent to render it, — of genuine scholars, of sound and liberal thinkers, who believe in, and are working for, the progress of their country and of mankind.

If the North American Review shall receive such aid, and thus be enabled to accomplish even in part the work which such a Quarterly may perform, it will anticipate with confidence the happy arrival of its one hundredth birthday.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCVII.

APRIL, 1865.

ART. I. — *England and America. A Lecture read before the Boston Fraternity, and published in the Atlantic Monthly for December*, 1864. By GOLDWIN SMITH. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865. 8vo. pp. 56.

IT is generally admitted, even by the enemies of the United States, that not only material comfort, but also a considerable degree of intellectual cultivation, is here far more widely diffused among the people than in any other country. But that in our community there is a wider development of moral sentiment, and a higher moral standard of conduct, both in private and public affairs, than are to be found elsewhere, has not been so readily acknowledged, and has not, perhaps, been sufficiently affirmed in our own social and political speculations. There is, however, no result of the conditions of society in America more certain or more important. We are far indeed from asserting that our people as a whole are morally superior to special classes in other nations; we assert only that, as a whole, they are morally superior to the population of any foreign country.

However strong may be the support given to this claim by a comparative view of society in this and other countries, it would still be open to question, and might fairly be set down, if not as an arrogant, at least as an unproved assumption, were it not that the causes of the facts upon which the claim is based are not less evident than the facts themselves, and are of such nature that these results must be regarded as effects necessarily

proceeding from them. The diffusion of material prosperity and of a degree of intellectual cultivation forms a deeper and more solid foundation for the support and growth of moral sentiment than is found elsewhere. The quality of the moral notions possessed by an individual depends primarily on his freedom from the pressure of purely selfish wants, and on his appreciation of the wants of others, and of the relation of his wants to theirs. In a community, therefore, like our own, we find more intelligent moral ideas than in a community of which the greater number are scarcely raised above the level of poverty. And while the diffusion of wealth and education thus gives us this advantage, the nature of our social and political institutions confirms and increases it. The first notion of morality is that of the responsibility of the individual for the consequences of his conduct. In a society in which there is no factitious division of classes, and in which every man shares, under the law, in the direction of affairs according to his will and his ability, the sense of responsibility is constantly stimulated. A civic conscience is created, which holds up an ideal rule for the judgment of the performance both of private and of public duties. Its decisions may be affected by passion, prejudice, or interest; but it does not fail to pronounce them, and in pronouncing them to rectify in some degree its former errors. The appeal is continually made from selfishness to the highest rule of conduct which the enlightenment of the community has enabled it to discover. The development of the moral sentiment and the growth of moral ideas are thus the natural, inevitable, necessary consequences of free democratic institutions. That these consequences may be checked by outward circumstances, and that moral degeneracy may follow, may in some instances be true; but such instances must be exceptional, and need not be considered in our argument. The general conclusion does not admit of question, that free institutions, based upon material prosperity and popular education, are the most powerful means that can be adopted for raising the moral standard of a community.

And it is because in America we are possessed of these conditions that we have attained to a comparative moral superiority, which ought to be more distinctly recognized by ourselves than it has heretofore been, not as an isolated fact, or as a

motive for national conceit, but as involving consequences of the greatest moment both socially and politically. In so far as politics rest upon a moral foundation, it is plain that their character must be determined by the moral principles of the people. These principles are to find expression in the conduct of public and national affairs, in our dealings with foreign nations, in our treatment of races other than our own. But the application of the principles of right to public national and international affairs has been in the past history of the world very imperfect and irregular. The traditions of all national histories are traditions of force, violence, and fraud. The very idea that politics are but a branch of ethics, an idea essential to the correct conception of political duties, is not yet accepted and acted upon by those who have the guidance of public affairs even in the most civilized states. The conduct of statesmen and politicians is neither guided nor judged by any absolute and pure rule of morality. Hence the relations of governors and governed have been, and still are, determined rather by selfish interests than by considerations of justice. The dealings of nation with nation have been, and still are, regulated, so far as they submit to such regulation, by a compilation of customs, traditions, and current opinions, derived from ages of comparative darkness, and formed into an imperfect and fluctuating code, which has neither the command nor the sanction of law, and the authority of which may often be invoked in defence of injustice and wrong as strongly as in favor of justice and civilization.

But improvement in the moral sentiments of mankind precedes, by a longer or shorter interval, improvement in their conduct; and private morals feel and respond to the impulse of improved ideas much more easily and speedily than the morals of public affairs. In America there has been no exception to this general rule. Our political conduct has frequently failed to conform to the demands of that justice, which we acknowledged, but refused to obey. Our treatment of the Indians and of the negroes, to say nothing of other minor instances of the sort, will long remain a reproach upon our national character, and afford solid reason for distrust of our claims to a superior national morality.

But the events of late years are compelling us to learn that a

higher standard of action is required of us than has heretofore been attained; that old precedents from periods of less enlightenment, and from the history of nations less advanced in civilization, are not to be cited as authorities for our guidance; that maxims drawn from the experience of a period in which considerations of justice, humanity, and the brotherhood of men, were less understood in their application to public affairs than at present, are not fitted to the existing needs of our society; that we are not to follow the old paths, but to open new ones, in which we are to lead the advance of the world in the establishment of peace and good-will among men.

The mere taking of this high ground will enable us in some measure to maintain it. The progress of the world depends on the degree in which ideal excellence is acknowledged as a real object of desire and of effort. The want or disregard of ideal objects involves a moral deterioration alike in individuals and in communities. The upholding of an ideal standard is to make progress toward its attainment certain. By position and condition, as well as by the nature of our institutions, we are summoned to the performance of unexampled duties, and to the raising of the character and conduct of our own and other nations to a level hitherto unattained. In proportion to our exceptional advantages are our exceptional responsibilities.

It is no fanciful view that we take of our opportunities and duties. We urge no impracticable undertaking. We commend no impossible excellence. On the contrary, the work of improvement to which this nation is called is no matter of speculation, no conclusion from any chimerical theory, no unreal product of exaggerated national vanity; but is a substantial, practical necessity, forced upon us as one of the conditions of national existence. Such work, however, is always of irregular and halting execution. The course of improvement, the progress of civilization, is like that of a stream, now running forward with steady and peaceful flow, now seemingly turned backward and for a time bent away from its true direction, now lingering among the flat lowlands, now gathering head to hurry onward over obstacles which, instead of impeding, serve by their very agitation to purify and quicken its current. The progress that we have yet made as a nation is very little compared

to that which lies before us; but in the future, as in the past, progress will be difficult, slow, imperfect. We shall constantly come short of our ideal; but our interests will continually combine more and more closely with our duties to compel us by faithful and strenuous exertions to become worthy of our splendid and unparalleled opportunities.

The application of these truths to the whole matter of international relations is evident, but at this moment they have a special force in respect to the relations of the United States and England. The thought of war with England has become a familiar one among us of late. The course of the English government, and the conduct and expressions of the aristocratic and wealthy classes in England, during the last four years, have produced among us an almost universal feeling of bitterness and irritation. We are conscious, not only of having experienced wrong at English hands, — of having had the suppression of a rebellion that imperilled the existence of the nation made more arduous by sympathy and material aid rendered by Englishmen to the Rebels; but also, what it is more difficult for a high-spirited nation to forgive, — of having been treated with contumely, even with insult, by the most powerful organ of public opinion, and by the ministers of government, in England, — of having had our conduct maligned, our intentions misinterpreted, and our sacrifices and efforts in our great cause, the cause of government, of liberty, of human right, vulgarly belied and condemned. Our best, our most natural sensibilities have been hurt, and the result is a degree of exasperation toward England, the deeper for having been necessarily in great part suppressed, which endangers and will endanger for a long time to come the maintenance of peaceful relations between the two countries. The privateers which have swept our commerce from the seas were English built and English manned; the supplies with which the Rebels have eked out their slender resources have reached them through English agency; the very cannon with which their forts have been defended, the rifles and the swords with which they have fought us, have borne the stamp of English makers; the money with which their troops have been paid has been the loan of English capitalists. Is it strange that the confidence and friendship of the people of the United States have been turned into distrust and ill-will?

And it is not strange, however much it is to be regretted, that this ill-feeling has been promoted and cherished by the efforts of some among our own citizens. The friends of the Rebellion in the loyal States have exaggerated every offence of England, and have stimulated every passionate impulse of resentment on our part, in the hope of involving the two countries in war. They have understood that to engage the United States in a foreign war would be the greatest aid that could be rendered to the cause of the Rebellion. They have played upon the excitable feelings of that great portion of our Irish fellow-citizens who carry in their hearts an inextinguishable hatred of England. They have sought to excite popular passion to a degree which should render it uncontrollable by the better reason of the community, and should force the government to yield to its eager demands. Happily these machinations of the enemies of the country have been baffled alike by the common-sense of the majority of the people, and by the firmness, patience, and diplomatic skill of the President, the Secretary of State, and the American Minister in London.

But though these efforts have been thus checkmated for the time, they have not been without effect upon the general sentiment. And this effect has been seconded by other influences scarcely less dangerous because proceeding from men devoted to the service of the country.

The old traditions of enmity still rankle in the hearts of some of the officers of our army and navy, and there are hot-headed zealots among them who long for needless war. They have ill learned the first lesson of their profession, the prime object of which is, not the making or the fostering, but the reconciling, of enmities. More than once during the Rebellion has one of the distinguished officers of the navy taken occasion to display his own ill-feeling toward England, and to stimulate the passions of his subordinates against her. His services afford neither justification nor palliation of the impropriety thus committed toward his own government, not less than toward that of a nation with whom we are at peace. Gasconade is not always harmless. An admiral should not play with sparks in a powder-magazine.

The questions which have arisen during the war involving the right of neutrals and belligerents have been of the most delicate

nature, and have demanded the coolest temper and the wisest judgment for their settlement. The precedents which might furnish a clew to their correct solution were conflicting and uncertain. Fortunately, many of those derived from our own history were such as based the decisions of international law upon principles of justice. They were such as we were proud to follow, even though their application to the existing cases might be to our seeming hurt. But before a decision was reached, that great portion of the press of England from which we had no reason to expect fairness or friendliness of judgment united in loading our conduct in the occurrences in question with opprobrious epithets, in applying to our intentions the worst interpretations, and in counselling us in words that sounded like threats. To a nation conscious of its own integrity, such language was of no import, save as it indicated the existence of a feeling against us of which we had already much stronger evidence. Although the language may have been foul, and the insinuations base, yet the counsel of our enemy was correct. But against the arraignment of our British censors there was a vehement protest, on the fallacious ground that "those who would teach correct principles must begin with correct example." The ancient and the recent annals of England were searched to find precedents and incidents in her history having in them all that was indefensible in the cases in point. The task was not difficult. The ancient and recent history of England is fuller of warnings than of examples to a nation that desires to direct its course by the rule of right rather than that of force. If the public opinion of England declared itself on the side of right, whatever might be the motives or the terms of the decision, it was for us, as leaders in the work of improvement in the law of nations, to rejoice that the power of England was for the moment, at least, thrown upon the side on which we were contending, and for which we had often heretofore contended against her in vain. But the attempt was made, and not without success, to find in the new teachings of England an additional ground of irritation against her. *Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?* was exclaimed, and the trite, sensible, and appropriate old maxim, *Fas est et ab hoste doceri*, was apparently forgotten.

Undoubtedly the real root of this bitterness is not that England used to do so and so, but that men believe that, in spite of her present outcry against us for acts which are but copied from the example she has set us, and in spite of the intentions and declarations of her better men, she would do so again were the occasion to arise. But still this is no good reason for the indulgence on our part of recriminations which, so far as they have effect, tend to widen the breach of good feeling between us.

So, again, one of our distinguished orators, a man whose chief claim to honor it is that he has striven through a lifetime to rouse and uplift the moral sense of the community in regard to the great national calamity and sin of slavery, deserting his own principles, has joined his voice with that of the thoughtless or the disloyal in inflaming the prejudices of Americans, not only against our English enemies, but against our English friends. It is easy to do it. But even if our English friends, in the warmth of good-will, commit what in thin-skinned sensitiveness we fancy to be impertinences toward us, is it the part of an honorable Christian statesman to exaggerate their unintentional errors, and to pass over in silence their genuine purposes and actual services?

We cite these instances as illustrations of a spirit that is dangerous to the highest interests of civilization and of the country, mainly because it is fostered and indulged by men whose position and whose intelligence ought to make them the first to frown upon it and to check its manifestations.

In the Lecture, the title of which stands at the head of this article, Mr. Goldwin Smith has stated with rare clearness and admirable candor the conditions of opinion and feeling in the various classes of English society toward the United States, and explained their causes and motives. But it is not from his statements alone that we learn that, however just it may be to charge England in its collective capacity as a nation with wrongs committed against us, it is not just to charge the English people with them, or correct to assume that the great body of the people has other than good-will toward us. In Mr. Adams's reply to the address of the Emancipation Society in London, on the 15th of December last, he puts the true state of the case in a few words. "Whatever," he says, "may be

the hostility of some, it is by no means shared by the greater number of the British people, and ought not to be presumed to be a national impression." England is a divided nation, and neither the will of the body of her people nor the opinion and principles of her wisest men are fully represented in the acts and demeanor of her government.

Knowing this to be the case, we ought to consider how natural and how plain are the causes which have contributed to produce the feeling which has been manifested toward us, during the progress of the Rebellion, by the majority of the upper classes in England. To say nothing of the character of our history for twenty or thirty years past, which was well fitted to occasion, even in those friendly toward us, the most serious solicitude as to the influence of our institutions on national temper and disposition, to say nothing of the complicated circumstances and events, which the most intelligent foreigner could hardly be expected to comprehend, that led up to the outbreak of the Rebellion, and nothing of those falsehoods and pretences and those conditions of the war which were fitted to excite an ignorant and sentimental, but not the less genuine, sympathy for the Rebels, two preponderating causes yet remain amply sufficient to account for and palliate the aversion with which we have been regarded abroad, and the active efforts made by individuals to injure us and prevent our success, however insufficient to form a moral justification of this feeling and these acts. The first of these causes is the natural and instinctive hostility of an aristocracy, which feels that the current of civilization, as represented by the thoughts and desires of the masses of men, is turned against it, and that its dignities, privileges, prerogatives, and even its possessions, rest on a foundation which is gradually being mined by the advances of the modern spirit of democracy, — the natural and instinctive hostility, we say, of an aristocracy thus circumstanced towards a democratic community rising in power, in wealth, in dominion, and in happiness, to one of the first places among nations, and becoming by force of example alone "a standing menace" to the despotic and aristocratic polities of the Old World.

The second of these causes is one of still more general nature, from the operation of which no nation has a right to ex-

pect to be exempt, and against which none is yet far enough advanced to have a right to protest. This is the principle of commercial selfishness. The men with whom the greed of gain is superior to every other consideration, who would sacrifice the interests of their country and of humanity to their own profits, are not confined to Liverpool and London. The Lairds and the Lindsays are a wide spread clan. And indignant as we may be that the temptations of large profits, and the excitement of the gambling of blockade-running, or the robbery of privateering, have engaged so many of the ship-owners and merchants of England in the support of the Rebellion and in a crusade against our commerce, we have little reason for surprise at their course. It is our misfortune that we are exposed for the time to suffer from such injuries; but the remedy is in our own hands, and not in the way of retaliation. The end of the Rebellion will be the end of the practices from which we suffer. Every vigorous blow struck at our civil enemies defends our interests abroad. And let us not revile England because some Englishmen are found ready to make money for themselves out of our present straits.

The question of compensation for the losses inflicted upon us by the privateers that have sailed from English ports is perhaps more dangerous to the continuance of friendly relations between the two countries than any other that is likely to arise after the close of the Rebellion. It is a question that cannot be settled by considerations of abstract justice, or by appeal to authoritative decisions of international law. Whatever may be the opinion concerning the friendliness or the policy of the British declaration of neutrality, if that declaration has been formally maintained by the English government, if the government cannot clearly be proved to have knowingly connived at its violation, there can be little hope of enforcing a claim against England for reparation for the injuries inflicted upon us by British subjects. Strong as such a claim might be in equity, it may not be founded on arguments which avail in the court of nations. The strongest case we have against England is probably that of the Alabama. But although, in allowing her departure from Liverpool, the British government was guilty of the most culpable negligence, we doubt if the attempt

to fasten the responsibility upon England of reparation for her piracies can be made good. Even if it be admitted that the evidence on which our claim for reparation is based is ample, clear, and convincing, yet such a claim is not likely to be settled by an appeal to reason. No nation, not even our own, is yet sufficiently under the control of reason to listen to its appeal in such a case, against the counsel of pride, of prejudice, of false shame, and of immediate interest. Shall we then contemplate the enforcing of our claim by war? Will war give to us that which we seek,—indemnity for loss?

To engage in war with England on account of a refusal to settle our claims against her, or on any other existing ground of quarrel, would be simply for the gratification of a resentment which may be better satisfied, and for the indulgence of a spirit of vindictiveness which no provocation can justify. That, in the present low state of civilization, there may be legitimate cause of war between nations, we do not dispute; but war is the greatest of crimes, if engaged in without just and sufficient cause.

War with England would be an unspeakable calamity for both nations. It is not to be thought of or spoken of lightly. It would be a war which, whatever might be its course or its termination, would be disastrous in equal measure to the true interests of each country. It would be the work and in the interest of the worst classes in each community. It could have no possible conclusion of good. Except when undertaken for the maintenance of some high principle of justice, war is especially to be deprecated by those who have the interests of the masses of the people at heart, and who see in the peaceful progress of democracy, not only the advance of civilization, but the diffusion of happiness among men. War is the game of princes and of aristocrats, not of the people. In the case of a war with England, the American people would in fact be using their national power against themselves. They would be throwing their lives, their resources, their energies, into the scale against their real interests, their principles, and their hopes. They would be casting away the advantages of the New World, to load themselves with the burden of the Old.

A war between America and England would be welcome to

all the opponents of democracy on both sides of the Atlantic. It would be playing into the hands of despotism. Whatever injury we might inflict on England would be hailed with satisfaction by every enemy of liberalism and progress in Europe; whatever injury England might inflict on us would be a weapon turned against the struggling, poor, and unprivileged masses of the Old World.

And still more, a war would inevitably for a time unite all classes in England against us. However much it might be resisted by England's better men, however plainly it might be seen by the more intelligent among the workingmen of England to be opposed to the interests of their class, yet, once engaged, it would of necessity weld the whole nation together in a common instinct of resistance and defence. Friends whose desires and hopes are common with ours, whose interests are bound up with our success, friends who have stood by us and worked for us in the heat of the day, would be converted into enemies. The hand raised to strike the guilty falls upon the innocent. The smoke which covers the battle prevents us from seeing that we are fighting our brothers in disguise.

The fact is hardly to be questioned, that there is a powerful party among the ranks of the aristocracy in England to whom war with America would be welcome, because it would enable them to strengthen their own privileges, to postpone reform, and to concentrate their power over the laboring classes. To make democrats or republicans synonymous with enemies, would add tremendous force to the aristocratic reaction which is now so strong in England. The American people could in no way so counteract and destroy their legitimate power abroad, in affording the example of a true democracy, in which the rights of every man are respected and equal justice meted out to all,—they could in no way so effectually ruin the best hopes of the lovers of freedom, of the laborers for reform, of the poor and the oppressed in Europe,—as by allowing themselves to be drawn by any consideration less than one of highest right and honor into a war with England. A war of resentment or vindictiveness would be an argument against the influence of democratic institutions upon national character, which, however unfair, would be welcome to the privileged absolutists of Europe, and powerful in their hands.

But if we look at the effects of war with England simply as they concern ourselves, they are not less to be deprecated. It has been said that there is but one thing for a nation worse than war, and that is to be afraid of it. It is no boast that, as regards a trial of strength with England or any other power, we are not afraid. The last four years have taught us much of the strength and resources of our country. We know now that our democracy is at least as strong as any other power. We trust ourselves. If it be a question of right, we are ready confidently for war. But there is a fear that is not cowardice, which may well fill our hearts at the thought of war with England. What but harm could come of such war to us and to those we love? Are we ready to send our bravest and best out to fight and to die, that we may get reparation for acts that touch not our national dignity and honor? Shall the light of our eyes perish, that our spite may be indulged? Are our hearts not yet full enough of sad memories? What is to be gained by war? Shall we spend millions on millions to get back the paltry few we have lost through England's misdeeds? No, whether such a war be regarded economically and materially, or as a matter of policy or of morals, it is alike without justification or rational motive. Politically, it would be the greatest of errors; morally, it would be a crime. Woe to that nation, indeed, that has not the capacity for great and noble passions; but deeper woe to that people which mistakes the irritations of temper for noble passion, and obeys the promptings of its baser instincts rather than the dictates of the supreme reason!

There are other ways of avenging ourselves on our foreign enemies than by war. There is no occasion for so brutal and uncivilized a process. The suppression of the aristocratic and despotic Rebellion of the slaveholders will in itself be the defeat of our foreign enemies; and our triumph will be shared by our foreign friends, who are fighting the battle of liberal principles and equal rights in the Old World. Our success in the work we now have in hand will be an argument for free popular government to which there can be no demurrer. There will be no need for us to engage in a crusade for the spread of democratic principles, or for the overthrow of despot-

isms. The example of a strong, rich, prosperous republic is a persistent revolutionary fact. Owing to the Rebellion, we have, for the first time in our history, become in truth an object of general attention and interest in Europe, and that attention and interest are not likely to diminish. For with the destruction of slavery, and the peaceful establishment of a truly republican government throughout the land, we may expect that the attraction which has heretofore been so strong to bring the laboring classes of Europe to our shores will receive new accessions of strength, and lead a still greater flood of emigrants to seek for the rights and opportunities denied them at home. The development of the internal resources of our country has hardly begun. The South, which the costly and inferior processes and results of slave labor kept poor, and whose productiveness was confined to two or three great channels, once entered upon and taken possession of by intelligent and independent labor, will rapidly grow rich, and pour her untold and untouched wealth through a thousand courses. Agriculture, mining, manufactures, will all take part, not so much in the regeneration as in the actual discovery of the productive capacities of the vast region which has so long been occupied by unwilling and comparatively ineffective laborers. The demand for labor here will be answered by the influx of laborers from Great Britain and the Continent. Every honest able-bodied man who crosses the ocean to us adds to our strength, and takes away from the strength of Europe. We are draining, we shall drain, from the Old World its most precious, its most important possession, — its intelligent laboring classes. That there may be evils to ourselves attending the process is probable enough; but it is enough for the present purpose to consider, that this emigration will change our relations to the European nations. It is men and money that make a nation powerful. We shall accumulate both faster than any other nation.

Our true war policy is the policy of peace. To husband our resources, to organize our industry, to develop the capacities of the country, to redeem the debt with which the Rebellion has burdened us, to heal the wounds with which the Rebellion has scarred us, — this is our surest way of avenging ourselves

upon our enemies. Thus we shall grow continually more powerful and more respected. No nation will insult us, for none will desire to provoke us to war. England need not be forced to pay indemnity for the loss her Confederate cruisers have inflicted upon us. She will be paying us all the time. In ten years the debt will be cancelled by the transfer of values to our side. We need not fight to humble her. There is, as we know by experience, no meaner character than that of a bully among nations. To grow strong ourselves will put an end to bullying. Moreover, if we really succeed, as we mean to succeed, in making our institutions conform to our principles, and in carrying forward our system to its natural results of general prosperity and popular happiness, we shall become attractive, not only to foreign people, but to our neighbors on this continent. There will be no need to annex Canada by force. She will drift toward us by inevitable gravitation, — and in the course of years may form a part of the United States, or may be joined to the United States in a federative league, which shall be the beginning of that grand federation of the states of the continent, which shall at last realize in its peaceful and harmonious action of mutual beneficence the best dream of the founders of the New World.

At the present moment, the motives of policy, not only for keeping on good terms with England, but for drawing close our alliance with her, are greatly quickened by the proceedings of France on our southwestern border. The establishment of a Franco-Austrian empire in Mexico is less dangerous to us than the acquisition by France of territory immediately adjoining our own, and united to our own by its geographical configuration and physical characteristics. France is an unwelcome neighbor in America, especially when she takes up her position as such by an act of spoliation, which she would hardly have ventured to commit had our arms been disengaged. The wolf makes free with the flocks when the shepherds are fighting with each other.

With such conditions as those in which we stand at present, and with such a prospect opening in the peaceful years before us, it is impossible to contemplate a foreign war, especially a war with England, with other feelings than abhorrence, or to

regard those who would bring it about otherwise than as hostile to the true interests and true honor of our country. At present these fosterers of war are in a minority; but the temper of the people generally is such that but little provocation might change this minority to a majority. It depends on England whether the provocation shall be given; it depends on the character of the American people whether, supposing it to be given, they will quit themselves like children or like men. And here we must recur to those moral considerations with which this article begins. A heavier responsibility rests upon us in this matter than upon any other people. If we are as a whole more intelligent than the people of other nations, if we have a moral standard higher than exists elsewhere, we are to manifest our superiority on the occasions in which our tempers and our passions may strive to obtain mastery over our conduct. Such occasions are the tests of our pretensions; and our conduct is the true measure of our advance. If we are more fortunate, more prosperous, happier, than other nations, we are bound to be more generous. As democrats, as believers in the rights of man, as standing upon our own deeds and not upon any inheritance from past generations, as fronting the facts of life squarely, man to man, we are bound to show a larger mode of thought, a quicker sense of duty, than men who have been brought up among the conventionalisms of an artificial society, and have inherited the injurious prerogatives and prejudices of the past.

It has been a favorite charge against democratic government, that it was more liable to be swayed by popular passion, and carried away by popular impulse, than any other. If we be true to ourselves, it will be for us to show that, as no government is more strong, so none is more stable and less passionate. It is, indeed, only by the practice of a noble self-restraint, that the nation can fulfil its career, and truly maintain its dignity and honor. It is only by great and continuous moral effort on the part of the people, as individuals composing the nation, that war is to be avoided, and that our republic is to achieve the glory of becoming a nation that can neither receive nor give provocation to a fight. The empire is not, but the republic may be peace.

ART. II. — *Lettres Inédites de* VOLTAIRE. *Recueillies par* M. DE CAYROL, *et annotées par* M. ALPHONSE FRANÇOIS. *Precedées d'une Préface de* M. SAINT-MARC GIRARDIN, de l'Académie Française. Paris. 1856. 2 vols. 8vo.

ON the 28th of March, 1727, the remains of Sir Isaac Newton lay in state in the Jerusalem Chamber in London. Statesmen, nobles, and philosophers gathered there to pay the last homage to a man whose sole claim to distinction was that he had enlarged the boundaries of human knowledge. When the body was carried to its last resting-place in Westminster Abbey, the pall was borne by the Lord Chancellor, the highest official in the kingdom; by the Duke of Montrose and the Duke of Roxburgh; by the Earls of Pembroke, Sussex, and Macclesfield, — members of the Royal Society, of which Newton had been President for nearly a quarter of a century. The funeral was attended by a concourse of the men highest in rank and greatest in name in England, and its solemn pageantry was witnessed by a multitude of citizens who understood little, it is true, of what Newton had done for them and their posterity, but who felt, in some degree, how becoming it was in men great by accident to pay such honors to a man great by nature.

There were two poets then in London upon whom this scene, so honorable to England and to human nature, made a profound impression. One of these was James Thomson, whose Seasons were then in course of publication, with the applause which six generations have ratified. In his poem upon the death of Newton, he expresses the feeling that in honoring *him* England redeemed herself: —

> "For, though depraved and sunk, she brought thee forth,
> And glories in thy name; she points thee out
> To all her sons, and bids them eye thy star,
> While, in expectance of the second life,
> When time shall be no more, thy sacred dust
> Sleeps with her kings, and dignifies the scene."

The other poet was Voltaire, then in exile in England, after his second imprisonment in the Bastille. What a lasting impression was made upon his susceptible mind by Newton's

stately funeral, the numerous allusions to it in his letters attest. In extreme old age, his eye would kindle and his countenance light up when he spoke of his once having lived in a land where a professor of mathematics, only because he was great in his vocation, could be buried in a temple where the ashes of kings reposed, and the highest subjects in the kingdom feel it an honor to assist in bearing thither his body.

Voltaire had more reason than the poet of the Seasons to feel the significance of such an event. He had had cause to know that in France nothing was really held sacred but hereditary rank. He was then thirty-one years of age. As yet he had written nothing that savored of immorality or impiety. Except some youthful indiscretions, which his countrymen were the last people in the world to judge with severity, he had done nothing to tarnish his name. Without assuming to compare himself, in any point, with the great philosopher of England, he could yet justly claim to represent the intellectual interests of France. He was the author of three successful plays, at a time when the production of a successful play was considered the highest achievement of genius. He had written a poem, *La Henriade*, which France appeared willing to rank with the great epics of antiquity. His success had produced a kind of sham revival of letters at Paris. "I have brought poetry into fashion," he writes in his gay, extravagant manner; "all the world is writing poems." His young king had given him a pension of two thousand francs, and the queen another of fifteen hundred. Princes had courted his society. He had been received well at court during the festivities at the marriage of Louis XV. "The queen," he wrote, "has wept at *Mariamne;* she has laughed at *L'Indiscret;* she speaks to me often; she calls me 'my poor Voltaire.'" In every way then known, France had hailed this new poet with welcome; his position in France for ten years, both as a citizen and a man of letters, had been high. Nevertheless, against the merest caprice, or the vaguest suspicion of a man of rank, neither the dignity of his calling nor his rights as a citizen had availed him aught. Twice he had been exiled from Paris because he was the friend of a nobleman out of favor at court. Again, because he was suspected (falsely) of having written some verses reflecting upon the government,

he was imprisoned in the Bastille for eleven months. His favorite work, *La Henriade*, written to celebrate the glory of an ancestor of his king, he was obliged to publish by stealth in a foreign country, because the capricious and inconsistent tyranny of the government refused to sanction its appearance in France. And now, as he stood looking upon the funeral cortege of the English philosopher, the recollection of a more recent outrage, one so vile that it has no parallel in the history of literature, was rankling in his bosom, and giving him the keenest sense of the meaning of what he beheld.

The incident which consigned Voltaire a second time to the Bastille has never, we believe, been told correctly in English. He was dining one day at the Duc de Sully's, with whom he was in great intimacy. Another of the guests was the Chevalier de Rohan, cousin of the host, a dull and debauched, a sordid and malignant member of one of the most powerful families in France. In the vivacity of conversation, Voltaire presumed to differ in opinion from this personage, who was often a lord among wits, but never a wit among lords, and whose presence weighed heavily upon the company. "Who is this young man," asked De Rohan, "who, in contradicting me, speaks so loud?" Voltaire, with flashing eye, replied: "Monsieur le Duc! he is a man who does not drag about with him a great name, but who honors the name he bears." The Chevalier rose from the table and left the house. The guests openly applauded the poet; and the Duc de Sully himself said aloud, "We are glad if you have rid us of him." A week after, as Voltaire was dining again with the Duc de Sully, a message was brought to him that some one wished to speak with him in the street below. He endeavored to excuse himself. "It is to do a good work that you are sought," said the messenger. Voltaire rose at these words, and, napkin in hand, descended to the gate of the mansion, where he observed a carriage and a hackney-coach standing. Approaching the door of the coach, a dolorous voice from within asked him to mount upon the step. At the moment of his complying with this request, he was seized by a strong hand, and held firmly by his coat. Two or three ruffians (ham-string cutters Voltaire calls them) sprang from the other vehicle, one of whom gave him five or six strokes

over the shoulders with a cane. A voice from the private carriage then cried, "Enough!" the poet was released, and the vehicles drove rapidly away. The voice that cried "Enough!" was that of the Chevalier de Rohan. It was in broad daylight, in the streets of Paris, in the summer of 1725, that this deed was done.

Voltaire, his clothes torn and disarranged, but not in a fury of passion (for it was only little things that put him in a fury), ascended to the company, related what had occurred, and called upon the Duc de Sully to resent this outrage committed upon one of his guests as done to himself. He asked him to go with him at once to a magistrate, and join him in a statement of the facts. The Duc de Sully, who had known and caressed Voltaire for six years, whose dinners and suppers Voltaire for six years had distinguished and enlivened, chose to win an immortality of shame by refusing to take any part against his noble cousin. The poet knew his world too well to hope for justice from the laws, unless his demand were supported by a man of rank. He retired to the country, engaged a fencing-master, and studied English. In the spring of 1726, he reappeared in Paris. One evening, accompanied by a single friend, he went to the theatre and entered the box of the Chevalier de Rohan. "Sir," said he to that valiant nobleman, "if some affair of interest has not made you forget the outrage of which I have to complain, I hope you will give me satisfaction for it." The Chevalier accepted the challenge at once, and himself named the time and place of meeting, — nine the next morning, at St. Anthony's Gate. He however immediately made known the nature of the interview to his family. Some of his relatives complained to the Duc de Bourbon, then Prime Minister, and, what was far more dangerous, enlisted in their cause the Minister's mistress by showing her some satirical verses upon herself which they pretended Voltaire had written. One of them afterwards declared that the reason of their interference was that De Rohan was suffering from the effects of a fall, and was unfit for an encounter in the field.

Now it appears that, in challenging De Rohan, Voltaire had broken an edict of the king, which forbade a commoner to challenge a nobleman. Voltaire's father held an office of

about the grade of first auditor of our treasury, and possessed an income of twenty-five thousand francs a year. Voltaire himself kept three servants, enjoyed considerable revenue, lived in the best society, and had a European celebrity. Nevertheless, the De Rohans stooped to avail themselves of the royal edict. They further alleged, that Voltaire, in his search after the Chevalier, had dared to invade the sacred domicile of the Cardinal de Rohan. The next morning, instead of meeting the Chevalier at the rendezvous, Voltaire encountered the officers of the police, armed with a *lettre de cachet*, which consigned him to the Bastille.

We have the brief remonstrance which the poet sent to the Minister of Police on this occasion: "I represent, very humbly, that I was assailed by the brave Chevalier de Rohan, assisted by six ruffians, behind whom he was boldly posted. Since that time, I have sought continually to repair, not my honor, but his, — a thing too difficult. If I went to Versailles, it is wholly false that I sought the Chevalier de Rohan at the house of the Cardinal de Rohan."

He was confined in the Bastille for thirty-two days. He was then released, on condition that he should leave France immediately, and not return without the king's permission. Such was the kind of justice meted out to men of letters under Louis XV. Such were the recollections which the spectacle of the honors paid to Newton revived in the mind of Voltaire.

The volumes named at the head of this article add about thirteen hundred letters to the six thousand four hundred which the public already possessed from Voltaire's indefatigable hand. He was the most laborious man of letters that ever lived. Besides the seventy volumes of his works, we have an average of more than two letters for each week of his public life of sixty-six years; and even as we write comes notice of a new series of letters just discovered in Germany. The entire Voltaire correspondence, including the letters addressed to him as well as those written by him, comprises the astonishing number of ten thousand letters, of which about eight thousand were written or dictated by himself. This correspondence fills thirty volumes octavo, all annotated and indexed. The new volumes are chiefly interesting from the light they throw upon

the least known and most important part of Voltaire's life,—his two years' residence in England. They contain, among other curious things, twenty-two letters written by him in the English language. With the aid of this new collection, we can now give a tolerably connected account of his life in England, of the company he kept there, the work he did, and the influences he imbibed. The importance of this part of his life has, perhaps, not been sufficiently noted. It was in England that Voltaire lighted the torch with which he set the world on fire. If he had never seen England, he would never have been the Voltaire we know him now. His works and letters bear us out in the assertion, that the principal employment of the last forty years of his life was to impart to France what England taught him. *That* was the new wine which burst the rotten old bottle of the French monarchy.

On the 1st of May, 1726, Voltaire sat in his room in the Bastille. The order for his release and expatriation had arrived, and he was writing letters to his friends, several of which are preserved. To one he wrote, asking her to come and see him, "perhaps for the last time"; to another, requesting the loan of a travelling carriage; to others, ordinary notes of farewell. The Bastille was not a place of horror to such prisoners as he. He may not, like Marmontel, have been furnished with a dinner of five courses from the Governor's own table, with a bottle of excellent claret, and another dinner of three courses for his servant, with a bottle of *vin ordinaire*, but he had a comfortable apartment, in which his literary labors were assiduously continued, and in which he entertained daily at dinner his sometime fellow-clerk and lifelong friend, Thieriot. The government of France was, even then, a government of mistresses. A man might be consigned to the Bastille to appease the wounded vanity of a woman, and yet have friends in the ministry who could convert his dungeon into a scene of luxury, maintained at the king's expense. Only a hint to the Governor of the Bastille was needed.

Let us look in upon Voltaire for a moment, before sending him into exile. This man, whom Goethe styles the most French of Frenchmen, was strikingly French in person and manners. His height, as he himself records, was five feet six

inches, — about the average stature of the French army. He makes merry, in his letters, with the slenderness of his figure and the meagreness of his countenance. He speaks of himself as a "dried herring"; and once, when he had said, "I hope soon to see you face to face," he added, "that is, if I may apply the word *face* to such a phiz as mine." But his portraits, which may still be collected by the hundred, do not justify this description. They show us a forehead broad and high, but not prominent; a large, long nose, a powerful under jaw, and somewhat prominent cheek-bones, — a countenance which would certainly present a very gaunt appearance if it were emaciated. It was far from being a handsome face; but his associates tell us, that, in these years, the wonderful brightness of his dark eyes and his luxuriant brown hair atoned for its deficiencies, and rendered his countenance striking and attractive. His figure, too, was erect and agile. Though he would pass in a crowd merely for a "little Frenchman," yet in a room full of fine company he was not an ordinary-looking nor an unprepossessing person, and his manners had all the vivacious grace of his nation and its court. Goldsmith, who says he saw him many years later, observes that, "when he was warmed in discourse, and had got over a hesitating manner which sometimes he was subject to, it was rapture to hear him. His meagre visage seemed insensibly to gather beauty; every muscle in it had meaning, and his eye beamed with unusual brightness." Frederic the Great wrote to him, *after* their quarrel: "You are charming in conversation; you know how to instruct and amuse at the same time. You are the most seductive spirit that I know, capable of making all the world love you when you wish it. Such are the graces of your soul that you can at once offend those who know you, and deserve their indulgence. Indeed, you would be perfect if you were not a man." This power to please stood him in good stead in a country that cherished an hereditary contempt for Frenchmen. It was in 1721 that Aaron Hill, in speaking of a company of French comedians playing in London, styled them "the French vermin."

On the 2d of May, Voltaire left the Bastille. On the 6th, he was at Calais, domiciled with M. Dunoquet, paymaster of the

king's troops, to whom he had been recommended by a lady of rank, — one of his fellow-prisoners in the Bastille. "We were like Pyramus and Thisbe," he wrote to this lady from Calais, — "separated from each other by a wall; only we did not kiss through a chink." A few days after, he crossed the Channel and sailed up the Thames as far as Greenwich, four miles below London, where he landed.

It was one of the most beautiful days of May. The sky, he records, was without a cloud, and a soft breeze from the west tempered the sun's heat and disposed all hearts to joy. It chanced, also, to be the day of the great Greenwich Fair, which was then a day of festivity to Londoners, who came in crowds to witness games, races, and regattas. The river was covered, he says, with two rows of merchant-ships for the space of six miles, with their sails all spread to do honor to the king and queen, who were upon the river in a gilded barge, preceded by boats with bands of music, and followed by a thousand wherries, each rowed by two men in breeches and doublet, with large silver plates upon their shoulders. "There was not one of these oarsmen," remarks the stranger, "who did not assure me by his face, his dress, and his excellent condition (*embonpoint*) that he was a freeman and lived in plenty."

Near the river, in the famous Greenwich Park, four miles in circumference, he observed a prodigious number of well-formed young people on horseback cantering around a race-course marked with white posts. Among them were women, who galloped up and down with much grace. But he was especially pleased with the girls on foot, most of whom were clad in Indian stuffs. Many of them were beautiful; all were well made; and there was a neatness in their dress, a vivacity in their movements, and an air of satisfaction in their faces, that made them all pleasing. Roaming about the Park, he came to a smaller race-course, not more than five hundred feet long. "What is this for?" he asked. He was told that this was for a foot-race, while the larger course was for horses. Near one of the posts of the large circle was a man on horse-back holding in his hand a silver pitcher, and at the end of the smaller course were two poles, with a large hat at the top of one, and a chemise floating like a flag from the other. Be-

tween the two poles stood a stout man holding a purse. The pitcher, he learned, was the prize for the horse-race, and the purse for the foot-race. But what of the hat and the chemise? He was "agreeably surprised" to be told that there was to be a race by the girls, and that the winner was to receive, besides the purse, the chemise "as a mark of honor," while the winning man was to have the hat.

Continuing his rambles, he had the good fortune to fall in with some English merchants to whom he had letters of introduction. These gentlemen, he says, did the honors of the festival with the eagerness and the cordiality of men who are happy themselves and wish to make others sharers in their joy. They had a horse brought for him; they sent for refreshments; and took care to get him a place whence he could comfortably view the races, the river, and London in the distance. At first, he thought himself transported to the Olympic Games; but when he beheld the beauty of the Thames, the fleets of ships, the immensity of London, he "blushed to have compared Greece with England." Some one told him that at that very moment there was a "combat of gladiators" in progress at London; and then he thought he was with the ancient Romans. Near him on the stand was a Danish courier, who had only arrived that morning, and was to set out on his return in the evening. "He appeared to me," says Voltaire, "overcome with joy and wonder. He believed that this nation was always gay, that the women were all beautiful and animated, that the sky of England was always clear and serene, that people there thought only of pleasure, and that every day in the year was like this. He went away without being undeceived. For my part, I was more enchanted even than my Dane."

Such were Voltaire's first hours in England. Ben Franklin was a journeyman printer in London then. What more likely than that he was at Greenwich that day? He may have brushed past the eager little Frenchman whom he was to meet in such singular circumstances fifty-two years after. He may have been one of the stout, well-dressed, fresh-complexioned youths whom Voltaire admired that day galloping about in the Park; for at Greenwich Fair many young fellows rode who trudged the rest of the year on foot.

Voltaire was not long in learning that England was not always clad in smiles. He was in London the same evening, probably at the house of his friend Lord Bolingbroke, which was usually the place of his abode in London, and to which his letters from France were always addressed. He had become acquainted with that fascinating nobleman four years before, when he was an exile in France, and was paying his court to Madame de Villette, whom he afterwards married. Bolingbroke, always a favorite with men of letters, won the heart of the French poet. After spending a day with him in 1722, Voltaire wrote to one of his friends: "You must share my enchantment. I have found in this illustrious Englishman all the learning of his own country, and all the politeness of ours. I have never heard our language spoken with more energy and exactness. This man, who has been all his life immersed in pleasure and business, has found the means of learning everything and retaining everything. He knows the history of the ancient Egyptians like that of England. He is as familiar with Virgil as with Milton. . . . . Both he and Madame de Villette were infinitely pleased with my poem (*La Henriade*). In the enthusiasm of their approbation, they placed it above all the poems that have appeared in France; but I know how much I ought to abate of their extravagant applause." The next year Bolingbroke was permitted to return to England and to repossess his estates. "He will be in Paris to-day," wrote Voltaire, "and I shall have the grief to bid him farewell, perhaps, forever."

In 1726, they had changed parts. Bolingbroke was at home, living in affluence and honor. Voltaire was an exile, deprived of his pensions and his *rentes*. Lord Bolingbroke made him welcome at his house, and obtained entrance for him to the best Tory houses in England.

In the course of his first evening in London, as Voltaire relates in the letter quoted above, he met some ladies of fashion. He spoke to them of the "ravishing spectacle" which he had witnessed at Greenwich, not doubting that they also had witnessed it, and had formed part of the gay assemblage of ladies galloping round the course. He was a little surprised, however, to observe that they had not that air of vivacity which

people usually exhibit who have just returned from a day's pleasure. On the contrary, they were constrained and reserved, sipped their tea, made a great noise with their fans, talked scandal, played cards, or read the newspaper. At length, one of these fine ladies, "more charitable than the rest," informed the puzzled foreigner that people of fashion never abased themselves so far as to attend miscellaneous gatherings like the one which had given him so much delight; that all those pretty girls, clad in the fabrics of India, were only servants and villagers; that those handsome young men, so well mounted, and cantering so gayly in the Park, were nothing but scholars and apprentices on hired horses. These unexpected statements he could not believe, and he felt himself moved to anger against the lady who made them.

Bent on pursuing his investigations into the character of this strange people, he went the next day into the city, to find the merchants and aldermen who had been so cordial to him at his "supposed Olympic Games." In a coffee-house which was dirty, ill-furnished, badly served, and dimly lighted, he found most of those gentlemen who, on the afternoon before, had been so affable and good-humored. Not a man of them recognized him. He ventured to address a remark to some of them. They either made no reply at all, or else merely answered yes or no. He imagined he must have offended them. He tried to remember if he had rated the fabrics of Lyons above theirs, if he had said that the French cooks were better than the English, if he had intimated that Paris was a more agreeable city than London, if he had hinted that time passed more pleasantly at Versailles than at St. James's, or if he had been guilty of any other enormity of that kind. No, his conscience acquitted him of all guilt. At length, "with an air of vivacity that appeared very strange to them," he took the liberty of asking one of them why they were all so melancholy. The prospect of being able to "chaff" a Frenchman appears to have put a little animation into this group of silent Britons. One of them replied, with a scowl, "The wind is east." At this moment, one of their friends came up, who said with an unmoved countenance: "Molly has cut her throat this morning. Her lover found her dead in her bedroom with a bloody razor

at her side." The company, "who all were Molly's friends," received this horrid intelligence without so much as lifting their eyebrows. One of them merely asked what had become of the lover. "He has bought the razor," quietly remarked one of the company.

The stranger, who seemed to take all this seriously and affects to relate it seriously, could not refrain from inquiring further into such a terrible tragedy. Appalled at once at the event and at the indifference of the company, he asked what could have induced a girl, apparently fortunate, to put an end to her existence in so revolting a manner. They only replied, that the wind was east. Not being able to perceive anything in common between an east wind and the suicide of a young girl or the melancholy humor of the merchants, he abruptly left the coffee-house, and sought again his fashionable friends at court. There, too, all was sad; and nobody could talk of anything but the east wind. He thought of the Dane whom he had met on the stand at Greenwich Fair, and was inclined to laugh at the false idea he was carrying home with him of the English climate; but to his astonishment, he found that the climate was having its effect upon himself, — he could not laugh! Expressing his surprise to one of the court physicians, the doctor told him not to be astonished so soon, for in the months of November and March he would have cause indeed to wonder. *Then* people hanged themselves by dozens; everybody was sick with low spirits, and a black melancholy overspread the whole nation; for in those months the wind blew most frequently from the east. "This wind," continued the "chaffing" doctor, "is the bane of our island. The very animals suffer from it, and wear a dejected look. Men robust enough to stand this cursed wind lose at least their good-humor. Every one shows a severe countenance and has a mind disposed to desperate resolutions. It was an east wind that cut off the head of Charles I. and dethroned James II." Then, whispering in the ear of the Frenchman, he added, "If you have a favor to ask at court, never ask it unless the wind is west or south."

It was not alone the courtiers and the merchants who were disposed to amuse themselves with this inquisitive foreigner.

He was in a boat one day upon the Thames. One of the oarsmen, seeing that he had a Frenchman for a passenger, began to boast of the superior liberty of his country, and declared, with an oath, that he would rather be a Thames boatman than a French archbishop. The next day, Voltaire relates, he saw this very man at the window of a prison stretching his hand through the bars. "What do you think now of a French archbishop?" cried Voltaire. "Ah, sir," replied the man, "the abominable government we have! They have forced me away from my wife and children to serve in a king's ship, and have put me in prison and chained my feet, for fear I should run away before the ship sails." A Frenchman who was with Voltaire at the time confessed that he felt a malicious pleasure in seeing that the English, who reproached the French with their servitude, were as much slaves as they. "I had a sentiment more humane," remarks Voltaire. "I was grieved that there was no more liberty on earth." He consoled himself, also, with observing, that, if the king impressed sailors, everybody in England could speak and write with sufficient freedom. "I have seen four very learned treatises against the reality of the miracles of Jesus Christ printed here with impunity, at a time when a poor bookseller was put into the pillory for publishing a translation of *La Religieuse en Chemise*." He thought it a strange British inconsistency that the government should permit the printing of heresy and punish the publication of indecency. A few days after, he observed another oddity at Newmarket. He was told that there he would see the true Olympic Games. He saw, indeed, a vast concourse of noblemen, the king and royal family, and a "prodigious number of the swiftest horses in Europe flying around the course, ridden by little postilions in silk jackets"; but he also saw "jockeys of quality betting against one another, who put into this solemnity more of swindling than magnificence." He evidently preferred Greenwich Fair to Newmarket Races.

These novel scenes, which he afterwards described with so much gayety, were not sufficient at the time to divert his mind from the recollection of the outrage which he had suffered in France. After spending a few weeks in England, he returned secretly to Paris, at the imminent risk of a third and more rig-

orous *Bastilling* than he had yet suffered. We know nothing of this perilous adventure, except what he relates of it in a letter to his most intimate friend, dated August 22, 1726. "I confess to you," he wrote, "that I have made a little journey to Paris recently. Since I did not see you, you will easily conclude that I saw no one. I sought but a single man, whom the instinct of his poltroonery concealed from me, as if he divined that I was on his track. At last, the fear of discovery made me leave more precipitately than I came." He added, that he was still uncertain whether he should return to England, although in that country the arts were honored and encouraged, and merit made the man. "It is a country where they think freely and nobly, without servile fear. If I followed my inclination, it would be there that I should settle, in the idea merely of learning to think. But I know not yet if my little fortune, much deranged by so many journeys, my bad health, worse than ever, my taste for the most profound retreat, will permit me to encounter the din of Whitehall and London, where I am well recommended, and where I shall be made sufficiently welcome. Only two things remain for me to do in my life: one is, to risk it with honor as soon as I can; the other, to end it in a solitude which accords with my way of thinking, with my misfortunes, and with the knowledge that I have of men. I give up with all my heart my pensions from the king and queen, regretting only that I could not succeed in making over a part of them to you." To add to his unhappiness, his sister died at this time. "How much better," he writes, "for my family and for myself, if I had been taken away in her stead!" The recent death of his father, too, involved him in a troublesome lawsuit.

He returned to England early in the autumn. Having little expectation of being again permitted to reside in France, he settled himself to work with his usual ardor, as though he intended to attempt a career in England as man of letters. His first object, of course, was to make a complete conquest of the English language. He studied it, as he remarks, "with passion," both in the works of great authors and in society; "conversing freely with *wighs* and *torys;* dining with a bishop, and supping with a Quaker; going on Saturday to the Synagogue, and on Sunday to St. Paul's; hearing a sermon in the morning,

and attending the play after dinner; passing from the court to the exchange; and, above all, not taking offence at the coldness, the disdainful and icy aspect, with which English ladies receive a stranger, and which some of them never lay aside." What success attended his efforts to master the language, we shall see in a moment.

The friendship of Bolingbroke brought him at once into friendly relations with the literary circle of which that nobleman was the idol and Pope the ornament. The affection entertained for Bolingbroke by literary men was as remarkable as the detestation in which he was held by some of his political associates. Pope paid him the most stupendous compliment, perhaps, that one mortal ever bestowed upon another. "I really think," said Pope, "that there is something in that great man which looks as if he were placed here by mistake. When the comet appeared to us a month or two ago, I had sometimes an imagination that it might possibly have come to our world to carry him away, as a coach comes to one's door for other visitors." And when Pope was dying, Bolingbroke hung sobbing over his chair, and said: "I have known him these thirty years, and value myself more upon that man's love than ——" His voice failed him and he could utter no more. Voltaire was exceedingly fond of both these brilliant men. In one of his poetical epistles, published in 1726, he speaks of Bolingbroke as one who possessed the eloquence of Cicero, the intrepidity of Cato, the wit of Mæcenas, and the agreeableness of Petronius. He loved him living and he defended him dead. Those sceptical opinions of which, later in life, he was the most conspicuous champion in Europe, evidently took their tone, and their limits too, from those of this English deist, and the deistical party who frequented his house. He relates, however, but one trifling anecdote of his intercourse with Lord Bolingbroke. The conversation turning one day upon the alleged avarice of the Duke of Marlborough, some one appealed to Bolingbroke to confirm the allegation, and with the more confidence because Bolingbroke had been of the party opposed to Marlborough. His reply was, "He was so great a man that I have forgotten his faults."

We may remind the reader, in passing, that, up to this time,

the English deists had had it all their own way. Shaftesbury, Collins, Toland, Chubb, Mandeville, had as yet found no opponents who could cope with them. Paley and Butler had not entered the lists. Wollaston's puny effort tempted even the young Franklin to try his hand at refuting the work which he was setting in type. Deism was in fashion. Voltaire probably met scarcely a man in England whose intellect he respected, who was not either a deist or a Churchman of the Swift and Young species, — that is, Churchmen to whom the Church was a profession merely, — a source of income and honors.

Of the authors then flourishing in London, the one whom Voltaire rated highest was Pope, who was then thirty-eight years of age. Pope's mere mastery of the art of rhyming would have sufficed to attract the regard of a man who had written only in rhyme, and who thought that there was no true poetry without rhyme. It appears that upon this vexed question of rhyme Pope and Voltaire were of the same opinion. He tells us that he asked Pope one day why Milton had not written Paradise Lost in rhyme. "Because he could not," answered Pope. This does not accord with the experience of Pope's successor in Homeric translation. Cowper says, that to rhyme in English demands "no great exercise of ingenuity"; and that he has frequently written more lines in a day "with tags to them" than he ever could without.

Voltaire and Pope were in accord upon subjects of more importance than the construction of poems. The vein of moralizing that runs through many of Pope's productions was peculiarly pleasing to Voltaire, who constantly insists that a poem should do something more than amuse. Pope had not yet written the Essay on Man, nor the Universal Prayer; but his conversation was much in the spirit of those works, which Voltaire regarded as among the masterpieces of English literature, and which by and by he caused to be translated into French. Goldsmith reports, that "Mr. Voltaire has often told his friends that he never observed in himself such a succession of opposite passions as he experienced upon his first interview with Mr. Pope. When he first entered the room and perceived our poor melancholy English poet, naturally deformed and

wasted as he was with sickness and study, he could not help regarding him with the utmost compassion. But when Pope began to speak and to reason upon moral obligations, and dress the most delicate sentiments in the most charming diction, Voltaire's pity began to be changed into admiration, and at last even into envy. It is not uncommon with him to assert, that no man ever pleased him so much in serious conversation, nor any whose sentiments mended so much upon recollection."

It was in the autumn of 1726 that Pope was overturned, as he was returning to London, in Lord Bolingbroke's coach, from that nobleman's country-house. The poet had a narrow escape from drowning in the stream into which he was thrown, and two of his fingers were cut with the glass of the coach window. The accident elicited from Voltaire the first specimen of his English that has been preserved. He had then resided in England four months, since he had spent two months in his secret visit to France. The following is his letter of condolence to Pope: —

"Sir: — I hear this moment of your sad adventure: the water you fell into was not Hippocrene's water; otherwise it would have supported you: indeed, I am concerned beyond expression for the danger you have been in, and more for your wounds. Is it possible, that those fingers which have written 'The Rape of the Lock,' the 'Criticism,' and which have so becomingly dressed Homer in an English coat, should have been so barbarously treated? Let the hand of Dennis or of your poetasters be cut off, — yours is sacred. I hope, sir, you are now perfectly recovered. Really, your accident concerns me as much as all the disasters of a master ought to affect his scholar. I am sincerely, sir, with the admiration which you deserve,

"Your most humble servant,

"Voltaire.

"In my Lord Bolingbroke's House,
Friday, at noon, Nov. 16, 1726."

Dr. Croly, the editor of Pope's works, thinks this a "stiff and school-boy epistle." It seems to us, however, pretty well done for a man who had lived no longer in England. In this connection, the reader may not be displeased to see another specimen of Voltaire's English, written in March, 1727. He began the letter in French, to one of his friends in Paris, but soon broke into English as follows: —

"It was indeed a very hard task formed to find that damned book which, under the title of 'Improvement of Human Reason'" (a translation from the Arabic), "is an example of nonsense from one end to the other, and which besides is a tedious nonsense, and consequently very distasteful to the French nation, that detests madness itself, when madness is languishing and flat. The book is scarce, because it is bad, it being the fate of all wretched books never to be printed again. So I spent almost a fortnight in the search of it, till at last I had the misfortune to find it.

"I hope you will not read it throughout, that spiritless nonsense romance, though indeed you deserve to read it, to do penance for the trouble you gave me to inquire after it, for the tiresome perusal I made of some parts of this whimsical, stupid performance, and for your credulity in believing those who gave you so great an idea of so mean a thing.

"You will find in the same parcel the second volume of M. Gulliver, which (by the by I don't advise you to translate) strikes at the first" (i. e. the first volume); "the other is overstrained. The reader's imagination is pleased and charmingly entertained by the new prospect of the lands which Gulliver discovers to him; but that continued series of new fangles, follies, of fairy tales, of wild inventions, pall at last upon our taste. Nothing unnatural may please long; it is for this reason that commonly the second parts of romances are so insipid.

"Farewell; my services to those who remember me; but I hope I am quite forgot here" [there?]. — *Lettres Inédites*, Vol. I. p. 35.

The errors in this hasty familiar letter cannot conceal from us that Voltaire had caught much of the spirit of the language at this time, and was not far from being able to write in it with correctness.

Dean Swift was then in the highest repute. Voltaire was much in his company in London, and it was he who suggested the translation of Gulliver into French. Swift befriended the stranger in various ways, and corresponded with him from Ireland. When the Dean proposed visiting France in 1727, Voltaire gave him letters to his friends, and advised them of the coming of "the English Rabelais."

There was another member of the Pope circle, then unknown to fame, with whom Voltaire contracted the most valuable and the most lasting of his English friendships. This was Everard Falkener, a Turkey merchant, who lived at Wandsworth, five

miles from London, where, in an elegant home provided with a library, he entertained men of letters with generous hospitality. Falkener in later years, partly through Bolingbroke's influence, became the English Ambassador at Constantinople, where he served many years with such ability as to receive the honor of knighthood. He was afterwards variously employed in public life, — much to Voltaire's delight, who thought it glorious to England that a merchant should be chosen for offices to which in France none but nobles could pretend. At the abode of Falkener at Wandsworth, Voltaire resided for more than a year, laboring assiduously at his vocation, and conversing with his host upon Horace and Virgil. There he wrote his play of "Brutus" in the English language, his "History of Charles XII.," and his Essays upon Epic Poetry and upon the Civil Wars of France; and there, too, were written most of those Letters upon the English which, a few years later, made so much noise in the world, and brought upon the author new persecutions. For thirty-five years he remained the friend and correspondent of Sir Everard Falkener, writing to him always in the English language. Their friendship extended even to the next generation; for two sons of Falkener visited Voltaire at Ferney, long after their father's death, and were royally entertained there. Placing one of them at his right and the other at his left at the table, the aged poet exclaimed: "Mon Dieu! How happy I am to find myself between two Falkeners."

Voltaire relates that he called upon Congreve to pay his homage to the man then esteemed the first of living English dramatists. Congreve affected to disregard his own celebrity as an author, and said that he desired only to be considered in the light of a gentleman. Voltaire, who was always a stickler for the dignity of the profession of a man of letters, was so much offended at this ridiculous vanity, that he almost lost his politeness. "If you had only been a gentleman," said he, "I should never have come to see you."

Voltaire, meanwhile, had a business enterprise on his hands. "He knew by intuition," as Bulwer has recently remarked, "that a man who would raise himself into a Power should begin by securing a pecuniary independence." At every period

of his life he looked well to his moneys and his usances. He probably learned the art of managing money from his crabbed old father, who, it is said, made his fortune as a money-lender, and with that fortune bought the offices which gave him consideration. Deprived of his pensions, and collecting with difficulty the revenue of his property in France, which was already considerable, he was busy in England with preparing to publish, by subscription, an edition of *La Henriade* in French. French was then the language of the English court. A company of French comedians usually played in London during a part of the season. Every man of rank was supposed to speak French, of course, and every one who expected court favor necessarily knew the language in which court favor was solicited.

It has been hitherto regarded as a mystery, how it was that Voltaire succeeded so wonderfully in an enterprise which at first wore so unpromising an appearance that no bookseller would undertake it. The names of the king and queen figured at the head of the list of subscribers, which embraced those of a vast number of the nobility and gentry. The price of subscription was a guinea, and the number of subscribers is reported to have been three thousand, yielding the poet a profit of two thousand pounds! The mystery, however, disappears when we look closely into the facts. The friendship of Bolingbroke procured him a most favorable introduction to two powerful classes, namely, men of letters and the old Tory party; of both of whom Lord Bolingbroke was a champion and a favorite. But this was not all. A letter now lying before us shows that a way of access was opened for him to Whig circles, and even to the chiefs of that party, then all-powerful at court and in Parliament. Sir Robert Walpole was Prime Minister, Horace Walpole (brother of Sir Robert and uncle of the Horace Walpole of Strawberry Hill) was the English Minister at the French court. Three weeks after the departure of Voltaire from the Bastille, we find this Horace Walpole writing in his behalf to Bubb Dodington, and writing, too, at the solicitation of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thus, a minister of the very government that had banished him was interested in his prosperity, and took measures to pro-

mote it, — a minister, too, that owed his place to his friendship for England, and whom the Walpoles were especially solicitous to gratify. If our readers will turn to the diplomatic memoirs of that time, they will perceive that a recommendation from the Count de Morville was the very last thing in the world, just then, that a Walpole would have disregarded. The following was the letter of the English plenipotentiary to Dodington.

"PARIS, May 29, 1726.

"DEAR SIR: — Mr. Voltaire, a French poet, who has wrote several pieces with great success here, being gone for England in order to print by subscription an excellent poem, called Henry IV., which, on account of some bold strokes in it against persecution and the priests, cannot be printed here; M. de Morville, the Mæcenas, or, I may truly say, the Dodington here, for the encouragement of wit and learning, has earnestly recommended it to me to use my credit and interest for promoting this subscription among my friends; on which account, as well as for the sake of merit, I thought I could apply myself nowhere more properly than to you; and I hope this will answer the particular view and interest which I have in it myself, which is to renew a correspondence so agreeable to me; who am, with the greatest truth and affection, sir,

"Your most obedient and most humble servant,

"H. WALPOLE."

This letter had the effect intended. It was at Mr. Dodington's seat in Dorsetshire that Voltaire became intimate with Young, afterwards the author of the "Night Thoughts," and already a poet of considerable celebrity. The anecdote which connects the names of Young and Voltaire is familiar to many of our readers. The French poet, it is said, objected to Milton's personification of Sin and Death, when Dr. Young is reported to have addressed him thus: —

"Thou art so witty, profligate, and thin,
At once we think thee Milton, Death, and Sin."

Or, as others have it,

"That thou thyself art Milton's Death and Sin."

If Dr. Young was guilty of such a couplet upon a stranger, it must have been in jest, over Dodington's "flowing Burgundy"; for a few years later we find him dedicating a poem to Vol-

taire, in complimentary verse, styling him his "patron," and alluding to his many triumphs in prose and verse. He speaks of having soothed him with "*gentle* rhymes" on Dorset Downs, when Milton's Death and Sin provoked his rage, and recalls himself to Voltaire as one

> "Who half inclined thee to confess,
> Nor could thy modesty do less,
> That Milton's blindness lay not in his song."

Having access to the most influential circles in England, both literary and political, Voltaire was not the man to abstain from making the most of his opportunities. He appears to have conducted his publishing enterprise himself. Certain it is that he personally solicited his friends to use their influence in procuring subscriptions. "May I beg you," he writes to Dean Swift, enclosing the advertisement, "to use your influence in Ireland to procure some subscribers for *La Henriade*, which is finished, and which, for want of a little aid, has not yet appeared. The subscription is only one guinea, payable in advance." Swift did procure subscribers in Ireland.

Besides Voltaire's "pushing," the poem had the advantage of containing much that was calculated to please the English taste of that day. Copies of the Dutch edition were in circulation in England. Queen Elizabeth figures in it. England is always alluded to, as in all the works of Voltaire, with respect. And there were very many passages that appealed to the Protestant feeling of a country that had only twenty-eight years before dethroned a king because he was a Catholic.

Now, in two senses of the word, *La Henriade* may be called an orthodox production. The poet employs the machinery, the supernatural effects and persons, the episodes and illustrations, as by Homer and Virgil established. Superstition, Fanaticism, Discord, Love, appear as persons, retarding, accelerating, guiding the action of the poem. St. Louis, also, father of the Bourbons, plays a decisive part. The reader is conducted to heaven and to hell, and is permitted even to look upon the eternal throne of God. Similes in the style of Homer, imitated by all epic poets, continually occur; and prophetical views of the future, in the manner of Virgil and Dante, give Voltaire an opportunity of introducing characters

living in his own time. Besides this poetic orthodoxy, there is an evident attempt throughout to propitiate the masters of France by an orthodoxy of opinion. The poet speaks of his Protestant hero as "a supporter of the party of *error*"; and concludes his poem by converting him to the Catholic faith, causing him even to discern a God under the guise of bread,— "the living sustenance of his elect." The descriptions of God, and of his dwelling-place, are not such as a Catholic would disapprove. At the same time, Voltaire does not forget that he lives under an absolute king, and that Paris has a Bastille. "He who dies for his king, dies always with glory," is one of his lines; and in another he tells his countrymen that the crimes committed by their ancestors will not involve *them*, "for your love for your kings has made reparation for them all."

Yet, notwithstanding this framework and veil of orthodoxy, the essential spirit of the poem is modern and Protestant. It is no "Heavenly Muse" whom its opening lines invoke, but "August Truth." While denouncing persecution for opinion's sake, the poet declares that Catholics and Protestants, as parties, are equally cruel and false. The massacre of St. Bartholomew is related with eloquence and pathos, as an English Protestant of that day would have had it related. As a climax of horror, the poet says that the murderers were urged on by the voice of "sanguinary priests, who invoked the Lord while slaughtering their brethren, and dared, with arms wet with the blood of innocence, to offer to God that execrable incense." Papal Rome is represented as "inflexible to the vanquished, complaisant to the conqueror." The hero of the poem observes, that "a great man ought not to dread the thunders of Rome, and that Rome and Geneva are equally indifferent to him." The decline of the Church from its original purity, the pride, the arrogance, the vices of the Papal hierarchy, are treated in a manner which would not have displeased Luther; while true Religion is described in language that Wesley and Watts would have enjoyed. "Far from the pageantry of Rome, from worldly pomp, from temples consecrated to human vanity, whose splendid decorations impose upon the universe, humble Religion hides herself in deserts. There lives she with God in peace profound, while her name, profaned in the world, is the holy pretext of the fury

of tyrants, a blind for the people, the contempt of the great. To suffer is her destiny; to bless, her portion. She prays in secret for the ingrate who outrages her. Without ornament, without art, beautiful in her own charms, her modest loveliness remains forever hidden from the false, importunate crowd who run to her altars to worship Fortune." In hell, too, the reader finds many kings undergoing punishment for the wrongs which they committed and the wrongs which they did not avenge. There also are ministers who sold to the highest bidder the honors due to virtue, and the justice due to all men. The Inquisition is heartily denounced, and the Bastille is spoken of as "that frightful castle, palace of vengeance, which often confines crime and innocence."

The most careless reader of *La Henriade* perceives or suspects that the passages which conform to the orthodoxy of France were dictated by policy; while the heart of the poet is in those which denounce tyranny, fanaticism, superstition, intolerance, and cruelty. Compared with the great epics of Homer, Virgil, Dante, Tasso, and Milton, *La Henriade* is a slight work indeed. Its departures from historic truth are of themselves fatal to its effect upon a modern reader; who, at the same time, finds something almost ludicrous in the hero relating the civil wars of France to Queen Elizabeth precisely in the tone of Æneas recounting to Dido the fall of Troy. It is like clothing the statue of a member of Congress in the costume of a Roman Senator. Nevertheless, *La Henriade* is a brilliant, flashing, stirring production. It contains several passages that approach the highest excellence, and several lines that reach it. If Voltaire could only have forgotten his Virgil, discarded the supernatural, and relied only on rational means of exciting interest, he might have produced a work which other nations beside the French would still read with satisfaction as well as pleasure. As it is, we can only regard it as the supreme effort of that stage of mental culture which we call the Sophomoric; though for ten years longer Voltaire continued to call it "the least bad of his works."

Voltaire dedicated the English edition of his poem to Queen Caroline, consort of George II., a princess who paid some honor to literature. His dedicatory epistle was written in the

English language. We believe it has never been printed in America.

"To the Queen.

"Madam:—It was the fate of Henry the Fourth to be protected by an English queen. He was assisted by the great Elizabeth, who was in her age the glory of her sex. By whom can his memory be so well protected as by her who resembles so much Elizabeth in her personal virtues?

"Your Majesty will find in this book bold, impartial truths; morality unstained with superstition; a spirit of liberty, equally abhorrent of rebellion and of tyranny; the rights of kings always asserted, and those of mankind never laid aside.

"The same spirit in which it is written gave me the confidence to offer it to the virtuous consort of a king who, among so many crowned heads, enjoys almost the inestimable honor of ruling a free nation; a king who makes his power consist in being beloved, and his glory in being just.

"Our Descartes, who was the greatest philosopher in Europe before Sir Isaac Newton appeared, dedicated his *Principles* to the celebrated Princess Palatine Elizabeth; not, said he, because she was a princess (for true philosophers respect princes and never flatter them); but because of all his readers she understood him the best, and loved truth the most.

"I beg leave, Madam, (without comparing myself to Descartes,) to dedicate The Henriade to your Majesty upon the like account, not only as the protectress of all arts and sciences, but as the best judge of them.

"I am, with that profound respect which is due to the greatest virtue as well as the highest rank, may it please your Majesty, your Majesty's most humble, most dutiful, and most obliged servant,

"Voltaire."

Readers familiar with the dedicatory epistles of that time will admit that this one is less extravagantly fulsome than was then usual. It has also the advantage of containing an idea or two. Goldsmith informs us that the queen acknowledged the homage of the poet by sending him her miniature "worth two hundred guineas." But as Voltaire does not mention the circumstance in any of his existing letters, and as he was not the man to omit mentioning it if it had occurred, we must regard it as more than doubtful. Of the reception of *La Henriade* by the English public, we only know one fact: within four

years of the appearance of Voltaire's edition, the poem was translated into English verse and published in London. It had already appeared in German, and erelong found an Italian and a Spanish translator.

Voltaire presented himself as an English author during his residence in England. He published a volume in the English language in December, 1727, of which the following was the title, as given in a London monthly magazine: —

"An Essay upon the Civil Wars of France, extracted from curious Manuscripts. And, also, upon the Epic Poems of the European Nations, from Homer down to Milton. By Mr. de Voltaire. London. Printed by Samuel Fallasson, and sold by the Booksellers of London and Westminster. 1727. In 8vo. pagg. 130."

We know of no copy of this work in America; and in the works of Voltaire the Essays appear in French. The editor of the magazine, unfortunately, did not think it necessary to criticise the volume. He merely remarks, "These two Essays deserve to be read by all the curious." Spence informs us that Dr. Young corrected one of them. The Doctor, he observes, set honestly to work and marked the passages that were most faulty; "and when he went to explain himself about them, Voltaire could not avoid bursting out laughing in his face." In sending a copy of his work to Dean Swift, Voltaire indulges in the strain of extravagant compliment which disfigures so many of his letters: "Have some indulgence for one of your admirers, who owes it to your writings to have carried his fondness for your language to the point of having the rashness to write in English."

It is in his character of observer, however, that Voltaire chiefly interests us during his stay in England. We have said enough to show that he knew the language sufficiently well to appreciate English authors, and that he had access to circles which enabled him to study the national character. Let us see what it was that he observed in England, what he studied, what impressions were made upon him. With regard to the objects of his inquiry we can justly give him the praise of being one of the most intelligent of travellers; for, besides the language of the country, it was its religion, its institutions, it learning, its poetry, its drama, that he studied.

In all these, and above them all, he loved the freedom that the people enjoyed, — "the noble liberty of thinking," which he deemed the cause of whatever he found in any of them that was excellent. This freedom, too, he regarded as the reason why the different religious sects lived together in harmony. "Enter the London Exchange," he remarks in one of his Letters upon the English, "a place more respectable than many courts. There you see the representatives of all nations assembled for a useful purpose. There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian treat one another as if they were of the same religion, and give the name of infidel only to bankrupts. There the Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist, and the Church-of-England man takes the word of a Quaker. On leaving this peaceful and free assembly, some go to the Synagogue, others go to drink; this man proceeds to be baptized in a great tub in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; that man circumcises his son, and causes to be muttered over the child Hebrew words which are quite unintelligible to him; others go to their churches to await the inspiration of God with their hats on: all are content. If there was in England but one religion, its despotic sway were to be feared; if there were but two, they would cut one another's throats; but as there are thirty, they live in peace and are happy."

The Quakers, who were still a novelty in England to foreigners, attracted the particular attention of this most unquaker-like of men. Believing, as he says, that the doctrines and history of so extraordinary a people merited the study of an intelligent man, he sought the society of one of the most famous Quakers in England, a retired merchant, who lived in a cottage near London, "well built and adorned only with its own neatness." The curious stranger visited him in his retreat.

"The Quaker was an old man of fresh complexion, who had never been sick, because he always had been continent and temperate. In my life I have never seen a presence more noble nor more engaging than his. He was dressed, like all those of his persuasion, in a coat without plaits at the sides, or buttons on the pockets and sleeves, and wore a broad-brimmed hat like those of our ecclesiastics. He received me with his hat on, and advanced towards me without making the least inclination of his body; but there was more politeness

in the open and humane expression of his countenance than there is in the custom of drawing one leg behind the other, and in that of carrying in the hand what was made to cover the head. 'Friend,' said he to me, 'I see that thou art a stranger; if I can be of any use to thee, thou hast only to speak.' 'Sir,' said I to him, with a bow and a step forward, according to our custom, 'I flatter myself that my reasonable curiosity will not displease you, and that you will be willing to do me the honor to instruct me in your religion.' 'The people of thy country,' he replied, 'make too many compliments and bows; but I have never before seen one of them who had the same curiosity as thou. Come in and take dinner with me.' I still kept paying him bad compliments, because a man cannot all at once lay aside his habits; and, after a wholesome and frugal repast, which began and ended with a prayer to God, I began to question my host. I began with the question which good Catholics have put more than once to the Huguenots: 'My dear sir,' said I, 'have you been baptized?' 'No,' replied the Quaker, 'nor my brethren either.' 'How! *Morbleu!* You are not Christians, then?' 'My friend,' he mildly rejoined, 'swear not; we do not think that Christianity consists in sprinkling water upon the head with a little salt.' 'Heh, *bon Dieu!*' said I, shocked at this impiety; 'have you forgotten, then, that Jesus Christ was baptized by John?' 'Friend, once more, no oaths,' replied the benign Quaker: 'Christ received baptism from John; but he baptized no one; we are not John's disciples, but Christ's.' 'Ah,' cried I, 'how you would be burned by the Holy Inquisition. In the name of God, my dear man, let me have you baptized!' .... 'Art thou circumcised?' he asked. I replied that I had not that honor. 'Very well, friend,' said he, 'thou art a Christian without being circumcised, and I without being baptized.'"

The conversation was continued to great length. In his report of it, Voltaire affects throughout the tone of the good Catholic, — Louis XV. being then king of France, and Cardinal de Fleuri his prime minister. He adds, that the benign Quaker conducted him, on the following Sunday, to a Quaker meeting, where he heard one of the brethren utter a long, nonsensical harangue, "half with his mouth, half with his nose," of which no one understood anything. He asked his friend why they permitted such silliness (*sottises*). The Quaker answered that they were obliged to endure it, because they could not know, when a man got up to speak, whether he was moved by the Spirit or by folly. The Quaker meeting appears to have

effaced the good impressions of the sect which he had derived from his conversations with the retired merchant. Nevertheless, he proceeds to relate the history of the Quakers and of William Penn. He concludes by remarking that the denomination, though flourishing in Pennsylvania, was on the decline in England, because the young Quakers, enriched by their fathers' industry, desired to enjoy the honors of public office, and to wear fashionable clothes, and to escape the reproach of belonging to a sect ridiculed by the world.

In his remarks upon the Church of England, Voltaire gives us a taste of his veritable self: "One can have no public employment in England, or Ireland, without being of the number of the faithful Anglicans; this reason, which is an excellent proof, has converted so many dissenters that to-day not a twentieth part of the nation is out of the pale of the Established Church." "The lower house of convocation formerly enjoyed some credit; at least, it had the privilege of meeting, of debating controverted points of doctrine, and of burning, now and then, some impious books, i. e. books against themselves. The Whig ministry, however, does not even permit those gentlemen to assemble, and they are reduced, in the obscurity of their parishes, to the mournful business of praying to God for a government which they would not be sorry to disturb." "The priests are almost all married. The awkwardness which they acquire at the Universities, and the little acquaintance they have here with women, usually has the effect of obliging a bishop to be contented with his own wife. The priests go to the taverns sometimes, because custom permits it; and if they get drunk, it is in a serious way, and without scandal. . . . . When they are told that in France young men, known by their debaucheries and raised to the rank of bishop by female intrigues, openly make love, amuse themselves by composing love songs, give every day costly and elaborate suppers, and go from those suppers to implore the illumination of the Holy Spirit, and boldly call themselves the successors of the Apostles, then they thank God that they are Protestants. Nevertheless, they are abominable heretics, fit to be burned by all the devils, as Rabelais says; and that is the reason why I do not meddle with their affairs."

Upon the government of England Voltaire descants in a graver strain. He failed not to inform his countrymen that in England no tax could be laid, except with the consent of the King, Lords, and Commons, and that every man was assessed, not as in France according to his rank, or rather according to his want of rank, but according to his income. Nor did he omit to remark that in England the peasant's feet were not blistered by wooden shoes. "He eats white bread; he is well clad; he fears not to increase the number of his beasts, nor to cover his roof with tiles, for fear of having to pay a higher tax the next year. You see many peasants who have five or six hundred pounds sterling a year, and yet do not disdain to continue to cultivate the lands that have enriched them, and upon which they live as freemen." He observed with pleasure that the younger sons of noble families frequently entered into commerce,—a thing unheard of then in France. "I know not, however," he slyly remarks, "which is the more useful to a state, a well-powdered lord, who knows precisely at what hour the king gets up and goes to bed, and who gives himself airs upon playing the part of slave in a minister's antechamber, or a merchant who enriches his country, who from his counting-room sends orders to Surat and Cairo, and contributes to the happiness of mankind."

Of the philosophers of England, Locke and Newton were those whom he studied longest and admired most. He was one of the first of his countrymen who understood the discoveries of Newton, and it was he who made them popularly known to France. Locke he frequently styles the wisest of human beings, and the only man who had ever written worthily upon metaphysics. Lord Bacon, he thought, "knew not Nature, but he knew and pointed out all the paths that lead to a knowledge of her." "He despised, early in his career, that which fools in square caps taught under the name of philosophy, in those mad-houses called *colleges;* and he did all that he could to keep them from continuing to confuse the mind by their *nature abhorring a vacuum*, their *substantial forms*, and all those words which not only ignorance rendered respectable, but which a ridiculous blending with religion rendered sacred. He is the father of experimental philosophy." All of Vol-

taire's remarks upon Bacon, Newton, and Locke show that he was at home in their works, and that he comprehended the peculiar importance of each of those great men.

The same praise cannot be bestowed upon his remarks on the drama of England. Shakespeare was above the reach of his genius. The fact alone that Voltaire, reading Shakespeare in Shakespeare's own tongue, failed to perceive his superiority to all other poets and dramatists, suffices to prove to us that, great Frenchman as he was, he was not a great man. "Shakespeare," he says, "created the English theatre. He had a genius full of force and fecundity, of nature and sublimity; but without the least spark of good taste, and without the slightest knowledge of the rules. I am going to say something bold, but true: it is, that the merit of this author has ruined the English drama. There are such beautiful scenes, there are passages so grand and so terrible in those monstrous farces which they call tragedies, that his pieces have always been played with great success. Time, which alone gives reputation to men, renders at length their faults respectable. Most of the odd and gigantesque notions of this author have acquired at the end of two hundred years the right to pass for sublime. Modern authors have almost all copied them; but that which succeeded in Shakespeare is hissed in them." He proceeds to remark, that England has produced but one tragedy worthy to be ranked with the master-pieces of the French stage, and that was Addison's Cato. The writings of Voltaire contain, perhaps, a hundred allusions to Shakespeare, but most of them in this tone; and in the last piece of prose he ever wrote, he still speaks of him as an inspired barbarian. In one of his essays, in 1761, after giving a ludicrous outline of Hamlet, he enters into an inquiry how it could be that a nation which had produced the Cato of Addison could endure such crudities. This is his reason: "The chairmen, the sailors, the hackney-coachmen, the shopmen, the butchers, and even the clergy, in England, are passionately fond of shows. Give them cock-fights, bull-fights, gladiatorial combats, funerals, witchcraft, duels, hangings, ghosts, and they run in throngs to see them; and there is more than one lord as curious in these things as the populace. The people of London find in the tragedies of Shakespeare all that can please

such a taste as this. The courtiers were obliged to follow the torrent."

Two or three considerations may lessen our astonishment at Voltaire's inveterate blindness to the transcendent merits of Shakespeare. One is, that he spoke of Shakespeare precisely as the great lights of English literature, from Dryden to Goldsmith, were accustomed to speak of him. Dryden styled Troilus and Cressida "a heap of rubbish." Dryden thought he had converted the Tempest into a tolerable play when he had spoiled it. Pope spoke of a forgotten play of the Earl of Dorset's as "written in a much purer style than Shakespeare's in his first plays." Bolingbroke, as Voltaire mentions, agreed with him upon the irregularities of Shakespeare. Goldsmith speaks of the "amazing, irregular beauties of Shakespeare." When George III. said to Miss Burney, that most of Shakespeare was "sad stuff," he probably expressed an opinion that prevailed in the higher circles of his time. There is reason to conclude that, when Voltaire's Letters upon the English appeared in London, his remarks upon Shakespeare were approved by the frequenters of such houses as those of Bolingbroke, Dodington, and Pope.

The customs of the French stage, in Voltaire's day, furnish some further explanation of his insensibility to Shakespeare. The tragic drama in France was a kind of drawing-room pastime,—decorous, artificial, high-flown, and dull. The common people attended the theatre only on festive days, when free admissions were given. This Voltaire himself records in one of his letters. To have introduced into a play the name of a prince of the reigning family, would have been deemed a very great audacity. No author presumed to do it till Voltaire, emboldened, as he says, by Shakespeare's example, brought upon the scene characters famous in the history of France. At the same time, it was against the "rules" to present to the courtly audiences of that day peasants, mechanics, or any plebeian except a soldier, a *valet de chambre*, or a waiting-maid. No one could kill another on the stage. The only killing permitted was decorous and classical suicide. The entire action of the play was required to be exhibited in the same apartment, and in the space of time occupied in its rep-

resentation. Subject to such rules, — subject, also, to the restraints of rhyme, — what could a French tragedy be but a series of stately dialogues? The events were not exhibited, but related. There was no coloring or naturalness, no comic interludes, no relief, no forms of salutation even; and scarcely any of those passages like Shakespeare's "Mercy is twice blessed," or "All the world's a stage," which lift the auditor out of the scene before him into the realm of abstract truth. The villains are conscious villains; they confess themselves villains to themselves and to their comrades; unlike the Iagos and the Richards of Shakespeare, unlike the villains of real life, who invariably use the little intellect they have in forming a theory of their situation which justifies or palliates their guilt.

Accustomed to such a drama as this, Voltaire was shocked beyond measure at such scenes as those of the grave-diggers in Hamlet, the fool in Lear, the cobblers in Julius Cæsar. When his *Tancrède* was performed, in 1760, the leading actress implored his consent to the erection of a scaffold upon the stage, draped in black. "My friend," he replied, "we must fight the English, not imitate their barbarous theatre. Let us study their philosophy; let us trample under our feet, as they do, infamous prejudices; let us drive out the Jesuits and wolves; let us no longer stupidly oppose inoculation and the attraction of gravitation; let us learn from them how to cultivate land; but let us beware of copying their savage drama."

Moreover, his self-love was interested. If Shakespeare was right, Voltaire was wrong. If Hamlet was a good tragedy, what was *L'Œdipe?* We must nevertheless repeat, that, if Voltaire had been as great a man as he was a Frenchman, he would have recovered from the wound to his self-love, and hailed the Shakespearian method as the true one. His inability to do this limits his claim to our regard, both as a human being and as an artist. It serves to explain, also, in some degree, his failure to comprehend things of higher importance than the drama.

He succeeded little better with Milton. In many passages of his works, he ridicules the "odd and extravagant concep-

tions" of that poet, to whose merit, however, he was not wholly insensible. Paradise Lost, he concludes, "is a work more peculiar than natural, fuller of imagination than of grace, and of boldness than judgment; of which the subject is wholly ideal, and which seems not made for man." He admired the "majestic strokes with which Milton dared to depict God, and the character, still more brilliant, which he gives the Devil." The description of the Garden of Eden pleased him, as well as the "innocent loves of Adam and Eve." But when he comes to speak of the combats between the angels and the fallen spirits, of the mountains hurled upon each other, and of the great gathering of the devils in a hall, he can see in those passages only something barbaric and ludicrous. Milton, he remarks, was a bad prose-writer, and combated the apologists of King Charles as a ferocious beast fights a savage. In all that he says of Milton, we perceive the influence of the English circle which he frequented. So Bolingbroke spoke of the author of Paradise Lost.

It was during Voltaire's stay in England that news was brought to the literary circle which he frequented that a daughter of Milton was living in London, old, infirm, and very poor. "In a quarter of an hour," he tells us, "she was rich." He thought of this incident, thirty-five years later, when he was soliciting subscriptions for the edition of Corneille which he published for the benefit of the granddaughter of that poet, whom he had adopted and was educating. He used it as a spur to the zeal of those who were aiding him. Milton's daughter died soon after, but not before she had related many particulars of her father's life and habits, which Voltaire eagerly gathered and afterwards recorded.

The English comedy of that time appears to have afforded the stranger much enjoyment. He complains, however, of the indecency of the popular comedies. But he appears to have been shocked only at the indecency of the *words* employed, not at all at the enormous and hideous indecency of the events exhibited. "We are bound to consider," he remarks, "that, if the Romans permitted gross expressions in the satires which only a few people read, they allowed no improper words upon the stage. For, as La Fontaine says, 'Chaste are the ears,

though the eyes be loose.' In a word, no one should pronounce in public a word which a modest woman may not repeat." Here we have the explanation of the fact that an Englishman in Paris and a Frenchman in London are equally astounded at the indecency of the plays which they attend. The Frenchman brings to the theatre fastidious ears, and the Englishman chaste eyes. The third and fourth acts of *Tartuffe* contain nothing offensive to a French audience, though it would be shocked at some of the words in the first act of Othello. An Englishwoman can endure a gross word or two in the midst of a scene otherwise proper, but would be inclined to run out of the theatre upon the performance of a whole act of decorous seduction which threatens at every moment to be successful; the husband of the lady being hidden under the table, and appearing only when the author has exhausted every other resource.

Apropos of *Tartuffe*, Voltaire gives an unexpected reason for the failure in England of a comedy which has given to the English stage so many of its religious hypocrites, and to Dickens perhaps his Uriah Heep. He says, that before there can be false devotees there must be true ones; and one of the great advantages of the English nation is, that it has no *Tartuffes*. "The English scarcely know the name of devotee; but they know well that of honest man. You do not see there any imbeciles who put their souls into the keeping of others, nor any of those petty ambitious men who establish in a neighborhood a despotic sway over silly women formerly wanton and always weak, and over men weaker and more contemptible than they." Would he have said as much in 1865?

Voltaire concludes his reviews of English literature by remarking, that, as the English had profited much from works in the French language, so the French, in their turn, ought to borrow from them. "We have both," he adds, "we and the English, followed the Italians, who are in everything our masters, and whom we have surpassed in some things. I know not to which of the three nations we ought to give the preference; but happy he who knows how to enjoy their different merits." In one particular, however, he awards the palm to England:

England honored literature and learning most. In France, he says, Addison might have been member of the Academy, and might have obtained a pension by the influence of a woman; or he might have been brought to trouble under the pretext that there might be found in his Cato some reflections upon the porter of a man in power. In England, he was Secretary of State; Newton was Master of the Mint; Congreve held an important office; Prior was plenipotentiary; Swift was dean in Ireland, and much more considered there than the primate; and if Pope's religion kept him out of office, it did not prevent his gaining two hundred thousand francs by his translation of Homer. "What encourages most the men of letters in England is the consideration in which they are held. The portrait of the prime minister is to be found hanging above the mantel-piece of his own study; but I have seen that of Mr. Pope in twenty houses."

Voltaire lived two years in England. In 1728, before the copies of *La Henriade* had been all delivered to the subscribers, the capricious tyranny which had banished him permitted his return to France. He had abandoned himself so entirely to the study of English, that when he resumed the habit of writing in French it was some time before he could use it with his former freedom.

It is scarcely possible to overstate the influence upon his mind and writings of his residence in England. The index to his works contains more than a thousand references to English authors, English learning, English customs, English laws, and especially English freedom. His letters are full of England and the English. "The French," he says in one of them, "are not *public-spirited;* hard and trifling nation, they have not even the word." In another he observes: "The love of law has become a passion with the English people, because every one is interested in the keeping of the law." In another: "In England a man must be all Whig or all Tory." In another: "We have been obliged to adopt their natural philosophy, to imitate their system of finance, to build ships after their plans; when shall we imitate them in their noble liberty of giving the mind all the play (*essor*) of which it is capable? When shall fools cease to hunt down the wise?" In

another: "Last year (1752) the Bishop of Worcester preached in London, before Parliament, in favor of inoculation. Such sermons are of more value than the twaddle of our preachers." In another: "In truth, we are the whipped cream of Europe; there are not twenty Frenchmen who understand Newton." We could fill many pages with such passages as these, all tending to show that it was this residence in England which completed Voltaire's education as a thinking man, and gave tone to all his subsequent labors. Goldsmith relates that, thirty years after his return to France, he was in his company one evening when the conversation turned upon England, and one of the company "undertook to revile" both the language and the authors of that country. Diderot defended them, but not with much success. Voltaire listened in silence to the dispute till midnight; which was the more surprising, because, as Goldsmith remarks, this was one of his favorite topics. But, at last, "Voltaire appeared roused from his reverie. His whole frame seemed animated. He began his defence with the utmost elegance mixed with spirit, and now and then he let fall his finest strokes of raillery upon his antagonist; and his harangue lasted until three in the morning. I must confess that, whether from national partiality, or from the elegant sensibility of his manner, I never was more charmed, nor did I ever remember so absolute a victory as he gained in this dispute."

We observe in the volumes of his letters that he continued to correspond with his English friends to the latest period of his life. Among his English correspondents were Bolingbroke, Lady Bolingbroke, Swift, Falkener, Hume, Robertson, Lord Lyttelton, Horace Walpole, Lord Chatham, and Colman. To his friend Falkener he dedicated his tragedy of *Zaïre*, and to him he wrote the long series of letters in the English language which appear in the volumes of *Lettres Inédites*. In 1748, he had the pleasure of congratulating him upon his marriage to a connection of the Duke of Marlborough, and upon his appointment to be secretary to the Duke of Cumberland, commanding the English army in Flanders. This letter shows that twenty years' absence from England had not made him forget his English.

"À M. le Chevalier Falkener.

"Lunéville, à la Cour de Lorraine,
le 5 Novembre, 1748.

"Dear Sir, — Your letter has afforded me the most sensible satisfaction; for when my friendship for you began, it was a bargain for life. Time, that alters all things, and chiefly my poor tattered body, has not altered my sentiments.

"You acquaint me you are a husband and a father, and I hope you are an happy one. It behooves a secretary to a great general to marry a great officer's daughter; and really, I am transported with joy to see the blood of Marlborough mixed with that of my dearest Falkener. I do present your lady with my most humble respects, and I kiss your child.

"You are a lusty husband, and I a weak bachelor, as much unhealthy as when you saw me, but some twenty years older. Yet I have a kind of conformity with you; for if you are attached to a hero, so I am in the retinue of another, though not so intimately as you are. My king has appointed me one of the ordinary gentlemen of his chamber, — *Gentilhomme ordinaire de sa chambre.* Your post is more honorable and profitable; yet I am satisfied with mine, because, if it gives not a great income, it leaves me at my full liberty, which I prefer to kings.

"The king of Prussia would once have given me one thousand pounds sterling *per annum* to live at his court; and I did not accept of the bargain, because the court of a king is not comparable to the house of a friend. I have lived these twenty years since with the same friend; and you know what power friendship gets over a tender soul and over a philosophical one. I find a great delight in opening my heart to you, and in giving you thus an account of my conduct. I will tell you that, being appointed also historiographer of France, I write the history of the late fatal war, which did much harm to all the parties; and did good only to the king of Prussia. I wish I could show you what I have wrote upon that subject. I hope I have done justice to the great Duke of Cumberland. My history shall not be the work of a courtier, nor that of a partial man, but that of a lover of mankind.

"As to the tragedy of *Sémiramis*, I 'll send it to you within a month or two. I always remember with great pleasure, that I dedicated to you the tender tragedy of *Zaïre*. This *Sémiramis* is quite of another kind. I have tried, though it was a hard task, to change our French *petits-maîtres* into Athenian hearers. The transformation is not quite performed; but the piece has met with great applause. It has the fate of moral books that please many, without mending anybody. I am now,

my dear friend, at the court of King Stanislas, where I have passed some months with all the easiness and cheerfulness that I enjoyed once at Wandsworth; for you must know that King Stanislas is a kind of Falkener..... He is indeed the best man alive. But, for fear you should take me for a wanderer of courts and a vagabond courtier, I will tell you that I am here with the very same friend whom I never parted from these twenty years past, the Lady du Chatelet, who comments Newton, and is now about printing a French translation of it; she is the friend I mean.

"I have at Paris some enemies, such as Pope had at London; and I despise them as he did. In short, I live as happy as my condition can permit.

"'Excepto quod non simul esses, cetera lætus!' I return you a thousand thanks, my dearest and worthy friend. I wish you all the happiness you deserve; and I 'll be yours for ever.

"VOLTAIRE."

Voltaire was the last man in the world to hide any light that he possessed under a bushel. He was nothing, if not communicative. There never was a person so little reticent. The whole of his long life was a ceaseless acquiring and imparting. *La Henriade* was the result of his conversations with a man familiar with the times of Henry IV. His History of Charles XII. came of his chance acquaintance with a person who had been part of that history. His Elements of Newton grew out of his sympathy with the favorite studies of Madame du Chatelet. He no sooner knew a thing than he was on fire to communicate it. He says truly of himself, that he had a "passion" to make known to France the masterpieces of other nations, — their science, their wisdom, their history. He labored for thirty years to overcome the scruples of the French against inoculation. This instinct of communication being so powerful in him, we cannot wonder that his English experience, so novel, so interesting, so triumphant, should have strongly influenced all his subsequent writings.

To state the effect upon France of his English knowledge, would be to state the causes of the French Revolution. The most remarkable pages in Mr. Buckle's History of Civilization are two in his first volume which contain a catalogue of names of French authors who, during the reign of Louis XV., studied the language and the authors of England. Those two pages

prove that every person who influenced France at that period drew inspiration from English sources. And this was chiefly Voltaire's work. The publication of his Letters upon England, in 1730,—letters written with all his vivacity and wit,—disclosed to the intelligence of France glimpses of an unknown and enchanting world; for at that day France was as far from England as Australia now is from the United States. Not twenty Frenchmen, probably, could then read English. The philosophy of Bacon, Newton, and Locke had scarcely been heard of, save by a few men of learning. The poetry and literature, the Church, the institutions, the customs of England, were all unknown. Voltaire partly lifted the veil, and revealed enough to excite a desire to see more. The French government, too, by placing its ineffectual ban upon the work, added to it the charm of forbidden fruit. It drove Voltaire from Paris; but finding a retreat in the chateau of Madame du Chatelet, he endured seventeen years of solitude, during which he had no resource against ennui but in literary labors of the same tendency.

Nothing would have been easier than for the government to have made Voltaire an ally. He was not at all inclined to be a martyr. No man in France was more disposed to make himself comfortable in the world. A smile now and then from the king, a place, and a pension, would have kept his restive pen under curb. The government chose to make an enemy of him. It had reached that point of blindness and folly which never yet ended except in destruction. Within fifteen years after Voltaire had published his English letters, it was truly said by a French writer that in France English held the rank of a learned language. "Our women study it, and have abandoned Italian in order to study the language of this philosophic people. There is not any of us who does not desire to learn English." The prevalence of this taste can be directly traced to Voltaire. The very fashions of England were adopted in Paris to an extent that was ridiculous. Many of our readers remember, perhaps, the letter of the eccentric Count Lauraguais, in which he speaks of this: "We are all metamorphosed into English; a strange and sudden revolution has happened in our dress, equipages, furniture, kitchens, and diversions. Our dan-

dies, who formerly were dressed, painted, and perfumed like dolls at ten in the morning, now ride in the environs of Paris in a plain shirt and frock, like English jockeys. Our delicate ladies, who never ventured to stir out in the morning, run all over Paris and frequent the public walks, in the genteel and loose dress of milkmaids. Our carriages are neat, plain, and convenient. Horse-races are frequent; our stables are full of English hunters and grooms; and our whips, saddles, and boots are manufactured by your countrymen, who have reduced ours to beggary. We have introduced roast beef and puddings in lieu of our soups, ragouts, and fricassee. We hunt, swear, drink toasts, and determine all disputes by bets, like your nobility and gentry," etc., etc.

Seven years later, Voltaire published his "Elements of the Philosophy of Newton,"—a popular, entertaining statement of the contents of the *Principia*. This work had a twofold effect. Besides overturning and finally abolishing the old philosophy, it excited that universal taste for science which prevailed in Europe during the thirty years preceding the Revolution, and which was a potent cause of that Revolution. This work, too, was forbidden; which greatly assisted to give it currency, and to make the intellect of France a solid phalanx against the old *régime*. That was the secret of the French Revolution. When the established order of things in Church or State is such that every man of sense and feeling is necessarily its foe, one of two things must speedily come to pass,—reform or revolution. Little, indeed, could such a man as Voltaire have affected the march of events, if he had not had the constant and mighty co-operation of an absolute king. Voltaire wrote, and the king served him as advertising agent.

The correspondence of Voltaire must have been an important element of his power. A large number of his letters, it is true, were written under restraint, or for a purpose which compelled him to take the tone of the great world. The great mass of them, however, written to old friends and schoolfellows, breathe the spirit of liberty. Opening a volume at random, we are likely enough to fall upon such a letter as the following, which may serve to show his habit of mind. It was written to the Marquis d'Argenson, from Holland, in 1743.

"Be Chancellor of France, Monsieur, if you wish me to return; restore to us the glory of literature, since we are losing that of arms. Men were made originally, it seems to me, to think, to instruct one another, and not to kill one another. Would that war were the only persecution which the arts experience! I groan at seeing that poor Abbé Langlet shut up at seventy in the Bastille, after having given us a good method of studying history, and some excellent chronological tables. Who then are the Vandals who have imagined that the printing of the sixth volume of Supplements to the history of that good citizen, President de Thou, was a crime of state? What a climax of barbarity, and what an extreme of littleness, not to permit us to print books which explain Newton, and which say that the reveries of Descartes are reveries!

"I prefer the abuse of liberty practised in Holland of printing one's thoughts, to that slavery to which they wish to reduce the human mind in France. If they go on in this train, what will remain to us but the remembrance of the glory of the beautiful age of Louis XIV.?

"This doctrine might make me desire to establish myself in the country where I now am. Having nothing to aspire to here, I should have nothing to complain of. I should live tranquil, and wish France more brilliant days.

"There are here some very estimable men. The Hague is a delicious place in summer, and liberty renders the winters less rude. I love to see the rulers of the state plain citizens. There are parties here, it is true, as there must be in a republic; but the spirit of party detracts nothing from the love of country: I see great men opposed to great men.

"I am very glad, for the honor of poetry, that there is a poet here" (Van Haren) "who has helped to procure succors for the queen of Hungary, and that the trumpet of war has been the very humble servant of the lyre of Apollo. I see, on the other hand, with not less admiration, one of the principal members of the government, who is of the peace party, walking in the streets unattended, inhabiting a house fit for those Roman consuls who cooked their own vegetables, spent scarcely two thousand florins a year upon themselves, and gave more than twenty thousand to indigent families.

"These great examples escape most travellers; but are not such curiosities better worth seeing than the processions at Rome, the priests at the Capitol, and the miracle of St. Januarius? Men of worth, men of genius, — these are my miracles!

"This government would please you infinitely, even with the faults that are inseparable from it. It is wholly municipal, which is just that which you love. Besides, the Hague is the place of news and of

books. It is properly the city of ambassadors, whose society is always very useful to one who wishes to instruct himself. You see them all here in one day. They go out, they return home; every street is a promenade; you can show yourself or remain in privacy, just as you like. It is Fontainebleau with no court to make."

A volume of letters in this tone could be selected from his correspondence. Perhaps we could find a thousand explosions like the following: "What a dog of a country is France, where a man cannot utter what he thinks! They speak their mind in England, — what harm comes of it? Does the liberty of thinking hinder the English from being masters on land and sea? Ah, French! French! in v in you drive out the Jesuits. You are still only half men!" When we consider that Voltaire was in correspondence with all the influential men and women of his time, that his letters, from the celebrity of their author, were handed about, preserved, and very frequently printed, we may form some estimate of their effect upon public opinion during the half-century preceding the Revolution.

Voltaire failed not to notice, what the people of the United States have frequently had to deplore, the inconsistencies of the English character. The witty Frenchman observed the contradictions of English history, but he was philosopher enough to know that inconsistency is not English, but human. "Divide the human race," he says, "into twenty parts. Nineteen of them are composed of those who labor with their hands, and who will never know that there has been such a man as Locke in the world. In the remaining twentieth part how few there are that read! and among those who read, there are twenty who read romances to one who studies philosophy. The number of people who think is exceedingly small." While this description of the human race remains substantially true, let us never be surprised at inconistencies in the acts or the feelings of a nation.

ART. III. — 1. *Deutsches Wörterbuch.* Von JAKOB und WILHELM GRIMM. Vol. I. – III. Leipzig. 1852 – 1863.
2. *Deutsches Wörterbuch.* Von JAKOB und WILHELM GRIMM, fortgesetzt von DR. RUDOLPH HILDEBRAND und PROFESSOR KARL WEIGAND. Erstes Heft. Leipzig. 1864.
3. *Deutsche Grammatik.* Von JAKOB GRIMM. Vol. I. – IV. Göttingen. 1819 – 1837.
4. *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache.* Von JAKOB GRIMM. 2 Vols. Leipzig. 1848.

THE name of Jacob Grimm has long been known as that of one of the most eminent representatives of erudition and of science produced by our century. His Grammar, although it has done but little for learners of the German language, has not failed of even grander results, and has since the day of its publication been prized as one of the most valued guides to linguistical and ethnological researches of every kind. Of late years his colossal enterprise, the ponderous Thesaurus of his language, has again brought out his name conspicuously among the *savans* of Europe, and carried it far beyond the limits of his country, not only wherever the German is read or spoken, but as far as there are lexicographers to profit from the lessons of a master in a science of which he is one of the originators. We need not therefore be surprised, that, since the date of his death, a little more than a year ago, a multitude both of notices and of eulogies have rapidly succeeded each other in nearly every country where letters are respected; and several of them, we are happy to say, are to be credited to pens from this side of the Atlantic. But although our readers may already have become informed of some of the leading facts connected with the name of Grimm, we cannot forbear thinking that the subject is not yet either exhausted or out of date for our pages; that, on the contrary, something further may be offered, which may shed new light upon it, and prove a source of profit or of pleasure to many of those whose eyes may chance to meet it. We propose, therefore, to insert here a brief sketch of the life of Grimm, and to link to it in chronological order as complete an outline of his writings as the limits of an article will permit.

From this sketch we could not well exclude the brother, who was inseparable from him nearly all his lifetime, and who, although not as eminent, has yet in association with him rendered services enough to letters to claim companionship of fame. We shall, therefore, connect to some extent the life of William Grimm with that of Jacob in the ensuing pages.

Jacob Grimm has himself left us an equally naïve and frank account of the earlier half of his life, in Justi's *Gelehrtenlexikon*, which was printed as long ago as 1831.* We are there informed that he was born at Hanau, on January 4th, 1785, the second son of the family, of which his brother William, one year older than himself, was the first and the eldest child. His father was *Amtmann*, or bailiff of the district; but before Jacob had reached the age of ten, his father moved to Steinau, and there shortly after died, leaving his family in a state of comparative destitution. The young boy, with his brother, received the first rudiments of his education at Steinau, where he probably also commenced his Latin. He was, we are told, remarkable for brightness from his childhood, and could read books fluently before others were beyond their alphabet. Of his earlier years there is nothing further to be noted, except that his face was for a time completely disfigured by the marks of small-pox, from which his features recovered their former symmetry but slowly.

Jacob's education, after so early a loss of his father, might have become much neglected, or at any rate suspended, had he not met with a helping hand in one of his aunts, who was living at the Electoral Court at Cassel. This good lady, Henrietta Philippina Zimmer, invited him, together with his brother, to the Lyceum at Cassel, where under her auspices they might continue and complete their preparation for the University. Jacob was but thirteen years of age at the time he entered the Lyceum, and was on that account put into *Unterquarta*, i. e. the lower subdivision of the fourth class of the institution; but he rapidly advanced from class to class, and, as he himself says, stood almost always *primus* until he had completed the course of studies at the Lyceum.

Everything seems to have gone on smoothly at Cassel, except

* Reprinted in Vol. I. of his posthumous *Kleinere Schriften*, Berlin, 1864.

that our young student was obliged to submit to a formal incivility, of which he afterwards deemed it just to leave a memorandum. One of his masters persisted in addressing him with *Er*, because he happened to be from the country, while all those of his class who were from the city were honored with the regular *Sie*, — a distinction which Grimm could not reconcile with his sense of justice. No special predilection for any one particular study seems to have developed itself in him as yet, and of the department in which he in after life became so eminent he could have had no conception at a time when nothing of the sort as yet existed. His leisure hours were devoted to drawing, — an art which his brother William likewise cultivated, and of which a younger brother, Emil, afterwards became Professor. In adverting to his course at the Lyceum, Grimm at a later date regretted too much of his time spent over studies which were but little calculated to benefit a career like his, as, for example, the natural sciences, geography, ethics, and philosophy, for none of which he had any special taste, except to some extent for botany.

Grimm entered the University of Marburg in 1802. He matriculated for the law; not from any special predilection for the study, but because his mother wished it, and his father too had been a jurist before him. "There is," says he, "something natural, harmless, and even promising in this adherence to the condition of one's father." His means at the University were extremely limited, his mother having three younger sons besides himself and his brother William to educate, and he was so far from being indebted to the aid of public or private beneficence as to be obliged to witness the fattest endowments unworthily bestowed and squandered by his side. But his austere lot did not discourage the aspiring youth, and he went on courageously with the work before him. "Poverty," says he, "spurs on to diligence and effort, saves us from many a dissipation, and inspires us with a certain noble pride that cannot be condemned, based as it is on the consciousness that we are earning for ourselves by personal effort what rank and wealth confer on others without exertion on their part. Nay, I am even inclined to generalize my remark, and to attribute much of that which the Germans have achieved to the circumstance

that they are not a rich people. They work from below upward, and on that account strike into many a peculiar path, while other nations may be said to advance rather upon a broad and well-paved public road."

Both the brothers Grimm studied under the eminent Savigny, to whose house they had free access, and in whose society they not only received the impulse for a profounder knowledge of jurisprudence than was common, but incidentally also, and mainly through some valuable works in his library, their attention was directed to the study of the Middle-High-German language and literature. Savigny's influence proved a decisive one on both the young students; and William Grimm afterwards confessed, that he did not know whether without it he would ever have attained to anything respectable (*je auf den rechten Weg gekommen wäre*).

And that Savigny likewise found something in the young men to appreciate is evident from the honor he conferred on Jacob two years after his matriculation. For when, in the summer of 1804, the celebrated jurist was on his learned tour to Paris, he had not been long in the capital before he felt the need of the assistance of his young student-friend, and sent him a request to follow him as early as January, 1805. Jacob was of course eager enough to accept so flattering an invitation, but his mother was so anxious about what she considered a risky undertaking, that, while her son was on his way, the good lady rose every night out of her bed to observe the weather, for fear her Jacob might meet with some accident, or freeze to death in the *diligence*. The closer intercourse with Savigny and the ample literary resources of the French capital gave a direction to Jacob's mind which never left him in after life, and which determined the character of all his subsequent colossal scientific enterprises.

It was in the course of the same winter that Jacob made application for some government employment at Cassel; but everything seemed barred against him, until, about a year after, he at last succeeded in becoming a sort of supernumerary under the Secretary of the War Department, with the extremely slender salary of one hundred thalers per annum. His good mother was not destined to live long enough to see the condi-

tion of her son materially mended. She died in 1808 at Cassel, while Jacob was yet limited to the wretched pittance of his hundred thalers.

It was not until July of the same year that a change took place in the relations of the young *savant*, which brightened his horizon considerably, but which was of such a nature that the Germans have pronounced themselves obliged to record it as a source of humiliation to their honor. It was the year in which the French had commenced to establish their dominion in the heart of Germany; and the new king of Westphalia, Jerome, who it appears was fond of at least the show of books, had a library for which he was in search of a custodian. Johannes von Müller recommended young Jacob Grimm, and the appointment was conferred on him. The post was in every sense a most desirable one, not only because it brought the incumbent a handsome salary, but also because it left him ample leisure for his favorite researches; no one being allowed to draw any books out of the library, and the king seldom demanding any service for himself.

The direction the librarian received on entering on his duties was simply, *Vous ferez mettre en grands caractères sur la porte: Bibliothèque particulière du Roi.* It was in the seclusion of this quiet sanctuary that Jacob, in connection with his brother William and some members of the Romantic school, began his labors to rescue the venerable literary monuments of his nation's antiquity from the oblivion and neglect in which they had for centuries been buried, and to astonish the world with glimpses into the poetry, tradition, and history of past centuries, of which it thus far had scarcely had a suspicion.

That Grimm discharged the duties of his office to the satisfaction of his royal master, we may infer not only from his remaining in his service in the capacity in which he had entered it until the dissolution of the kingdom, but also from certain additional honors and attentions bestowed on him as a reward of his fidelity. One morning, it is said, the king entered the library in person, and for no other purpose than that of announcing to its custodian his having nominated him Auditor in his Council of State. The young Germanist, but a short time before struggling for bread, was now honored with a seat

among the grandees of a sovereign, with whom he at first appeared regularly in the embroidered gala of the court. But Grimm's *penchant* was far greater in the direction of closet-work than in that of ceremonial court-business; and he accordingly no sooner learned that he need only appear when his master presided at the Council in person, than he turned the liberty to account, and quietly kept busy with his studies. The means at his command were now also much more ample, the salary of his two offices amounting to more than one thousand thalers, i. e. more than ten times the wretched allowance made him by the War Department of his native government.

Grimm remained with Jerome, as we have already said, from 1808 until the dissolution of the kingdom and the restoration of the Hessian government, in 1813. During the latter part of his reign, when the war began to menace the existence of his ephemeral throne, the king could not have so much confidence in his librarian, the only German in his Cabinet, as in the rest of his councillors. Grimm, however, conducted himself prudently enough to be retained until everything was lost, and the library had to be removed out of the danger of confiscation.

As soon as the war drew near to the royal residence, Grimm received orders to pack up the most valuable of the books and manuscripts at Cassel and Wilhelmshöhe, and to forward them to Paris; and in the performance of this duty he was closely superintended by one of Jerome's special agents, so that it was impossible for him to retain anything that was not of a purely local or special interest. All the rest went to Paris.

The modest, and in fact extremely patriotic, occupation of the royal librarian did not expose him to share the fate of the monarch in whose service he had spent five years of retired study, and he was therefore not required to leave Cassel. Complete amnesty even was easily granted to him, his brother William having maintained relations of loyalty with the exiled Elector, while his Aunt Zimmer had been a sharer of his banishment. Besides this, two of his younger brothers, who had lived far from home, had come back to respond to the call of their country, and had participated in the famous campaign of 1813.

It was thus that Grimm was enabled without much difficulty to return to loyalty again, and even greet the returning old Elector as he drove slowly along the streets of Cassel, which he entered towards the close of the year 1813. "We ran" (*liefen*), says he in his naïve mode of expressing himself, "along by the open carriage as it passed onward through the streets, which were hung with festoons and garlands." William too, although, like his brother, not unaware that his native land had much that was now out of date, and disposed to favor progress, could not refrain from expressing his satisfaction at the expulsion of the invader and the return of his native prince. "The restoration of Hessia," says he, "has been celebrated by us with emotions of the purest joy; and I have never witnessed anything more touching than the public entrance of our sovereign family. The people drew the carriage, not with an impetuous zeal roused for but a momentary purpose, but like one who brings back to his home a treasure, of which he has for a long time been deprived, and which the Divinity has restored to him again. It seemed to me at the moment that no fond expectation for the future could remain unfulfilled." So much then for the Grimms' patriotic sentiments as far as the invasion of their country was concerned.

Grimm's relations with Savigny and the late short-lived court of Jerome of Westphalia had naturally made him somewhat of a diplomate, and it was doubtless on that account that two days before Christmas, in 1813, he was nominated Secretary of Legation to the Hessian Envoy to the head-quarters of the allied army. In this position he once more was brought to Paris, in April, 1814, where he again improved every moment of his leisure to examine manuscripts in reference to his studies. It was then that Grimm saw his favorite books again in the French capital, where the same *huissier* that had helped him put them up at Cassel was now called upon to surrender them as the Elector's property, unlawfully seized and carried off by an enemy of the country. The Congress of Vienna next summoned Jacob to the capital of Austria, where he remained until June, 1815, busily occupied, most of the time, with researches into the Slavonic languages. In the course of the same year, the Prussian government called

him once more to Paris, charging him with the business of searching up and redemanding some manuscripts that had been robbed from some of the Prussian provinces. No commission could have been more agreeable to Grimm. It gave him ample opportunity for his researches, — there being on this occasion no other draft upon his time than the slight one which his duty as the temporary *locum tenens* of the Hessian Ambassador demanded of him. At this time he came into collision with some of the officials of the Imperial library, and one day, while engaged in making extracts from some of the manuscripts, which could not at the moment be reclaimed, he was interrupted by Langlès, the *conservateur*, who indignantly exclaimed, "*Nous ne devons plus souffrir ce M. Grimm qui vient tous les jours travailler ici et qui nous enlève pourtant nos manuscrits.*" The reprimand was sufficient. Grimm at once returned the manuscript from which he was extracting, and never made his appearance again at the library, except in his official capacity, as the substitute of his principal, the Ambassador.

Grimm had no sooner returned to his home than he was offered the post of Secretary of Legation to the new Federal Diet; but his attachment to his studies had already won a decided ascendency over him, and he on that account declined the appointment, but accepted the place of second librarian in the Electoral library at Cassel, in which the salary of six hundred thalers, paid him by King Jerome, was continued, and a few perquisites were added from other petty offices, among which, for a time, even that of the censorship (not coveted by him) was included. To his great satisfaction, provision was at the same time made for his brother William, who had, however, to content himself with the modest post of secretary to the library. This arrangement was due to Privy-Councillor Strieder, who had influence with the Elector, and who had so much regard for the two learned brothers as to give biographical sketches of both of them in his *Gelehrtenlexikon*, and with a minuteness that took in even the names of their nearest ancestors and relations. During the occupation of his country by the French, the patriotic indignation of this Strieder ran so high, that for seven entire years he could not be prevailed upon to

cross the threshold of his house, and the enemy could not be mentioned without rousing him to ire.

Jacob Grimm's connection with the library at Cassel lasted from 1816 till towards the close of the year 1829; and these thirteen years were to him not only the most laborious and prolific, but perhaps, with the exception of his last ten years at Berlin, also the quietest and most satisfactory of his life. It was here that he commenced authorship in earnest, for which his previous studies, and even publications, had been but preliminary; and it was here that he conceived and executed to some extent those works which constitute the basis of his immense celebrity abroad as well as in his native country.

Grimm had indeed begun his career as author while yet in the service of the king of Westphalia, and had already issued several publications, partly in his own name, partly in connection with his brother. His first work was an examination of the poetry of the old German Master-singers (*Ueber den altdeutschen Meistergesang*). It appeared at Göttingen in 1811, the year in which William likewise made his *début* in a translation of the popular heroic songs of Denmark (*Altdänische Heldenlieder, Balladen u. Märchen*, Heidelberg, 1811). In 1812, Jacob made a memorable contribution to Schlegel's *Deutsches Museum*, in which he discussed the mysterious transmission of popular legends from nation to nation, and from one generation of the same people to another.

About the same time the two brothers edited together the two most ancient poems of the German language, dating from the eighth century (*Die zwei ältesten deutschen Gedichte des achten Jahrhunderts*), fragments invaluable for the study of the language, which had up to that time been mistaken for prose, but now were by Jacob Grimm proved to be alliterative poetry. In the same year, 1812, they also gave to the world the three volumes of their charming collection of nursery tales, the widely and justly celebrated *Kinder- und Hausmärchen*, most of which they themselves collected as they found them in the mouth of the people, and which they reproduced in a style which, in point of truthfulness and natural ease, is quite unique, if not incomparable in its kind. This work is the first that reveals to us that scrupulous attention to the

humbler spheres of German life, which the Grimms regarded as an invaluable aid to the study of a nation's history, and which now became one of the essential features of their method.

From 1813 to 1816 the two brothers still continued to work conjointly. They published in a periodical form, and under the title of *Altdeutsche Wälder*,—"Old German Forests,"—a collection of valuable old texts, with dissertations on the language and literature of Germany during the Middle Age. This work attracted notice, not only from its intrinsic value, but also, and perhaps still more, from the critical assault of William Schlegel, who, as the chief of the so-called Romanticists, considered himself called upon to expend some of his fastidious mockery on the labors of the Grimms, and that too, singularly enough, in spite of the fact that the latter were likewise arrayed, at least nominally, under the banner of his school. The two brothers were, however, far from being disheartened or intimidated by the attack, and continued to work and publish together, on the same plan and in the same spirit as before. They edited, in 1815, a selection of extracts from the Elder Edda (*Die Lieder der älteren Edda*, Berlin, 1815), then for the first time made known to Germany in its own language; and a year or two after, a collection of German legends, in two volumes (*Deutsche Sagen*, Berlin, 1816–1818). This popular series they completed in 1826, by adding a volume of Irish fairy legends (*Irische Elfenmärchen*, Leipzig, 1826) in imitation of the work of Crofton Croker, with a learned and ingenious introduction on the traditions relating to the elves.

But to return now more particularly to Jacob Grimm. We have already remarked that his residence at Cassel as librarian was perhaps the most satisfactory and successful period of his laborious life. Of this he was himself so well aware, that when, in 1816, the University of Bonn invited him, together with his brother, to chairs in its Faculty, he declined to accept, afraid of losing by the exchange some of the quiet leisure which he then enjoyed. He kept perpetually at work, and now not only in conjunction with his brother and on secondary publications, but far more earnestly and extensively

on works of solid erudition, and these of the most original and widest scope. His studies had thus far, as we have seen, been mainly and steadily directed towards the linguistical and literary antiquities of his country; but these he did not allow to be restricted to their ordinary limits. He extended his researches in every direction where he knew or suspected the remotest bearing on his subject, and thus made tributary to his purpose not only the old and new dialects of his own language, including the old Scandinavian and its modern descendants, the Gothic and the Sanscrit, but also the Slavonic languages, and the Romansh idioms descended from the Latin. As an additional proof of his preparatory studies in all these directions, we may cite his *Silva de Romances Viejos*, which was printed in Vienna in 1815, and which for many years passed as the best collection of old Spanish romanzas.

The first great work of Jacob Grimm began to make its appearance in 1819. This was the first volume of his German Grammar (*Deutsche Grammatik*, Göttingen, 1819), which was destined to be a colossus of four thick octavos, and compared with which all his previous publications dwindled into secondary rank. It was in its scope and execution a grammar in a sense in which none had been seen before; and it has justly been said of it, that it for the first time demonstrated to the learned world what a language is. Its method was a complete revolution in the science of grammar, — the substitution of a natural and comparative process, in lieu of the former *a priori* rules, which had scarcely varied since the time of the grammarians of Alexandria and Rome. All the languages of Germanic origin were here considered as dialects of one, and not only were they subjected to a minute comparison of their sounds and forms, with a view to determining the law of their transition from one into the other, but the different epochs of each of them were also examined with scrupulous care, so as to bring out completely their history and the successive phases of their organic life. And in the execution of this plan the author not only communicated the results of his researches to his readers, but he worked as it were before their eyes, and never drew his generalizations until he had first adduced long lists of examples, all of which

were derived from and credited to authentic sources. The book, it is true, became thus somewhat ponderous and unpractical; but of what consequence is this in labors of the sort? Its scientific method and exactness won it, from the outset, an authority which placed it on a level with the Comparative Anatomy of Cuvier. The plan on which Grimm's work is executed must doubtless be attributed to his invention, although the movement to which it belongs goes back as far as the commencement of the century. Frederic Schlegel published his work on the language and wisdom of the ancient Hindus in 1808; Raynouard's grammar of the Romansh languages was printed in 1816; and Bopp's conjugation-system of the Indo-Germanic languages in the same year.

After bringing out the second volume of this Grammar in 1826, Grimm next published, in 1828, another great work on the legal antiquities of Germany (*Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, Göttingen, 1828), in which he again astonished the world of letters by demonstrating how closely the history of a nation's jurisprudence is linked to that of its manners and customs, and to its archæology. The author here disclosed vestiges of law from sources in which no one had ever looked for them before; and his book diffused an effulgence of light on the Germanic manners of the Middle Age, which extended its beneficent rays to other nations even. In France, M. Michelet, the historian, was so fascinated by it, that a few years after he composed, in imitation of it, a book on the legal antiquities of his own country (*Sur les Origines du Droit français*), in which he incorporated a portion of Grimm's work translated by himself, and expressed himself in terms of boundless admiration for the author of it. This translation gave rise to a correspondence between Grimm and Michelet, of which several interesting letters from the pen of Grimm have recently been printed. Michelet entered so completely into the spirit of the great work in question, that we can scarcely do better than give, from his own Introduction, the following brief characterization of it.

"There is no country in which the science of jurisprudence is as prolific in poetical formulas as it is in Germany. In 1816, Jacob Grimm, the Ducange of our age, published a brief but interesting dissertation 'On the Poetry of the Law' (*Ueber die Poesie des Rechts*); and in 1828

he gave to the world his gigantic work 'On the Antiquities of German Jurisprudence.' Never did a book shed so sudden and profound a light on any science. There is here no room left either for confusion or for doubt. It is not a more or less ingeniously constructed system that we have here; it is a magnificent collection of formulas derived from the jurisprudence of every country, from all the idioms of Germany and of the North. We perceive in this book, not the hypotheses of a man, but the living voice of antiquity itself; the irrefragable testimony of two or three hundred old jurisconsults, who in their naïve and poetical formulas have preserved us the beliefs, the domestic usages, nay, the very secrets of the fireside and of the most intimate moral relations of the German people. The book has an immense intrinsic value, considered merely as a revelation of the poetry of a nation's jurisprudence, but a still greater one as a term of comparison with that of other countries. No nation is as rich in this department as Germany, and that which the rest possess finds in nearly every instance something to correspond with it in the collection given us by Grimm, and may derive from it either confirmation or interpretation, as the case may happen to require. The new science indicated by Vico has now become possible, the symbolism of the law."

Grimm was so much pleased with Michelet's proceeding, that, in a letter bearing the date of Göttingen, December 1st, 1837, he wrote to him *inter alia*: "Your Introduction to your *Origines du Droit* is, in my opinion, more poetical than *L'Art Poétique* of your Boileau,"—an estimate which a recent French writer does not accept as a compliment to his literature, and maintains Goethe to have been the only German that ever judged equitably of the *esprit* of the French, although himself not possessed of the slightest affinity with it.

While Jacob thus won celebrity at Cassel, his brother William was not idle, although his delicate health and his disinclination for philosophical generalizations did not allow him to enter upon tasks so arduous and ambitious as were those of Jacob. He published in 1821 a valuable dissertation on the German Runes (*Ueber die deutschen Runen*), and in 1829 a work on the Heroic Legends of the Germans (*Die deutsche Heldensage*), which Jacob afterward pronounced his masterpiece. Besides this, he now began to publish the texts of some of the old German writers (e. g. *Grave Ruodolf*, Göttingen, 1828), of which he afterward at Göttingen and Berlin edited a considerable number.

This peaceful existence of the Grimms at Cassel was suddenly interrupted by the death of the principal librarian, in 1829. The great merit of the two learned brothers entitled them to promotion; and Jacob was, in the estimation of every one, the man to fill the vacancy, while the less distinguished but not less meritorious William had likewise strong claims to advancement. But it seems no such estimate was put upon their services by the obtuse authorities about them. A certain Von Rommel, who the year before had been elevated to the peerage of the Electorate, was made director of the library and museum, while the two brothers were to remain in their previous condition of subalterns. This was too serious an infraction of their honor to pass unnoticed, either by themselves or by the numerous and devoted friends which their great services to national letters had attached to them. Some of the latter suggested that an honorable call to Göttingen should be accepted by them, and all the parties consulted about the step advised them by all means to consent to it. But, singularly enough, their attachment to their home and to their quiet pursuits made it appear hard for them to move into the publicity of University chairs; and it was only their sense of honor that prevailed on them at last to listen to the proposition addressed them.

All these scruples were overcome when, in October, 1829, the royal patent reached them which appointed Jacob regular professor and librarian, and William assistant librarian, to the University of Göttingen. One of the most desirable, and doubtless the most consoling, advantages of these new positions was, that both of them had salaries attached to them, — a consideration which was destined to put an end to the perpetual pecuniary embarrassments with which they had to struggle in the service of their native government. Jacob was thus at length reconciled to the change. "It is true," said he, "the country about Göttingen cannot be compared with that of Cassel; but then the same stars are over our heads, and God will help us onward." At Göttingen, William had ample room for moving onward in his beaten path, and prepared a number of new publications from his post. Jacob alone was called to the performance of an additional duty, new to him, and about which he had felt some hesitation; but his *début* as a lecturer was quite satis-

factory, and he soon became one of the most popular men of the University. His courses were chiefly on the comparative grammar of his language, and on the legal antiquities and literary history of his country, sometimes also on the *Germania* of Tacitus. The style of his lectures, like that of his writings, was not unfrequently striking and poetic. He began one of them with the memorable words: "Thought is lightning, speech is thunder." In speaking of the German language, he said upon another occasion: "The old language may be compared to an infant, which has inherited wonderful talents, but which has not as yet developed them; the new, on the other hand, is a man who, although possessed of but moderate endowments, yet manages them so well as to be equal to any emergency." William too, though not an *ordinarius* like his brother, considered himself now called upon to give courses, and lectured chiefly on old German literature, and on the *Nibelungenlied.* His style bore much resemblance to that of Jacob, and he likewise soon became one of the favorites of the students.

Grimm's residence at Göttingen was attended with remarkable results, although perhaps upon the whole not equal to those at Cassel. While William went on with the publication of curious old texts, Jacob continued to work at his Grammar, of which from 1829 to 1837 he succeeded in getting through the press the third and a portion of the fourth (and last) volumes. This last volume, which was to treat of the comparative syntax of the Germanic languages, promised to be one of special interest. But this part of his work Grimm unfortunately left unfinished, to the great disappointment of all the admirers of his method. His study on the syntax extends only to the end of the simple proposition, without as much as touching on the complex, in which so many and so serious difficulties are involved. He seems to have deferred the completion of it until it was too late or inconvenient to accomplish it. His Grammar, however, is nevertheless a splendid and an admirable work, and in spite of this defect we doubt if there is another one to rival it in any language. During this same period he published his edition of the text of the old popular favorite "Renard the Fox" (*Reinhart Fuchs*, Berlin, 1834), accompanied, as in other instances, by a valuable dissertation

on the origin, the development and specific character, of the legends in which animals figure as interlocutors, and on the necessity of distinguishing them from the common fable, with which they had been improperly confounded.

The last fruit of his labors at Göttingen is one of those to which we may justly point as one of the great pillars of his vast celebrity. It is his equally original, thorough, and acute "German Mythology" (*Deutsche Mythologie*), which appeared in 1836. This work, although not strictly a comparative mythology in the wide sense of the term, is yet one which far transcends the limits of the nation to which it properly refers, and derives light from a variety of sources more or less remotely related to its own. Its characteristic feature is the introduction of the popular element, which, up to this time, had been excluded from researches of the kind; and its information is derived almost entirely from the traditional superstitions of past and present times. The popular beliefs and superstitions still more or less in vogue are, according to Grimm, often but the remains of the primitive religions of the nation. For in Germany, as in other countries, Christianity is so far from having entirely eradicated the old popular beliefs which preceded it, that, on the contrary, it has even adopted some by modifying them, and has not been able to annihilate completely the majority of those which it supplanted. It is thus that in Scandinavia the myths concerning Freya have become metamorphosed into the legends of Saint Gertrude, that in Germany the night of the summer solstice has been consecrated to Saint John, and the fantastic May-day night linked to the name of the humble nun, Saint Valpurgis, in whose real life we look in vain for the slightest reference to the mysterious eve in question. These superstitions, it is true, have vanished almost entirely from the surface of society, but many of them have concentrated themselves in the lower strata of it in the shape of proverbial expressions, of legends, nursery-tales, and local superstitions, which the people repeat and have had in their mouths for centuries, without comprehending either their origin or primitive intention. It is from this vast mine of popular lore, which up to his day had lain unexplored by any one, that Grimm derived a multitude of myths, which to most of his readers were as novel as they

are intrinsically curious and significant; and it is on this account that his Mythology from the day of its appearance became not only the model for subsequent researches of the kind, but also an invaluable guide for the exploration of other national myths more or less akin. To the works prepared by Jacob Grimm while at Göttingen, we must add one of a religious character which appeared soon after his removal there. It is his *Hymnorum veteris Ecclesiæ* XXVI *Interpretatio Theotisca*, 1830. The texts published by William about this time are *Der Freidank*, Göttingen, 1834, and *Der grosse Rosengarten*, 1836.

These literary enterprises of the brothers at Göttingen were suddenly and rudely interrupted by an event of a political nature, which occurred towards the end of the year 1837. The king of Hanover, under whose auspices the Grimms had come to Göttingen, was William IV. of England, who in 1833 had given a liberal constitution to his German kingdom. But when upon his decease, in 1837, the two crowns were separated, and that of Hanover fell to his brother, the Duke of Cumberland, the new King Ernest Augustus threw himself into the arms of the old feudal party, and, under the pretext of some irregularity, declared himself not obligated to recognize the concession of his brother; so that the constitution was formally abolished by a decree of November 1st, 1837, and the old state of things, in which the territorial nobility was all-powerful, was re-established. The act was looked upon as a breach of faith on the part of the new king, and an energetic protest was entered against it by the University of Göttingen, signed by seven of the most distinguished of its professors, among whom were Jacob and William Grimm. The rest were Dahlmann, the lecturer on political economy; Ewald, who taught Hebrew; Gervinus, of the chair of history and literature; Weber, of that of physics; and Albrecht, of the law. The protest was a weighty one, when we consider that in Germany the faculties of a University have an authority analogous to that of the supreme court of appeals in other countries; but in this instance it only served to challenge another act of violence from the arbitrary monarch and the party by which he was supported. By an edict of the 11th of December, 1837, the seven

professors who had signed were all of them deprived of office, and the three who had published the protest, Dahlmann, Gervinus, and Jacob Grimm were required to quit the kingdom within three days. They carried with them, however, the sympathy and regrets of the majority of the students, who insisted on accompanying them *in corpore* as far as the frontier, and passed a resolution not to redemand the lecture fees that had been paid them in advance,—a resolution which was faithfully observed by all except six nobles of the royal party, who demanded reimbursement. This demonstration, as might be expected, led to a collision between the enthusiastic sons of the Muses and the civil authorities. For when, on December 15th, they again met to salute the four deposed professors who were still living in the city, the military intervened, and several of the young men were wounded, while others were arrested and imprisoned. Here the matter ended without any further trouble from the students, who it would seem were not supported by any of the citizens.*

Thus exiled from Göttingen, Jacob Grimm proceeded at once to his old Cassel, while his brother William remained yet for nearly an entire year, probably to wind up their affairs at the University. He followed Jacob in October, 1838, and they now once more began to work quietly together where nearly thirty years before they had commenced their career as authors. Their fate enlisted sympathy and respect all over Germany, and it seemed almost certain that they were destined to gain more than they had lost from their removal. But their pecuniary prospects were at this moment none of the most flattering, and it was chiefly on this account that, when Weidmann, a publisher of Leipzig, offered to engage them to prepare an extensive historical dictionary of the German language, they accepted without hesitation a task which under better circumstances they might have shrunk from undertaking, on account of the enormous labor which it involved. The task, however, was well suited to them; and in a letter to Michelet,† in which Jacob complains of the necessity which compelled them to engage in

* Cf. Jacob Grimm's own account, *Ueber meine Entlassung*, in Vol. I. of *Kleinere Schriften*, Berlin, 1864.

† *Revue Germanique*, Février, 1864.

it, he goes on to describe with apparent satisfaction the plan of the great work on which they were about to enter. He says: "That which is more especially to occupy us for a series of years to come is a complete dictionary of the German language, which we propose, however, to construct rather upon the plan of the *Academia della Crusca* than on that of the French Academy. A work of this description has long been felt to be a great desideratum for our language, and still it will not yet be too late to undertake it. And that to foreigners too it may come just in time to be acceptable, we intend to give the definitions of the words in Latin; and where the dead language offers no equivalent, in French. All the writers of the last three centuries, from Luther down, will be consulted, with the assistance, of course, of a large number of contributors; and this, you may imagine, will bring together an amount of matter that will be really astonishing."

The two brothers were already zealously at work, and the preparations for the great task almost completed, when in 1841 a new turn of events placed them in a position either to relinquish the engagement, or at any rate to proceed more deliberately and at their leisure. It was in that year that, at the suggestion of William von Humboldt, the late king of Prussia, Frederic William IV., who took pride in extending his favors to everything relating to the literature and art of Germany, invited them to Berlin as members of the Academy. No offer could have been more honorable, and it was therefore readily accepted. The position of academician was in itself an eminent and well-remunerated one, and it had besides attached to it the privilege of lecturing at the University, — a privilege of which the Grimms, however, made but little use, owing to a natural disinclination for public courses. The Athens of the North offered them advantages which thus far they had only partially enjoyed, and it was destined to be their place of happy effort until the end of their career on earth. They there not only had the benefit of the concentrated intellect and refinement of a great metropolis, but they also enjoyed a still rarer private favor. They lived by the side of the celebrated Bettina, the widow of their friend Achim von Arnim; and the society of this warm-hearted and highly intellectual woman

became to them at once a source of refined domestic enjoyment and an incentive to perseverance in their arduous literary enterprises.

Of the two Grimms, William alone had married, as long ago as 1825. His wife was one of his mother's friends from Cassel, and the marriage was in every respect a happy one. So far from separating the two brothers, or even disturbing their intimacy, Madame Grimm contributed in no small degree to link them ever closer together, by presiding over the domestic board of both with a degree of fidelity that made her say sometimes, in her naïve pleasantry, that she was attending to "her husbands." William had several children, one of whom, Hermann Grimm, is the husband of one of Bettina's daughters, and a writer of some note in Germany. Jacob, although submissive to the arrangements of a family, remained independent to the end of his days, with now no other care upon his mind but that of his studies, which were, however, immense enough to wear out any constitution less vigorous than his own. The domestic economy of the Grimms was in every sense a rational one, nor was it ever disturbed by anything like petty feuds or divisions. That its honor, too, was always respected, we need not here remark, although we cannot but record an instance of *médisance* of which none but a gay capital like that of Prussia could be guilty. Shortly after the settlement of the Grimms at Berlin, a comedy was brought out under the title of *Wer soll heirathen?* (Which of the two shall get married?) in which some of the mischievous talkers of the town pretended to find allusion to the supposed embarrassment of the two bachelors prior to the marriage of one of them, some twenty years before.

The special charge of Jacob in the family, and one in which he took no little satisfaction, was that of private librarian. With the exception of the few most necessary books always to be kept at hand, the brothers had but one common library, and it was Jacob who attended to it with the science and devotion of a consummate custodian. He would often, we are told, walk slowly along by the shelves, to take down here and there a volume, which he then would examine for some moments, and put back in its place again with the satisfaction of a veri-

table amateur. It was his delight to rise and to put his hand directly upon the volume which the rest were looking for in vain. He was so familiar with the places of his books, that he could find them even at night without a candle. Many of the volumes of this select collection were full of marginal notes and manuscript fly-leaves from the hands of one or both of the two brothers; and where a work had no printed index, it not unfrequently acquired two, one from the pen of each of them. It was doubtless mainly on this account that the Grimms were rarely willing to allow a volume to be lent out of their collection, and were somewhat in the repute of over-nicety in this respect, although the writer of these lines recollects that, when in Berlin, Jacob of his own accord offered him the use of a work on the Gothic language which, on account of other occupations, he could not at the moment accept. Jacob's devotion to his literary treasures extended to the end of his days; and in his old age he often expressed the wish that his collection should not be scattered after his decease. His friends assured him that it should be respected; and when, while on his death-bed, they desired to cheer him with something grateful to his failing senses, they again repeated that his library should be preserved entire. They were probably the last words he distinctly heard before expiring. In addition to this idiosyncrasy about the library, Jacob had another and still more marked one about his writings. His posthumous papers contained a testamentary note, made, it would seem, long prior to his decease, in which he expressed the wish that all his unfinished manuscripts, and even the *excerpta* that might be found after his death, should be destroyed by fire, — a clause which, in spite of the respect due to the wishes of the testator, it is hoped will not be complied with by his executors.

From all that we have thus far seen of the Grimms, their dominant passion was for books; but they had still another one in common, and that was one for flowers. It is true they had but little chance to cultivate them, living as they did mostly in cities. But they made room for a few at any rate in front of their windows, where William regularly kept his primroses, and Jacob his gilliflowers and his heliotropes. The latter also liked to see two or three cut flowers in a vase upon the table

at which he worked. Their flowers were to them symbolical of the precious blossoms of the heart and intellect, as unfolded in the old poetry and traditions of their native country.

In illustration of the intimate and never clouded harmony of the two brothers, it is perhaps not out of place to quote the words which Jacob addressed to William in 1831, just after the latter had recovered from a serious illness. It is the page which, in the shape of a dedication, Jacob put in front of the third volume of his Grammar, and reads as follows: —

"My dear William: — When last winter you were so ill, I was obliged to fear that your faithful eyes might perhaps never light upon the pages now before you. I was seated at your table, in your chair, and my mind was filled with inexpressible sadness when I saw with how much order and neatness you had read and extracted from the first volumes of my work. It appeared to me then that I had written it for you alone, and that, if you were taken away from me, I could never proceed any further with its composition. God's mercy has protected us and left you with us, and it is therefore to you that in all justice the present volume more especially belongs. It has been said truly, that certain books are written for posterity; but it is nevertheless even more true, that at the same time each work of the kind belongs first of all to the limited circle in which we live, and that that circle alone contains the key to its most intimate sense, which often may remain sealed to all the rest. At any rate, when you read me, you who know exactly my manner, with all its commendable qualities and its defects, I experience more satisfaction than if I were read by a hundred others, who may not comprehend me properly here and there, or to whom my work, in many a part of it, may be a matter of indifference. But as for you, I know that you peruse every portion of my book with the most impartial and most constant interest, and that not only on account of the subject itself, but also for my own sake. May you therefore be fraternally contented with that which I now dedicate to you."

The intimacy here brought out so conspicuously, although rare in history, is not so surprising, when we recollect that it was based upon a perfect harmony, nay, an identity, of life-plan. Their difference of age was but one year; they had been at school and at the University together; they had for a great while lived and even dressed alike. For many of their earlier years they had but one room and but one bed, and they also studied at the same table. At the University they still

lived in a common room, with two tables and separate beds. At the age of manhood even, they for a great while adhered to a common study-chamber; and when at a later date a difference of habit and of inclination made some separation necessary, the distance never extended beyond their occupying two study-chambers contiguous to each other. William could do nothing except in the most perfect silence, and the slightest interruption was to him a source of trouble and annoyance. His time too was of necessity somewhat differently occupied from that of his brother. He devoted the day only to study, while the evening he thought belonged to his family and his friends, or to visits out of the house. Jacob was unwilling to surrender to society any stated portion of his time, and if left to himself would have kept on working without any intermission. Yet he could be interrupted without any inconvenience, and he was even glad to have a paper brought him, or to have a chat on politics. He made it a point never to refuse a visitor at any time; and when the call was over, he would go on with his work precisely as if its thread had been unbroken. Yet William, in spite of his precaution, evinced much less concentration of mind than Jacob. The latter had the native force in him, and on that account he alone planned and executed nearly everything that is original, profound, or great in the labors of the two.

Notwithstanding this marked difference, the two brothers were yet devoted to one common task, and this was shared with a number of others; as, for example, with Lachmann, Schmeller, Graff, Hoffmann, and after a while with other younger members of the Germanists. The central sentiment of all these men was a patriotic one, and one which commenced with and derived its main inspiration from the great movement for national independence in opposition to Napoleon. The labors of the Grimms, and especially of Jacob, placed them at the head of the school in which they had registered their names, and they were accustomed to look upon it as the great end of their lives to rear to their country a national monument that might last for centuries to come, and to do so by reanimating the past for the benefit of the future. They thus became historians, but historians in a new and extraordinary sense. In-

stead of occupying themselves with the monotonous and often humiliating or disgusting spectacle of political events, they penetrated into the spirit of the past, into those common elements in which a nation lives and moves, and from this exhaustless mine they brought to light, not only the primitive poetry, the religion, superstitions, and popular legal wisdom of the nation, but also, and in close connection with them, the history of its language, which they were wont to look upon as the most faithful mirror of the collective and spontaneous life of the masses from which it emanated. The task was a gigantic one, and yet their untiring, patriotic zeal advanced it so far, that it may almost be said to have been completed. The labors of the Germanists were attended with the noblest results. The poets of the nation, men like Uhland and Simrock, caught the inspiration, and have revived for us many a pleasant legend of the olden time, while the regal public halls of Munich and many a gallery of Germany bear evidence that art too has learnt its lessons from researches like those which we have here endeavored to describe. Of their eventual effect upon the nation at large there cannot be the slightest doubt, however difficult it may be at present to calculate the exact nature and extent of it.

The fraternal concord between the Grimms lasted until it was broken by the hand of death. William died of an anthrax, in December, 1859, about eighteen years after his arrival in Berlin, and seven after the appearance of the first number of their great work, the Dictionary. He had reached the seventy-fourth year of his life. The funeral homage paid his remains was of the most distinguished kind; and among those who followed him to his last repose was one of his old colleagues at Göttingen, the celebrated Gervinus of Heidelberg.

That the Grimms in the midst of so much to favor their studies at Berlin did not remit any of their previous ardor, it is scarcely necessary to remark. William, besides proceeding with his publication of old texts, contributed a number of valuable dissertations to the transactions of the Academy, among which we find, for example, one on the German finger-names (*Ueber die deutschen Fingernamen*), in the year 1846, and another no less remarkable one on the myth of Polyphemus,

in the year 1857. But by far the heaviest portion of his efforts was bestowed upon the Lexicon, to the mere preliminaries of which more than a decennium was found necessary, and in the final reduction of which William, during the last seven years of his life, divided the work about equally with his brother.

Jacob's studious zeal during his residence in Berlin was as untiring as ever. His superior intellect placed him at the head of the lexical enterprise, and he also made still more numerous and important contributions to the Academy. During his first years in the city, he went on chiefly with the revision and completion of things already printed, and partly with the execution of some of his many plans of new publications. After preparing a new and greatly enlarged edition of his German Mythology, which appeared in 1843, he published a collection of documents of popular jurisprudence (*Dorfweisthümer*), in three heavy volumes, intended as a sequel to his Antiquities of German Jurisprudence, and prepared probably already at Göttingen or during his late stay at Cassel. To these he intended to add a fourth volume, containing the necessary introductions and elucidations; but this, like the last volume of his Grammar, was never entirely completed. But the most important original work from his pen while at Berlin is his History of the German Language (*Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*), in two large octavos, which was prepared just before the political troubles of 1848, and published in that year. This work linked itself essentially to the author's Grammar, and is in a certain sense the complement of it. The title, however, does not give us a correct idea of its character; for it is so far from tracing the development of the language to the entire extent of its history, that it scarcely passes beyond the limits of its antiquities. But these it treats with a thoroughness and exactness rarely to be met with and unsurpassed in any scientific department. All the old dialects of the German, the Gothic, the Scandinavian, the High and Low German subdivisions, &c., are here once more subjected to a close examination of their characteristic law of development, and compared not only with each other and with the kindred idioms of Indo-European descent, but even with those less related idioms geographically contiguous to them, as, for example, with the

Finnish. Grimm had here again a patriotic end in view. His object was to determine with the utmost possible exactness the limits of the Germanic race and of the nations which constituted it, and to demonstrate their original identity. The work has, therefore, an immense scientific value; and although offering but little interest to the general reader, it will yet hereafter be looked upon as an indispensable introduction, not only to the history of Germany, but also to that of the barbaric invasions which buried the old Roman empire.

The first number of the great Lexicon (*Deutsches Wörterbuch*) made its appearance in 1852 (nearly fourteen years after the proposition to prepare it was accepted), and the first complete volume bears the date of March 22, 1854. Of the plan of the work we have several sketches from the authors themselves. One of them was submitted by William to the Congress of Germanists which met at Frankfort in 1846; two at least are furnished us by Jacob in his letters, and one extended and minute one in his admirable Preface to the first volume. The work, as we have already seen, embraces in its vocabulary the German language as represented by the authors of the nation for the last three centuries, commencing with Luther and ending with Goethe; that is to say, it professes to be a complete Thesaurus of the third period of the language, which Jacob in his Grammar has designated as the Modern High German. The Old and Middle High German had necessarily to be excluded from the alphabetical order of the words, but they are nevertheless respectably represented, not only in the etymological researches, but also in the quotations introduced to elucidate or define the words employed by the writers of a later date. The citations from authors are numerous, and well calculated to bring out the meanings of the word which they are intended to illustrate, while the etymological researches are such in every sense as we might expect from two great philologians who in this department stood unrivalled. The definitions are mostly in German, but under the most important words generally also, as the prospectus promised, in Latin, or in some modern language. The plan is as unique as it is comprehensive; and the work will doubtless prove an invaluable mine to the scholar and the future author of the nation, how-

ever unpalatable and comparatively useless it may be to those who are too indolent or ignorant to use it. "It appears to me," says Jacob in a letter to Adolph Regnier, "to be the first time that in the case of a modern idiom an attempt is made to make one's self master of the entire living language, by comprising in it those expressions even which it has lost in the course of the last centuries. With a view to this end, abundance and exactness of citations are indispensable. Our aim should not be to interdict the use of words to the writers of the present or of future time, but to make it easier for them to reintroduce some of those now out of date. Our object, therefore, was first of all to open a complete archive of the language, as it actually exists and has existed during the time in question, let the practical use that shall be made of it be what it may. If the work shall be continued and completed as we have commenced it, the trite complaint about the dryness of lexicons will entirely disappear." This was written in 1853, a year before the publication of the first volume (*A — Biermolke*) entire. The second volume (*Biermolke — E*) did not appear complete until eight years after (1860); but the eight numbers of the third (*E — Forsche*) followed each other in rapid succession, and the whole of it was out in 1862.

After the death of William, who did not live to see the second volume entire, the whole of the enormous task devolved mainly on Jacob, who sustained it with admirable constancy and fortitude. But he was not destined to proceed much further than his fraternal coadjutor, and was called away to follow him before the letter *F* of the first number of the fourth volume was completed. We must not imagine, however, that Germany could allow so noble a monument of its language to fail, or even to be suspended long, by the decease of its originators. To the credit of the work and of the nation, it is already continued, and the first number of the fifth volume (*K — Kartenband*), from the pen of Dr. Rudolph Hildebrand, is already before us; while the remainder of the fourth, from the hand of Prof. Karl Weigand, is also in a state of progress. Both these continuators had contributed to the work during the lifetime of the authors; and Dr. Hildebrand to such an extent, and so much to their satisfaction, that Jacob Grimm

had expressly designated him as his successor. We need not, therefore, be surprised to find that the continuation is pronounced to be in every respect worthy of the beginning, and that the work will in all probability be completed on the same plan and in the same spirit in which it was begun.

That this unique Thesaurus, as far as it is before the public, should have enjoyed an extensive circulation and a wide celebrity, both at home and abroad, is no more than its antecedents would lead us to expect. But it has also met with detractions, and a number of faults have been found with it. Adolph von Raumer accuses the authors of sacrificing too much of the present classical state of the language to that of an anterior date,* while Denhard complains of Jacob's attempt to alter the present orthography of the German upon the basis of what he calls its organic development.† The latter of these charges more especially is not unfounded, and Grimm's proposition on this point will in all probability never be accepted. But as no human work is absolutely perfect, so the one in question may likewise be subject to exceptions. Be that, however, as it may, it will nevertheless not only answer completely all the ends for which, as we have seen above, it was intended, but it will stand probably for centuries as one of the noblest and most gigantic monuments of erudition ever reared by mortals. The attempts to censure his proceeding were a source of some annoyance to Jacob, but he dismissed them with the brief remark, "Two spiders have crept upon the plants of my word-garden, and have discharged their poison on them."

One would not suppose that Grimm, amid the arduous responsibilities of efforts like those just enumerated, could have either inclination or leisure for anything else; and yet we find that during his residence in Berlin he was not only one of the most active associates of the Academy, but also the honored member of several public conventions and the orator of festive occasions. When, in 1846, the venerable *Römersaal* at Frankfort had united within its walls the Germanists of the nation, the poet Uhland in a brief speech nominated Grimm for President, and the convention confirmed his nomination with

* *Gesammelte Sprachwiss. Schriften*, Frankfurt, 1863.

† *Ueber die Brüder Grimm, ihr Leben und ihre Werke*, Hanau, 1860.

unanimous acclamation. Grimm replied with an enthusiastic discourse, in which he patriotically advocated the unity of Germany, and asserted its legitimate limits to be far beyond its present geographical extension. "The natural boundaries of nations," said he, "are not the rivers, but the mountains and the languages." The remark seems to have been made more especially in reference to Lorraine and Alsace, between the Rhine and the Vosges; but the speaker also intended it to apply to Holland, Belgium, the German portion of Switzerland, and, in fact, as far as the dialects of his language extend. In reference to all these provinces, he elsewhere expressed the hope that they would not always remain disrupted from the unity of Germany.

The political events of 1848 brought Grimm again to the old imperial hall at Frankfort, where he attended the national parliament as deputy from Mülheim, on the Ruhrt. Although a pupil of the conservative Savigny, Grimm's political sentiments were liberal, and he voted independently, — sometimes with the right, and sometimes with the left, as his good sense and conscience happened to direct him. While the project of a constitution was under discussion, he proposed the following memorable article to be put at the head of it: "All the Germans are free. The soil of Germany tolerates no slavery. It liberates the stranger not already free as soon as he sets foot on it." The French formula, *Liberté*, *Egalité*, *Fraternité*, he rejected, on the ground that men are not equal by nature, and that the idea of fraternity is a moral and religious, rather than a political one. "But that of liberty," said he, "is so important and so sacred, that it appears to me necessary to assert it at the head of our declaration of rights." After these remarks Grimm took very little further part in the proceedings, except that, when some member said he wanted to hear no more of historical development, Grimm, like one personally assailed, replied from his seat: "Let those who do not want to hear anything about history know that history will not want to hear anything about them." Grimm was likewise present when the parliament of Frankfort met at Gotha in 1849; but, unfortunately, neither he nor any one else succeeded in cementing the unity of Germany.

From 1851 until the time of his death, Jacob Grimm was one of the most zealous supporters of the philosophico-historical section of the Academy, to which he contributed not only a series of learned dissertations, but also several no less elaborate and original public discourses. Among these contributions we need only mention those on the origin of language, on the god of love, on the names of women derived from flowers, on the various names of thunder, on the change of persons in connection with the verb, &c., &c. Of the dissertations here enumerated, that on the origin of language attracted perhaps the most attention, as proceeding from a man who had a right to speak upon a subject so important, but at the same time also so obscure and difficult. It is true that more than one of the views advanced have been, and are liable to be, contested; but it is no less true that every page of the admirable memoir exhibits at once the profoundness and the independence of a manly intellect, and is on that account well worth attentive study.* It is needless to add, that Grimm, like Humboldt before him, did not declare himself in favor of the theory which makes language the object of a direct Divine revelation. To these contributions to the Academy's transactions we must add a variety of other essays printed in Haupt's Journal for German Antiquities and in other periodicals. The learned Prefaces to Merkel's *Lex Salica* and to Schulze's Gothic Glossary are also from his pen.

Two of his public discourses read before the Academy are too remarkable to be passed over here unnoticed. The first is that pronounced upon the occasion of the Schiller festival, celebrated all over Germany in November, 1859. His subject was Schiller and Goethe; but in connection with it he took occasion to animadvert severely against subjection to the yoke of sect and party in matters of religion, in which he maintained that the liberty of the spirit alone could unite, while the worship of the letter always divided. His text was the celebrated epigram of Schiller in which he says: —

> "Welche Religion ich erkenne? Keine von allen
> Die du mir nennst. — Und warum keine? — Aus Religion."

---

* Reprinted in Vol. I. of his *Kleinere Schriften*, Berlin, 1864.

The second of these discourses was read at the celebration of the birthday anniversary of Frederic the Great, on January 26th, 1860. Upon this occasion his theme was old age, which he maintained to be rather the crowning plenitude of life than a diminution or decline of it. "The privilege of old age," says he, "is liberty of thought. The ornament of the old man (*des Greisen*) consists in his courage to look truth in the face, and to bear testimony to it in matters both of politics and religion. It is this which constitutes him the elder of the people to which he belongs, and his years bestow on him the privilege of determining and pronouncing what is just." * That Grimm was to a great extent himself the representative of the position here so admirably advocated, the reader may gather from nearly every incident and act belonging to the latter portion of his life.

Grimm remained hale and active until within a few days of his death. The Lexicon took up a good part of his time, but his head was nevertheless at intervals occupied with the projection and preparation of new additions to the long list of his works. He contemplated a work on the manners and customs of the ancient Germans, and another on Ossian. He wanted, besides, to write an introduction to his Popular Tales, and to complete the last volume of his so long neglected Grammar. The fourth volume of his *Weisthümer* (Old Law Documents), which was to contain the dissertations and elucidations promised years before as a sort of key to the work, was almost finished, and among his posthumous papers was also found a discourse on his brother William, which he probably intended to read before the Academy, and to which only the last leaf was wanting. His last publication was an article on Jonckbloet's Renard the Fox, and on the old legends in which animals figure as the characters. It was printed in the *Gelehrte Anzeigen* of Göttingen.

In all these writings Grimm exhibits certain peculiarities of style which distinguish him from all other authors of his nation, with the sole exception of his brother William. Both of them show themselves accomplished writers, when in the midst of

* Cf. *Rede auf Wilhelm Grimm und über das Alter*, herausgegeben von Hermann Grimm. Berlin, 1863.

their philological technicalities they find some narrative to relate or some popular legend to record. Their *Hausmärchen* are masterpieces in the department of literature to which they belong, and never has literature succeeded so completely in imitating and reproducing the naïve simplicity of the popular mind. But Jacob has a certain manly independence and originality of style and thought peculiar to himself, and stands, in this respect, far above his brother. This independence extended itself to his orthography and type even. In common with several other Germanists, he rejected the use of capital initials to substantives, and had nearly all his works printed in the Roman character.

We have thus far considered Grimm chiefly as a scholar, a man of science, and a writer. If it be true that the style constitutes the man, then he who placed himself at the head of an extensive school like that of the Germanists must, in respect to his personality, have been a man not only of the primitive Teutonic force, but also one of the rarest and profoundest endowments both of the intellect and of the heart. And such he was in every sense, combining as he did the most delicate poetical sensibility with the thoroughness, exactness, and comprehension of the man of science, while the nobility and strength of his character were displayed in his devotion to his country and his nation, to honor and the truth. His life consisted of an uninterrupted series of laborious efforts, and he scarcely knew any other want than that of knowledge and of science. His residence in his brother's family enabled him to live almost wholly independent of society, and he thus saved nearly all his time for study. Even in the summer, when William and his wife went into the country or to some watering-place, he would stay at home to keep house for them, or he would sometimes follow them to join them for a few days only. But even then it was his custom to bring a small library along with him, and one might find him reading even on his public promenades. Occasionally he would take a railroad trip to see an old friend living at a distance; and but a year before his death we thus find him on a visit to Mayor Smidt of Bremen, where we are told he had a long chat with a young woman in his country's costume, who was on the point of emigrating to America. During the last

few months of his life, he was uncommonly active in corresponding with some of the younger members of his literary fraternity, exhorting them to diligence and perseverance in their work.

Grimm's physical constitution was one of primitive Germanic soundness, and he scarcely knew what it was to have any physical ailment. His last illness lasted but a fortnight, and he thought he was recovering even from that, when, on the 20th of September, 1863, a sudden attack of apoplexy paralyzed his tongue and one side of his body. The shock was so severe, that he never completely recovered his consciousness, and he expired in the course of the same evening.

With Grimm Germany lost one of the last representatives of the great generation of men, which rendered it illustrious in literature, science, and art, and which will be respected for centuries as one of the brightest mirrors of its individuality and history. At the head of it stands Goethe as its elder and its chief, with Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Beethoven, the two Humboldts, Bopp, and others, to complete the group. They are the men who, in the brief space of less than half a century, made their country respected where before it was despised, and appeared as leaders in departments in which there had been but feeble imitation and mediocrity among their predecessors. If Germany, through them now intellectually great, is ever destined to become politically so, it will doubtless be to them that it will have to rear its first and proudest monuments.

ART. IV. — 1. *Social Statics: or the Conditions essential to Human Happiness specified, and the First of them developed.* By HERBERT SPENCER. London: John Chapman. 1851. 8vo. pp. 476.

2. *The Principles of Psychology.* By HERBERT SPENCER. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. 1855. 8vo. pp. 620.

3. *Education, Intellectual, Moral, and Physical.* By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1865. 12mo. pp. 283.

4. *Illustrations of Universal Progress; a Series of Discussions.* By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864. 12mo. pp. xxiv., 470.

5. *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy.* By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864. 12mo. pp. 503.

6. *The Classification of the Sciences; to which are added Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte.* By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864. 8vo. pp. 48.

7. *Essays, Moral, Political, and Æsthetic.* By HERBERT SPENCER. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864. 12mo. pp. 386.

8. *Principles of Biology.* By HERBERT SPENCER. In Quarterly Parts, by Subscription. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

WHY the inductive and mathematical sciences, after their first rapid development at the culmination of Greek civilization, advanced so slowly for two thousand years, — and why in the following two hundred years a knowledge of natural and mathematical science has accumulated, which so vastly exceeds all that was previously known that these sciences may be justly regarded as the products of our own times, — are questions which have interested the modern philosopher not less than the objects with which these sciences are more immediately conversant. Was it in the employment of a new method of research, or in the exercise of greater virtue in the use of old

methods, that this singular modern phenomenon had its origin? Was the long period one of arrested development, and is the modern era one of a normal growth? or should we ascribe the characteristics of both periods to inexplicable historical accidents, — to the influence of conjunctions in circumstances of which no explanation is possible, save in the omnipotence and wisdom of a guiding Providence?

The explanation which has become commonplace, that the ancients employed deduction chiefly in their scientific inquiries, while the moderns employ induction, proves to be too narrow, and fails upon close examination to point with sufficient distinctness the contrast that is evident between ancient and modern scientific doctrines and inquiries. For all knowledge is founded on observation, and proceeds from this by analysis and synthesis, by synthesis and analysis, by induction and deduction, and if possible by verification, or by new appeals to observation under the guidance of deduction, — by steps which are indeed correlative parts of one method; and the ancient sciences afford examples of every one of these methods, or parts of the one complete method, which have been generalized from the examples of science.

A failure to employ or to employ adequately any one of these partial methods, an imperfection in the arts and resources of observation and experiment, carelessness in observation, neglect of relevant facts, vagueness and carelessness in reasoning, and the failure to draw the consequences of theory and test them by appeal to experiment and observation, — these are the faults which cause all failures to ascertain truth, whether among the ancients or the moderns; but they do not explain why the modern is possessed of a greater virtue, and by what means he attained to his superiority. Much less do they explain the sudden growth of science in recent times.

The attempt to discover the explanation of this phenomenon in the antithesis of "facts" and "theories" or "facts" and "ideas," — in the neglect among the ancients of the former, and their too exclusive attention to the latter, — proves also to be too narrow, as well as open to the charge of vagueness. For, in the first place, the antithesis is not complete. Facts and theories are not co-ordinate species. Theories, if true, are facts, —

a particular class of facts indeed, generally complex ones, but still facts. Facts, on the other hand, even in the narrowest signification of the word, if they be at all complex, and if a logical connection subsists between their constituents, have all the positive attributes of theories.

Nevertheless, this distinction, however inadequate it may be to explain the source of true method in science, is well founded, and connotes an important character in true method. A fact is a proposition of which the verification by an appeal to the primary sources of our knowledge or to experience is direct and simple. A theory, on the other hand, if true, has all the characteristics of a fact, except that its verification is possible only by indirect, remote, and difficult means. To convert theories into facts is to add *simple verification*, and the theory thus acquires the full characteristics of a fact. When Pascal caused the Torricellian tube to be carried up the Puy de Dôme, and thus showed that the mercurial column was sustained by the weight of the atmosphere, he brought the theory of atmospheric pressure nearly down to the level of a fact of observation. But even in this most remarkable instance of scientific discovery theory was not wholly reduced to fact, since the verification, though easy, was not entirely simple, and was incomplete until further observations showed that the quantity of the fall in the Torricellian tube agreed with deductions from the combined theories of atmospherical pressure and elasticity. In the same way the theory of universal gravitation fails to become a fact in the proper sense of this word, however complete its verification, because this verification is not simple and direct, or through the spontaneous activity of our perceptive powers.

Modern science deals then no less with theories than with facts, but always as much as possible with the verification of theories, — if not to make them facts by *simple* verification through experiment and observation, at least to prove their truth by indirect verification.

The distinction of fact and theory thus yields an important principle, of which M. Comte and his followers have made much account. It is in the employment of verification, they say, and in the possibility of it, that the superiority of modern inductive research consists; and it is because the ancients did

not, or could not, verify their theories, that they made such insignificant progress in science. It is indisputable that verification is essential to the completeness of scientific method; but there is still room for debate as to what constitutes verification in the various departments of philosophical inquiry. So long as the philosophy of method fails to give a complete inventory of our primary sources of knowledge, and cannot decide authoritatively what are the origins of first truths, or the truths of observation, so long will it remain uncertain what is a legitimate appeal to observation, or what is a real verification. The Platonists or the rationalists may equally with the empiricists claim verification for their theories; for do they not appeal to the reason for confirmation of deductions from their theories, which they regard as founded on observation of what the reason reveals to them?

The positivists' principle of verification comes, then, only to this, — that, inasmuch as mankind are nearly unanimous about the testimony and trustworthiness of their senses, but are divided about the validity of all other kinds of authority, which they in a word call the reason, or internal sense, therefore verification by the senses produces absolute conviction, while verification by the reason settles nothing, but is liable to the same uncertainty which attends the primary appeals to this authority for the data of speculative knowledge.

But not only does the so-called metaphysical philosophy employ a species of verification by appealing to the testimony of reason, consciousness, or internal sense; but the ancient physical sciences afford examples of the confirmation of theory by observation proper. The Ptolemaic system of astronomy was an instance of the employment of every one of the partial steps of true method; and the theory of epicycles not only sought to represent the facts of observation, but also by the prediction of astronomical phenomena to verify the truth of its representation. Modern astronomy does not proceed otherwise, except that its theories represent a much greater number of facts of observation, and are confirmed by much more efficient experimental tests.

The difference, then, between ancient and modern science is not truly characterized by any of the several explanations

which have been proposed. The explanation which, in our opinion, comes nearer to the true solution, and yet fails to designate the real point of difference, is that which the positivists find in the distinction between "objective method" and "subjective method." The objective method is verification by sensuous tests, tests of sensible experience, — a deduction from theory of consequences, of which we may have sensible experiences if they be true. The subjective method, on the other hand, appeals to the tests of internal evidence, tests of reason, and the data of self-consciousness; authorities on which, as the history of philosophy shows, there is little unanimity among philosophers. But whatever be the origin of the theories of science, whether from a systematic examination of empirical facts by conscious induction, or from the natural biases of the mind, the so called intuitions of reason, what seems probable without a distinct survey of our experiences, — whatever the origin, real or ideal, the *value* of these theories can only be tested, say the positivists, by an appeal to sensible experience, by deductions from them of consequences which we can confirm by the undoubted testimony of the senses. Thus, while ideal or transcendental elements are admitted into scientific researches, though in themselves insusceptible of simple verification, they must still show credentials from the senses, either by affording from themselves consequences capable of sensuous verification, or by yielding such consequences in conjunction with ideas which by themselves are verifiable.

It is undoubtedly true, that one of the leading traits of modern scientific research is this reduction of ideas to the tests of experience. The systematic development of ideas through induction from the first and simplest facts of observation, is by no means so obvious a characteristic. Inductions are still performed for the most part unconsciously and unsystematically. Ideas are developed by the sagacity of the expert, rather than by the systematic procedures of the philosopher. But when and however ideas are developed science cares nothing, for it is only by subsequent tests of sensible experience that ideas are admitted into the pandects of science.

It is of no consequence to scientific astronomy whence the theory of gravitation arose; whether as an induction from the

theories of attractions and the law of radiations, or from the rational simplicity of this law itself, as the most natural supposition which could be made. Science asks no questions about the ontological pedigree or *a priori* character of a theory, but is content to judge it by its performance ; and it is thus that a knowledge of nature, having all the certainty which the senses are competent to inspire, has been attained, — a knowledge which maintains a strict neutrality toward all philosophical systems, and concerns itself not at all with the genesis or *a priori* grounds of ideas.

This mode of philosophizing is not, however, exclusively found in modern scientific research. Ptolemy claimed for his epicycles only that "they saved the appearances"; and he might have said, with as much propriety as Newton, "*Hypotheses non fingo*," for it was the aim of his research to represent abstractly, and by the most general formulas, the characteristics of the movements of the planets, — an aim which modern astronomy, with a much simpler hypothesis, and with immensely increased facilities, still pursues.

We find, therefore, that while moderns follow a true method of investigation with greater facilities and greater fidelity than the ancients, and with a clearer apprehension of its elements and conditions, yet that no new discoveries in method have been made, and no general sources of truth have been pointed out, which were not patent and known to the ancients; and we have so far failed to discover any solution to the problem with which we began. We have seen that it was not by the employment of a new method of research, but in the exercise of greater virtue in the use of old methods, that modern scientific researches have succeeded. But whence this greater virtue? What vivifying, energizing influence awakened the sixteenth century to the movement, which has continued down to the present day to engross, and even to create, the energies of philosophic thought in the study of natural phenomena? Obviously some interest was awakened, which had before been powerless, or had influenced only men of rare and extraordinary genius, or else some opposing interest had ceased to exercise a preponderating influence.

We have now arrived at a new order of inquiries. We ask

no longer what are the differences of *method* between ancient and modern scientific researches, but we seek the difference in the *motives* which actuated the philosophic inquiries of the two periods. We seek for the interests which in modern times have so powerfully drawn men of all orders of intelligence to the pursuit of science, and to an observance of the conditions requisite for its successful prosecution. This inquiry will, we think, lead to more profitable conclusions than the course we have pursued in review of the theories which have been put forward on this subject. But we have little space in these introductory pages to develop this aspect of the history of science, or to do more than indicate the conclusions we have reached in the classification and history of the dominant motives and the sources of the questions which have determined and directed the pursuit of science. We ask no longer what course has led to successful answers in science, but what motives have prompted the pertinent questions.

In place of the positivists' phraseology, that the ancients followed "the subjective method," or appealed for the verification of their theories to natural beliefs, while the moderns follow "the objective method," or appeal to new and independent experimental evidence,—if we substitute the word "motive" for "method," we have the terms of one of the conclusions on which we wish to insist. But these require explanation.

By a subjective motive we mean one having its origin in natural universal human interests and emotions, which existed before philosophy was born, which continue to exist in the maturity of philosophy, and determine the character of an important and by no means defunct order of human speculations. By an objective motive we mean one having an empirical origin, arising in the course of an inquiry; springing from interests which are defined by what we already know, and not by what we have always felt,—interests which depend on acquired knowledge, and not on natural desires and emotions. Among the latter we must include the natural desire for knowledge, or the primitive, undisciplined sentiment of curiosity. An objective motive is what this becomes when it ceases to be associated with our fears, our respects, our aspirations,—our emotional nature; when it ceases to prompt ques-

tions as to what relates to our personal destiny, our ambitions, our moral worth; when it ceases to have man, his personal and social nature, as its central and controlling objects. A curiosity which is determined chiefly or solely by the felt imperfections of knowledge as such, and without reference to the uses this knowledge may subserve, is prompted by what we call an objective motive.

A spirit of inquiry which is freed from the influence of our active powers, and the interests that gave birth to theological and metaphysical philosophies, — which yields passively and easily to the direction of objective motives, to the felt imperfections of knowledge as such, — is necessarily, at all times, a weak feeling; and before a body of systematic, well-digested, and well-ascertained scientific truth had been generated, could hardly have had any persistent influence on the direction of inquiry.

The motives to theological and metaphysical speculation exist from the beginning of civilized human life in the active emotional nature of man. Curiosity as a love of the marvellous, or as a love of facts, — new facts, prized because they are new and stimulating, — also dates back of civilized life. These motives find play in human nature, as it emerges from a semi-animal state; but they also persist and determine the growth of the human mind in its most advanced development.

The questions of philosophy proper are human desires and fears and aspirations — human emotions — taking an intellectual form. Science follows, but does not supersede, this philosophy. The three phases which the positivists assign to the development of the human mind — the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive or Scientific — are not in reality successive, except in their beginnings. They coexist in all the highest developments of civilization and mental activity. They coexisted in the golden age of Greek civilization, in the intense mental activity of the Middle Ages. They move on together in this marvellous modern era. But until this latest epoch positive science was always the inferior philosophy, — hardly a distinct philosophy at all, — not yet born. But at the beginning of the modern era its gestation was completed. A body of knowledge existed, sufficiently extensive, coherent, and

varied, to bear within it a life of its own, — an independent life, — which was able to collect to itself, by its own determinations, the materials of a continued, new, and ever-increasing mental activity, — an activity determined solely by an objective curiosity, or by curiosity in its purest, fullest, and highest energy.

We are probably indebted to the few men of scientific genius who lived during the slow advancement of modern civilization for the foundation of this culture, — for the accumulation of the knowledge requisite for this subsequent growth. These men were doubtless, for the most part, the products of their own times and civilization, as indeed all great men have been, but still originators, by concentrating and making productive the energies, tendencies, and knowledges which, but for them, would have remained inert and unfruitful. It is to such men, born at long intervals in the slow progress of civilization, each carrying forward a little the work of his predecessor, that we probably owe our modern science, rather than to the influence of any single mind, like Bacon, who was, like his predecessors, but the lens which collected the light of his times, — who prophesied rather than inaugurated the new era. And we owe science to the combined energies of individual men of genius, rather than to any tendency to progress inherent in civilization.

We find, then, the explanation of the modern development of science in the accumulation of a body of certified knowledge, sufficiently extensive to engage and discipline a rational scientific curiosity, and stimulate it to act independently of other philosophical motives. It is doubtless true, that other motives have influenced this development, and especially that motives of material utility have had a powerful effect in stimulating inquiry. Ancient schools of philosophy despised narrow material utilities, the servile arts, and sought no instruction in what moderns dignify by the name of useful arts ; but modern science finds in the requirements of the material arts the safest guide to exact knowledge. A theory which is utilized receives the highest possible certificate of truth. Navigation by the aid of astronomical tables, the magnetic telegraph, the innumerable utilities of mechanical and chemical science, are constant

and perfect tests of scientific theories, and afford the standard of certitude, which science has been able to apply so extensively in its interpretations of natural phenomena.

But the motives proper to science, though purified by their dissociation from the subjective determinations and tendencies, which gave an anthropomorphic and teleological character to ancient views of nature, are not the only legitimate motives to philosophical inquiry. There is another curiosity purified by its association with the nobler sentiments, — with wonder, admiration, veneration, — and with the interests of our moral and æsthetical natures. This curiosity is the motive to philosophy proper. "Wonder is a highly philosophical affection," says Plato's Socrates; "indeed, there is no other principle of philosophy but this."

Curiosity determined by natural sentiments and emotions — subjective curiosity — is the cause of a culture coextensive with civilization, long preceding the growth of science, and constituting all that is peculiar to civilized life except the material arts. However meanly the conclusions of theological and metaphysical speculations may appear, when tried by the objective standard of science, they too have their superiorities, by the test of which science becomes in turn insignificant. Unverified conclusions, vague ideas, crude fancies, they may be, but the products they certainly are of activities which constitute more of human happiness and human worth than the narrow material standards of science have been able to measure.

Philosophy proper should be classed with the Religions and with the Fine Arts, and estimated rather by the dignity of its motives, and the value it directs us to, than by the value of its own attainments. To condemn this pursuit because it fails to accomplish what science does, would be to condemn that which has formed in human nature habits, ideas, and associations on which all that is best in us depends, — would warrant the condemnation of science itself, since science scarcely existed at all for two thousand years of civilization, and represented as a distinct department during this period only the interests of the servile arts. The objects of Philosophy were those which the religious ideas and emotions of man presented to his speculative curiosity. These, though motives proper to Philosophy,

also gave direction to inquiries in Physics and Astronomy. The Fine Arts sprang from the same interests, and persisted through the conservative power of religious interests in a development to which the modern world offers no parallel. We have no styles in Art, no persistently pursued efforts for perfection in beauty, because we are not held to the conditions of this perfection by the religious motives which directed ancient Art. The growth of Theology and Metaphysics is less vigorous now for the same reason. Theology was Philosophy developed in the interests of Religion or of religious feeling, and Metaphysics was cultivated in the interest of Theology. Both aimed at truth; both were determined by the same love of simplicity and unity in knowledge, which determines all search after truth; but neither cared for simple truth alone. When pursued for the truth of fact alone, they both degenerate into affectation and emptiness. We do not omit the sceptical philosophies of antiquity from this description, because they were not held independently of the religious interests of the orthodox philosophy, but in opposition to them or in criticism of them.

Theology and Metaphysics failed to apply a correct method and to arrive at certain results, not because philosophers were ignorant of method, but because the object-matters of their research were not questions of sensible experience, — were not mere questions of facts of which the mind is the passive recipient through the senses. Their aim was to *prove* truth, not to discover it, — to reduce opinions and ideas which had the warrant of religious associations to the simplicity and consistency of truth; and when ideas and opinions have this warrant, it does not require the verification of the senses to make the conclusions of Philosophy acceptable and true to the religious instincts. To educe conclusions acceptable to these instincts and in opposition to no known truth, — in other words, to free religious beliefs from contradictions and to give them consistency, — was the aspiration and the devoted service of Philosophy.

Philosophy has in fact three phases instead of two. For as Theology was a speculation prosecuted in the interest of religious feeling, and Metaphysics a speculation in defence or criticism of the doctrines of Theology, so Criticism or Critical Philosophy is an examination of metaphysical conclusions.

But the latter is properly, in its motives, a scientific speculation. Such is the true logical order of Philosophy proper, though all these phases may and do coexist in history.

It is the opinion of many modern thinkers, besides the so-called Positivists, or avowed followers of M. Comte, that science, as we have defined it, or truth pursued simply in the interests of a rational curiosity, and for the mental discipline and the material utilities of its processes and conclusions, will hereafter occupy more and more the attention of mankind, to the exclusion of the older philosophy. It is also the opinion of these thinkers, that this is not to be regretted, but rather welcomed as a step forward in the advancement of human welfare and civilization; that the pursuit of science and its utilities is capable of inspiring as great and earnest a devotion as those which religious interests have inspired, and which have hitherto determined the destinies of mankind and given form to human thought, and one vastly more beneficent.

Whatever foundations there are for these opinions, it is certain that the claims of science, as a new power in the world, to the regard of thoughtful and earnest men, are receiving a renewed and more candid attention. Through its recent progress, many of the questions which have hitherto remained in the arena of metaphysical disputation are brought forward in new forms and under new auspices. Scientific investigations promise to throw a flood of light on subjects which have interested mankind since the beginning of speculation, — subjects related to universal human interests. History, society, laws, and morality, — all are claimed as topics with which scientific methods are competent to deal. Scientific solutions are proposed to all the questions of philosophy which scientific illumination may not show to have their origin in metaphysical hallucination.

Prominent in the ranks of the new school stands Mr. Herbert Spencer, whose versatility has already given to the world many ingenious and original essays in this new philosophy, and whose aspiring genius projects many more, which, if his strength does not fail, are to develop the capacities of a scientific method in dealing with all the problems that ought legitimately to interest the human mind.

The programme of his future labors which his publishers have advertised might dispose a prejudiced critic to look with suspicion on what he has already accomplished; but the favorable impression which his works have made, and the plaudits of an admiring public, demand a suspension of judgment; and the extravagance of his pretensions should for the present be credited to the strength of his enthusiasm.

It is through the past labors of an author that we must judge of his qualifications for future work, and the completeness of his preparation. Mr. Spencer's writings evince an extensive knowledge of facts political and scientific, but extensive rather than profound, and all at second hand. It is not, of course, to be expected that a philosopher will be an original investigator in all the departments of knowledge with which he is obliged to have dealings. He must take much at second hand. But original investigations in some department of empirical science are a discipline which best tests and develops even a philosopher's powers. He has in this at least an experience of what is requisite to an adequate comprehension of facts. He learns how to make knowledge profitable to the ascertainment of new truths, — an art in which the modern natural philosopher excels. By new truths must be understood such as are not implied in what we already know, or educible from what is patent to common observation. However skilfully the philosopher may apply his analytical processes to the abstraction of the truths involved in patent facts, the utility of his results will depend not so much on their value and extent as mere abstractions, as on their capacity to enlarge our experience by bringing to notice residual phenomena, and making us observe what we have entirely overlooked, or search out what has eluded our observation. Such is the character of the principles of modern natural philosophy, both mathematical and physical. They are rather the eyes with which nature is seen, than the elements and constituents of the objects discovered. It was in a clear apprehension of this value in the principles of mathematical and experimental science, that the excellence of Newton's genius consisted; and it is this value which the Positive Philosophy most prizes. But this is not the value which we find in Mr. Spencer's speculations.

Mr. Spencer is not a positivist, though that was not a very culpable mistake which confounded his speculations with the writings of this school. For however much he differs from the positivists in his methods and opinions, he is actuated by the same confidence in the capacities of a scientific method, and by the same disrespect for the older philosophies. Mr. Spencer applies a method for the ascertainment of ultimate truths, which a positivist would regard as correct only on the supposition that the materials of truth have all been collected, and that the research of science is no longer for the enlargement of our experience or for the informing of the mind. Until these conditions be realized, the positivist regards such attempts as Mr. Spencer's as not only faulty, but positively pernicious and misleading. Nothing justifies the development of abstract principles in science but their utility in enlarging our concrete knowledge of nature. The ideas on which mathematical Mechanics and the Calculus are founded, the morphological ideas of Natural History, and the theories of Chemistry are such working ideas, — finders, not merely summaries of truth.

But before examining more in detail Mr. Spencer's method of philosophizing, it will be useful to consider his career and character as a thinker and writer. Born in Derby in 1820, he was educated by his father, who was a school-teacher in that town, and by his uncle, a clergyman of the Established Church. At the age of seventeen he entered on the profession of civil engineering, which he followed for eight years. He then abandoned this pursuit for a literary career. He had already published in a scientific journal several papers on professional subjects, and at the age of twenty-two gave an earnest of his tastes for political speculation in a newspaper article on "The Proper Sphere of Government." He afterwards became a writer in the Economist, and in 1851 published his "Social Statics, or the Conditions essential to Human Happiness specified, and the First of them developed." By this work he became first generally known to the reading public in America. This work exhibits the traits which characterize all Mr. Spencer's subsequent writings. A constant and close student of facts both political and scientific, with the practical bent of the English radical and idealist, he is none the less strongly attracted to the abstrac-

tions of speculative thought. He aims at the same time at system and at effect. No distract idealist, though always actuated by that uncontent which moves revolutions and reforms, he uses abstractions and abstract modes of thought for moral ends. His allegiance to his speculative and his practical aims seems sometimes divided, and then he shows a tendency to follow out the consequences of theory, and to trust the welfare of mankind to its omnipotent care. He has great faith in the self-sufficingness of things. The very elements have in them the seeds of moral perfectibility. But he would leave out of the category of natural agencies in politics the paternal care of the rulers of mankind. He regards with lofty scorn that presumption in the governing classes which pretends to comprehend and help forward the inherent progressiveness of the world. Moral idealism colors all Mr. Spencer's views, both in science and politics. This gains him a popular hearing, especially with the youth of democratic America. But American democracy itself sympathizes with English radicalism only as the rich and benevolent sympathize with the poor. We wish them the good of universal suffrage. We are studying how to remedy the evils of it. To us this boon is a present fate, mixed of good and evil, — a thing neither to seek nor to avoid, but of which we must make the best. We suffer our legislators to exercise that absolute tyranny which Mr. Spencer proves to be an absolute immorality, — a compulsory universal common-school education, — without a murmur. We have not even suspected its immorality. Some of us regard it as a little overdone; but few or none have found that the system is radically faulty, though it be at variance with Mr. Spencer's moral premises. But we must defer the consideration of the arguments of this work, for we are at present only concerned with the characteristics of the writer.

The strong tendency to speculative and abstract modes of thought which this work evinces found a more distinct utterance in the author's "Principles of Psychology," published four years later, in 1855. The choice of this subject seems to have been determined by the author's genius for the kind of thinking to which this subject is adapted, rather than by any special training in its literature. Indeed, this work, like the

"Social Statics," is characterized by great originality. Constrained by his entire sympathy with modern movements in thought and scientific culture, he is perforce a scientific empiricist, though his peculiar genius would have found a more congenial employment in scholastic philosophy. Mr. Spencer believes in developments. All his writings are developments, and most of them are about developments. He delights in "evolutions from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous," — in "changes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations." He not only discovers them in all the objects of scientific research, but he rings these changes in all his discourses on them. Analysis is his *forte*, and developments are foibles. But he had not yet in his "Principles of Psychology" fully developed these foibles. He finds, however, in the problems of Psychology scope for his analytical powers. Like all writers who do not speak from the urgency of conviction or dissent, he is an eclectic. He aims to combine in his Psychology what is true in empiricism with what is true in metaphysics; and he had special reasons for this course. Mr. Spencer is here no longer a champion. His moral convictions find their utterance in his political and social essays. In Philosophy he is charmed with ideas, and with his power to unravel them. He is actuated by a simple love of truth, and he is therefore an eclectic. He has no real respect for ideas or for the religious grounds of metaphysics. As between pure empiricism and religious metaphysics his choice would be unhesitating. He would choose empiricism. But ideas are fine things when one has more power to unfold than to find them, and they are still found, as heretofore, by the insights of scientific sagacity rather than by any method. Pure empiricism, however, or Positivism, refuses to Psychology any place in the hierarchy of the sciences. How then can Mr. Spencer get the ideas on which to exercise his powers? There is only one course; he must postulate them. Ideas are all derived from experience, it is true; but we must not seek in actual particular experiences for their validity. These may be, and probably are, beyond the reach of resuscitation. What then is the test of truth or of reality in the grounds of any idea? "The incon-

ceivableness of its negation," says Mr. Spencer; and so he adopted a principle from metaphysics, but with a limitation. This inconceivableness results from the discipline of experience. It does not depend on any plastic power of the mind as an original nature, determining the possibilities of experience and thought, but it is determined in the mind by invariable experiences. Those orders and relationships of events in nature which are present to the mind from its first determinations to thought, which are never contradicted in experience, determine also the possibilities of thought; and in turn the possibilities of thought are tests of invariable experiences, though the particular experiences are lost in oblivion. In other words, the mind has but one faculty peculiarly its own, and that is memory. The mind is pure memory, but this has various forms. The primordial memory, the intellect, that which is as it were the framework of all the others, — the containing memory, — consists of certain beliefs, the negations of which cannot be conceived, but the particular grounds of which are forgotten. This memory extends back of the individual life, is derived from the experience of the race, and constitutes the innate tendencies and mental powers with which the individual life begins. This sounds like Plato's doctrine, that learning is a kind of reminiscence; but it is in fact pure empiricism. Mind is but a reflex of organism. But the organism has a memory, — a memory of the results of all invariable experiences in the continuous evolutions of the race. No empiricist can find any radical fault in this account of innate ideas.

But Mr. Spencer evolves it in a somewhat different manner. He is seeking for a basis of psychology which shall be consistent with the truth of empiricism, and at the same time with the possibility of psychology as a distinct science. Some first truth or truths peculiarly psychological are wanted, for Mr. Spencer proposes to try his speculative powers in eliciting what has eluded the sagacity of his predecessors in psychology, — in the analysis of ideas. Now, the existence of beliefs, proved to be invariable by the inconceivableness of their negations, is a fundamental fact of consciousness, — the most fundamental fact. Beliefs of all sorts are the constituent elements of consciousness. Every act of the mind involves a judgment, that

is, a belief; and the only test, indeed the only meaning, of the *truth* of a belief is its *persistency*. Hence invariableness in a belief, as proved by the inconceivableness of its negation, is the highest possible warrant of truth. Sensible experience can give us no higher warrant. The mind, therefore, contains in itself the criterion of truth; and psychology, or a scientific evolution of the data of consciousness, is a legitimate philosophy. And this is thought to be not inconsistent with the empirical explanation of the origin of invariable beliefs, namely, the formation of the mind by invariable, often repeated, special experiences, both in the individual and in the race. But there is a superfluity somewhere, — too many authorities. Occam's razor is not too old to apply to this new philosophy. The characteristic common to particular, real experiences, and to universal, necessary truths, so called, — namely, that they are believed, and believed without appeal to anything else, — this characteristic is either from the same or from different sources. If from different sources, then empiricism is false, and Psychology is a legitimate philosophy. If from the same source, namely, particular experiences, then these are a sufficient authority, and indeed the only *final* appeal, though invariable beliefs, "proved to be invariable by the inconceivableness of their negations," may be excellent approximate determinations of what experience certifies. No empiricist will deny this excellence to natural beliefs, but this is not ascribing to them any proper authority.

In discussing this his criterion or "universal postulate," Mr. Spencer encounters two of the acutest of modern thinkers, Mr. Mill and Sir William Hamilton, whose opinions he finds opposed to his own on opposite grounds. Here is a fine chance for eclecticism, to combine what is true in both these philosophies; but first he must refute what is false.

Speaking of the effect of habit in determining the limits of our conceptive faculty, Mr. Mill says: "There are remarkable instances of this in the history of science; instances in which the wisest men rejected as impossible, because inconceivable, things which their posterity, by earlier practice and longer perseverance in the attempt, found it quite easy to conceive, and which everybody now knows to be true." While

granting that this evidence is sufficient to disprove the doctrine of the *a priori* character of our natural beliefs, our author thinks that "it does not really warrant Mr. Mill's inference, that it is absurd to reject a proposition as impossible on no other grounds than its inconceivableness." Further on he says: —

"If there be, as Mr. Mill holds, certain absolute uniformities in nature; if these uniformities produce, as they must, absolute uniformities in our experience; and if, as he shows, these absolute uniformities in our experience disable us from conceiving the negations of them, — then, answering to each uniformity in nature which we can cognize, there must exist in us a belief of which the negation is inconceivable, and which is absolutely true. In this wide range of cases subjective inconceivableness must correspond to objective impossibility. Further experience will produce correspondence where it may not yet exist; and we may expect the correspondence to become ultimately complete. In nearly all cases this test of inconceivableness must be valid now; and where it is not, it still expresses the net result of our experience up to the present time; which is the most that any test can do."

True, — the most that any *empirical* test can do; but is not Mr. Spencer's test, "the universal postulate," exempt from this imperfection? If not, how does it warrant rejecting as impossible an inconceivable proposition, *on no other ground* than its inconceivableness? Mr. Spencer's argument, condensed and completed, is this. If there be any such things as universal necessary truths, then invariable beliefs must result from them; but we have invariable beliefs, therefore they must be the tests of truth! If A exists, then B exists; but B exists, therefore — Mr. Spencer must find the conclusion in his own logic: neither *Modus Ponens* nor *Modus Tollens* will serve.

"But," he continues, "the inconsistency into which Mr. Mill has thus fallen is most clearly seen in the second of his two chapters on 'Demonstration and Necessary Truths.' He admits in this the validity of proof by a *reductio ad absurdum*. Now what is a *reductio ad absurdum*, unless a reduction to inconceivableness? And why, if inconceivableness be in other cases an insufficient ground for rejecting a proposition as impossible, is it a sufficient ground in this case?"

After quoting other passages from Mill, Mr. Spencer says of them: —

"Here, and throughout the whole of his argument, Mr. Mill assumes that there is something more certain in a demonstration than in anything else, — some necessary truth in the steps of our reasoning which is not possessed by the axioms they start from. How can this assumption be justified? In each successive syllogism, the dependence of the conclusion upon its premises is a truth of which we have no other proof than the inconceivability of the negation. Unless our perception of logical truth is *a priori*, which Mr. Mill will not contend, it too, like our perceptions of mathematical truth, has been gained from experience," &c.

Now all this shows a grand confusion in Mr. Spencer's mind. He bases his postulate, the ultimate test of all truth, on two *hypotheses*, — the existence of universal facts or absolute uniformities in nature, and their effect in producing invariable beliefs in the mind; and because Mr. Mill allows these as *empirical* generalizations, he is regarded as inconsistent in not allowing the character of *necessity* to an imperfect conclusion from them! But Mr. Mill does not deny to natural beliefs a proximate or derivative authority. Both logical axioms and the axioms to which they are applied in reasoning may safely be taken as properly accredited from experience; but their authority is secondary, and such authority is not always to be trusted, as Mr. Mill's historical example shows. The imperfect argument, "If A, then B, but B," proves nothing absolutely, but it may determine a probability. Mr. Mill maintains that there are degrees of trustworthiness in natural beliefs, as well as in the so-called empirical beliefs, and that this trustworthiness depends absolutely, not on the strength of our beliefs, whether this be absolute or not, but on particular experiences, ultimately and absolutely.

Mr. Spencer endeavors to explain away Mill's historical example, — the fact that certain Greek philosophers could not credit the existence of antipodes, — by the consideration that the conception, which seemed impossible to these philosophers, is really a complex one, whereas the truths which are properly attested by the inconceivableness of their negations are simple "undecomposable" ones. He therefore puts a modifying clause into his canon. It is necessary that the ideas so tested be simple. The mind in the confusion of compound ideas may

think that it conceives what it really does not conceive, and that it cannot conceive what it really can conceive. The certainty of the application of the test depends on the number of really independent applications which it involves, in each of which the mind is liable to a slip of the attention. Mistakes from a confusion of matters are quite independent of the essential trustworthiness of our primary sources of knowledge. Even the senses may get confused. Why not, then, our invariable ideas? Easily: for does not Mr. Spencer himself confound the *authority* of our natural beliefs with their *utility* in directing us to what our *experiences* certify?

Mr. Spencer is mistaken in supposing that any middle ground is possible between empiricism and metaphysics, or that the characteristic ideas of these two philosophies can be reconciled by the hypothesis of organized experiences, anterior to the life of the individual mind. In these experiences, as in those of the individual life, particular facts are the real authorities, as is evinced by what Mr. Spencer cannot deny, that such facts are competent to overthrow the most settled beliefs. It avails nothing to say that such facts cannot be experienced, the mind being, *ex hypothesi*, unable to conceive them even if they exist; for this is to convict natural beliefs and the mind itself of incompetency, not to establish these beliefs as competent authorities.

In reviewing previous attempts to find an independent basis for Psychology, Mr. Spencer encounters Sir William Hamilton's philosophy of Common-Sense. After quoting Hamilton's leading maxims, that "Consciousness is to be presumed trustworthy until proved to be mendacious," and that "the mendacity of consciousness is proved, if its data immediately in themselves, or mediately in their necessary consequences, be shown to stand in mutual contradiction," he says: —

"Now a sceptic might very properly argue that this test is worthless. For as the steps by which consciousness is to be proved mendacious are themselves states of consciousness; and as they must be assumed trustworthy in the act of proving that consciousness is not so; the process results in assuming the trustworthiness of particular states of consciousness, to prove the mendacity of consciousness in general. Or to apply the test specifically: — Let it be shown that two data of consciousness

stand in contradiction. Then consciousness is mendacious. But if consciousness is mendacious, then the consciousness of this consciousness is mendacious. Then consciousness is trustworthy. And so on forever."

But the condition of vacillation to which Mr. Spencer reduces the sceptic's application of Hamilton's criterion is itself the true condition of scepticism. Mr. Spencer seems to mean by scepticism a dogmatic scepticism, — if we may be allowed the expression, — or a negative dogmatism; whereas Hamilton means by scepticism a negation of all philosophical judgments, the "what do I know?" condition of a mind confused about authorities; and Mr. Spencer has really given an excellent illustration of the application of these maxims, while seeking to depreciate their value. But the condition of scepticism is best illustrated by the original of the sophism to which he reduces Hamilton's maxims. "If you say that you lie, and say so truly, then you do lie; but if you say so falsely, then you speak the truth. In either case, therefore, the same statement is both true and false." To the fearful consequences of such lying is the sceptic reduced who doubts the testimony of consciousness. Mr. Spencer gives to this sophism the more common but inferior form, of which the original is this: "All Cretans are liars. But Epimenides, who says this, is himself a a Cretan. Therefore, as he is a liar, this saying is not true. But if the saying is not true, Epimenides may have spoken the truth. Then the saying is true: — and so on as before." In his singular misapprehension of the meaning of the word "scepticism" in philosophy, Mr. Spencer illustrates another trait of his writings. He means by "sceptic" one who doubts the essential doctrines of orthodox philosophy, "natural realism," "personal identity," "the possibility of a science of psychology," and the like; and as he is opposed to such sceptics, he gives the impression to the world that he is ranged on the side of orthodoxy. But it is only with the husks of orthodoxy that he feeds his flock. He does not defend its doctrines as Hamilton did in the interests of dogmatic theology and religion, but simply from the vanity of disputation.

It cannot be said of Hamilton's criterion, that it is of any greater value than Mr. Spencer's, or that it yields anything

more as a principle of research, but it at least has the merits of self-consistency and distinctness.

In reviewing the objections to the test of inconceivableness, Mr. Spencer again finds himself opposed to Sir. William Hamilton. The doughty knight is encased in a seemingly invulnerable logic, and impedes the progress of truth. After stating certain minor and indecisive objections to the doctrine of the "conditioned," Mr. Spencer waives them.

"Granting all this," he says, "Sir William Hamilton's argument may still be met. He says that inconceivability is no criterion of impossibility. Why? Because of two propositions, one of which must be true; it proves both impossible, — it proves that space cannot have a limit, because a limit is inconceivable, and yet that it has a limit, because unlimited space is inconceivable; it proves, therefore, that space has a limit and has no limit, which is absurd. How absurd? Absurd because 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.' But how do we *know* that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? What is our criterion of *this* impossibility? Can Sir William Hamilton assign any other than this same inconceivability? If not, his argument is self-destructive; seeing that he assumes the validity of the test in proving its invalidity."

This is the same shaft *ad hominem* which Mr. Spencer levelled at Mill, and it glances for the same reason. He does not precisely apprehend the position of his antagonist. Hamilton's argument is not self-destructive, since it is only designed to prove the incompleteness of the test, which Mr. Spencer has adopted in its baldest and crudest form. What was an obvious *petitio principii* as applied to Mr. Mill, namely, ascribing to him the opinion that logical axioms rest ultimately on the test of the inconceivableness of their negations, is none the less really such as applied to Hamilton's doctrines. Hamilton can and does assign a different criterion. Mr. Mill appeals to particular experiences as the tests, in the proper sense of that word, of all axioms logical or mathematical; while Hamilton admits for them a psychological test, analogous to Mr. Spencer's, yet more complete. "A proposition which can be conceived, but of which the negation cannot be conceived, is true, and its negation is false," is the complete formula.

The conceivable and inconceivable correspond to the possible

and impossible only when logically opposed to each other. If two conceivables *could* be logically opposed to each other, we should have scepticism in the philosophical sense of the word, or as Hamilton uses it. If two inconceivables are logically opposed, we have no test of true or false; yet not that vacillation of the mind, that uncertainty, which is the characteristic of scepticism. But we have the feeling that there is truth beyond the power of knowledge, or that "the domain of our knowledge is not coextensive with the horizon of our faith"; for a principle of truth—the principle of non-contradiction—is seen to extend where sense and imagination and our powers of conception cannot follow. This decides nothing positively. It only shows that unbelief or negative dogmatism is unfounded, and it opens the way for the authority of religious feeling, in whose behalf the contests of philosophy are undertaken by all but such pretended champions as Mr. Spencer. Hamilton went to the extremest verge in the direction of empiricism which it was possible to reach, without renouncing the interests for which philosophy proper has always been cultivated. Empiricism has other interests, worthy interests, but they are not religious.

It was necessary to a philosophical defence of religious doctrines to establish logical axioms on a broader basis than experience can afford, in order to secure a ground for belief in truths which are inconceivable, or truths of which the terms cannot be united in a judgment either by proofs from what is really known or by intuition; and in order also to reason about such truths, and bring the objects of religious feeling, partially at least, within the scope of our thoughts. Such are the motives for metaphysical philosophy, and such indeed are the only grounds for metaphysics. Philosophy converts practical reasons or final causes into theoretical reasons, and postulates a faculty where there is only a feeling. But after all, that which the Best in us most prizes is not so much the service of Philosophy as that for which this service is undertaken.

Mr. Spencer pursues his discussion of this subject in the first part of his recently published work, the "First Principles of a New System of Philosophy," to the consideration of which we shall presently come. Of his further developments in Psychology we can only say that they are very wearisome. He

makes little explicit use of his postulate; for this, after all, is only a license to take any ideas one chooses for the bases of science, if one only cannot conceive their negations. It is one of those unproductive principles which Positivism condemns; and he develops others equally useless, except in the mental discipline there may be in following their evolution. One such application of his method is in search of a definition of Life, which after a development in as many pages results in these words: "Life is defined as — The definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences." These are sufficiently abstract to be of some scientific service, but they only make Life the more perplexing, which had mysteries enough before. But we ought not to prejudge. Perhaps Mr. Spencer will be able, when he comes to treat of Morality in his new philosophy, to apply this definition to elucidating the principles of correct living.

But to return to the argument of his Social Statics. This is a thorough-going application of one of the conditions of human happiness to all the relations of human life, — namely, the Law of Liberty, or the "Let alone Principle." To warrant the exclusive application of this principle to the deduction of social laws and the limits of state powers, he postulates it as a part or one side of a perfect law, of which we have knowledge through a moral sense. This sense has not an *a priori* character, as the metaphysicians maintain, but is derived from the observation, by the human race as a whole, of the conditions essential to human happiness on the whole, and is developed in our nature with the evolution of civilization, as the instinct which cares for the interests of society just as the bodily appetites are produced to care for the interests of the individual organism. This doctrine is perfectly analogous to that which he develops more explicitly in the Principles of Psychology concerning the origin and character of natural beliefs. He makes the same mistake in basing a criterion on an hypothesis, and he is inconsistent in the same way in ascribing to his "moral sense" an original authority. With the exception of these errors, there is nothing in his doctrine of moral sense with which the utilitarian can find fault. But he develops his

ideas in this his earlier work so inexplicitly, that not only Mr. Mill,* but many others, have mistaken him for an opponent of utilitarianism. By ascribing an absolute authority to intellectual and moral ideas, when on his principles he ought only to have ascribed to them a relative and derivative one, he was led into mistakes which have given rise to misinterpretations of his doctrines, — misinterpretations of which he cannot justly complain. But he has also gained a reputation for orthodoxy, which he does not deserve.

Mr. Spencer succeeds better in his shorter essays, many of which for ingenuity, originality, and scientific interest have been rarely surpassed. Of his characteristics as a political writer, and of the general character of his attainments in science, we have already spoken. In a former article in this Review we pointed out sundry mistakes of a scientific character which he made in his essay on the Nebular Hypothesis. We shall have occasion to notice others in his more recent publications.

Judging only by his writings and the general character of his thinking, we should not ascribe to him that precision in the apprehension of scientific facts which comes chiefly from a successful cultivation of experimental and mathematical research in natural history and natural philosophy. To learn only the results of such researches and the general character of their processes is not enough. One must also be qualified to pursue them. The fact that Mr. Spencer was at one time a civil engineer seems to militate against this judgment of his qualifications. But though a marked success and a reputation acquired in this pursuit would be of great weight in determining our judgment, yet, in the absence of any evidence of this kind, we adhere to the opinion we have formed from his writings. We will say nothing of the impossibility of any one man's acquiring adequately all the knowledge requisite for the successful accomplishment of such an undertaking as Mr. Spencer has proposed for himself.

But a part of this work has become an accomplished fact. The "First Principles" of the new system of philosophy has appeared, and a serial publication of parts of another work on the "Principles of Biology" is now in progress. Mr. Spencer

* See Essay on Utilitarianism.

modestly omits from his gigantic scheme any special consideration of physics or the principles of inorganic nature; although his training in mathematics and engineering would seem at first sight to be a preparation best suited to this subject. Perhaps he regards this science as standing in little need of his developments, and besides he has already published some of his views on this subject in his essay on the Nebular Hypothesis, and his First Principles involve generalizations from physical theories.

To the positivists the sciences of general physics, that is Astronomy, Mechanical and Chemical Physics, and Chemistry, afford the patterns for all the sciences, and some, like Physiology, are beginning to profit by such examples. But Mr. Spencer does not find in general physics free play for his ideas. It is only in what constitutes the problems and obscurities of these sciences that he finds free exemplifications of his principles. In the nebular hypothesis and in the obscure relations of physical forces to organic life, and in the hypothesis of the development of organic life through successive geological eras, he is at home. He is conscious of the temptation there is to impose teleological interpretations upon the obscurities of science; and he therefore aims to free his speculations as much as possible from these biases, but with as little success as he had in his Psychology in correcting the errors of metaphysics by the light of empirical science.

The idea which has exercised the profoundest influence on the course of Mr. Spencer's thought, as well as on all thought in modern times, and one which appears more or less distinctly in nearly all of Mr. Spencer's writings, is the idea which he elaborates in his First Principles as the "Law of Evolution." But what is the origin and value of this idea? Ostensibly it was derived from the investigations of the physiologists in embryology, from Harvey down to the present time. The formula of Von Baer was the first adequate statement of it. This formula Mr. Spencer has elaborated and completed, so as to apply, he thinks, not only to the phenomena of embryology, but to the phenomena of nature generally, and especially, as it appears, to those which we know least about, and to those which we only guess at.

But while this is the ostensible origin and scientific value of

this idea, its real origin is a very curious and instructive fact in human nature. Progress is a grand idea, — Universal Progress is a still grander idea. It strikes the key-note of modern civilization. Moral idealism is the religion of our times. What the ideas God, the One and the All, the Infinite First Cause, were to an earlier civilization, such are Progress and Universal Progress to the modern world, — a reflex of its moral ideas and feelings, and not a tradition. Men ever worship the Best, and the consciousness that the Best is attainable is the highest moral consciousness, the most inspiring of truths. And when indications of that attainment are visible not merely to the eye of faith, but in sensible progress, scientifically measurable, civilization is inspired with a new devotion. Faith that moral perfectibility is possible, not in remote times and places, not in the millennium, not in heaven, but in the furtherance of a present progress, is a faith which to possess in modern times does not make a man suspected of folly or fanaticism. He may forget the past, cease to be religious in the conventional sense of the word, but he is the modern prophet.

When Plato forsook the scientific studies of his youth, and found the truest interpretation of nature by asking his own mind what was the best, according to which, he felt sure, the order and framework of nature must be determined, he did but illustrate the influence which strongly impressed moral ideas have on speculative thought at all times; but he did it consciously and avowedly. Modern thinkers may be less conscious of this influence, may endeavor to suppress what consciousness they have of it, warned by the history of philosophy that teleological speculations are exploded follies; nevertheless, the influence surrounds and penetrates them like an atmosphere, unless they be moral phlegmatics and mere lookers-on.

It was Mr. Spencer's aim to free the law of evolution from all teleological implications, and to add such elements and limitations to its definition as should make it universally applicable to the movement of nature. Having done this, as he thinks, he arrives at the following definition: "Evolution is a change from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity through continuous differentiations and integrations." But teleology is a subtile poison, and lurks

where least suspected. The facts of the sciences which Dr. Whewell calls palætiological, like the various branches of geology, and every actual concrete series of events which together form an object of interest to us, are apt, unless we are fully acquainted with the actual details through observation or by actual particular deductions from well-known particular facts and general laws, to fall into a dramatic procession in our imaginations. The mythic instinct slips into the place of the chronicles at every opportunity. All history is written on dramatic principles. All cosmological speculations are strictly teleological. We never can comprehend the whole of a concrete series of events. What arrests our attention in it is what constitutes the parts of an *order* either real or imaginary, and all merely imaginary orders are dramatic, or are determined by interests which are spontaneous in human life. Our speculations about what we have not really observed, to which we supply the order and most of the facts, are necessarily determined by some principle of order in our minds. Now the most general principle which we can have, included by all others, is this: that the concrete series shall be an intelligible series in its entirety, shall only interest and attract our thoughts and a rational curiosity.

But to suppose that such series exist anywhere but where observation and legitimate particular inferences from observation warrant the supposition, is to commit the same mistake which has given rise to teleological theories of nature. The "law of causation," the postulate of positive science, does not go to this extent. It does not suppose that there are throughout nature unbroken series in causation, forming in their entirety intelligible wholes, determinable in their beginnings, their progressions, and their ends, with a birth, a growth, a maturation, and a decay. It only presumes that the perhaps unintelligible wholes, both in the sequences and the coexistences of natural phenomena, are composed of intelligible elements; that chaos does not subsist at the heart of things; that the order in nature which is discernible vaguely even to the unobservant implies at least a precise *elementary* order, or fixed relations of antecedents and consequents in its ultimate parts and constituents; that the apparently irregular heterogeneous

masses, the concrete series of events, are crystalline in their substance.

To discover these elementary fixed relations of antecedents and consequents, is the work of scientific induction; and the only postulate of science is, that these relations are everywhere to be found. To account, as far as possible, for any concrete order, like that of life, intelligible as a whole, or regular, is the work of scientific explanation, by deductions from the elementary fixed relations which induction may have discovered. But to explain any such order by simply defining it externally in vague, abstract terms, and to postulate such orders as the components of nature and parts of one complete and intelligible order, is to take a step in advance of legitimate speculation, and a step backward in scientific method, — is to commit the mistake of the ancient philosophies of nature.

But Mr. Spencer thinks he has established his "Law of Evolution" by induction. The examples from which he has analyzed his law, the examples of progress in the development of the several elements of civilization, such as languages, laws, fashions, and ideas, — the hypothetical examples of the Nebular Hypothesis and the Development Hypothesis, and the example of embryological development (the only one our conceptions of which are not liable to be tainted by teleological biases), — are examples which, according to Mr. Spencer's philosophy, afford both the definition and its justification. In other words, his definitions are only carefully elaborated general descriptions in abstract terms; or statements of facts which are observed in numerous instances or classes of instances, in terms detached from all objects, in abstract terms, of which the intension is fully known, but of which the extension is unknown except through the descriptions they embody. This, though a useful, is a precarious kind of induction, and is apt to lead to premature and false generalizations, or extensions of descriptions to what is hypothetical or unknown. Such inductions are liable to be mistaken for another sort, and to be regarded as not merely general, but universal descriptions, and as applicable to what they do not really apply to. This liability is strong just in proportion as prominence is given to such definitions in a philosophical system. No convert to Mr. Spencer's philosophy

doubts the substantial correctness of the Nebular and Development Hypotheses, though these are only hypothetical examples of Mr. Spencer's law.

The other sort of inductions to which we have referred are peculiar to the exact inductive sciences. Facts which are not merely general, but, from their elementary character and their immediate relations to the orderliness of nature, are presumed to be universal facts, are the sort which the positive philosophy most prizes, and of which the law of gravitation is the typical example. The honor must be conceded to Mr. Spencer of having elaborated a precise and very abstract description of certain phenomena, the number, the other characters, and the extent of which are, however, unknown, but are all the more imposing from this circumstance.

The law of gravity was a key which deciphered a vast body of otherwise obscure phenomena, and (what is more to the purpose) was successfully applied to the solution of all the problems these phenomena presented. It is common to ascribe to Newton the merit of having discovered the law of gravity, in the same sense in which Mr. Spencer may be said to have discovered his law. The justness of this praise may well be doubted; for others had speculated and defined the law of gravity before Newton. What he really discovered was the *universality* of this law, or so nearly discovered it that the astronomers who completed the investigation did not hesitate to concede to him the full honor. He established for it such a degree of probability that his successors pursued the verification with unhesitating confidence, and still pursue it in the fulness of faith.

Mr. Spencer's law is founded on examples, of which only one class, the facts of embryology, are properly scientific. The others are still debated as to their real characters. Theories of society and of the character and origin of social progress, theories on the origins and the changes of organic forms, and theories on the origins and the causes of cosmical bodies and their arrangements, are all liable to the taint of teleological and cosmological conceptions, — to spring from the order which the mind imposes upon what it imperfectly observes, rather than from that which the objects, were they better known, would supply to the mind.

To us Mr. Spencer's speculation seems but the abstract statement of the cosmological conceptions, and that kind of orderliness which the human mind spontaneously supplies in the absence of facts sufficiently numerous and precise to justify sound scientific conclusions. Progress and development, when they mean more than a continuous proceeding, have a meaning suspiciously like what the moral and mythic instincts are inclined to, — something having a beginning, a middle, and an end, — an epic poem, a dramatic representation, a story, a cosmogony. It is not sufficient for the purposes of science that the idea of progress be freed from any reference to human happiness as an end. Teleology does not consist entirely of speculations having happy *dénouements*, save that the perfection or the end to which the progress tends is a happiness to the intellect that contemplates it in its evolution and beauty of orderliness. Plato's astronomical speculations were teleological in this artistic sense.

It is not sufficient for the purposes of science, that the idea of progress be thus purified; and it would be better if science itself were purified of this idea, at least until proof of its extent and reality be borne in upon the mind by the irresistible force of a truly scientific induction. Aristotle exhibited the characteristics of scientific genius in no way more distinctly than in the rejection of this idea, and of all cosmological speculations.

But there is a truth implied in this idea, and an important one, — the truth, namely, that the proper objects of scientific research are all of them processes and the results of processes; not the immutable natures which Plato sought for above a world of confusion and unreality, in the world of his own intelligence, but the immutable elements in the orders of all changes, the permanent relations of coexistences and sequences, which are hidden in the confusions of complex phenomena. Thought itself is a process and the mind a complex series of processes, the immutable elements of which must be discovered, not merely by introspection or by self-consciousness, but by the aid of physiological researches and by indirect observation. Everything out of the mind is a product, the result of some process. Nothing is exempt from change. Worlds are formed and dissipated. Races of organic beings grow up like their

constituent individual members, and disappear like these. Nothing shows a trace of an original, immutable nature, except the unchangeable laws of change. These point to no beginning and to no end in time, nor to any bounds in space. All indications to the contrary in the results of physical research are clearly traceable to imperfections in our present knowledge of all the laws of change, and to that disposition to cosmological speculations which still prevails even in science.

We propound these doctrines not as established ones, but as having a warrant from the general results of physical research similar to that which the postulate of science, the law of causation, has in the vaguely discerned order in nature, which forces itself on the attention even of the unobservant. But as a mind unfamiliar with science is easily persuaded that there are phenomena in nature to which the law of causation does not apply, phenomena intrinsically arbitrary and capricious, so even to those most familiar with our present knowledge of physical laws, but who have not attended to the implication of their general characters and relations, the supposition is not incredible that there is a tendency in the forces of nature to a permanent or persistently progressive change in the theatre of their operations, and to an ultimate cessation of all the particular conditions on which their manifestations depend. To show why this is incredible to us would carry us beyond the proper limits of our subject, were it not that our author has speculated in the same direction.

Having developed what he thinks to be the true scientific idea of progress in his "Law of Evolution," Mr. Spencer next considers its relations to ultimate scientific ideas, the ideas of space, time, matter, and force. As evolution is change, and as change, scientifically comprehended, is comprehended in terms of matter, motion, and force, and the conditions necessary to these, or time and space, it is necessary that evolution be further defined in its relations to these ideas. These are only formulating terms, entirely abstract. They imply no ontological theory about the nature or existence of mind or matter; and when Mr. Spencer proposes to formulate the phenomena of mind as well as those of matter in terms of matter, motion, and force, it is because these ideas are the only precise ones in which the phenomena of change can be defined.

Mr. Spencer is not a materialist. Materialism and spiritualism, or psychological idealism, are as dogmatic theories equally self-contradictory and absurd. Mr. Spencer is neither a materialist nor an idealist; neither theist, atheist, nor pantheist. All these doctrines are, he thinks, without sense or reason; and the philosophers who invented them, and the disciples who received and thought they understood them, were deceived. But we are inclined to the opinion that believers, though they may be deceived about their ability to comprehend these theories (for it is easy to mistake meanings), are not deceived about the motives or the spirit which prompts these speculations, and which in fact determines for each his election of what doctrine best suits his character. For within the pale of philosophy, character determines belief, and ideas stand for feelings. We receive the truths of science on compulsion. Nothing but ignorance is able to resist them. In philosophy we are free from every bias, except that of our own characters; and it therefore seems to us becoming in a philosopher, who is solicitous about the moral reputation of his doctrines, who would avoid classification under disreputable categories, that he teach nothing which he does not know, lest the direction of his inquiries be mistaken for that of his dispositions. The vulgar who use these obnoxious terms, materialism, atheism, pantheism, do not pretend to define them; but they somehow have a very definite idea, or at least a strong feeling, about the dangerous character of such speculations, which are none the less reprehensible because inconceivable.

But we must defer the consideration of the moral character of Mr. Spencer's speculations, until we have further examined their scientific grounds.

Terms which the real physicist knows how to use as the terms of mathematical formulas, and which were never even suspected of any heterodox tendencies, terms which have been of inestimable service both in formulating and finding out the secrets of nature, are appropriated by Mr. Spencer to the further elaboration of his vague definitions, and to the abstract description of as much in real nature as they may happen to apply to. As if an inventory of the tools of any craft were a proper account of its handiwork! Out of mathematical for-

mulas these terms lose their definiteness and their utility. They become corrupting and misleading ideas. They are none the less abstract, but they are less clear. They again clothe themselves in circumstance, though vaguely. They appeal to that indefinite consciousness which, as Mr. Spencer says, cannot be formulated, but in which he thinks we have an apprehension of cause and causal agencies.

"Though along with the extension of generalizations, and concomitant integrations of conceived causal agencies," says Mr. Spencer, "the conceptions of causal agencies grow more indefinite; and though as they gradually coalesce into a universal causal agency they cease to be representable in thought, and are no longer supposed to be comprehensible, yet the consciousness of *cause* remains as dominant to the last as it was at first, and can never be got rid of. The consciousness of cause can be abolished only by abolishing consciousness itself."

This is quoted by himself from his "First Principles," as one of his "reasons for dissenting from the philosophy of M. Comte." Though he seems solicitous to avoid all ontological implications in his use of scientific terms, yet we cannot avoid the impression of a vague metaphysical signification in his speculations, as if he were presenting all the parts of a system of materialism except the affirmative and negative copulas. These are withheld, because we cannot be supposed to believe anything inconceivable, as all ontological dogmas are. He seems to lead us on to the point of requiring our assent to a materialistic doctrine, and then lets us off on account of the infirmities of our minds; presenting materialism to our contemplation rather than to our understandings.

Mr. Spencer regards the ultimate ideas of science as unknowable; and in a sense the meanings of the abstractest terms are unknowable, that is, are not referable to any notions more abstract, nor susceptible of sensuous apprehension or representation as such. But the way to know them is to use them in mathematical formulas to express precisely what we do know. It is true that this cannot yet be done, except in the physical sciences proper, and not always with distinctness in these. It is only in astronomy and mechanical physics that these terms are used with mathematical precision. They change their meanings, or at least lose their definiteness, when we come to chemistry and physiology.

"The indestructibility of matter," "the continuity of motion," "the conservation of force," and "the correlation and equivalence of forces," are ideas which mathematical and physical science has rendered familiar. Beside these, Mr. Spencer has analyzed others, descriptive of the general external characteristics of motion; and he continues with a development of what the Law of Evolution implies. To all the ideas which he adopts from science he adds a new sense, or rather a vagueness, so as to make them descriptive of as much as possible. One of these ideas loses in the process so many of its original features, as well as its name, that we should not have recognized it as the same, but for Mr. Spencer's justification of what he regards as a change of nomenclature. He prefers "persistence of force" to "conservation of force," because the latter "implies a conservator and an act of conserving," and because "it does not imply the existence of the force before that particular manifestation of it with which we commence." Science, we are inclined to believe, will not adopt this emendation, because the conservation it refers to is that whereby the special conditions of the production of any mechanical effect in nature are themselves replaced by the changes through which this effect is manifested; so that if this effect ceases to appear as a motion, it nevertheless exists in the altered antecedents of motions, which may subsequently be developed in the course of natural changes. It is this conservation of the conditions of motion by the operations of nature through the strictest observation of certain mathematical laws, that science wishes to express. The objection (if there be any) to this phrase is in the word "force." This word is used in mathematical mechanics in three different senses, but fortunately they are distinct. They are not here fused together, as they are by Mr. Spencer, into one vague expression of what nobody in fact knows anything about. There is no danger of ambiguities arising from this source in mathematics. The ideas expressed by this word are perfectly distinct and definable. The liability to ambiguity is only when we pass from mathematical formulas to sciences, in which the word has more or less of vagueness and an ontological reference. This liability is somewhat diminished, at least so far as distinct mathematical comprehension is con-

cerned, by the use of the phrases, "conservation of mechanical effect" or "the law of power," which are now employed to express the mathematical theorem which has as one of its corollaries the doctrine that "perpetual motion" is impossible in the sense in which practical mechanics use the words. This theorem is deduced from the fundamental laws of motion, or those transcendental ideas and definitions which have received their proof or justification in their ability to clear up the confusions with which the movements of nature fall upon the senses and present themselves to the undisciplined understanding.

The phrase "conservation of force" was adopted from mathematical mechanics into chemical physics, with reference to the question of the possibility of "perpetual motion" by means of those natural forces with which chemistry deals. The impossibility of "perpetual motion," or the fact that "in the series of natural processes there is no circuit to be found by which mechanical force can be gained without a corresponding consumption," had been demonstrated only with reference to the so-called "fixed forces" of nature, or those which depend solely on the relative distances of bodies from each other. Chemical forces are not mathematically comprehended, and are therefore utterly unknown, save in their effects, and their laws are unknown, save in the observed invariable orders of these effects. These forces are merely hypotheses, and hypotheses which include little or nothing that is definite or profitable to research. But mechanical forces suggested to physicists a problem perfectly clear and definite. "Are the laws of chemical forces also inconsistent with 'perpetual motion'?" "Are light, heat, electricity, magnetism, and the force of chemical transformations, correlated with each other, and with mechanical motions and forces, as these are among themselves?" Here is something tangible; and the direction which these questions have given to physical researches in recent times mark out a distinct epoch in scientific progress. Here the answer could not be found *a priori*, as a consequent of any known or presumed universal laws of nature. Experiment must establish these presumptions; and it does so with such an overwhelming amount of evidence, that they are made the grounds of prediction, as the law of gravity was in the discovery of the

planet Uranus. Physicists have anticipated, on the ground of the impossibility of perpetual motion, such an apparently remote fact as this, "that the freezing temperature in water depends on the pressure to which the water is subjected." Experiment confirms this anticipation.

The processes of such researches are long and intricate, but they are perfectly precise and definite; and it is thus that the law of the "Conservation of Force" is made of value, and not by such use as Mr. Spencer is able to make of it, if indeed his "Persistence of Force" can be regarded as having any meaning in common with it. His principle seems to us to bear a much closer resemblance to the old metaphysical "Principle of Causality," or the impossibility of any change in the quantity of existence (whatever this may mean); and it also seems to us to be as profitless.

Having developed his Law of Evolution to maturity, he arrives at "Equilibration." All evolutions must have an end, and this end is "Equilibration." Then there is no longer any tendency to "a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations." Life is balanced. The worlds are completed.

Throughout this speculation the mechanical arguments of the Nebular Hypothesis have been the guides to Mr. Spencer's abstractions, while the doctrines of embryology have furnished the terminology. Recent developments of this hypothesis in connection with the theory of the correlations of mechanical forces and heat, have afforded him a splendid opportunity to carry out and illustrate his theories, and this opportunity Mr. Spencer has not neglected. Fully convinced of the truth of the Nebular Hypothesis, as well as of the importance of his own Law of Evolution, he reasons with the earnestness of conviction and with the blindness of zeal; and he brings to bear upon his theories the intense interest which the recent developments of physics are calculated to awaken concerning certain problems in astronomy. The source of the sun's heat, the origins of the planets and their motions in the solar system, the past and future histories of the earth and of the universe, — all these topics have an interest outside of science. They appeal to the story-loving, mythic instinct which willingly helps Science over

her difficulties and uncertainties. It is desirable on this account to distinguish as far as possible between what is demonstrative or scientifically probable, and what is imaginary or poetically probable, in theories on these subjects. To do this adequately is the work of time, patience, and science, following the methods of experimental philosophy rather than those of Mr. Spencer. We can now present only the elements of these problems, with the impressions which come from an *a priori* distrust of cosmological speculations.

The discovery of the constant relation of mechanical effect and heat, and the determination of the measures by which this relation can be mathematically expressed in an equation, gave at once, by a simple computation with well-known astronomical data, results of the most surprising and interesting character. The mere motions of bodies, such as they have in the spaces of the solar system, and such as the sun is able to produce in bodies falling to it and in the masses of which it is composed through their mutual attractions, were found to represent vastly greater quantities of heat than could be produced by any known chemical agency, like combustion, with the same quantity of matter of whatever kind. Here then was the long sought for origin of the sun's heat. If the motions continually produced and arrested in the contractions of the sun's mass, incident to its cooling, should only amount to what would diminish the sun's diameter by one part in twenty millions in a year, it would be sufficient to produce all the enormous amount of heat which the sun has been proved to radiate in that time. If a body falling from a height not greater than the known limits of the solar system should have the motion it would thus acquire arrested and dissipated in the form of heat in the mass of the sun, it would also produce this amount of heat, provided the mass of the body be to that of the sun only as one to thirty millions. At least one half of the energy represented by this heat would be acquired in that part of the fall between the surface of the sun and a height not greater than the distance of this surface from the centre; and if the body should have fallen from the greatest supposable height, all but about one in six thousand parts of this energy would have been acquired within the known limits of the solar system, and all but about one in two

hundred parts within the limits of the earth's orbit. To explain the origin of the sun's heat, two theories have, therefore, been advanced. One in accordance with the Nebular Hypothesis explains it as arising from the falling in upon itself of the matter which composes the mass of the sun and an arrest of this motion resulting in heat and a continuous contraction of the sun's diameter, but without any change in the sun's mass. The other, on the evidence there is of the existence of innumerable small bodies moving in irregular and eccentric orbits through the spaces of the solar system, supposes the frequent fall of such bodies to the sun, and the arrest of their motions in its mass, as the origin of its heat.

What shall decide between these two theories? At first sight, the fact that the mass of the sun does not change so fast as the second theory appears to require, as is evinced by the fact that there is not a corresponding change in the attractive energy of the sun, and in the resultant periods of revolution in the earth and other planets, seems to refute this theory, and to decide in favor of the first. On the other hand, the second theory appeals to its foundation in independently probable evidence which the first does not possess, and to another theoretical consideration which explains away this difficulty, namely, the consideration that only one half of the problem has yet been attended to; for on either hypothesis we should explain, not only how the sun's heat is produced, but also what becomes of the mechanical energy which this heat represents.

Dr. Mayer, who advances the second or the meteoric hypothesis, is content to affirm that the matter of the sun is dissipated also, as well as its heat, through the agency of its heat; so that its mass remains sensibly constant. This additional hypothesis has in itself about the same character which the Nebular Hypothesis possesses. So far, therefore, the two explanations are balanced. Both explain the origin of the sun's heat and the constancy of its mass by the union of facts independently probable with an hypothesis made for the purpose of explanation but not inconsistent with observed facts. The one theory adopts the hypothetical contraction of the sun's diameter, which observation has been unable to test, with the observed fact that the sun's mass does not increase so much as the other theory

seems to require. And the other theory avoids this requirement by the hypothesis of the dissipation of the matter of the sun, united with the independently probable fact that bodies are continually falling to the sun's surface, just as they are continually falling to that of the earth, only in vastly greater numbers.

It is enough to say of the Nebular Hypothesis, that no physicist of repute regards it as having that degree of independent probability which warrants its use as a ground of probable prediction, or as affording a justification of any new or implied hypothesis. But the uncertainty as to which of the two mechanical theories of the origin of the sun's heat is true, should not for a moment be compared to the uncertainty of the Nebular Hypothesis. For it is almost certain that either one or the other is the true explanation; and, indeed, they are not essentially inconsistent with each other. Both may be true; or rather a third theory, combining both, may have a probability superior to that of either. If it be true that the sun is a body at a minimum of temperature, which on account of its enormous mass and attractive energy is able, through the contractions due to its loss of heat, to make compensation for its radiations at the expense of its dimensions, then it follows that this temperature is also a maximum one, and that an increase of the total heat of the sun by the fall of bodies to it will not increase its temperature, but rather its dimensions; its temperature being kept uniform, much as the energies and impulsions of an engine are reduced to uniformity by the inertia of its fly-wheel and that of the bodies on the resistances of which its energies are expended.

But on what are the energies of the sun expended? What becomes of its radiations? Mr. Spencer speaks in his vague way and in his dialect of the mechanical processes of the solar system as constituting "Evolution where there is a predominant integration of Matter and disintegration of Motion." He regards the laws of change as causes of "Dissolution where there is a predominant integration of Motion and disintegration of Matter." What in the language of physics does all this mean? We suppose it means that the parts of a body or a system of bodies are brought nearer each other on the whole

by a loss of internal motions, whether these be in the form of heat or of massive motions; and that a system or a body is expanded on the whole by an addition to its internal motions or the relative motions of its parts. These are important mechanical theorems, but their deduction and extension by generalization necessitates the scholium, that all such "Evolutions" are attended by corresponding "Dissolutions." Motion is the motion of something, though Mr. Spencer seems to speak of it as capable of existing by itself. Motion may grow less or cease in a body or a system without being lost from it, but in this case it is represented by an expansion of the body or the system. The motions of the solar system are continually varying, becoming greater or less according as the bodies of the system are approaching or receding from each other on the whole. But motions really lost from one body or system of bodies are taken up by others, and those which are really gained are acquired from others. This is so universally true, that it includes the motions of living as well as of so-called dead matter. The motions of heat and of mechanical energy in the living body are necessarily derived from the motions and antecedent special conditions of motion which are contained in the sunbeam and in the food through which the living bodies of plants and animals are formed. But while in these bodies, during their growths and throughout their lifetimes, there is a well-marked order and harmony in such changes, the definitions of which are the proper definitions of life, yet such an order is not necessarily implied in the universal laws of change. All that is necessarily implied in these is balance and ultimate compensations, — compensations in times and spaces, which are wholly indefinite, and in concrete series of phenomena, which may or may not be simple orders or intelligible as wholes, but over which it is certain an elementary order reigns supreme.

The principle of the conservation of mechanical energy in and through the operations by which it is manifested, is the expression of this elementary order, from which, however, nothing can be deduced *a priori* in regard to any class or concrete series of phenomena in nature. The positions of the planets are deducible *a posteriori* from a sufficient number of particular facts in *this* concrete series, and by means of elemen-

tary laws. But while such successions as life exhibits involve the law of the conservation of force, so far as they involve any changes in matter, yet no characteristic features in such successions are deducible from this law, notwithstanding Mr. Spencer's asserted demonstrations of the contrary. Life must still be studied from without. Its principle is not yet discovered.

Concentrations of matter with a transfer of its internal motions to other matter, and separations of matter by motions received from without, are both exemplified in growth. Mr. Spencer calls the first "Evolution," but the growth of plants is really characterized by the second; for though there is a concentration of carbon in the tissues of the plant, yet the mechanical operation by which this is effected is really a separation of the carbon from oxygen by the mechanical energy of the sunbeam, which, coming in from without, overcomes the forces of chemical aggregation in carbonic acid. There is here an aggregation of matter so far as mass or weight is concerned, but none so far as the *chemical* forces are concerned. In respect to these forces, vegetation is a dispersion of matter through an accession of forces; and combustion or consumption as food in animal bodies is a dispersion of forces with a concentration of matter, though so far as mass or weight is concerned this matter is also dispersed in the form of carbonic acid gas.

Dispersion and concentration are not to be mechanically measured by mere distances in space, even in the case of gravitation; for, as we have said, a body falling from the limits of the solar system acquires on reaching the surface of the sun all but one in six thousand parts of the energy which it could acquire in falling from the height of the remotest star. The immense distances by which the stars are separated from each other is not, therefore, the representant of a much greater energy than that which the dimensions of the solar system represent, though these become as nothing in respect to mere distances. Gravitation is a feeble force except in close proximity, and there is some degree of probability in the speculation which regards it as really a resultant of the forces to which it seems to give rise. Whether this speculation be true or not,

there is no evidence that the law of gravity is exact, or more than approximately true, or that the force of gravity subsists at all between the remotest stars. That it plays but an insignificant part in determining the distributions and motions of stars and systems of stars is highly probable, since these are but imperfectly accounted for, if at all, by its law. The motions of the closely proximate members of binary stars are in fact the only ones in sidereal astronomy which have been brought under the law of gravity. Still it would be contrary to the postulate of science, or to any sound principle of philosophizing, to regard the distribution of the stars as in any absolute sense fortuitous; for in this also, as in nature generally, there is that vaguely discerned order which warrants the postulate of science, and its efforts to decipher what it has a right to presume, namely, at least an elementary order.

We hold the opinion that the mechanical theory of heat, when it comes to be applied in earnest to the problems of dynamics in sidereal astronomy, will be rewarded with triumphs not inferior to those which the law of gravitation has achieved in the solar system; and that the distribution of the stars will be accounted for, not on the hypothesis of simple attractive or repulsive forces, but by the distributions of matter and heat through the interstellar spaces, and by their actions and reactions, not as centres of simple forces, but as the receptacles of concrete masses and motions, and as the sources of diffused motions and matters, none of which can ever be lost or destroyed; that their motions will be found to result principally from those of the medium of diffused materials, from which they are aggregated precipitates, and into which they are evaporated by heat.

This is at present only an hypothesis, but it is not teleological in any sense of the term. The most obvious objection to it is the theory that there is "a universal tendency in nature to the dissipation of mechanical energy," a theory well founded, nay, demonstrated,* if we only follow this energy as far as the present limits of science extend. But to a true Aristotelian this theory, so far from suggesting a dramatic *dénouement*,

* By Professor William Thomson.

such as the ultimate death of nature, only propounds new problems. What becomes of the sun's dynamic energy, and whence do the bodies come which support this wasting power?

The earth is composed of masses mechanically as well as chemically heterogeneous. The forces of chemical aggregation overcome this confusion to a limited extent, through the agency of internal heat and aqueous solution, in the formation of metallic deposits and crystalline segregations, but only to a limited extent. Long persistent mechanical actions of air and water, and vegetal aggregations, produce a similar mechanical homogeneity in geological deposits. Still the materials of the earth's surface exist as if they had been thrown together without any determinable order, — as if the earth and similar bodies had been compounded of the materials of smaller masses falling together, and gradually wrought by geological forces into the little order they present. Materials continue to arrive at the earth's surface, — in how great quantities it is at present impossible to form a trustworthy estimate. Are not all large bodies so formed? But how are the smaller bodies formed? The comets, which are more numerous "in the heavens than fish in the ocean," and the meteors, more numerous than the sands of the desert, — how are they formed? Our answer is an hypothesis. They are formed by chemical and mechanical aggregation from matters diffused throughout space by the mechanical energy of the sun; and by their fall they restore this energy. This would complete the round of nature, but the theory is not thereby demonstrated. Scientific demonstration is slow and painful, the work of time and patience. All that can now be presented are problems, but these are scientific problems. They are about the details of an elementary order, which science has a right to presume, and not about the abstract features of an external order, which science has no right to presume.

Following the publication of his "First Principles," there appeared a short essay by Mr. Spencer on "The Classification of the Sciences"; to which are added his "Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte." We had a little hope that here at least Mr. Spencer's reputation for philosophical analysis, and for an extensive knowledge of the sciences, would stand

proof, and be confirmed by a valuable result. Instead of this, we find nothing deserving attention from any one who does not find in his "First Principles" the germs of a great philosophy, except bad criticism, a perverted terminology, and fanciful discriminations.

Nearly all philosophers are agreed, we believe, in assigning logic and mathematics to a distinct division of the sciences, and these have with great propriety been denominated formal sciences, as distinguished from the real or material sciences. This propriety is quite independent of any metaphysical or critical theory which we may have about the origin or intrinsic character of mathematical and logical truth. Whether we regard the truths of formal science as really universal or not, their *presumed* universality is what determines their peculiar character and functions in science generally. But Mr. Spencer seems more solicitous to avoid an implication of a metaphysical doctrine, which these terms have, than to avail himself of their real scientific utility; and he uses, instead of them, the ambiguous and otherwise objectionable terms "abstract" and "concrete," and is obliged, consequently, to define and defend these in the sense in which he proposes to use them. Truths that have exemplification in nearly every class of facts of which we have precise knowledge, the axioms and postulates of which are implied, indeed, in all knowledge, may relatively to all other truths be properly regarded as *a priori* and formal, or as the moulds into which these truths are cast. It may be, as Mr. Spencer thinks, that these truths are obtained by abstraction alone, from our experience of things; nevertheless, to make any reference in a classification to this circumstance is to sacrifice the proper objects of a classification to an extrinsic object, and is also open to the objection which seems to have prevailed with him, though he makes no explicit reference to it, against the more generally received terms "formal" and "material." "Formal" implies precisely what Mr. Spencer means by *wholly* abstract, and "material" what he means by *wholly* concrete; but he uses the unqualified terms "abstract" and "concrete" in these extreme senses. He gets confused about the distinction of "abstract" and "general," and thinks M. Comte and M. Littré have confounded them.

According to the most authentic usage, "abstract" and "general," though not the same, are not antithetical, as Mr. Spencer would have them to be. He says: "Abstractness means *detachment from* the incidents of particular cases. Generality means *manifestation in* numerous cases." *Total* detachment he means, for he uses "abstract" and "concrete" as exclusive contraries. In this use, however, Mr. Spencer is not alone; for the character of the process of abstraction, says Sir William Hamilton, has "been overlooked by philosophers, insomuch that they have opposed the terms *concrete* and *abstract* as exclusive contraries." But no philosopher before Mr. Spencer has attempted to establish any opposition between "abstract" and "general"; for though the "abstract" does not imply generality, yet generality is dependent on abstraction. "*Manifestation in* numerous cases" is the manifestation of what? — we would inquire of Mr. Spencer. Of anything but what must be obtained by abstraction? And yet he claims that his use of the words "abstract," "concrete," and "general" is the correct one. M. Littré's definition of abstractness as "subjective generality," does not appear to us a very happy one, but it is vastly superior to his critic's definitions.

In designating by the terms "abstract," "abstract-concrete," and "concrete" the divisions of the sciences which the words "formal," "mixed," and "material" have hitherto denoted, Mr. Spencer has only confused a subject already possessed of an adequately precise nomenclature. The *presumed* universality of mathematical and logical truth, the entirely empirical generality of merely descriptive sciences, and the union of these kinds of truth in general physics, are properly connoted by the terms already in use.

In Mr. Spencer's subdivisions of mathematics he has given a prominence to "Descriptive Geometry" which might be regarded as arising from the partiality of the civil engineer for a branch of his own art, were it not that he says: —

"I was ignorant of the existence of this as a separate division of mathematics, until it was described to me by Mr. Hirst, whom I have also to thank for pointing out the omission of the subdivision 'Kinematics.' It was only when seeking to affiliate and define 'Descriptive Geometry' that I reached the conclusion that there is a negatively-

quantitative mathematics, as well as a positively-quantitative mathematics. In explanation of the term negatively-quantitative, it will suffice to instance the proposition that certain three lines will meet in a point, as a negatively-quantitative proposition; since it asserts the absence of any quantity of space between their intersections. Similarly, the assertion that certain three points will always fall in a straight line is negatively-quantitative; since the conception of a straight line implies the negation of any lateral quantity or deviation."

The propositions selected by Mr. Spencer to illustrate what he calls "Descriptive Geometry" are by no means peculiar to or characteristic of the art to which mathematicians have given this name. In the most elaborate and extensive treatises no more is claimed for this art than that it is an account in a scientific order of certain methods of geometrical construction, useful in engineering and architecture, but inferior in scientific extension even to trigonometry, to which Mr. Spencer does not deign to descend. It is possible that Mr. Spencer has in mind certain propositions in the "Higher Geometry" concerning relations of position and direction in points and lines; but these cannot be made to stand alone or independently of dimensional properties, and if they could, they would be as appropriately named "qualitative" mathematics as "negatively-quantitative." In short, this is the most flagrant application of "the principle of contraries" in classification which has ever come to our notice. If Mr. Spencer proposes to select from mathematics all positively-quantitative problems and propositions for one branch, and all negatively-quantitative ones for the other, he must reconstruct, if he can, the whole science, and the question of terminology will only be a question between him and his brothers in his own craft.

His subdivisions of the "concrete" and "abstract-concrete" sciences are an application of his "First Principles," concerning the character of which we have already spoken.

We treated first in order of the second part of Mr. Spencer's "First Principles," which comprises his "Laws of the Knowable," reserving for our concluding paragraphs the consideration of his doctrine of "the Unknowable," and his position before the religious world.

This position has been greatly misunderstood, and Mr. Spen-

cer himself has contributed much to the misunderstanding. He has appeared as a champion for what is sound in the older philosophy, and one of his avowed objects is to reconcile the truths of religion with those of science. He is anxious not to be thought a positivist, and he publishes as an appendix to his "First Principles" a response to his reviewer in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, to show that he is not a positivist or a follower of M. Comte.

It requires only a little thoughtful attention to the speculations of Mr. Spencer and M. Comte to see that they are radically unlike, not only in the details of doctrine, but in their ostensible aims. The religious world, however, though perhaps a little too trusting and a little dull of thought, has very acute feelings, and a fine sagacity in apprehending the religious drift of a system of philosophy. It began to have suspicions, but it was, nevertheless, anxious to see the truths of science reconciled with those of religion, and so it has continued to listen to Mr. Spencer.

There can be no doubt of the earnestness and moral honesty of Mr. Spencer's writings. He is conscious of a generous purpose, and is actuated by the modern form of religious sentiment, moral idealism, or a belief in the moral perfectibility of things in general. He only lacks a distinct consciousness of his exact position with reference to older forms of religious sentiment. He imagines that his philosophy can conciliate these also. This conciliation is effected, he thinks, by presenting the unknowable as a subject of contemplation, — the abstract unknowable, not an entity or a subject for propositions and beliefs. Beliefs about the unknowable are absurd, thinks Mr. Spencer. It is only in the existence of the unknowable as implied in the existence and limits of the knowable that we can believe, and this becomes more and more distinct as the knowable becomes more distinct in its conditions and limits.

"Thus the consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena has been growing ever clearer, and must eventually be freed from its imperfections. The certainty that on the one hand such a Power exists, while on the other hand its nature transcends intuition and is beyond imagination, is the certainty towards which intelligence has from the first been progressing. To this conclusion science inevi-

tably arrives as it reaches its confines; while to this conclusion religion is irresistibly driven by criticism. And satisfying as it does the demands of the most rigorous logic at the same time that it gives the religious sentiment the widest possible sphere of action, it is the conclusion we are bound to accept without reserve or qualification.

"Some do indeed allege that though the Ultimate Cause of things cannot really be thought of by us as having specified attributes, it is yet incumbent upon us to assert these attributes. Though the forms of our consciousness are such that the Absolute cannot in any manner or degree be brought within them, we are nevertheless told that we must represent the Absolute to ourselves under these forms. As writes Mr. Mansel in the work from which I have already quoted largely, 'It is our duty then to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite.'

"That this is not the conclusion here adopted needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing arguments, duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to the established limits of our intelligence, and not perversely to rebel against them. Let those who can believe that there is eternal war set between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations. I for one admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things.

"This, which to most will seem an essentially irreligious position, is an essentially religious one, — nay, is *the* religious one to which, as already shown, all others are but approximations."

We are inclined to think, nevertheless, that the older forms of religious sentiment, instead of being satisfied with this, and in place of a better reconciliation, if none appears, will resort rather to formularies and the fine arts. Religious sentiments are essentially constructive. They must have propositions, or something to believe, — something to give entire, free, and hearty assent to. Strings of abstract incomprehensible terms, with the copulas all left out, — nothing to believe in except our own ignorance (however respectable this may be), — will never do. If thought cannot furnish the copulas, feeling can and will.

But, seriously, we must repeat that the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton went to the extremest verge in the direction of empiricism which it was possible to reach without renouncing the interests for which philosophy had always been cultivated. Empiricism has other interests, worthy ones, but they

are not religious. Hamilton's doctrine aimed only at this,—to show that unbelief or negative dogmatism was unfounded, and to open the way for the authority of religious feeling.

Mr. Mansel, correctly apprehending the drift of Sir William Hamilton's doctrine, elaborated it still further, and supplied what was wanting to make it a religious philosophy, namely, the authority of religious feeling; but it was the authority of the religious feelings of his own sect, of course. This movement, apparently in behalf of the Established Church, roused great opposition to the doctrines of Hamilton on the part of dissenting theologians. They attacked what had been before called in question, the empirical doctrines to which, while admitting and defending them theoretically, Hamilton opposed what is peculiarly his own philosophy, as a practical defence of religion. But any other sectarians were just as competent to supply the defects of Hamilton's philosophy as Mr. Mansel. They had only to advance the authority of *their* religious feelings into the vacant place. Controversy would have gone on just as before. Only the irreligious would have been excluded from the field. But the vacant place was historically preoccupied by Mr. Mansel, and it was thought necessary by the others to carry the whole position.

Thus religious controversy blinded both the friends and the foes of religious philosophy in regard to the true scope and position of Sir William Hamilton's doctrine. He has come to be regarded by both parties as the great modern champion of philosophical empiricism, whereas he only quoted it against Cousin and the German rationalists, and proposed as his own contribution to philosophy that which is regarded by Mr. Spencer as a defect and an inconsistency in his philosophy.

"The Conditioned," says Hamilton, "is a mean between two extremes, two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of which *can be conceived as possible*, but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one must be admitted as *necessary*. On this opinion, therfore, reason is shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other as equally possible; but only as unable to understand as possible either of two extremes, one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true. We are

thus taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence; and are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality."

Of this passage, in which Sir William Hamilton first stated his own peculiar doctrine, though less clearly than in his subsequent writings, Mr. Spencer says: —

"By the laws of thought, as Sir William Hamilton has interpreted them, he finds himself forced to the conclusion, that our consciousness of the absolute is a pure negation. He nevertheless finds that there does exist in consciousness an irresistible conviction of the real 'existence of something unconditioned.' And he gets over the inconsistency by speaking of this conviction as a 'wonderful revelation,' 'a belief' with which we are 'inspired'; thus apparently hinting that it is supernaturally at variance with the laws of thought. [!] Mr. Mansel is betrayed into a like inconsistency," —

which Mr. Spencer proceeds to point out.

Strange inconsistency indeed, if it be true, between that which is mistaken by his critic as the essence of his philosophy, and that which, being the real essence, is regarded as an inconsistency. Supposing Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are really arguing in the interests of empiricism, he tries to help them out, and supply another proof of "the relativity of all knowledge"; yet he finds in some of the statements of his friends an implication of "a grave error." He thinks they deny by implication that we can "rationally affirm the positive existence of anything beyond phenomena"; whereas what they are all along trying to prove is, that we *can* rationally affirm what we cannot positively conceive or construe to thought. This includes what Mr. Spencer calls "the incomplete thoughts of an indefinite consciousness," and more. It even signifies that we can and do rationally affirm not only what is incompletely thought of, but that of which we can only think the meanings, or the relations of the terms by which it is expressed.

Mr. Spencer believes that we have an indefinite consciousness of the Absolute and of Cause, but not one which will war-

rant any other proposition than that which is implied in this consciousness, namely, that it is not distinct. That we can be distinctly ignorant is the highest religious truth he has to offer. In setting forth this his contribution to religious philosophy, he characterizes the argument of his predecessors thus: —

"Truly to realize in thought any one of the propositions of which the argument consists, the unconditioned must be represented as positive, not negative. How then can it be a legitimate conclusion from the argument, that our consciousness of it is negative? An argument, the very construction of which assigns to a certain term a certain meaning, but which ends in showing that this term has no such meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide."

But really the argument of which Mr. Spencer has proved his total misapprehension is not an argument about meanings at all, but about the supposed objects of thought which the terms of the argument denote. To conceive the meaning of a proposition and to conceive the proposition itself, or to conceive the fact which the proposition expresses, are not the same; though in confounding them Mr. Spencer does not stand alone. The question is about the mind's ability, right, or duty to believe what, as stated in a proposition, is stated in terms which, while their meanings are clear, cannot be united in a judgment, either by proof from what is truly known, or by intuition. If two such propositions stand in mutual contradiction, says Sir William Hamilton, one of them must be true, or the laws of thought are false; and he offers the alternative of absolute or philosophical scepticism, a suspension of all judgments, or a belief in something inconceivable. He offers it of course only formally; for a decision in favor of scepticism is self-contradictory, a judgment that all judgments are false, which ends in that painful uncertainty exhibited in the sophism of the liar, to which we referred in treating of Mr. Spencer's Psychology. The choice between having judgments and having none is, of course, only a paradoxical mode of presenting the absurdity which cannot really be committed, but which is implied in certain confusions of thought. It was to remove these confusions by clear philosophical statements, and not to prove anything, that Hamilton's doctrine of the conditioned was propounded.

We have now completed our survey of the principal philosophical works of Mr. Spencer, a writer whose pretensions aim at a system of truth which shall formulate all legitimate human knowledge, but whose performance of the part he has undertaken gives little hope of success in what yet remains to do.

The number of topics which we have been led to consider in this survey illustrates the versatility of our author, and the number in regard to which we have been compelled to deny his conclusions illustrates his incompetency for the further development of his encyclopedic abstractions.

ART. V. — *Inaugural Message of Governor* THOMAS C. FLETCHER, *to the Twenty-third General Assembly of the State of Missouri. In Session January* 2, 1865. Jefferson City. 1865. 8vo. pp. 14.

THIS day (we write on the 11th of January, 1865) a great State, the magnificent home of millions yet to be, emerges from the long shadow. The curse laid on her forty-four years ago has been lifted. The chain has been broken that bound the strength of the earth and the soul of man throughout the vast domain of Missouri. For this day, at ten minutes before three, P. M., in the State Convention in the city of St. Louis, an ordinance was passed, declaring all persons held as slaves in the State of Missouri free, and henceforth slavery in her borders forever abolished.

In vastness of natural resources so mingled as to minister to the development of a rich, energetic, and multiform civilization, Missouri is unequalled amid the Western States. Her omnigenous soils are capable of producing all the growths that belong to her latitude which may serve man's necessities or luxuries, his comfort, convenience, or pride. Picturesque with contrasts of surface and feature, with pleasing change of hill, meadow, table-land, river-basin, grove, and prairie, she is unrivalled in her variety of natural beauty. Nor is

she equalled by any other State in her affluence of streams, from the many-threaded offshoots of the Grand, the Chariton, and the Platte, that fertilize the rich meadows of Northern Missouri, or the crystal brooks that, gushing forth from the Ozark, and winding amid forests of cedar and pine and at the base of cliffs of sandstone and mountains of iron, grow to navigable rivers in the lowlands, to the mighty currents that sweep upon their bosom the argosies and steam-palaces of trade and traffic within or along her borders, for twelve hundred miles.

In all these characteristics, and in the geniality and kindliness of a climate tempered between the extremes of heat and cold, and situate in a latitude most favorable, on the whole, to the length and vigor of human life, Missouri stands with no superior, and in most of them without an equal, among the magnificent sisterhood of States surrounding her.

Moreover, her geographic position, central to the Great Valley and to the United States east of the Rocky Mountains, gives her peculiar advantages for facility of commercial interchange and intercourse. Whether we consider her occupation of the central section of the great river system of the Mississippi and its affluents, stretching from the Great Lakes and waters that flow into the Arctic Ocean on the north, to the Mexican Gulf on the south, or of the railroad system running transversely to this, and destined to connect the two oceans, her position is unique and unequalled.

But over this land, presenting such a picture of fertility and beauty, and such promise of agricultural, pastoral, manufacturing, and commercial prosperity, has brooded one institution, that, like a plague, seems to have struck at once a blight on man and nature. That institution was slavery, — the fatal gift extorted for her by friends, falsely so called, in a convulsion that wellnigh shook down the Republic, — wrung from unwilling and remonstrant reasons and consciences by threats of dissolution of the Union, and in the name of a compromise since most foully violated.

Her beauty and riches were wedded to the great wrong of the century, and she passed over with all her resources to the enemies of liberty and progress. Though the slaveholders

numbered but a small portion — not probably one twentieth — of the population, the slave interest, by its natural instinct of domination, soon mastered every other. It became *the interest, par excellence*, the policy and pride of the State.

The tide of free immigration swept by her as a land accursed. No lands more fertile and beautiful than those of the Upper Mississippi or Missouri, or the borders of the Osage, the Grand, or Platte Rivers, tempted the emigrant, — no mineral treasures more ample than those she spread out in her exhaustless magazines of lead, copper, zinc, cobalt, iron, coal, porphyry, and marble, — lured him on. He passed her by, seeking less favored regions, and hastening to a more distant exile.

Slavery having become identified with State pride, policy and supposed interest enlisted her against the cause of civilization and social progress. It poisoned her intellect and passion. It suborned her thought, spirit, and speech to the championship of falsehood and crime. It paralyzed her enterprise, muzzled or perverted the press. It drove from her the free school and free church, together with free labor and free thought. It stifled invention, despised improvement, dishonored industry and economy, and repelled skilled work. It mastered, as an evil genius, not only politics, but literature, and corrupted the very heart and soul of society.

The results to the State of Missouri from slavery may be indicated in part by the statistics of her population, productions, and property, compared with those of States lying adjacent, on the east and north, with soil and climate and natural advantages similar in many respects, and on the whole certainly not superior to hers, viz. Illinois and Iowa.

Select for comparison the State lying immediately east of Missouri on the same great river, and chiefly in the same latitude, and with inferior conditions of soil and climate, and of nearly the same date of settlement and of admission into the Union. Whatever differences there may be, they certainly are not on the whole to the disadvantage of Missouri. Compare Missouri and Illinois in increase of population in decades from 1820 to 1860, and in estimates of the value of real estate in 1860; also in the amount of produce of some great staples common to both.

	Missouri.	Illinois.
Population, 1820,	66,557	55,162
Ratio of Increase for 10 years,	110.94	185.17
Population, 1830,	140,455	157,445
Ratio of Increase,	173.18	202.44
Population, 1840,	383,702	476,183
Ratio of Increase,	77.75	78.81
Population, 1850,	682,044	851,470
Ratio of Increase,	73.30	101.06
Population, 1860,	1,182,012	1,711,951
Real Estate and Personal Property in 1860,	$501,214,398	$871,860,282
Increase in Real Estate and Personal Property from 1850 to 1860,	$363,966,691	$715,595,276
Improved lands in 1860,	6,246,871 acres.	13,251,473 acres.
Corn crop,	72,892,157 bushels.	115,296,779 bushels.
Wheat crop,	4,227,586 bushels.	24,159,500 bushels.
Hay crop,	401,070 tons.	1,834,265 tons.*

These statistics speak for themselves. They admit of but one explanation. The advanced position of the lesser of these two States which began the race nearly together, Missouri having a little start in the outset, has but one solution. And the superior increase of Illinois in population and property was achieved in spite of the following advantages on the part of Missouri: —

1st. Missouri, from its position, lying right across the lines of direct migration from the Free States, and presenting similar conditions of temperature, would be likely to receive settlers from these States, because of its conveniency of access and of their familiarity with its climate and culture.

2d. All settlers from Slave States seeking cooler latitudes, still wishing to carry slavery with them, would be constrained to go to Missouri as the only State presenting both those conditions as possible.

Institutions are mightier than the physical world; man, a stronger historic factor than the land he lives on. Universally,

---

* For further interesting facts and reasonings on this topic, we refer to a forthcoming work on the comparative growth, population, production, and revenue of Missouri, by D. E. Leigh of St. Louis.

a maleorganization or maleadministration of society, a vicious policy or economy, ruins the richest climes. Still the geographic theatre in a great degree forms the actors. It furnishes the resources of nations, and determines to a great extent their occupation, character, and strength. The conditions of earth, air, and flood are plastic forces, as well as resources and instruments of civilization.

A glance, therefore, at the physical geography of Missouri may serve to show the value of the prize contended for in 1821, — the importance of the empire then surrendered to slavery, and placed under its spell and seal by the ordinance of admission, and again vindicated for liberty and released from paralysis by the ordinance of emancipation, January, 1865.

The State of Missouri extends from 36° 30′ to 40° 30′ of north latitude, and from 89° 30′ to 95° 52′ of west longitude, measuring from north to south 277 miles, and from east to west a breadth averaging about 250 miles, — though in the extreme southern section it exceeds 300, — covering an area of 67,380 square miles. Its eastern boundary of 470 miles rests on the Mississippi River, and meets the important affluents of the Illinois and the Ohio; which streams, with their numerous ramifications, drain the vast basin between the Great Lakes and the Alleghany and Cumberland Mountains, and place it in immediate commercial relations with Missouri. On the northwest through some two hundred miles it is bounded by the Missouri River, and meets its tributaries the Kansas and the Nebraska, — the latter debouching near its northern border. These embrace with their vast network of branches the Great Plains as far as the Rocky Mountains, and bind their currents and slopes to the natural commercial system of Missouri. Having received the Kansas, the Missouri, turning eastward, and intersecting the State to which it gives name, hastens to join the less vast and turbid, but more direct current of the Mississippi.

The State of Missouri may be considered as framed on the river whose name it bears. The Missouri, with its basin and that of its tributaries, — the Nodaway, the Little Platte, the Grand, and the Chariton on the north, and the Gasconade, the Osage, and lesser streams on the south, — fills the entire State, with the exception of a narrow rim adjacent to the

Mississippi and sloping towards it, and a small section on the south, which, lying beyond the water-shed of the Ozarks, is drained by the St. François and the head-waters of the White and Black and the Current Rivers.

In territorial extent Missouri far surpasses any of the second-class kingdoms of Europe, and ranks with some that have aspired to supremacy in it. It is more than one third larger than the realm of England; two thirds as large as all the British Isles, or as all the Italian peninsula. It is twice the size of Portugal; more than three times that of Denmark; nearly four times that of the kingdom of Greece; more than five times that of the Netherlands; nearly three times as large as all the Swiss Cantons. It is equal to one third of the entire realm of France; and is larger than all the New England States together, with another Connecticut added on.

It is the largest of all the United States lying east of New Mexico and the Great Plains, except Texas and Minnesota, being, since the admission of Colorado, the sixth in size in the Union. In its extent of arable territory it probably is surpassed by none. The proportion of its cultivable and fertile territory is very large. Very little land is waste. A large portion is very rich. That less fitted for the plough is admirably adapted for pasturage or grape culture. The broken country — even the mineral regions — is to a great extent covered with valuable forests or grasses. In general richness of soil and agricultural capacity in proportion to its area, Missouri is probably equalled by few countries on the globe, — surpassed by none, unless perchance by States lying immediately east and north of it. In variety of resource and production, in diversity of soil, surface, scenery, and elevation, as well as in abundance of streams for navigation, irrigation, and mill-power, and in richness of mineral treasures, it far surpasses even these.

The portion of the State north of the Missouri is a continuation of the vast plains of Iowa and Wisconsin, sloping southward to the bed of the Missouri, and commonly increasing in depth and richness of soil with the progress of the slope. Like those plains, most of this section of the State is a vast expanse of fertile, undulating prairie, tissued and veined by small streams with wooded banks, and studded with occasional groves, like oases in the verdant wastes.

The northwest angle of the State, drained by the Little Platte and the Nodaway, abounds in extensive and heavy forests. All this region north of the Missouri is most attractive to the agriculturist. It has an exuberant and varied soil, of easy tillage, and yielding rich harvests of wheat, maize, and all the cereals, as well as of grasses, hemp, tobacco, and all the fruits and vegetables of the latitude.

These plains, when broken into bluffs and ridges by the watercourses, furnish well-watered pasture-grounds most grateful to flocks and herds. The low prairies of the river borders and bottoms produce even richer harvests than the uplands, and are especially favorable for the culture of hemp and tobacco, while the slopes of the bluffs that border them present a soil and situation most desirable for vineyards. Indeed, these slopes along the Mississippi and Missouri, and their affluents in Northern and Southern Missouri, assure for the State in the future a rich and extensive grape culture, unsurpassed on the continent. These bluffs, and the acclivities of the Ozark, which are in soil and exposure admirably adapted for the vine, furnish Missouri more than a million of acres of the best grape lands in the world. Heavy forests of the best timber also abound along all the streams of this region.

This section of the State, with the Missouri on the western and southern border and the Mississippi on the east, is traversed by the North Missouri Railroad, to extend when completed from St. Louis to the northwest for two hundred and eighty-six miles; while the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad runs through its entire breadth from east to west, for two hundred and six miles. With all these facilities, furnishing ready access to market and opening the land to immigrants from the East, this section has had some peculiar advantages which before the war were securing for it a flourishing settlement.

South of the Missouri the land ascends with gentle acclivity. Toward the southwest, along the rich and broad basin of the Osage, this slope stretches far away into the boundless savannas of Kansas. Toward the south and southeast it is bounded by the water-shed which separates the head-waters of the Maramec, the Gasconade, and the southern forks of the Osage, from those of the rivers that flow into the Southern Mississippi or the Arkansas.

This portion of the State presents a wide variety of soil, surface, and scenery. It may be regarded as divided into two great sections, — that of the Ozark and that of the Osage. Its great characteristic feature is the highlands of the Ozark; and it may be regarded as framed on these and the streams issuing from them. These highlands, — hills and ridges of primitive or metamorphic or lower Silurian formation, — starting near the forks of the Arkansas River, enter the State in the southwest, between the valleys of the Neosho and the White Rivers, and extend toward the northeast. Dividing north of Pilot Knob, one range spreads out along the Mississippi River from below Cape Girardeau to the mouth of the Maramec, about one hundred and twenty miles; the other, turning northward, strikes the Missouri east of the Osage, near the mouth of the Gasconade.

As we approach these highlands, the change from the rich and uniform exuberance of the lowlands to the more broken and rugged aspect of the country, is not unpleasing to those accustomed to the scenery of the Eastern States. The mountainous aspect of the country and of its vegetation, the forest growths, indicating a thinner and colder soil, and one better fitted for grasses, the outcropping of metamorphic or primitive rock, the evergreens clinging to crag and precipice, the streams, now losing their turbid hue and languid motion, and running limpid over pebbly bottoms, or gushing cool and crystal from the rock, or leaping in sparkling cascades down the terraced steep, — all these remind the New-Englander or emigrant from the Alleghanies of the brooks and hills and flocks and herds of his early home. Such is the aspect of the country in the vicinity of Pilot Knob and the Iron Mountain, and southward and westward.

The highlands are not a continuous chain or ridge, but detached hills set upon a table-land, now with picturesque vales intervening, now softening down into extensive plains adapted for grasses and pasturage, and also yielding most generous harvests of corn, grain, wheat, and all the cereals, and also of garden vegetables and fruits. These hills are fringed and crowned with immense forests. Extensive pineries, valuable for timber, tar, and rosin, constitute a source of great future wealth for

this region. Their slopes also, in soil and situation, are most genial to the vine. They are interlaced with clear rock-bottomed streams, — affluents of the Missouri, the Arkansas, and the Mississippi, — which furnish in their descent the best water-powers and facilities for rafting down the abundant and excellent timber found on their borders. They are rich in mineral resources, in building stone, of lime and sand rock, marble, porphyry, and granite, and in metals of copper, zinc, lead, cobalt, manganese, and iron of numerous and most valued varieties, piled in mountain masses, that stretch seemingly from the heart of the earth to some eight hundred feet above the level of the sea. Coal is found in some sections where the Silurian rock of the highlands dips under the carboniferous formation of the lowlands.

This part of the State is evidently destined to be the great region for mining, lumbering, wool-growing, and stock-farming. It is the Arcadia of Missouri. Its elevation tempers the extreme heat of summer, and its mild and brief winters allow stock to range and graze, with little fodder, through the year. These regions occupy, with their northern and southern slopes, the southern and southeastern portion of the State, covering nearly one third of its area.

The northern branch of these highlands follows the basin of the Gasconade to the Missouri. East of this basin and north of the Maramec is an angle of territory in the forks of the highlands, including St. Louis County, which bears more resemblance to the vast prairie region north of the Missouri, to which it seems naturally to belong. The section of the State south of the Missouri and west of the basin of the Gasconade corresponds in soil, surface, and general character to North Missouri, though exhibiting a much greater variety. The valley of the Osage, filling nearly all the central and western portions of South Missouri, is one of the most magnificent agricultural regions in the Mississippi Valley.

The Osage — four hundred miles in length — is navigable some two hundred miles from its mouth for light-draught steamers, and passes through some of the richest lands and most picturesque bluff scenery in the State. In the basin of the Osage, as on the north of the Missouri, coal is found abun-

dantly. Indeed, a carboniferous system seems to underlie all the lowlands in this section of the basin of the Missouri. This and other minerals, which in other countries are associated with desolate and barren regions, here often underlie the richest cultivable soil, or are covered with valuable forests and nutritious grasses.

The geology of the State ranges from the upper coal measures to the lower Silurian formations, extending in places to the metamorphic and igneous rock; but over all the surface of the State, not covered by the Ozark highlands or the river-bottoms, extends the formation called *loess*, resting mainly on carboniferous rock, but found posited on all strata, to the lower Silurian. This formation, the supposed deposit of some vast Preadamic sea, varying from sixty to two hundred feet in thickness, extends — except where broken or abraded by special causes — over three fifths of the State, overspreading all the country north of the Osage and the Missouri, together with the county of St. Louis and all the counties lying on the Mississippi River.*

It is composed of a pulverulent marl and clay, mixed with other ingredients, and forms a soil of great richness, easily tillable, and, with subsoiling, inexhaustible. Its fertility is surpassed only by that of the alluvions and bottom prairies. These bottom lands form a very important feature of the agricultural resources of the State. They are belts of country extending along all its principal streams, varying in breadth usually in proportion to the size of the river. Those on the Mississippi and Missouri, where these streams touch this State, average, according to the Geological Survey, five miles. They seem formed partly by the deposit of the river, partly by that of primeval lakes and seas, which, as the continent emerged, finally wore out, in their retreat, their pathway between the bluffs as shores. These lands are of prodigious fertility. Their extent also forms no inconsiderable portion of the area of the State, being equivalent to more than four thousand square miles; or nearly the dimensions of Connecticut, if we apply the estimates of the Mississippi and Missouri bottoms, contained in the State Geological Survey,† to the rivers of the entire State.

---

* See Geological Survey, pp. 139, 714, 789. † Pages 65, 68.

They yield profusely all the products of the latitude, while the bluffs which wall them in furnish the best soils and exposure for vineyards. These hillsides, following along the length of the Mississippi, the Missouri, the Osage, the Gasconade, and the Grand Rivers, and other streams, impress us with the immense provision supplied by nature to make this State the land of corn and wine.

These alluvial tracts abound in forests of the finest timber. Among their growths we may mention the elm, ash, and hickory, pecan, maple, and oak of many varieties.* These forests, added to the woodlands of the upland prairies and those of the southern highlands, furnish Missouri with abundance of the best lumber for her own use, and much for exportation, in situations convenient of access.†

Very little absolute waste land is found in the State. The only extensive swamps are those back of New Madrid, extending northward some one hundred miles, and they for the most part are covered with heavy timber. Hills and ridges covered with *chert* are found in the southern sections, where the lime-rock outcropping through the loess has been disintegrated; and rare spots of barren sand and gravel appear where the drift has come to the surface. Thin soils are found on the slopes of the Ozark hills. Feeble or unproductive ones occasionally appear, from especial causes, elsewhere. But these exceptional cases still leave this State with an extent of rich lands probably not surpassed by that of any in the Union.

Its mineral wealth is unequalled, save by the auriferous regions that lie amid and beyond the vast wastes to the west of it. The extent of its coal measures is ten times greater than that of the British Isles, and probably far exceeds that of all Europe, extending, according to the Geological Survey,‡ under a surface of 26,887 square miles, and estimated in amount at 134,435,000,000 tons.§ In connection with these coal measures, as might have been expected, petroleum is found in several localities. The State is rich in copper, zinc, and cobalt. Lead is found scattered widely over its surface, and in lodes as

---

* Geological Survey, pp. 139, 170.

† Ibid., p. 170.

‡ Page 89.

§ Ibid., p. 15.

rich as any that exist elsewhere. Iron is laid up in magazines of mountains.

We quote from the Geological Survey of Missouri the following remarks with reference to the Iron Mountain, Pilot Knob, and the region adjacent. Of the first of these the Survey says: —

"But little need be said of this mountain of iron, as there is no room for speculation or doubt as to the quantity or quality, — one is inexhaustible, and the other cannot be improved for many purposes. The quantity above the level of the valley is easily estimated. The height of the mountain is 228 feet, and its base covers an area of 500 acres, which gives 1,655,280,000 cubic feet, or 230,187,375 tons of ore. But this is only a fraction of the ore at this locality. The nature of the ore, the plutonic character of the associated rocks, and the position of the ore beneath the level of the valley and the sedimentary rocks skirting the base of the mountain, all indicate its igneous origin, and that it extends downwards indefinitely, enlarging as it descends. But on the supposition that it continues of the same size, every foot of descent will give over 3,000,000 tons of ore. . . . .

"Pilot Knob is 581 feet high, (its base 537 feet above St. Louis,) and it covers an area of 360 acres. A large portion of this mountain is pure ore; it is not easy to estimate the quantity, but it is known to be enormous, and may be considered inexhaustible. The amount above the surface cannot be less than 13,972,773 tons. . . . . There is ore enough of the very best quality within a few miles of Pilot Knob and Iron Mountain, above the surface of the valleys, to furnish one million tons per annum of manufactured iron for the next two hundred years." — pp. 155 – 157.

A voyage on the great rivers of the State, from New Madrid to Keokuk on the Mississippi, or up the Missouri to its northwestern border, skirts and penetrates, for more than a thousand miles, one of the richest agricultural and mineral regions in the world. Suppose yourself on one of the palatial steamers of the Lower Mississippi, and that, having traversed this river a thousand miles from New Orleans, you have passed the mouth of the St. François, the southern border of the State, and are coasting along the peninsula of New Madrid, a tongue of land lying between the Mississippi and the extensive swamps of the St. François. You look out on vegetation of almost tropical luxuriance, and on fields which seem as if fertilized by the earth-

quake which in 1811 broke up and depressed them, where the corn and the cotton grow side by side. Steaming along past the mouth of the Ohio, passing the Grand Tower, which, with the bluff opposite, seems to have been the gateway of an ancient inland sea, you enter a region whose geological and mineralogical features, together with shot-towers and the smoke of furnaces, indicate that you are touching on the great mineral region of the State, — a region which stretches westward in uplands broken into irregular hills, crags, and detached mountain masses, occasionally opening upon rich vales and extended plains, till it declines towards the prairies of the Osage and Neosho, veined throughout with a web-work of clear and rapid streams winding amid metalliferous rocks and heavy forests.

Proceeding through this region, beneath bluffs of the lower limestone and sandstone, whose masses, rounded, escarped, castellated, or pinnacled, rise in some places from 150 to more than 400 feet, you pass the mouth of the Maramec, and enter on a region different in surface and soil, as well as in geological character. You leave the verge of the highlands, the region of the evergreen woods, and of the Silurian or metamorphic rock, and skirt along the edge of a carboniferous system, the border of a vast champaign of woodland and prairie.

Voyaging along, now beneath mural bluffs of lime-rock, bare, or mantled with ivy or trumpet-flower, now amid rich savannas grassy or gorgeous with the gaudiest flora in its season, and fringed with forests, you come to St. Louis, with its gay and party-colored embroidery of steamers stretching for miles up and down the river front, whose arrivals and departures, before the war, were wont to amount to nearly four thousand annually.

On the Levee at St. Louis you see specimens of the varied riches of the State, animal, vegetable, and mineral, in the process of exchange. Here you change boats, the streams above requiring a craft different from those of the Lower Mississippi, and each one a craft peculiar to itself.

Proceeding northward, you pass the mouth of the Missouri, whose turbid and turbulent waters enter the Mississippi like a sevenfold Nile, — its waters already three months on the voyage, from their sources, and bringing quicksand and earthy sediment from a sweep of country some four thousand miles

in extent. It enters the Mississippi as a tyrant, crowds it to a narrow channel, takes possession of its bed, itself far the lordlier current, bestowing its character, aspect, and velocity — as it should give its name — to their joint stream.

Thence to the northern boundary of the State, 180 miles, you continually skirt along a vast champaign, covered with the loess formation, undulating with expanse of prairie and forest intersected by frequent water-courses. Or if, turning up the Missouri, we flank the lands upon the eastern verge of which we have been passing, and ascend to the northwest corner of the State, we find the same loess expanse of meadow and woodland stretching off on both sides of the Missouri for seven hundred miles.

But a peculiar picturesqueness and varied richness mark the country of the Missouri, especially above the Osage. Before one standing on the bluffs on either side of the Missouri, or looking up the valley of the Osage, the La Mine, the Chariton, or the Grand, there rolls and stretches indefinitely away a magnificent agricultural landscape. In the verdant season, nothing of its type of beauty can surpass it. Boundless green wastes are studded occasionally with islets of the wild plum, the crab-apple, the persimmon, and the cherry. Here and there rounded elevations called "mounds" are crowned with groves whose central growth of the oak, elm, and hickory is fringed by the sassafras, the pawpaw, the multifloral haws, the alder, and the sumach, — the haunts of birds of game, of song, and plumage, — the mocking-bird, the paroquet, the quail, and the prairie fowl. Long ranges of statelier forests mark the windings of the river, where the sycamore, the pecan, the oak, the elm, the ash, and the maple are mingled, and in the spring and summer are adorned with the red-bud, the acacia, the trumpet-flower, and the climbing rose.

Nor are the bluffs at the feet of the spectator inferior as objects of interest or as elements of wealth. They add much to the wildness, grandeur, and beauty of the State, varying in different sections. Here they roll away in vast green surges, inviting with their acclivities and terraces, both by exposure and soil, the vine-grower and horticulturist; there their escarped faces show various lime and sandstone rocks, whose gray, white,

and brown hues are now painted with metallic oxides* to a likeness to the pictured rocks of Lake Superior; now interstratified with a jet of outcropping coal; now, in rare localities, veined and diked with lodes of ore, — in others, with ochres, blue and purple shales, marbles, and other materials for the arts. Often broken and worn by the elements into terraces, towers, and turrets, mantled by the clinging and disintegrating ivy, they seem old ruins constantly ministering to the richness of the soil they embellish.† Now they recede into grassy bays, whose verdure is deepened by brooklets that steal on, or dash down from the uplands. Now they are cleft sheer down to their base by rivers; some of which, flowing into the Missouri, wellnigh rival that stream itself, opening far into the interior, with similar scenery, and at certain seasons, also, with almost similar capabilities of navigation.

Such is a general glance at the surface, scenery, soil, and natural resources of Missouri. All these riches lie under a kindly sky. Situated in the middle of the Northern Temperate Zone, the climate of Missouri is tempered between the long and severe winters of the North and the protracted and fierce heat of the South.‡ True, its position as a border land between summer and winter exposes it, like all border lands, to frequent raids by both belligerents. Its latitude and the configuration of the continent make it a battle-ground for the Gulf winds and the currents descending from the frozen zone. Its climate, therefore, is subject to sudden and sharp vicissitudes. But are not such changes requisite for the development of the highest type of manhood? They apply a stimulus and discipline to man's physical and intellectual and moral nature never found in a zone of perpetual calms, or in the air of an eternal spring. The valleys and plains that slope away from the Mississippi toward the Rocky Mountains, and from the Missouri to the Ozark, attain an elevation that lifts them sensibly above the heat and miasm of the borders of these rivers, into

---

* See Geological Survey of Missouri, p. 93. † Ibid., p. 63.

‡ The mean annual temperature at Jefferson Barracks (latitude 38° 28′, elevation 472 feet) for twenty-six years was 55.46°, distributed to the seasons thus: spring, 56.15°; summer, 76.19°; autumn, 55.63°; winter, 33.85°. The lowest monthly mean in this period was 18.54°, and the highest 85.80°.

an atmosphere cooler, purer, more salubrious and elastic. This gives the southern portion of the State a climate in many respects more desirable than sections lying at less elevation several degrees to the north. At the same time, the whole State is less liable than regions farther west, toward the Great Plains, to those seasons of protracted drought that sometimes convert them, like the Plains themselves, during the summer months, into arid deserts.

Thus Missouri stands, amid the States surrounding it, distinguished for its variety of soil, scenery, conformation, climate, and resource. While it does not present the magnificent monotony of agricultural richness of some of them, Nature has adapted it to that manifoldness of interest and pursuit that seems essential to the richest and most energetic type of civilization.

Its advantages for internal commerce are peculiar, as is obvious when we consider that its whole eastern border of four hundred and seventy miles is skirted by one of the longest and largest rivers in the world, and that another of the same character bisects the State in the centre for some five hundred miles, throwing off large laterals, — navigable for steamboats or rafts of lumber, — and then coasts along the western border some two hundred miles. The State has a navigable river line of more than two thousand miles. The facility with which artificial lines of commerce can be thrown across these natural ones of rivers may be imagined from the general level or easy slopes of the prairie sections of the country, and the abundance of road material — stone, iron, and lumber — found everywhere in the State.

Nor will the natural advantages of water transportation ever be lost by the introduction of railways. They will aid railways and be aided by them. But in the season of navigation, rivers like the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Osage will carry freight cheaper than railways. Missouri has therefore a natural advantage over other States of the West, in her peculiar relations to the great rivers of the valley, — an advantage which nothing but the paralysis of slavery could so long have rendered nearly null.

The importance of Missouri as a political power is derived

from her geographic position in our national domain. She is central in longitude to our national territory east of the Rocky Mountains; and in latitude, to our whole domain, being about midway between the extremes of the North and the South. The advantages, social and commercial, of centrality in a vast empire, enfolding her on all sides with hundreds of leagues of population, institutions, and culture kindred to her own, must attach to the geographic position of Missouri, if our arch of empire is unbroken. She is also central to a natural commercial system of vast extent. On the great river of the North American continent, whose valley stretches from north to south through the whole United States, — on this great central artery, throwing out numerous lateral branches, some of them navigable thousands of miles, and with their web-work of affluents filling the valley and interlacing the Alleghany and the Rocky Mountains with rivers which flow into the Atlantic and the Pacific, — on this "ocean-stream" she holds the central section of nearly five hundred miles. Her commercial capital is situate near the bifurcation of its two great arms; the chief of which, through an immense reach of territory, is a river all her own.

Of the river system of the Great Valley, St. Louis is the natural centre. Standing at the head-waters of permanent navigation, as regards obstruction by the ice of winter or the drought of summer, — and where boats are compelled to break freight because of the change of craft required in passing from the Lower to the Upper Mississippi, — it is in perpetual commercial relation with all the valley south of it, and is the natural receiving and distributing emporium for the vast and rich Northwest. This position ordains it as the great mart of exchange in the Mississippi Valley, despite any change which man's wit or industry can make. The river system will shape the railroad system, — determine its centres, courses, and convergences. Certainly a city with the advantage of central position on this system is mistress of the situation, if true to herself in rightly using her natural advantages. When we reflect on the vastness and the varied production and resource of the Mississippi Valley, and consider that its great river runs through it, not, like the Nile, a single trunk, a

branchless canal, but like an artery through a living body, throwing out branches whose multitudinous ramifications permeate its entire area, through twenty degrees of latitude, affording navigable waters of greater length than a voyage round the globe, we feel that a central position commanding this system promises a future of wonderful prosperity.

St. Louis, thus brought into commercial relation with all parts of this vast valley, again holds a central position in another great commercial system, transverse to this, stretching across the continent from east to west. Of the routes from the Atlantic to the Pacific, determined by the configuration, surface, and climate of the continent, Missouri occupies the central section. Between the great emporiums of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the most direct and feasible path runs through her territory.. New York, St. Louis, and San Francisco lie in latitudes not very different, and almost in a right line with each other. The belt of central routes from cities near the Atlantic border, running west through the great tier of Middle States, naturally will seek through Missouri their pathway to the Golden Gate, through which must pass our chief future traffic with the East. A tier of States and Territories already extending, west of Missouri, wellnigh to the foot of the Rocky Mountains and the Sierra Nevada, is fast conducting these lines of trade and travel to where California will take them up and perfect them to San Francisco.

Offering a supply of grass, water, timber, arable lands, a temperate climate, and practicable mountain passes requisite for the passage of such routes, — presenting, moreover, the attraction of settlements, established civil organizations, and roads already opened and thronged, together with the boundless mineral riches to which they lead, — Missouri affords inducements, which would be enough to deflect these routes from a direct course, but which now conspire to bind them to it. The direct course is also the safest, avoiding, as it does, the danger of interruption by foreign war, to which such a road would be exposed if running near the northern or southern frontier.

The importance of this centrality of position on this transcontinental route, or belt of routes, is greatly enhanced by the probable near approach of one of those great revolutions in Indo-

European commerce, such as in other ages has deflected the path of that commerce, and with it that of supremacy in commercial wealth and empire.

The growth of commercial cities on our western coast, the vast mineral wealth of California and the adjacent regions, the extension of the United States, with their free, industrial, energetic civilization, across the continent, opening and guarding a commercial highway, — these will combine with superior advantages of climate, distance, and security, to attract across our own continent and country the traffic between the East and West.

That golden stream which sustained the commercial splendor and empire of Babylon, Nineveh, Alexandria, and Carthage, in ancient history ; of the Italian cities and the Hanseatic League, in the mediæval period ; and, in modern history, the successive ascendency of Portugal, Holland, and Britain, — that golden stream, a considerable portion of it at least, seems now likely to be carried through the centre of our national domain. San Francisco must be the Tyre or Alexandria of this trade, — its chief *entrepôt* on the Pacific. Thence its direct lines must, some of them, pass through the State of Missouri ; and its main junction with the vast river system of the continent must be at St. Louis. The relations of Missouri to this new road of commerce, likely soon to be opened, much enhance the value of the prize recently won from slavery for freedom.

With such natural resources and a future of such promise, a territory so vast, so richly and variously endowed by nature, with such geographic position and such commercial relations, Missouri moves into the ranks of Free States. It is a mighty transfer ; it is also a vast creation of power. Freedom multiplies the gifts of nature. It multiplies human powers. The ordinance of admission, in 1821, put manacles on nature and man. These were broken by the ordinance of the 11th of January, 1865. The emancipation of such an em pire might well seem ample compensation even for the pres ent war.

No one who has not lived in a Slave State can conceive the stifling, though often subtle, repression which this institution puts on all social life and thought, — how it strikes with paralysis all interests, often those seemingly most remote from its

proper sphere. It has a quick instinct against light and liberty anywhere. It masters everything, — legislation and jurisprudence, the press, the pulpit, the school, public opinion, fashion, trade, and State pride. All these it coerces into its service. It tends in its very instinct of self-preservation to drive forth from the land free labor, free speech, free presses, and free schools. It is of the genius of slavery to imprison the mind of the masses within false, puerile, and bitter prejudices, and to breed in them a stupid, fanatical idolatry of the evil that crushes them hopelessly down. It works in them a false sentiment of loyalty and homage for itself. Of course the fairest natural inheritance given to men thus blindfolded, deluded, and mastered, loses its value.

We of Missouri are already beginning to wonder how such sentiments could exist as not many months since ruled this people with almost unquestioned sway. Emancipation breaks the spell; it releases brains, tongues, hands; it sets agoing factories, mills, stithies, workshops; it quickens thought, invention, enterprise; it fills the farm and the shop with versatile, educated, inventive, proprietary labor; it enforces economy, incites competition and emulation, stimulates education, trade, internal improvement; it builds the school-house, the college, the university; it improves the water-course, constructs railways, opens the morass, restores soils, diversifies agriculture and production. The light is brighter, the air more vital; the heavens and the earth have a richness, beauty, joy, and power of life unknown before. We breathe a new moral atmosphere. We feel the glow of a new hope. The public mind is delivered from the direful necessity of defending a wrong; public morals, from the suicidal worship, not only of a falsehood, but of a crime. Public conscience is freed from the terrible violence put upon it. Public reason, emancipated from the championship of a lie, leaps up to a point of wider and clearer vision. The oppressive sense of a vast wrong, indefensible in the court of conscience, at war with humanity and God, but which we must submit to indefinitely in the future, — this being removed, there is a rebound of the entire social life.

Such a new life already begins to beat through the heart of Free Missouri, — a life which we believe will become a power to

heal the terrible wounds that have been inflicted on her by her own children in this cruel war, and with which it seemed she might bleed to death. She feels a strange and mighty force at work within her, that shall repair her fearful desolations. She feels new life pulsating through all her vast domain. She hears the footsteps of free multitudes coming from near and far, attracted by her peerless natural gifts, — multitudes which shall more than restore the ruin. They shall bring to her skill, industries, enterprise, intelligence, and a social and physical well-being, unknown before, and which could not dwell in the presence of the slave. Above all, — her great wrong purged away, — she may now dare look up and see the heavens propitious over her, and through the rifted clouds behold the Throne girt with the bow of peace, — peace with eternal law, with omnipotent right, with humanity, civilization, and the government of God.

By some it may be apprehended that the anticipated brilliant future for Free Missouri will be defeated by the perpetual feuds which the present evil times will have engendered, — that these will continue to fester in the body politic. The furies of civil rage that have torn society asunder, that have burned through families, churches, and old friendships; and desolated the most beautiful regions of nature, — these furies, some imagine, will continue to waste and ravage us for a long future. Let us look at the grounds of this apprehension. To us it seems that our present conditions indicate that, rebellion and slavery being overthrown, we may hope for civil and social coalescence and peace; that feuds, social and civil, will disappear with their cause. Slavery and the State Sovereignty heresy alone could have produced them. The latter derived all its power of mischief from the former. Without the presence of slavery, the doctrine of State Sovereignty, in which this rebellion arose, would have been a nullity, an idle theory at most. It was a pretext, a blind for some minds tempted into rebellion, but constrained to find some nobler cause than that of enforcing human bondage. But slavery with us is dead. There is for it no resurrection. The fight over its grave is hopeless, objectless, and cannot, therefore, last forever. The wrong and mischief of slavery will be more clearly discerned as we remove farther

from it in time, and its championship will become more odious and opprobrious. Partisans will be likely to draw off from it, both because of public obloquy and because of new views and convictions in the realm of reason and conscience. The sentiment against slavery will become constantly more intense, pronounced, absolute, and universal. And this for several reasons: —

1. We shall see and feel more naturally, as we escape from the denaturalizing influence of its presence. Slavery is an offence against nature, an outrage on natural reason and conscience, — eminently so against reason and conscience illumined by Christianity. The subserviency of public opinion to it can only exist because of force, fear, interest, or of a false political and social position. But let all influences perturbing natural action be removed, let the bribe of interest be withdrawn, let society be restored to its natural status, and there will be a rebound of public opinion, vehement in proportion to the pressure and violence to which it has been subjected. It will haste to take revenge for the force put upon it in the past. Probably nowhere will there be an antislavery sentiment so pronounced and so intense as in communities which have been most tyrannized over by the actual presence of slavery. This reaction of the public mind is already manifestly in progress in the State of Missouri and in all the Border States.

2. To all the natural odiousness of slavery will also have been added the guilt of this most foul rebellion, with all its cruelties and crimes. A fierce indignation will burn against it, as having attempted the assassination of our nation, and been the selfish and wicked author of unnumbered woes and shames; and we especially of Missouri shall hate it, as having been the oppressor, tormentor, and destroyer of our people.

3. The antislavery sentiment will also tend to become more overwhelming and universal henceforth, because of its prestige of victory and power. These are wonderful persuaders, — equivalent with many to the judgments of God, — and this not only because gifts and emoluments are in their hands, but because they overawe the imagination. Moreover, this prestige will have been achieved by two instruments which men are wont to regard with almost superstitious reverence, —

the sword and the ballot-box. All the forces that wait on victory will now press to the side of freedom; the power of government, law, majorities; the influence of place, fashion, civil and social honors; and, at no distant time, of vested interests, established habitudes, and, finally, that mightiest of social elements, — manners. The press and all organs of public opinion will pass over to its championship. All parties will hasten to conciliate the dominant sentiment, and vie in at least professed devotion to it.

4. Freedom will, meantime, be vindicating itself by its fruits, and a new and more intelligent immigration, invited in by the downfall of slavery, will be throwing the constantly increasing weight of its numbers and influence into the scale of liberty, socially and politically.

5. The war and the peace following it will, by death, exile, or disfranchisement, have removed or disabled many of the most violent partisans of slavery.

All these causes indicate for the antislavery sentiment in Missouri, at no distant day, a majority, amounting almost to a social and political unity; for the minority will be as small and as impotent and as odious as the Tories after the Revolution.

To all these causes, tending to depress or extinguish any partisanship of slavery in the State, is to be added the mode of its death. In some of the older States it has passed by a sort of euthanasia; the institution fading out with its last memorials in the forms of old, faithful household servants, transmitted from one generation to another, associated with cherished family traditions and pleasant memories of the olden time. Its name was redolent of patriarchal associations, of social conditions passed away, — and the pleasanter because passed, — of family mansions and manors, of nursery endearments, weddings, domestic reunions, simplicity of manners, and genuine hospitalities, — all touched by time with the coloring of fancy. It seemed to partake of the attractiveness of the scenes with which it had been associated, and men came falsely to regard it as an essential element of that attraction. Its malign, selfish, sordid, cruel aspects were hidden by time or softened by distance. But here it dies of a sharp, fierce, desperate conflict, in the act of treason and murder. The latest memo-

ries will connect it forever with terrible suffering and crime, with assassination, arson, battle, and massacre. It goes to the grave drunk with human blood. Missouri has been trampled, violated, desolated by it, till she has cried out to Heaven in her agony for deliverance. Slavery will be to Missouri a name of horror through all coming time.

Special causes have conspired to give peculiar intensity and acrimony to the proslavery sentiment in Missouri. But most of these causes are now, like captured ordnance, turned upon the foe. We refer to causes above and beyond the influence and advantage which the possession of the government and of majorities always confers.

1. Missouri was born in a desperate conflict between the partisans and antagonists of slavery, and naturally incorporated into her growth the passions that waited on her birth. The proslavery party, triumphing in that struggle, carried into power all the fierceness of prejudice and consciousness of peculiar interests which such a struggle is adapted to generate. The people of Missouri grasped the evil prize they had won with all the eagerness, and guarded it with all the fierceness, of jealousy, natural to that illusion of value wont to invest objects for whose possession we have to contend, and in whose enjoyment we have a sense of hazard. The slave power has therefore studiously fostered in the people the resentments, hates, prejudices, and suspicions generated in the original struggle, together with the feeling of holding, in opposition to conspiracy and attack, the prize obtained in that struggle. It ordained that fidelity to itself should be the first essential requisite to all popular favor. Disloyalty to itself it pursued, as the most heinous of offences, with popular outcry and opprobrium. Even her great autocrat, Benton, who ruled Missouri so long and so absolutely, and for the most part in the interests of slavery, she at last cast away, because he paused on the question of its unlimited extension by the robbery of a neighboring empire, and the violation of the compromise through which she had been admitted into the Union. Constantly, for more than thirty years, has a party of the Calhoun school in regard to both slavery and secession been aiming to alarm, irritate, and arm the public mind in Missouri in behalf of this one interest.

2. This proslavery jealousy and irritation have been stimulated, moreover, by the geographic position of Missouri, which placed her not only on the verge of the territory of freedom, but thrust her as an invasive and defiant power far into the interior of its domain. This has intensified her sensitiveness and suspicion, as it has bred a sense of insecurity from a consciousness of encroachment on territory forbidden to slavery by Nature herself, and of being exposed in consequence, through so vast a frontier, to the constant invasion of an antagonist sentiment and civilization. Perpetual agitation has thus been kept up, not only along, but within, her extended border, by the collision or comparison of ideas, institutions, and manners through intercourse and transit. Missouri was thus guarded by slavery with especial vigilance, as an advanced and exposed outpost, and also as offering to the slaveholder the highest latitude on this continent to which he could migrate with his peculiar, cherished institution.

These facts gave to the proslavery sentiment in Missouri an acrimony and fanaticism even beyond that of other Border States. Most of these influences have now been reversed. The fierce conflict with which slavery obtained possession of the State at its birth, and from which it bore the passions of struggle and victory into power, has now been offset by a still fiercer conflict, from which her antagonist, triumphant, has carried the passions and purpose of a harder struggle and a more decided victory, a will and policy even more earnest, absolute, and resolved, to the administration of affairs. That projection northward, beyond the line of slave territory, which kept her spirit vigilant, jealous, and armed, as amid a hostile territory, now makes more easy her blending into one with the free civilizations and institutions around her. Her long frontier, through which her public sentiment was irritated and inflamed to fanaticism, is now an inlet of free principles and free immigration.

Her State pride, moreover, which led her to resent the attempted prohibition of slavery in her original Constitution, as an infringement on her State rights, and which made her the champion of slavery after it was obtained, as of her own institution, — this State pride will now pass over to the side of liberty, which, with equal zeal, it will defend as its own ordinance.

Moreover, those diversities of manners, that most potent source of animosities and schisms, civil and social, which have grown up in the Free and Slave States from diversities of domestic institutions, will tend in time — their cause being removed — to soften down and assimilate to a social unity. From all these causes we confidently believe there will be, at no distant period, in the State of Missouri, a strong, united, enlightened, and loyal society, in full sympathy with the great social revolution which has been accomplished.

Those that reason, from the history of other nations after civil wars, to the perpetuity of personal, or family, or sectional discords in Missouri, widely mistake the relative situation of the countries compared. There is no real analogy between the Missouri of this hour, and England, Scotland, France, or Italy after the great civil wars of those countries. We have not the social conditions or establishments in which perpetual feuds can inhere; we have no ancient families, or clans, or orders, with their distinctive badges and special interests, — no entailed estates or traditionary watchwords. With us all is new, — everything of yesterday. Society is fluent. We are a new people in a new territory, with social aspects and conditions constantly changing. Few permanent or determinate relations yet appear. Indeed, the people between whom such relations are to arise are not yet here. Immigration and shifting populations will be constantly changing the forms or relations which society may, for the hour, assume. Our vast territory is but scantily settled. Much of it is yet a wilderness. The civil war has wellnigh depopulated entire counties, and has driven much of our population elsewhere. Of our 43,123,200 acres, only 9,732,670 were embraced in farms in 1860; and of these much has since been abandoned because of the war. Manifestly the multitudes that will throng in now that the barrier of slavery is removed, as soon as peace is restored, will have more to do in determining what the Missouri of the future shall be, than we who are now here. Meantime the intermingling, already in process, of elements from different States, sections, and countries, of different opinions, manners, sects, and cultures, races and civilizations, will leave few of the social features and landmarks of the primitive Missouri. We are now divorced from

the past. We feel the forces creative of a new structure already at work. What they will elaborate, we cannot so well prophesy, as that, build what they may, they will bury much of the past Missouri, much of its thought, passion, parties, policies, and feuds, its fortunes and its fames, amid the fossils of a perished era.

This argument for the future social, political, and moral transfiguration — we may call it — of Missouri, is no mere speculation. It is already in part realized in experience. The great change is here. We see it palpably and rapidly in progress. We behold Missouri FREE.

And is this the Missouri that for so many years has gloried in its servile adhesion to slavery? that essayed to bind church and school and press and speech in chains? that sold men and women and children, even the members of Christian churches, publicly in its marts? that even attempted to legislate freed men into slavery? Is this the Missouri that in the behoof of slavery cast printing-presses into the river? that mobbed editors and clergymen, if any dared an approach to free speech? Is this the Missouri that sent her ruffian hordes to Kansas to crush out liberty, and inaugurate human bondage in that infant commonwealth? And is St. Louis the city where for so many years slavery has dominated public sentiment and fashion? Is this the same city where missives were sent from midnight juntos, some three years since, warning Northern and antislavery men to leave, on pain of death? Is this the city whose government, in the spring of 1861, sent down its peremptory mandate to the United States troops near the Arsenal, requiring them to remove their quarters to within that enclosure, and forbidding their encampment outside of it? Is that the same Arsenal where in those opprobrious days we saw a little squad of American soldiers virtually in a state of siege, fortifying and guarding all approaches as carefully as in a hostile country, against daily and nightly attacks? Are these the streets where, for weeks, the flag of treason was kept flying openly over the heads of passers-by, and no one dared remove it? where our national colors were spit upon, and our children were afraid to wear them along the sidewalks, and where frantic and drunken youth made days and nights hideous with

yells for "Jeff Davis"? where the Home Guard had to steal like criminals to their quarters, as to some place of shame, and where to wear the Federal uniform was to incur the danger of assassination? where women hooted and spat at United States soldiers as they passed, — where they even rushed out, yelling like Mænads frantic with irrepressible joy, as the sorrowful tidings came wailing on the southern wind from the bloody field of Wilson's Creek, that Lyon, the brave, the generous, the gifted, most single-souled and devoted of patriots, one of the earliest and noblest of the heroes and victims of this war, had crimsoned with his life-blood the soil of the State his daring had saved? And is that little, quiet grove yonder, now so silent, Camp Jackson, once so uproarious and flaunting with treason, where the Confederate chivalry stalked so proudly along "Beauregard" and "Davis" avenues, vaporing of the Union as a "farce played out"? Yes, this is the same Missouri, the same St. Louis; yet how changed — separated as if by the gulf of ages — this from that!

But is this change genuine or forced, — real or semblant? Most genuine, most real. Proslaveryism is descending from power to infamy as fast as the most rapid conditions of healthful change in the public mind render possible. These men in convention in the Mercantile Library Hall truly represent the State. It is idle to talk of coerced elections, and the military overawing the polls. The election that sent them there was free to all but traitors, and the voters were a fair representation of those who will hereafter have the right of suffrage, and will constitute the true State of Missouri. Nor was it a small vote in proportion to our whole population, or to the number of suffrages cast at former elections. It was, considering the depletion which the State has undergone by the war, as large a vote relatively as that of 1860. It fell below that election only some sixty thousand votes; two thirds of which number have gone forth to join the Rebel army, while hosts of refugees have fled the country.

The change is real. These dreadful years have waked and illumined the popular reason and conscience like a day of judgment. In that convention are men whose conversion is as astounding — almost as sudden — as that of the Apostle

Paul, and as genuine. So it is with tens of thousands all over the State. But it is not simply change of mind we witness. There is a change of persons. There is another people. The *dramatis personæ* have shifted during the course of the terrible tragedy. Faces strange to the older inhabitants now throng the streets of St. Louis. We that have lived here long feel as in a strange city. New faces have come: old ones are gone. The most active and fierce of the partisans of slavery and the Rebellion have disappeared. Indeed, old St. Louis is a thing of history, as much as the age of the Indians. The old *régime*, social, political, financial, has passed away. Men's thought, speech, manners, aims, passions, and interests are changed. Of the former leaders, oracles, and lords of the State and society, some have changed their sentiments, and others are attempting to cover up their past history; but large numbers are gone to the grave, or to an obscurity as deep and as lasting as the shadows of the tomb. That ruffian "Chivalry," that, in the name of slavery and treason, ruffled it so fiercely along our chief sidewalks; the minute-men that defiantly flaunted the Confederate flag for months across one of our principal streets in the face of our State Convention, then in session; the men that spoke in that Convention so loftily and menacingly of Southern rights, and raged so fiercely against coercion; the gay bands of fast young men that marched out so proudly to Camp Jackson, — many of them gallant, generous, and brave, but sadly deluded, — that soon were to take the city and State over to the Confederacy, — where are they now? They have been swept away like chaff before the whirlwind of this war. Most of them are in bloody graves; many have perished miserably in camp, many in hospitals; some are in prisons, some are slinking away in corners and disguises within our lines. Some, weary, worn, and despondent, still follow the waning fortunes of the Southern armies. Some have borne their wrath and fear to foreign lands, and are hanging around the purlieus of foreign courts, — pensioners on the patronage or charity of strangers. Some are pirates on the seas. But from the walks which they were wont to occupy they are gone forever. Here their places will know them no more.

With her matchless natural resources relieved from the long

paralysis of slavery, and with the life of freedom developing and stimulating them, and calling in free and skilled labor from all quarters, we believe the wounds, political, social, and fiscal, which Missouri has suffered, will be speedily healed, — far more speedily than might be inferred from supposed analogies in the history of any other country. With her magnificent domain improved, her mines and forests opened, her lands cultivated, her railroads completed, her debt would soon be paid with no appreciable effort.*

The demoralization of this war, that destruction of the habits and sentiments, the motives and order of peaceful life, which war usually makes; the impaired reverence for legal right, civil authority, and for the sacredness of property and human life, which it generates; the impatience of peaceful economy and regular industry; the thirst for intense excitement and gambling ventures; the vices and violences wont to wait on all wars and especially on civil ones, — these perhaps constitute the greatest present danger of Missouri. But with the danger comes in our case the protection from it. All wars demoralize. They are for the time the inauguration of the reign of violence. But some wars bring their own correctives. Their causes and aims, ruling idea and spirit, have much to do with their moral results. If they are those of justice and mercy, the vindication of some great right, the removal of some great wrong, the deliverance of our fellow-men from some vast injury and misery, or if they are those of a struggle for national life, liberty, law,

* According to the Report presented to the State Convention by George K. Budd (chairman of the Committee on Finance), February 4, 1865, Missouri now owes — principal and interest — $ 32,000,000, of which $ 28,000,000 is loaned to the railroads in the State, and is secured on them and their lands, which amount to 1,623,000 acres. $ 30,000,000 have been expended on the roads. A large portion of the debt might be paid immediately by selling the railroads. But it is argued in the Report, that the debt could be met within a few years, on the return of peace, by a more efficient and universal system of taxation, — adding one half of one per cent to our present rate. The value of taxable property will be much enhanced by emancipation, and by the increased amount of lands cultivated and brought under assessment through natural growth and immigration. Of the 43,000,000 acres of land in the State, only 16,707,313 were assessed, and those irregularly, and only 6,246,871 were improved in 1860. Beside over 15,000,000 acres of mineral lands with their exhaustless treasures, chiefly unoccupied, more than 20,000,000 acres of arable lands, some of them the richest in the world, were open to the agriculturist, and that too before the desolations of war.

and civil order, the aim and spirit counteract the inherent vicious tendency of war; especially if the contest be so waged that these motives are constantly brought to the consciousness of the people and the army. If they are wrought into the national heart by sacrifice and suffering, they ennoble men, they make martyrs and heroes. Great agonies and suffering for a great cause make men and nations great.

Such, we are confident, has been the ruling idea and spirit, such, in general, the method and manner, and such we believe will be the ultimate effect, of the war in Missouri. The people will love righteousness, liberty, and loyalty, and will hate oppression, treason, and slavery, the more, for all the woes they have suffered and the heroic labors they have performed. They will come out of these terrible years with a stronger sense of the omnipotence and the true wisdom of the Right, and a deeper and more reverent feeling of the presence of a righteous God in human affairs. These sentiments will have been burnt into the soul of the people for all generations. We believe that even war, with emancipation, will prove less demoralizing to them than peace with slavery, and that the principles of a just civil order will be dearer and more sacred for all their blood, and tears, and pain, and toil. These, we believe, will be the ultimate moral results of this war on the people of Missouri, while the demoralizing effects we anticipate will be but temporary and superficial. We shall, we are sure, in the end be stronger in our love of both liberty and order, of justice and of mercy, for this war in vindication of both.

With the armor of war, we trust we shall lay aside its habits and feelings, and return with reverence and devotion, stronger than ever before, to the reign of civil government and the order of peace. To this end there needs the prompt inauguration of a system of effort for the diffusion of popular enlightenment and Christian faith; the enlargement and invigoration of our common-school system, so that it shall reach all sections, classes, and colors; the full endowment and effective operation of our colleges and universities, and the extension of evangelizing influences through all the land. Some humane and wise provision is demanded for the instruction, protection, and elevation of the emancipated race, and for securing

among them habits of self-respect, self-government, self-education, and self-employment, and especially for arming them with the moral guard and power of Christian intelligence, faith, and principle. Our reliance for the future must be on religious and intellectual forces, more than on those of arms. The school-house and church will guard the land better than fortresses and garrisons. For the purposes required, all our people must unite, — the patriot, the philanthropist, the statesman, and the Christian. We must accept as men and Christians the inexorable logic of our own past wrongs, and be ready to meet and mitigate, as far as possible, the consequences they have entailed, and to respond manfully to the demands which self-interest and patriotism, as well as justice and humanity, make upon us in behalf of an oppressed race. We must make amends in the spirit of a large-hearted humanity and of a liberal civilization. We need wise and prompt legislation, and a generous and energetic private beneficence. The Christian Church has an important work to accomplish in the new social birth. Never was there a field where there was a more urgent demand for the most vigorous application of all the agencies of a true statesmanship, an intelligent philanthropy, and a living Christianity, than is now opening in the State of Missouri. Old prejudices are beaten down; old fossil organizations that stood in the way are disintegrated. Novelties of men, methods, and measures are no longer regarded with jealousy or resented as intrusions. Let the demands of the hour be fitly met, and Missouri enters on a career of unsurpassed prosperity.

Sad is the story of her sale to slavery. All her beauty, and strength, and riches, and magnificent future, bound and bartered to that dark power; its chains put on her virgin hands, and its accursed seal on lip, heart, and brain. Melancholy, monitory, opprobrious, and at last terribly tragic, has been the drama of "Missouri Bound." Thank God! it is past, — the wretched cycle of her binding. The agony is over; the chain, rusting with her blood and tears, is broken forever. This day, Missouri — bruised, spoiled, trampled, bleeding, wasted with murder, and fire, and battle — yet is FREE! Her foot on her broken chain, she stands erect before earth and heaven, claim-

ing the sympathy of both, — her eye fixed hopefully on a beautiful future, that seems as "descending from God out of heaven" to restore her land from desolation, and make it the permanent abode of freedom, justice, happiness, and peace.

ART. VI. — *The Works of* WILLIAM WORDSWORTH. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 7 vols. 16mo.

WILLIAM WORDSWORTH was born in April, 1770, at Cockermouth in Cumberland; his father, of a family which came originally from Yorkshire, was a solicitor in the town.

Left an orphan early in life, his recollections attach themselves less to his home than to the neighborhood in which he was placed at school. Hawkshead, an antique village, the centre of one of the large straggling parishes of the North country, possessing an ancient and once famous grammar foundation, stands a little way from the west side of Windermere, beside a small lake of its own. Here, lodged in a country cottage, he spent most of his time from 1778 to October, 1787, — nine years.

His reminiscences of this period and this locality form the most beautiful part of his biographical poem, "The Prelude"; and a considerable number of his most pleasing minor poems refer to the same years and place. It was then and there, beyond a doubt, that the substantive Wordsworth was formed; it was then and there that the tall rock and sounding cataract became his passion and his appetite, and his genius and whole being united and identified itself with external nature.

From this provincial, primitive seclusion he passed, in October, 1787, to St. John's College, Cambridge; where his three years of academical residence, not much improved by attention to the studies of the place, were happily broken for him by visits to his own country, to Hawkshead, amongst his mother's relations, and more remarkably by a bold pedestrian tour (almost wholly and literally pedestrian) through France, Switzerland, and the district of the Italian lakes, — regions which the revolutionary wars almost immediately afterwards closed to all Eng-

lish, and which were before comparatively unknown. The account of the journey is again one of the finer points of the Prelude, and in particular the description of the passage of the Simplon, and of night on the shores of Lago Maggiore.

Taking his degree at Cambridge in January, 1791, he again went over to France, led, it would seem, by enthusiasm for the political changes then at work there. He remained there, at Orleans and at Paris, about fifteen months, during which he was a witness of the culmination of the Revolutionary tumult, and beheld the commencement of its period of bloodshed and terror It gives a feeling of strange contrast to the after tranquillity of his life, to hear him speaking of the desire he then felt to enter himself as an actor into that terrible arena, and seriously seeming to consider it a thing at the time likely enough to happen, and from which chance rather than his own will diverted him.

Chance, however, carried him back to England. Sympathizing strongly with the original Revolutionary movement, and continuing long, in spite of its crimes and horrors, to cling to republican feelings, he showed, to the mortification of his friends, no disposition to carry out their views by entering orders in the Church. He loitered, living in a desultory manner, partly alone in London, partly among friends in the country, and was at one time on the point of engaging in the drudgery of writing for the newspapers. At last, in 1795, his twenty-sixth year, he found himself made what he considered to be independent by a bequest of £ 900, left him by a young friend in the faith of his vocation to literary achievement. He now settled down into domesticity with his sister in a country place in Somersetshire. This sister was one of the two persons whose minds, he said, had been most operative upon his. The other was Coleridge, whom he met for the first time in June, 1797.

Coleridge, youngest son of a clergyman and schoolmaster at Ottery St. Mary, Devon, born two years after Wordsworth, bred up at Christ's Hospital and at Cambridge, which Wordsworth, when he came up, was just quitting, had for the last three years been engaged with Southey, a young Oxford student, in wild schemes for a Pantisocratic settlement on the banks of the Susquehanna (a situation selected for the sweetness of the

sound); had been publishing poems, lecturing and neglecting to lecture, preaching in a blue coat and yellow waistcoat, here and there and everywhere, especially at Bristol. Finally he had run into the most imprudent of marriages, and had settled himself at the village of Nether Stowey. Here, during more than a year, Wordsworth had continual intercourse with him, residing at a beautiful spot not far from it, — Allfoxden.

Some years before 1793 he had published verses, not particularly promising, written in the established metre and manner, that of Pope and Dryden. But if Hawkshead had made the inner Wordsworth, Allfoxden, Coleridge, and his own sister gave us the expressed Wordsworth. The effect of this time on Coleridge was remarkable: his high poetic period is just this of his intercourse with Wordsworth; but to Wordsworth it was more distinctly an epoch.

His first characteristic poems were published together with Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, under the title of "Lyrical Ballads," in 1798. They obtained considerable notice, and made his name well known; but that notice was not favorable, and his name was known rather for ridicule and censure than praise.

The following winter he spent in Germany, where Coleridge was proceeding to lose himself in metaphysics; Wordsworth returned, and after some little wandering in Yorkshire, he and his sister finally settled with their petty income in a cottage at Grasmere, in December, 1799.

In 1800, a new volume of Lyrical Ballads, containing some of his best poems, was published. Quite undaunted by their want of popularity, and the adverse judgment of the highest critics, relying on his own feelings and perceptions, he worked in his mountain retirement steadily on, devoting himself chiefly at this time to the biographical poem which, with the name of the Prelude, was published for the first time after his death, in July, 1850.

So ends his story, before he was thirty years old. After his settlement at Grasmere, we do not imagine that his mind or genius developed or grew at all. It grew perhaps in bulk, we may say, but never altered its form and character, attaining merely more and more what he himself calls "the monumental pomp of age." In 1803 he made a tour in Scotland,

of which a very pleasing record remains, not only in the occasional poems suggested by its incidents, but in the journal of his companion, his sister. Returning southward, they paid a visit, on the 17th of September, to Mr. and Mrs. Scott, at their cottage at Lasswade, near Edinburgh. They received a promise that their host would join them again at Melrose, and, stopping on their way thither at the inn of Clovenford, were assured by the landlady that Mr. Scott was a very clever man. At Melrose they met and spent the evening together. The landlady here, says Miss Wordsworth, made some difficulty about beds, and refused to settle anything till she ascertained from the Sheriff himself, i. e. Scott, that he had no objection to sleeping in the same room with William, i. e. Wordsworth.

Mr. Scott was already known in the literary world as a translator of German and an editor of Scotch ballad poetry. But he had published nothing original; and it was not till two years after this, that (as it stands recorded) nothing in the history of British poetry ever equalled the demand for the Lay of the Last Minstrel, the first four cantos of which Wordsworth and his sister had heard their author recite during their visit at the cottage of Lasswade. In the same year, 1803, Wordsworth married, without, however, any great internal or domestic revolution. In 1832, Scott died. This is also the date of the collected edition in four volumes of Wordsworth's Poems, including "The Excursion," which, under general unpopularity, he had steadily gone on writing and publishing.

In 1839, in the theatre at Oxford, he received an honorary degree with unusual acclamation.

In 1840, on the death of Southey, he was, with a general feeling that it was his due, made Poet Laureate. 1850 conveyed his body to the quiet churchyard of Grasmere.

We have presented this bare biographical outline as preliminary to all remarks and criticism. But this meagre chronological table is not to be dismissed without some attention. The list of mere names and figures, dry as they may look, is really full of curious significance and pregnant with many thoughts and conjectures.

Let us consider, for example, on what sort of reading the youthful period of Wordsworth's life was cast. The English

literature of the then closing eighteenth century, as deficient perhaps in force and fertility as it is remarkable for justness and propriety and elegance of diction, was obtaining its completion in Cowper, who, born in 1731 and dying in 1800, published his one great poem, "The Task," in 1785.

As we now read Scott's novels and poems, Byron and Southey and Wordsworth, so they, in Wordsworth's boyhood, read the series from Pope to Johnson, read Fielding and Richardson and Sterne, Gray and Collins and Goldsmith. What effect upon the mind of young men of this time had Burns, or, to turn to works of foreign literature, the works of Rousseau?

To proceed lower down, the curious meeting of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey deserves special notice. In proximity to Wordsworth, Coleridge blazed forth in a stream of poetic brilliancy, which his after years never in any sort or kind repeated: in no after moments did he create an Ancient Mariner or a Christabel. Wordsworth also was elevated and enkindled by the more vivid and radiating genius of Coleridge. Notice again how completely anterior and antecedent to Scott and Moore and Byron are those Lake Poets, whose nascent influence and popularity the former so completely overpowered. But without Christabel, the Lay of the Last Minstrel would never have been written. Without Scott's stories we should scarcely have had Byron, without Wordsworth and the reminiscences of Hawkshead village school we might never have had the third and fourth cantos of Childe Harold: we should have lost very probably half the beauty of Byron alike and Scott.

Like the runners in the torch-race, they hand along the flame. Who shall say, in these spiritual and subtile exchanges and interchanges, This is mine, and that is thine. We cannot indeed assert that Wordsworth derived anything directly from Byron, or even from Scott ("The White Doe of Rylstone," so far as it followed Scott at all, so far is a failure); but without that antagonism, and without the severe lessons their popularity taught him, he probably would neither have escaped his natural faults nor exerted his natural strength.

Out of Wordsworth and Byron came Shelley; nor is Keats

(there is no such thing) an independent genius. We may remark also how, as the brief career of Byron encloses within itself the yet briefer life of Shelley, and that of Keats, briefest of all, so is Byron himself included in the larger arc of Scott and the yet larger arc of Wordsworth. Wordsworth, gradually working his way to reputation, was displaced by the sudden glory of Scott. Scott as a poet presently has to resign the field to Byron, and to compete against his Corsairs and Beppos with the new phenomenon of the Waverley Novels. When Byron had died in early manhood and Scott in premature age, when the furor for the poet had passed away and the charm of the novelist had begun to decline, Wordsworth first tasted the sweets of popular acceptance, and received in his turn, at the end of his laborious and honorable life, the reward which his rivals had almost outlived.

It is a curious and yet an undeniable fact, that Wordsworth, who began his poetical course with what was at any rate understood by most readers to be a disclaimer and entire repudiation of the ornament of style and poetic diction, really derives from his style and his diction his chief and special charm. We shall not venture categorically to assert that his practice is in positive opposition to the doctrine he maintains in the prefaces and supplementary remarks which accompanied his Lyrical Ballads, and which, calling down upon him and them the hostility of reviews and the ridicule of satirists, made him notorious as one

> "Who both by precept and example shows
> That prose is verse, and verse is merely prose."

Certain it is, however, that he did bestow infinite toil and labor upon his poetic style; that in the nice and exquisite felicities of poetic diction he specially surpassed his contemporaries; that his scrupulous and painstaking spirit in this particular constitutes one of his special virtues as a poet. The moving accident, as he says, was not his trade; of event and of action his compositions are perfectly destitute. A lyrical and didactic almost exclusively, scarcely ever in any sense a dramatic writer, it is upon beauty of expression that by the very necessity of his position he has to depend. Scott and Byron are mere negligent school-boys compared with him. The anecdote has

often been told, that Wordsworth said to Landor, or Landor to Wordsworth, that there was but one good line in all Scott. To which assertion of the one, the other at once assented, and said that there was no doubt which it was, —

"As the wind waved his garment, how oft did he start."

Wordsworth's practice in all probability was far more just than his theory. His theory, indeed, as directed, not against style in general, but against the then prevalent vices of style, was doubtless a very tolerable and justifiable one, but his practice was extremely meritorious; his patience and conscientious labor deserve all praise. He has not, indeed, — Nature had not bestowed on him, — the vigor and heartiness of Scott, or the force, and the sweep, and the fervor of Byron; but his poems do more perfectly and exquisitely and unintermittedly express his real meaning and significance and character, than do the poems of either Scott or Byron express theirs. Lyrical verse is by its nature more fugitive than drama or story; yet we incline to believe that there are passages of Wordsworth which, from the mere perfection of their language, will survive when the Marmions and the Laras are deep in dust. As writers for their age, as orators so to say, as addressing themselves personally to their contemporaries, Byron and Scott, one cannot hesitate to declare, were far more influential men, *are* far greater names. They had, it may be, more to say to their fellows; they entered deeper, perhaps, into the feeling and life of their time; they received a larger and livelier recognition, and a more immediate and tangible reward of popular enthusiasm and praise. It may be, too, that they had something not for their own generation only, but for all ages, which quite as well deserved a permanent record as anything in the mind of Wordsworth. But that permanent beauty of expression, that harmony between thought and word, which is the condition of "*immortal*" verse, they did not, and Wordsworth did, take pains to attain. There is hardly anything in Byron and Scott which, in another generation, people will not think they can say over again quite as well, and more agreeably and familiarly, for themselves; there is nothing which it will be plain has in Scott's or Byron's way of putting it attained the one form which of all others

truly belongs to it, which any new attempt will at the very utmost merely successfully repeat. For poetry, like science, has its final precision; and there are expressions of poetic knowledge which can no more be rewritten than could the elements of geometry. There are pieces of poetic language which, try as men will, they will simply have to recur to, and confess that it has been done before. We do not say that there is in Wordsworth anything like the same quantity of this supreme result which you find in Shakespeare or in Virgil; there is far less of the highest poetry than in Shakespeare, there is far more admixture of the unpoetic than in Virgil. But there is in him a good deal more truly complete and finished poetic attainment than in his English contemporaries.

And this is no light thing. People talk about style as if it were a mere accessory, the unneeded but pleasing ornament, the mere put-on dress of the substantial being, who without it is much the same as with it. Yet is it not intelligible that by a change of intonation, accent, or it may be mere accompanying gesture, the same words may be made to bear most different meanings? What is the difference between good and bad acting but style? and yet how different good acting is from bad. On the contrary, it may really be affirmed that some of the highest truths are only expressible to us by style, only appreciable as indicated by manner.

That Raphael paints a Virgin and Child is not a very significant fact; half a thousand other painters have painted the same; but painted *as* Raphael, not one. It is as though you should suppose that to each poetic thought some particular geometric figure or curve, it might be, specially appertained, just as to a particular definition the circle appertains, and no figure but the circle.

Those who write ill draw the figures, half right, half wrong, imperfectly and incorrectly; their circle is not a true circle, not a circle all round; its radii would many of them be equal, but not all; no one will dare, therefore, to keep it as the model and pattern. To draw the figure which may truly stand as the model and pattern, the unmisleading, safe representative, this is the gift and the excellence of style.

In Milton the gems of pure poetry lie imbedded in the rock

of scholastic pomp, and in Wordsworth you must traverse waste acres of dull verse that had far better have been, if anything, plain prose, to seek out the rich, felicitous spots of fragrance and pure beauty. There is no doubt, that he wrote overmuch. Posterity, we must hope, will have an instinct to cast away the dross and keep the good metal, and judiciously to reduce his seven volumes to one. Setting himself laboriously and painstakingly to work, and being by nature moreover a little cumbrous and heavy, he sometimes measured his result, we cannot doubt it, by quantity, and fell into the not unnatural mistake of counting a great deal of silver to be worth a great deal more than one quarter the quantity of gold. Where a man has himself at once to produce and to judge of his production, it is certainly natural, it may be even desirable, that the judgment should not be exact; it cannot, perhaps, well be so, without the accompanying evil of an excessive and vitiating introspection and self-consideration.

Had Wordsworth been more capable of discerning his bad from his good, there would, it is likely enough, have been far less of the bad; but the good, perhaps, would have been very far less good. The consequence is, however, that, to prove him a true poet, you have to hunt down a bit here and a bit there; a few lines in a book of the Prelude or the Excursion; one sonnet perhaps amongst eighty or ninety; one stanza in a series of Memorials of Tours in Scotland or the Continent; only very occasionally finding the reward of a complete poem, good throughout and good as a whole.

What is meant when people complain of him as mawkish is a different matter. It is, we believe, that, instead of looking directly at an object, and considering it as a thing in itself, and allowing it to operate upon him as a fact in itself, he takes the sentiment produced by it in his own mind as the thing, as the important and really real fact. The real things cease to be real; the world no longer exists; all that exists is the feeling somehow generated in the poet's sensibility. This sentimentalizing over sentiment, this sensibility about sensibility, has been carried by the Wordsworthians to a far more than Wordsworthian excess. But he has something of it surely. He is apt to wind up his short pieces with reflections on the way in

which hereafter he expects to reflect upon his present reflections. Nevertheless, this is by no means attributable to all his writings.

And even in this defect is indicated one great praise that belongs to Wordsworth alike as a poet and as a man. He set himself manfully and courageously to his work; and through good report and evil, especially the latter, patiently and perseveringly kept to it; reminding one, with his hardy, unflinching North-country spirit, of the story told of the Lancashire workman who, when the easy looker-on took occasion to observe that he had a hard day's work, simply rejoined that he was paid for a hard day's work. Paid, we dare say, however, not very largely, any more than, till late in life, was Wordsworth.

Wordsworth, we have said, succeeded beyond the other poets of the time in giving a perfect expression to his meaning, in making his verse permanently true to his genius and his moral frame. Let us now proceed to inquire the worth of that genius and moral frame, the sum of the real significance of his character and view of life.

> "Unless above himself he can
> Erect himself, how poor a thing is man,"

are words which he himself adopts from the Elizabethan poet Daniel (translated by him from Seneca), and introduces into that part of the Excursion which gives us what might be called his creed, the statement of those substantive, enduring convictions upon which, after more or less of fluctuation and tossing about in the world, he found himself or got himself anchored.

A certain elevation and fixity characterize Wordsworth everywhere. We do not find, as in Byron, an ebullient, overflowing life, refusing all existing restrictions, and seeking in vain to create any for itself, — to own in itself any permanent law or rule. To have attained a law, to exercise a lordship by right divine over passions and desires, this is Wordsworth's preeminence.

Nor do we find, as in Scott, a free, vigorous animal nature, ready to accept whatever things earth has to offer, eating and drinking, and enjoying heartily; like Charity, hoping all things,

believing all things, and never failing. A certain withdrawal and separation, a moral and almost religious selectiveness, a rigid refusal, and a nice picking and choosing, are essential to Wordsworth's being. It has been not inaptly said by a French critic, that you may trace in him, as in Addison, Richardson, Cowper, a spiritual descent from the Puritans.

Into what Byron might have remade himself in that new and hopeful era of the life upon which, when death cut him down at Missolonghi, he appeared to be entering, it would be overbold to conjecture. But assuredly, — without passing judgment on a human soul simply according to the errors of those thirty-six years, which may claim, perhaps, the name and palliation of an unusually protracted youth, — assuredly to be whirled away by the force of mere arbitrary will whose only law was its own wilfulness, to follow passion for passion's sake, and to be capricious for the love of one's own caprice, — this is not the honor or the excellence of a being breathing thoughtful breath, looking before and after.

The profounder tones of Walter Scott's soul were never truly sounded until adversity and grief fell upon his latter days, and those old enjoyments in which he seemed to live and move and have his being, his natural and as it were predestined vocation, fell from him and were no more. The constancy, courage, and clear manly sense, which, amid broken fortunes, severed ties, and failing health, spirits, and intellect, the extracts from his journals, given in Mr. Lockhart's Life, evince, constitute a picture far more affecting than any to be found in Kenilworth or the Bride of Lammermoor. But the sports and amusements of Abbotsford, the riding and coursing and fishing and feasting and entertaining of guests, — these a little disappoint, dissatisfy, displease us, and make us really thankful, while we read, for the foreknowledge that so strong and capable a soul was ere the end to have some nobler work allotted it, if not in the way of action, at any rate in that of endurance.

More rational, certainly, either than Byron's hot career of wilfulness, or Scott's active but easy existence of animal spirits and out-of-door enjoyments, — more dignified, elevated, serious, significant, and truly human, — was Wordsworth's homely and

frugal life in the cottage at Grasmere. While wandering with his dear wagoners round his dearer lakes, talking with shepherds, watching hills and stars, studying the poets, and fashioning verses, — amidst all this there was really something higher than either wildly crying out to have things as one chose, or cheerfully taking the world's good things as one found them, and working to gain the means and the relish for amusement. He did not, it is true, sweep away with him the exulting hearts of youth

"O'er the glad waters of the dark blue sea";

he did not win the eager and attentive ear of high and low, at home and abroad, with the entertainment of immortal Waverley Novels; but to strive not unsuccessfully to build the lofty rhyme, to lay slowly the ponderous foundations of pillars to sustain man's moral fabric, to fix a centre around which the chaotic elements of human impulse and desire might take solid form and move in their ordered ellipses, to originate a spiritual vitality, — this was perhaps greater.

"Unless above himself he can
Erect himself, how poor a thing is man."

Unless above himself; yet, if beyond or outside of his world, how useless and purposeless a thing. This also must be remembered. And we cannot help thinking that there is in Wordsworth's poems something of a spirit of withdrawal and seclusion from, and even evasion of, the actual world. In his own quiet, rural sphere, it is true, he did fairly enough look at things as they were; he did not belie his own senses, nor pretend to recognize in outward things what really was not in them. But his sphere was a small one; the objects he lived among unimportant and petty. Retiring early from all conflict and even contact with the busy world, he shut himself from the elements which it was his business to encounter and to master. This gives to his writings, compared with those of Scott and of Byron, an appearance of sterility and unreality. He cannot, indeed, be said, like Cowper, to be an in-doors poet, but he is a poet rather of a country-house or a picturesque tour, not of life and business, action and fact. This also sadly lessens the value which we must put on that high moral tone which we

have been hitherto extolling. To live in a quiet village, out of the road of all trouble and temptation, in a pure, elevated, high, moral sort of manner, is after all no such very great feat. It is something indeed anywhere. But we fear it cannot quite truly be said of him, as he has himself finely said of Burns:

> "In busiest street and loneliest glen
> Are felt the flashes of his pen;
> He lives 'mid winter snows, and when
> Bees fill their hives,
> Deep in the general heart of men
> His power survives."

People in busy streets are inclined a little to contemn the mild precepts of the rural moralist. They will tell you that he rather reminds them of the achievements of that celebrated French sea-captain,

> "Who fled full soon
> On the first of June,
> But bade the rest keep fighting."

Perhaps it is only those that are themselves engaged in the thick of the struggle and conflict, that rightly can cheer on, or fitly can admonish their fellows, or to any good purpose assume the high moral tone. Yet it must be confessed that even in a country village it is something.

Nor was Wordsworth in the earlier years of his life by any means of a timid or valetudinarian virtue. A man who was in Paris in the heat of the first Revolution was not without experiences. And the poems, it may be observed, which follow closest upon this period of living experience, are of far higher value than the later ones, which ensued upon his prolonged and unbroken retirement.

There may be, moreover, a further fault in Wordsworth's high morality, consequent on this same evil of premature seclusion, which we shall characterize by the name of false or arbitrary positiveness. There is such a thing in morals, as well as in science, as drawing your conclusion before you have properly got your premises. It is desirable to attain a fixed point; but it is essential that the fixed point be a right one. We ought to hold fast by what is true; but because we hold wilfully fast, it does not follow that what we hold fast to is

true. If you have got the truth, be as positive as you please; but because you choose to be positive, do not therefore be sure you have the truth.

Another evil consequence is the triviality in many places of his imagery, and the mawkishness, as people say, of his sentiment. We cannot heartily sympathize with the Odes to the Small Celandine, or repeated poems to the Daisy. We a little recoil from the statement that

> "To me the meanest flower that blows doth give
> Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears."

These phenomena of external nature, which in the old and great poets came forward simply as analogies and similitudes of what is truly great, namely, human nature, and as expressions of curious and wonderful relations, are in Wordsworth themselves the truly great, all-important, and pre-eminently wonderful things of the universe. Blue sky and white clouds, larks and linnets, daisies and celandines, these it appears are "the proper subject of mankind"; not, as we used to think, the wrath of Achilles, the guilt and remorse of Macbeth, the love and despair of Othello.

This tendency to exaggerate the importance of flowers and fields, lakes, waterfalls, and scenery, we indeed remember to have heard, not without a shock of mild surprise, the venerable poet correct. People come to the lakes, he said, and are charmed with a particular spot, and build a house, and find themselves discontented, forgetting that these things are only the *sauce and garnish* of life. Nevertheless, we fear that the exclusive student of Wordsworth may go away with the strange persuasion that it is his business to walk about this world of life and action, and, avoiding life and action, have his gentle thoughts excited by flowers, and running waters, and shadows on mountain-sides.

This we conceive is a grievous inherent error in Wordsworth. The poet of nature he may perhaps be; but this sort of writing does justice to the proper dignity neither of man *nor* of nature.

ART. VII. — 1. *The Vine-Dressers' Manual, an Illustrated Treatise on Vineyards and Wine-Making.* By CHARLES REEMELIN, of Ohio. New York: A. O. Moore. 1859. pp. viii., 103.

2. *Bright's Single Stem, Dwarf, and Renewal System of Grape Culture, etc.* By WILLIAM BRIGHT, Philadelphia. New York: C. M. Saxton, Barker, & Co. 1861. pp. iv., 155.

3. *Open Air Grape Culture. A Practical Treatise on the Garden and Vineyard Culture of the Vine, and the Manufacture of Domestic Wine, etc.* By JOHN PHIN. New York: C. M. Saxton. 1862. pp. xvi., 376.

4. *The Grape Culturist. A Treatise on the Cultivation of the Native Grape.* By ANDREW S. FULLER, Brooklyn, N. Y. New York: Printed for the Author, by Davies and Kent. 1864. pp. iv., 259.

5. *Manual of the Vine.* By C. W. GRANT, Iona, N. Y. 1864. pp. 100.

No branch of horticulture has attracted greater attention among us of late years than vine-growing; and the culture of grapes, both for wine making and for sale in the market, is becoming, even in New England, an important branch of popular labor. We propose, therefore, in the following pages, to give a brief account of the extent and prospects of grape culture in this country, and of the origin, character, and comparative value of those kinds of grapes which can be raised in the open air in the Northeastern States.

The vine is a hardy plant, and will grow so far north that it can do no more than blossom. The climate most congenial to it lies between the thirty-fifth and fiftieth degrees of latitude, and between these parallels are the most esteemed plantations and the countries most abounding in wine. Königsberg, in latitude 54° 42′ N., is the extreme northern limit of the vine in Europe; and as we go farther south, we find it increasing in vigor of growth and excellence of fruit. It is indigenous in America, and flourishes from the Rocky Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, and from Maine to Florida. Many of the early travellers make especial mention of the number of vines they

met with in America, of the luxuriance of their growth, and the excellence of the grapes for wine-making.

The earliest attempt to establish a vineyard in the North American Colonies was made by the London Company in Virginia before 1620, although wine had been made from native grapes by the settlers in Florida as early as 1564. In 1630 the Virginia planters imported some French *vignerons*, who ruined the vines by their unskilful management. Wine was made in the Colony in 1647, and premiums were offered for its manufacture in 1651. In the "Perfect Description of Virginia," first printed in 1649, and reprinted as the seventh number in the second volume of Force's "Historical Tracts," we find the following statements: "Vines in abundance and variety do grow naturally over all the land, but by the birds and beasts [are] most devoured before they come to perfection and ripenesse; but this testifies that the Ground and the Climate is most proper, and the Commodity of Wine is not a contemptible merchandize; but some men of worth and estate must give in these things examples to the inferior inhabitants and ordinary sort of men, to show them the gain and Commodity by it, which they will not believe but by experience before their faces." In 1648, Beauchamp Plantagenet, in his "Description of the Province of New Albion," speaking of the various kinds of grapes there growing, said: "The first is the Tholouse Muscat, sweet scented; the second, the great fox and thick grape, after five months reaped, being boyled and salted, and well fined, is a strong red Xeres; the third, a light claret; the fourth, a white grape, creeps on the land, maketh a pure, gold-colored wine. Tennis Pale, the French man, of these four made eight sorts of excellent wine; and of the Muscat, acute boyled, that the second draught will fox [intoxicate] a reasonable pate, four moneths old; and here may be gathered and made two hundred tun in the vintage moneth, and replanted will mend."

In 1683, William Penn made an unsuccessful attempt to establish a vineyard near Philadelphia. Andrew Doré, in 1685, met with no better success. In Beverly's History of Virginia, written before 1722, we are told that there were vineyards in that Colony that produced seven hundred and fifty gallons a

year, although little care was bestowed upon the vines, and no pains was taken to improve them. In 1793, Peter Legaux obtained of the Legislature of Pennsylvania the incorporation of a company for cultivating the vine. For one year only were his prospects favorable: quarrels arose, the stockholders sold out, and the vineyard went to ruin.

Many other unsuccessful attempts at wine-making were made in various States, but the great turning-point of vine culture in America was the introduction of the Catawba grape to the public, in 1816. This grape was found growing wild in 1801 in North Carolina, and afterwards made its appearance in Georgetown, D. C., where it was first brought prominently into notice by Major Adlum, who, in introducing it, asserted that he had thus conferred a greater boon upon the people of this country than he would have done if he had paid off the national debt. The name of the late Nicholas Longworth, of Cincinnati, is inseparably connected with the history of this grape, and with the history of wine-making in general in this country. After numerous vexatious and expensive attempts to naturalize European vines in Ohio, he abandoned them altogether, and planted the Catawba, which, though now suffering from the rot, and sure to be superseded by the Delaware, is grown more extensively than any other grape this side of the Rocky Mountains. From Cincinnati it has spread along both banks of the Ohio into Kentucky and Tennessee, and farther westward into Missouri, where it is raised on a large scale.

Nearly one third of all the wine produced in the United States is made in the Ohio valley. In 1850 the number of gallons of wine manufactured in Ohio was 48,207; in 1860, 562,640.

The European grape was introduced into California in 1769 or 1770, from San Carlos in Catalonia, by Spanish Jesuits, and its cultivation has long been an object of the greatest interest and importance to the people of that State, although it is only within a very few years that wine has been made there on a sufficiently large scale to become widely known and appreciated. In 1857 there were not a million cultivated vines in all California. Now at least ten and a half millions are flourishing in her vineyards, while one and a half millions are added to this

number every year. The State imported fourteen hundred varieties of foreign vines in 1861 for experimental purposes, and we read of vineyards owned by private individuals which contain from one hundred and sixty thousand to three hundred thousand vines. In 1850, California produced 58,000 gallons of wine; in 1862, 700,000. This new State is sure to become one of the most considerable wine-producing regions in the world; but we do not stop to discuss her prospects or the character of her wines, as we propose to treat almost exclusively of the cultivation of grapes for the table and the market.

The European grape, *Vitis vinifera*, differs widely from the American species, and comprises a vast number of varieties. Which one of these represents the original stock is of course unknown, although the parentage and history of many of the varieties can be ascertained with some degree of certainty. The American family of vines embraces two genera, — the *Vitis* proper, the *Ampelopsis*, and the sub-genus *Cissus*. The vine proper includes four species, viz. *Labrusca*, *æstivalis*, *cordifolia*, and *vulpina*. The *Labrusca*, the most common of the four in New England, has given rise to the Isabella and many other cultivated kinds, while from the *vulpina*, or Southern Muscadine grape, have come the Scuppernong and probably the Catawba. The *cordifolia* is a well-marked variety, with small acerb berries which do not ripen until after a frost (hence its popular name of frost grape), and is represented among cultivated kinds by the Clinton, sometimes found in our gardens. Vines of the species *Labrusca* and *vulpina* are distinguished by the muskiness of their fruit, and all four species are noted for the coarseness and vigor of their growth. All American grapes are diœcious-polygamous, a fact of much importance, as we shall see, in the artificial production of new varieties. Repeated trials have shown the folly of attempting to naturalize the *Vitis vinifera* in New England. It will not succeed except under glass.

No richness of soil or care in training and pruning will ever change the nature of an ordinary vine from the woods. This fact is ignored by many a simple man, who digs up a vine in the woods, transplants it into his garden, and gives it every advantage of soil and situation, in hopes of redeeming its wild

nature, and making it bear palatable fruit. His labor is lost. The vine remains what it always was. It may not drop its berries so badly, but the character of its fruit is the same as before. A thick, tough skin, enclosing a sour, stringy centre, in which are four or five monstrous seeds: these are the marks of most of our wild grapes; and even when they are a little better than this, they are best described by the words used by Dr. Bigelow in speaking of another plant,—"Fruit mawkish, eaten by pigs and boys." Yet from grapes no better than these have descended the handsome Concord, the luscious Diana, the delicate Rebecca, the Catawba, and last, but not least, the Delaware, *facile princeps* of American grapes.

It is worth while to consider for a moment the steps by which so wonderful a change can be effected.

There are two methods by which we may obtain new and improved grapes, and each of these has its enthusiastic advocates and professors. First, the method of Van Mons. This plan (successfully applied by Van Mons to the production of new varieties of pears) consists in planting a great number of seeds from the best grapes, and selecting from the plants thus produced those which are marked by some favorable traits, and which show an evident superiority to the parent vine. Seeds from these seedlings are then planted, and the process continued until, by a rich soil and high cultivation, the native habit is entirely broken up. Every deviation for the better from the character of the original vine is eagerly seized upon by the cultivator, who strives to make this deviation permanent. The grapes or seeds are planted in the fall, and the plants which come up are carefully removed from the seed-bed the next autumn, to make room for a second set from the same sowing, which in its turn is succeeded by a third, and even a fourth crop, the value of the plants, by a curious and little understood law, being in direct proportion to the length of time the seeds remain in the ground without germinating. These seedling vines bear fruit in the third or fourth year, but their character is not fully established for several years after. This method has led to brilliant results in the hands of E. W. Bull of Concord and Dr. Grant of Iona Island.

Mr. Bull, twenty years ago, determined to obtain a vine

which should blossom late enough to escape the frosts of spring, should ripen its fruit early enough to avoid those of autumn, and at the same time should bear better grapes than any native vine. In this he has had perfect success. He planted seed of the best wild grape he could get, and from this, in the third generation, obtained the grape so well known as the Concord; and from the Concord, to use his own words, he has obtained "grapes as delicate as the Chasselas, and of exquisite flavor."

But a large part of the seedlings raised in this way are barren; and of the fruit-bearing vines nine tenths are rejected, either for marked defects, or on account of having no especially desirable qualities. Thus it will be seen that large numbers of vines have to be raised and sacrificed to obtain one really good one. The Concord vine was, if we recollect right, the best of three thousand seedlings. The new Iona of Dr. Grant is said to be the best of five thousand plants, two thousand of which were rejected in the second year for positive defects. And these seedlings were themselves far removed from the native vine; for the Iona was raised from seed of the Diana, which is descended from the Catawba, and this last comes from a native grape. This method of Van Mons thus requires time and patience, as well as skill in selecting the best and most promising plants.

The second method, by hybridization, consists in impregnating the pistil of the flower of a native grape with pollen from the stamens of a foreign variety, or *vice versa*, and raising seedling plants from the seed thus produced. The advocates of hybridizing claim for their system more speedy and better results than those obtained by the disciples of Van Mons, and the idea of being able to create a vine that shall have the strength, vigor, and hardiness of a native, and whose fruit shall be as delicate as that of the Black Hamburgh or Chasselas, is certainly very fascinating. But those who follow the other method say that in planting wild seed and breeding in and in, so to speak, we have a better foundation to build on; that our native grapes have a much more strongly marked flavor than foreign kinds, and that this flavor, properly softened and refined by successive generations of seedlings, will surpass the simply sweet and luscious taste of European varieties.

Hybridizing has led to very successful results in at least two cases. Messrs. E. S. Rogers and W. Fiske Allen, of Salem, have produced some very remarkable hybrids. The vine known as Allen's Hybrid was obtained by crossing the Isabella with a Chasselas, and is a most beautiful grape. When well sheltered it will sometimes ripen in the open air in New England, and then is the best light-colored grape we have. From its European parent, however, it has inherited an unlucky predisposition to mildew. Mr. Rogers has given to the world no less than forty new grapes, of different degrees of excellence; hybrids between several foreign kinds, and a monstrous and uneatable variety of the *Vitis Labrusca*, from the Salem woods. Some of the new-comers have already taken their place in the small list of standard out-door varieties, and three or four of them, for healthy growth and excellence of flavor, are almost unsurpassed. Some writers, indeed, maintain that they are not genuine hybrids, but simply seedlings of the native grape; but this notion is wholly untenable, and those plants which have come under our immediate notice bear unmistakable marks of their foreign origin.

A glance at the following considerations will show in part the weight of the evidence that goes to prove them to be true hybrids. If forty seeds of the wild grape be planted, and as many seedlings obtained, one half of these seedlings will probably be barren; and of the other half, nine tenths will show no marked superiority to their parent. If forty fertile plants should be raised, all better than the parent vine, it would be little short of a miracle. Now Mr. Rogers has raised forty-four vines without getting one sterile or staminate plant, and the poorest among them is better than the average of fertile seedlings from the wild grape, — a result to be explained only by admitting a large infusion of the *Vitis vinifera* in their composition. Hybrids from two species which are very difficult to cross are generally very sterile; but these are not only true hybrids, they are also very fertile; and we have observed, in some experiments that we are making further to unfold their character, that the seed from these hybrids, and especially from the No. 19, germinates readily, and with much more certainty than seed from the wild grape. The fact of their hybrid-

ism being admitted, the experimenter's triumph becomes more brilliant, for distinguished botanists have repeatedly denied the possibility of crossing two distinct species of the genus *Vitis*. Some of these new vines have been crossed a second time with the foreign grape with perfect success, and with very interesting results.

It is a curious but admitted fact, that there are certain plants, as for instance some species of Lobelia, which can be far more easily fertilized by the pollen of another and distinct species than by their own pollen. Decisive experiments upon this point with regard to the genus *Vitis* are still wanting; but whether this singular law holds good with regard to the vine or not, it is certain that the probability that many seedlings raised by the method of Van Mons are hybrids has not yet been sufficiently considered by experimenters. When vines of various kinds are raised in the same garden, it is inevitable that currents of air and those industrious fertilizers, the bees, should carry pollen from one blossom to another, and a cross or mongrel be the result. Any one, says Darwin, can convince himself of the efficiency of insect agency by examining the flowers of sterile Rhododendrons, which produce no pollen, for he will find on their stigmas plenty of pollen from other plants.

Admitting, then, that many seedlings may be unintentional crosses, the immense divergence from the parent stock which some of them manifest will not be surprising.

The striking success that has attended the experiments of the pioneers in hybridizing opens to us a most interesting and profitable field for research. We hardly as yet understand what unhoped for results have been attained, or comprehend the importance of Mr. Rogers's praiseworthy undertaking.

Scarcely any useful plant can be propagated so easily as the vine. It is raised from single buds, called eyes by the nurseryman, from cuttings, by layers, and, for special purposes, from seed. This is a very important trait in the character of the grape, especially to the propagator of new varieties; for if he originates a new and valuable grape, in three or four years he may count his plants by tens of thousands. Raising vines from single eyes is an operation requiring the aid of artificial heat, and a good deal of skill and experience. Millions of vines,

however, are so produced every year, and when well grown are undoubtedly the best for planting on a large scale.

The roots in vines thus propagated are in the best possible form for transplanting, as they all radiate from a common centre, and the plant partakes more of the habit of one raised in the natural way, from seed.

A cutting is simply a branch of a vine, with two or three buds. Set in rich earth in spring or fall, under favorable conditions, the top bud sends up a stem, and the lower buds put forth roots, making a strong plant by October.

Layers, as their name indicates, are branches of an old vine bent down into the soil, and made to grow there, while yet deriving nourishment from the parent plant. In this manner the best vines are obtained, but they are expensive, as only a few can be taken at once, and the old vine is much injured.

An excellent method of growing layers, borrowed from the French *vignerons*, has come into use in this country within a few years. It consists in bending down the branches of the vine into large boxes or baskets filled with rich earth, and making them root there. When they have filled the box with roots they are cut loose from the main vine, and thus a well-grown plant is obtained, already potted, which may be transplanted or removed to any distance without disturbing the roots in the least. Vines so raised will bear a few bunches the first year, and thus enable the impatient buyer to test his purchase at once.

No plant will flourish better in unfavorable circumstances than the grape-vine, and at the same time no plant more gratefully repays all that is done for it. It requires for its successful cultivation a southern or southeastern aspect, a dry, rich, and thoroughly pulverized soil, and careful and judicious training.

First, with respect to the soil. It is absolutely necessary that this should be either naturally dry, or else thoroughly drained. Vine-dressers have a saying that "the vine cannot bear wet feet," and this is perfectly true. Stagnant water round the roots of a vine causes the fibres to die prematurely, and this gives rise to weak and ill-ripened wood, sour and worthless grapes. Many soils which are called dry need draining if they are heavy or clayey, not only to carry off water, but to aerate

the earth ; for if the soil be such as to be pervious to air, it will be likely to transmit moisture rapidly, and not hold too much of it. A dry soil having been secured by natural or artificial means, the depth to which it should be worked becomes the next, and a very important and perplexing consideration.

Until within a year or two it has been almost heresy to doubt that, the deeper the ground is worked, the better off the vines are, and almost all books on the cultivation of the grape advocate deep trenching; not simply subsoil ploughing, but the actual inversion and pulverization of the soil to the depth of two, three, or even four feet. Some very light volcanic soils are said to have been trenched with profit to the depth of five feet. The Western grape-growers, many of them Germans, who carry out here the same plans which they followed at home, with hardly an exception trench their vineyards two or three feet deep. All the books named at the head of this paper, except Mr. Bright's, recommend deep trenching, and their authors carry out in practice the plans which they advocate in theory. Some cultivators, however, have begun to think that, although working the ground to the enormous depths above mentioned may be very proper in light and porous soils, yet it is unwise to adopt this system in New England ; and Mr. Bright goes even to the opposite extreme. Mr. Bull says: "The soil of Massachusetts does not get heated, during our short summers, sufficiently for the healthy growth of the grape, to a depth greater than about one foot. Now if the ground is trenched and made rich, the roots are coaxed down into the lower and cold stratum of soil, and the wood and buds are not properly ripened, the former being immature and spongy, and as a natural consequence the latter being weak and imperfect, so that next year's crop is enfeebled, and will ripen later. The grape-grower should always aim to get thoroughly-ripened wood. Without this he cannot count on a crop of fruit with any certainty, even if the immature wood survive the winter."

Whether the soil be trenched or ploughed, the finer that part of it is made in which the roots of the young vine will have to make their way, the better it is for the plants. Mr. Bright advises twelve ploughings and as many harrowings, so as to produce the most perfect and minute division of the soil that is

possible ; or to use his own words, so that it shall be left at last "as fine as bolted flour." Very few will follow his advice, but those who do will be repaid for their labor.

If the soil of the vineyard be poor, it will of course need enriching. We hardly dare to touch upon the subject of fertilizers, for upon no other topic connected with agriculture have so many disputes and quarrels arisen as upon the question what manures are proper for the grape. One successful grower puts a quarter of an ox under each of his vines, and has splendid crops; another thinks that a good old pasture soil, where no trees, grain, or vines have grown for twenty years, is the best of all soils for the vine; — and between these two extremes is a wide field for theory and practice. A few maxims, however, may be laid down, which probably will be undisputed by all acquainted with the needs of the grape-vine in New England.

Dead cattle, oily woollen rags and waste, and in general all rank, undecomposed manures, are positively injurious. We speak especially of oily rags, because the injudicious application of a quantity of these to the soil came near in one case to destroying a lot of seedling vines, whose worth, regarded as the result of long and tedious experiments, was not to be reckoned in money. Ashes and bone-dust ploughed into the soil, and whole bones buried under the vines, are all excellent. Guano in moderate quantity, and meadow mud composted with ashes, lime, and barn-yard manure, are profitable fertilizers. The notion of having special manures for particular plants is falling into deserved contempt; but we observe that Mr. Bright still advocates a nostrum for the vine. His reasoning is, that because tartrate of potash exists in grapes, *ergo* tartrate of potash, or free tartaric acid, is a proper fertilizer for grape-vines; and he professes to have obtained marvellous results with it. Nothing could be more absurd than this theory. It is not possible that that which plants never find in the soil can be a proper manure for them. Now tartaric acid is never found in the soil, either free or combined, and cannot be found there by reason of the way in which it is produced. Grapes select from the carbonic acid of the air and the water of the soil atoms of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, in such proportions as to form

tartaric acid, which, uniting with the potash that the vines find in the soil and take up therefrom, forms bitartrate of potash, or cream of tartar. Tartaric acid being an organic acid, and not a mineral constituent of the soil, is of course never found in the earth, and the berries of a vine watered with a solution of cream of tartar would not contain a hundredth of one per cent more of that salt than they would if supplied with potash alone, and left to elaborate their own acid. To water a vine with tartaric acid would be as sensible as to pour molasses round the roots of a sugar-maple, or to water with a solution of quinine the tree that produces that alkaloid. Mr. Bright's success is due solely to the potash in his compost, and not to the acid.

Whoever is about to set out vines, and will plough and pulverize the soil to the depth of eighteen inches, and then make it rich enough to bear a hundred bushels of corn on the acre, need not fear disappointment with the ordinary kinds of grapes, provided always that the land be well drained.

Vines are set out either in the spring or fall. We have tried both seasons, and are inclined to give the preference to the fall. In the vineyard, vines are either trained upon wire trellises or tied up to stakes, and from five hundred to five thousand plants are set out on an acre, the distance between the plants varying from thirty inches to nine feet. For strong, coarse vines, like the Concord, the latter distance is not too great. Plants one year old, if raised from single eyes, or two years old with well-pruned roots, if raised from cuttings, are the best for vineyard culture. Their roots should not be put more than four or five inches below the surface in New England, and on account of our fiery summers the ground should be well mulched with straw, leaves, or tan.

But before planting a vineyard the kind of vines to be planted must be decided upon; and here we have no great latitude of choice, for the number of really good vines that will ripen so far north as Boston is very small. Our climate is not particularly favorable to the vine, the late spring frosts sometimes killing the blossoms, and those of early autumn ruining the fruit. Nothing has done more in past years to bring discredit upon viticulture in New England than planting varieties of

grapes that will never ripen here until our summers have an additional month. The Concord, the Hartford Prolific, the Diana, Rebecca, Delaware, possibly Dr. Grant's two new varieties, Allen's Hybrid, and some of Mr. Rogers's new vines, are the only good grapes that can be planted in New England with the full assurance of getting a crop every year. Even this statement has to be limited and qualified, for the Hartford Prolific is not a grape of the first class, the Rebecca is very tender, and the hybrids have not yet been fully tested, or at least have not been in bearing long enough for their failings to become fully apparent. This list is so short that we are justified in speaking of these varieties in detail.

The Hartford Prolific is a strong, coarse vine, a seedling of the native, we believe, in the first generation, and possesses many of those traits which render the native grape so unpleasant. It bears large bunches of round black berries, somewhat tough in the centre, and of a coarse flavor. It would not be tolerated in the garden, were it not for its extreme earliness.

The Concord is a seedling in the third generation from the native. It is extremely hardy, produces enormous crops every year, will grow in soils where better grapes would utterly fail, and, though not a grape of the first quality, is the most profitable market variety, bearing the same relation to other outdoor grapes that Hovey's seedling strawberry does to other strawberries. This variety is planted very extensively, and has done a good work in educating the public taste to something better than the nauseous wild kinds. Whoever cultivates the Concord will have grapes in abundance, though not the best.

The Diana, a much better grape than the last mentioned, is a somewhat tender vine, and a shy bearer when young: it is a seedling of the Catawba, and the parent of the new Iona. It originated in Milton, and came into notice in 1844. In quality the fruit of well-established vines is superior to that of the Catawba, being juicy, rich, and refreshing, with a slight musky odor. Those who plant this must prepare themselves to lay down their vines in the fall, and cover them with three or four inches of earth.

The Rebecca, presumed to be a seedling of the Isabella, is a delicate vine, requiring a favorable location and the highest

cultivation; and even with these it sometimes drops its leaves and baffles the cultivator. But when it does succeed, it amply repays all the pains spent upon it. The berries are light yellowish-green, tinged with amber, translucent, and are sometimes sold to unsuspecting purchasers for foreign grapes. A few vines should be planted in every garden, in a warm place, where they can be well sheltered. What has been said of the Rebecca applies with equal force to Allen's Hybrid, a vine or two of which may be planted in some very favorable place, for when it does ripen it is our best white grape.

The Israella, a seedling of the Isabella, is asserted to be the earliest good grape, and the Iona the best grape in every respect, the Delaware alone excepted, that can be raised out-doors. These grapes have been before the public only a few years, and it remains to be seen how they will succeed in New England. A most bitter warfare is now going on about them in the agricultural newspapers, and while every amateur will of course test them, the public will wait till the dust of the battle has subsided, and the true merits of the vines become known.

Of Mr. Rogers's vines we have already spoken, and will only add that his numbers three, four, fifteen, and nineteen deserve to be planted in every garden. They show evident marks both of foreign and native parentage, and for vigor of growth, and size and beauty of berry, come close upon the Black Hamburgh.

Last and best comes the Delaware. This famous grape, unequalled as yet by any other out-door kind, and matched only by the most delicious foreign varieties, has been discussed, condemned, and praised more than any species recorded in the stormy annals of vine culture. Prejudice and hostility have yielded at last, and the Delaware stands now, where it belongs by right, at the head of the list of out-door grapes. Its berries are of a peculiar amber color, and are juicy, delicate, and refreshing in the highest degree. Its growth is slow, but it is as hardy as an oak, and now that under improved cultivation bunches weighing a half-pound have been obtained, the last objection to it, the smallness of its clusters, seems to be removed.

For the vineyard, then, the only kinds which can be trusted at

present are the Delaware, the Hartford Prolific, the Concord, and perhaps the Diana. The other kinds should all be planted in gardens, as some of them will give a crop every year. We make no mention of the Catawba or Isabella, as the former cannot be raised here at all, and the latter will not give a full crop once in ten years. This list is so small that it leaves open a wide field for progress and improvement. Whoever will add to our present kinds a new and really good early grape, will not only be a public benefactor, but will reap a rich reward for himself. Whether his grape be very good or not, it will be bought by thousands, if it be a few days earlier than any known kind; for the shortness of our season is the greatest drawback with which the vine-grower has to contend. If we knew any one about to make experiments in hybridizing, we should urge him to cross the Delaware with the Black Hamburgh, and the Concord with the Chasselas. If he should be successful in these two attempts, his success would be brilliant indeed; for it is much to be regretted that Mr. Rogers did not use a better native vine in his experiments.

The limits of our article do not permit us to review the various systems of training and pruning the vine in use in this country and in Europe. Volumes have been written upon this important subject, and much remains to be said; but the whole art depends upon a very simple natural law. The tendency of the sap in the vine is towards the extremities of the branches, and any method of training that leads to profitable results is merely a device by which the cultivator either counteracts this tendency or avails himself of it.

We must content ourselves with a glance at the leading and best system. In this the young plants are allowed to make a single upright shoot or cane the first year, and in the fall this cane is cut back at a point about a foot and a half from the surface of the ground. The next year two horizontal arms are raised from the two uppermost buds of this cane, and from these arms upright fruiting shoots are raised the third year. The vine thus trained has first the shape of the letter T, and then that of a gridiron with the handle stuck in the ground. The canes that have borne fruit are thereafter cut away every autumn, and new ones are raised the next year. The village of Tho-

mery, about five miles from Fontainebleau, where the Chasselas grape is raised for the Paris market, has given its name to a system of training that has been in use there for one hundred and twenty years, and which is perhaps the best method the ingenuity of man and a patient study of the grape-vine have yet devised. Those who wish to become acquainted with this method, which cannot be explained without the aid of diagrams, will find it elaborately treated in Du Breuil's *Cours élémentaire d'Arboriculture*, an excellent translation from which forms an appendix to Mr. Phin's book. The Thomery system requires time for its full development, but it gains ground in this country just as fast as its merits are understood. Around Cincinnati the German vine-dressers train their vines to two or four stakes, clinging to the customs they have brought with them from home; but most American growers train their vines to a permanent trellis of posts and wire.

Delightful as the cultivation of the vine is to the amateur, it will not attract the investment of capital on a large scale, unless it can be shown to be profitable; and even if it can be proved to be remunerative, it will take some little time to make the cultivation universal. Liebig's words, which we find on the title-page of Mr. Bright's book, "Things which bring in money will be sure to make their own way," are very true; but the saying must be taken with some allowance as to the length of time required. Anything new is sure to be ridiculed, and viticulture has both ignorance and prejudice to contend with. It is not easy to convince farmers who are content to travel in the steps of their fathers, and to whom everything beyond the narrow limits of corn and potatoes is rash and foolish speculation, that the stories they read of profits of a thousand and twelve hundred dollars from an acre of land are not wholly apocryphal; yet it can be shown that the cultivation of the vine yields larger and more certain profits than anything else that can be grown out-doors in New England, tobacco alone excepted.

Eight tons of Concord grapes have been raised on an acre in Massachusetts, and six tons is an average crop from vines five or six years old. Mr. Bull says that an acre of vines four years old will give the cultivator fourteen thousand pounds.

A glance at the retail prices of grapes will show whether the market is in any danger of being over-supplied or not. Concord grapes were sold last year in Boston at from twelve to twenty cents per pound, Isabellas at twenty-five cents, Dianas at thirty, and Rebeccas at forty. Delaware grapes have not yet made their appearance in the Boston market in large quantities, but in New York they are sold at prices varying between forty and sixty cents per pound. These prices sufficiently explain the large profits made by grape-growers. At a meeting of the Western Fruit-growers' Society, held in Rochester, in 1859, profits of from one thousand to fifteen hundred dollars per acre were reported, and no cultivator gave in a return of less than five hundred dollars as the result from an acre of grapes.

Those who have been the longest engaged in vine-growing in New England are the most enthusiastic, and we may congratulate ourselves that a new, unfailing, and most profitable branch of agriculture is taking firm root among us. For the amount of capital and care employed, the out-door culture of the grape offers profits which we may look for in vain from other standard crops.

California and Ohio need no longer monopolize the vine. With our present kinds, and with new and improved varieties better suited to our short summers appearing every year, we shall soon be able to rival our sister States. Already American vines are receiving great attention in France and Germany, where they have been introduced with the hope that they will be free from the disease (*oidium*) which has made such havoc in European vineyards. American grapes are regularly exported from New York to the Old World; and if the progress of the next twenty years equals that of the last twenty, we shall have no need of hot-houses; for the distance between the best foreign grapes and our best out-door varieties is only a fraction of that which separates the Fox grape of the woods from the Iona.

With regard to wine, it is sufficient to say, that, although the Concord makes a tolerable wine, and the Delaware a wine that sells for twice the price of the Catawba, yet very little, comparatively speaking, will be made in New England while grapes for the table command the present high prices. As vineyards

multiply and prices fall, the surplus fruit will undoubtedly be converted into wine, and such wine too, if we can trust the promises made by some of the best kinds, as will not fear a comparison with famous European sorts. Wine is even now extensively manufactured by at least two firms in Massachusetts, and others in Connecticut, from wild grapes found in the woods, although we have heard of none produced from vineyards planted for the purpose.

We hardly dare to look forward to the time when the vine shall cover all the bleak and barren hills of New England ; but we do see close at hand the day when broad vineyards will be planted to supply with their luscious fruit the markets of our cities and great towns, and when rows of well-chosen and well-trained vines will be as common an appendage to every decent garden as a line of currant-bushes is now.

We have endeavored to set forth, more by figures of arithmetic than those of rhetoric, the importance of the cultivation of the grape in the open air in New England, and to furnish our readers with some hints upon this subject drawn in a large measure from our own experience. We would infuse into them a little of our own enthusiasm about hybridizing, the production of new varieties, and, in short, everything that relates to the cultivation and development of this precious plant. It is as true now as it was two hundred years ago, that "some men of worth and estate must give in these things examples to the inferior inhabitants and ordinary sort of men, to show them the gain and commodity by it, which they will not believe but by experience before their faces."

We wish we could say, in persuasive accents, to every one who owns a rod of land, — Plant a good vine, tend it and care for it, and you will have your reward. Do not wait till next year, but

"Insere *nunc* Melibœe pyros, pone ordine vites."

ART. VIII. — 1. *The President's Message on the Peace Negotiation, presented to Congress, February* 10, 1865.
2. *The Inaugural Address, March* 4, 1865.

IN the glare of our civil war, certain truths, hitherto unobserved or guessed at merely, have been brought out with extraordinary sharpness of relief; and two of them have been specially impressive, the one for European observers, the other for ourselves. The first, and perhaps the most startling to the Old World watcher of the political skies, upon whose field of vision the flaming sword of our Western heavens grew from a misty speck to its full comet-like proportions, perplexing them with fear of change, has been the amazing strength and no less amazing steadiness of democratic institutions. An army twice larger than England, with the help of bounties, drafts, and the purchase of foreign vagabonds, ever set in the field during the direst stress of her struggle with Napoleon, has been raised in a single year by voluntary enlistment. A people untrained to bear the burden of heavy taxes not only devotes to the public service sums gathered by private subscription that in any other country would be deemed fabulous, but by sheer force of public opinion compels its legislators to the utmost ingenuity and searchingness of taxation. What was uttered as a sarcasm on the want of public spirit in Florence is here only literally true: —

> "Many refuse to bear the common burden;
> But thy solicitous people answereth
> Unasked, and cries, 'I bend my back to it.'"

And that the contrast may be felt in its fullest completeness, we must consider that no private soldier is tempted into the ranks by hopes of plunder, or driven into them by want of fair wages for fair work, — that no officer can look forward to the splendid prizes of hereditary wealth and title. Love of their country was the only incentive, its gratitude their only reward. And in the matter of taxation also, a willingness to help bear the common burden has more of generosity in it where the wealth of the people is in great part the daily result of their daily toil, and not a hoard inherited without merit, as without industry.

Nor have the qualities which lead to such striking results been exhibited only by the North. The same public spirit, though misled by wicked men for selfish ends, has shown itself in almost equal strength at the South. And in both cases it has been unmistakably owing to that living and active devotion of the people to institutions in whose excellence they share, and their habit of obedience to laws of their own making. If we have not hitherto had that conscious feeling of nationality, the ideal abstract of history and tradition, which belongs to older countries, compacted by frequent war and united by memories of common danger and common triumph, it has been simply because our national existence has never been in such peril as to force upon us the conviction that it was both the title-deed of our greatness and its only safeguard. But what splendid possibilities has not our trial revealed even to ourselves! What costly stuff whereof to make a nation! Here at last is a state whose life is not narrowly concentred in a despot or a class, but feels itself in every limb; a government which is not a mere application of force from without, but dwells as a vital principle in the will of every citizen. Our enemies — and wherever a man is to be found bribed by an abuse, or who profits by a political superstition, we have a natural enemy — have striven to laugh and sneer and lie this apparition of royal manhood out of existence. They conspired our murder; but in this vision is the prophecy of a dominion which is to push them from their stools, and whose crown doth sear their eyeballs. America lay asleep, like the princess of the fairy tale, enchanted by prosperity; but at the first fiery kiss of war the spell is broken, the blood tingles along her veins again, and she awakes conscious of her beauty and her sovereignty.

It is true that, by the side of the self-devotion and public spirit, the vices and meannesses of troubled times have shown themselves, as they will and must. We have had shoddy, we have had contracts, we have had substitute-brokerage, we have had speculators in patriotism, and, still worse, in military notoriety. Men have striven to make the blood of our martyrs the seed of wealth or office. But in times of public and universal extremity, when habitual standards of action no longer serve, and ordinary currents of thought are swamped in the flood of

enthusiasm or excitement, it always happens that the evil passions of some men are stimulated by what serves only to exalt the nobler qualities of others. In such epochs, evil as well as good is exaggerated. A great social convulsion shakes up the lees which underlie society, forgotten because quiescent, and the stimulus of calamity brings out the extremes of human nature, whether for good or evil.

What is especially instructive in the events we have been witnessing for the past four years, is the fact that the people have been the chief actors in the drama. They have not been the led, but the leaders. They have not been involved in war by the passions or interests of their rulers, but deliberately accepted the ordeal of battle in defence of institutions which were the work of their own hands, and of whose beneficence experience had satisfied them. Loyalty has hitherto been a sentiment rather than a virtue; it has been more often a superstition or a prejudice than a conviction of the conscience or the understanding. Now for the first time it is identical with patriotism, and has its seat in the brain, and not the blood. It has before been picturesque, devoted, beautiful, as forgetfulness of self always is, but now it is something more than all these, — it is logical. Here we have testimony that cannot be gainsaid to the universal vitality and intelligence which our system diffuses with healthy pulse through all its members. Every man feels himself a part and not a subject of the government, and can say in a truer and higher sense than Louis XIV., "I am the state." But we have produced no Cromwell, no Napoleon. Let us be thankful that we have passed beyond that period of political development when such productions are necessary, or even possible. It is but another evidence of the excellence of the democratic principle. Where power is the privilege of a class or of a single person, it may be usurped; but where it is the expression of the common will, it can no more be monopolized than air or light. The ignorant and unreasoning force of a populace, sure of losing nothing and with a chance of gaining something by any change, that restless material out of which violent revolutions are made, if it exist here at all, is to be found only in our great cities, among a class who have learned in other countries to look upon all law as their natural enemy.

Nor is it by any fault of American training, but by the want of it, that these people are what they are. When Lord Derby says that the government of this country is at the mercy of an excited mob, he proves either that the demagogue is no exclusive product of a democracy, or that England would be in less danger of war if her governing class knew something less of ancient Greece and a little more of modern America.

Whether or no there be any truth in the assertion that democracy tends to bring men down to a common level (as it surely brings them up to one), we shall not stop to inquire, for the world has not yet had a long enough experience of it to warrant any safe conclusion. During our Revolutionary struggle, it seems to us that both our civil and military leaders compare very well in point of ability with the British product of the same period, and the same thing may very well be true at the present time. But while it may be the glory, it can hardly be called the duty of a country to produce great men; and if forms of polity have anything to do in the matter, we should incline to prefer that which could make a great nation felt to be such and loved as such by every human fibre in it, to one which stunted the many that a few favored specimens might grow the taller and fairer. People of more sensitive organizations may be shocked, but we are glad that in this our true war of independence, which is to free us forever from the Old World, we have had at the head of our affairs a man whom America made, as God made Adam, out of the very earth, unancestried, unprivileged, unknown, to show us how much truth, how much magnanimity, and how much statecraft await the call of opportunity in simple manhood when it believes in the justice of God and the worth of man. Conventionalities are all very well in their proper place, but they shrivel at the touch of nature like stubble in the fire. The genius that sways a nation by its arbitrary will seems less august to us than that which multiplies and reinforces itself in the instincts and convictions of an entire people. Autocracy may have something in it more melodramatic than this, but falls far short of it in human value and interest.

It has been brought against us as an accusation abroad, and repeated here by people who measure their country rather by

what is thought of it than by what it is, that our war has not been distinctly and avowedly for the extinction of slavery, but a war rather for the preservation of our national power and greatness, in which the emancipation of the negro has been forced upon us by circumstances and accepted as a necessity. We are very far from denying this; nay, we admit that it is so far true that we were slow to renounce our constitutional obligations even toward those who had absolved us by their own act from the letter of our duty. We are speaking of the government which, legally installed for the whole country, was bound, so long as it was possible, not to overstep the limits of orderly prescription, and could not, without abnegating its own very nature, take the lead in making rebellion an excuse for revolution. There were, no doubt, many ardent and sincere persons who seemed to think this as simple a thing to do as to lead off a Virginia reel. They forgot what should be forgotten least of all in a system like ours, that the administration for the time being represents not only the majority which elects it, but the minority as well, — a minority in this case powerful, and so little ready for emancipation that it was opposed even to war. Mr. Lincoln had not been chosen as general agent of an antislavery society, but President of the United States, to perform certain functions exactly defined by law. Whatever were his wishes, it was no less duty than policy to mark out for himself a line of action which would not further distract the country, by raising before their time questions which it was plain would soon enough compel attention, and for which every day was making the answer more easy.

While this was necessarily the attitude of the government, it is also true that the people ran before it, and were moved by a deeper impulse than the mere instinct of self-preservation. The public conscience gave energy and intention to the public will, and the bounty which drew our best soldiers to the ranks was an idea. The game was the ordinary game of war, and they but the unreasoning pieces on the board; but they felt that a higher reason was moving them in a game where the stake was the life not merely of their country, but of a principle whose rescue was to make America in very deed a New World, the cradle of a fairer manhood. Weakness was to be no longer

the tyrant's opportunity, but the victim's claim; labor should never henceforth be degraded as a curse, but honored as that salt of the earth which keeps life sweet, and gives its savor to duty. To be of good family should mean being a child of the one Father of us all; and good birth, the being born into God's world, and not into a fool's paradise of man's invention. But even had this moral leaven been wanting, had the popular impulse been merely one of patriotism, we should have been well content to claim as the result of democracy, that for the first time in the history of the world it had mustered an army that knew for what it was fighting. Nationality is no dead abstraction, no unreal sentiment, but a living and operative virtue in the heart and moral nature of men. It enlivens the dullest soul with an ideal out of and beyond itself, lifting every faculty to a higher level of vision and action. It enlarges the narrowest intellect with a fealty to something better than self. It emancipates men from petty and personal interests, to make them conscious of sympathies whose society ennobles. Life has a deeper meaning when its throb beats time to a common impulse and catches its motion from the general heart.

But while the experience of the last four years has been such, with all its sorrows, as to make us proud of our strength and grateful for the sources of it, we cannot but feel that peace will put to the test those higher qualities which war leaves in reserve. What are we to do with the country our arms have regained? It is by our conduct in this stewardship, and not by our rights under the original compact of the States, that our policy is to be justified. The glory of conquest is trifling and barren, unless victory clear the way to a higher civilization, a more solid prosperity, and a Union based upon reciprocal benefits. In what precise manner the seceding States shall return, whether by inherent right, or with some preliminary penance and ceremony of readoption, is of less consequence than what they shall be after their return. Dependent provinces, sullenly submitting to a destiny which they loathe, would be a burden to us, rather than an increase of strength or an element of prosperity. War would have won us a peace stripped of all the advantages that make peace a blessing. We should have so much more territory, and so much less substantial greatness. We did not enter

upon war to open a new market, or fresh fields for speculators, or an outlet for redundant population, but to save the experiment of democracy from destruction, and put it in a fairer way of success by removing the single disturbing element. Our business now is not to allow ourselves to be turned aside from a purpose which our experience thus far has demonstrated to have been as wise as it was necessary, and to see to it that, whatever be the other conditions of reconstruction, democracy, which is our real strength, receive no detriment.

We would not be understood to mean that Congress should lay down in advance a fixed rule not to be departed from to suit the circumstances of special cases as they arise. What may do very well for Tennessee may not be as good for South Carolina. Wise statesmanship does not so much consist in the agreement of its forms with any abstract ideal, however perfect, as in its adaptation to the wants of the governed and its capacity of shaping itself to the wants of the time. It is not to be judged by its intention, but by its results, and those will be proportioned to its practical, and not its theoretic excellence. The Anglo-Saxon soundness of understanding has shown itself in nothing more clearly than in allowing institutions to be formulated gradually by custom, convenience, or necessity, and in preferring the practical comfort of a system that works, to the French method of a scientific machinery of perpetual motion, demonstrably perfect in all its parts, and yet refusing to go. We do not wish to see scientific treatment, however admirable, applied to the details of reconstruction, if that is to be, as now seems probable, the next problem that is to try our intelligence and firmness. But there are certain points, it seems to us, on which it is important that public opinion should come to some sort of understanding in advance.

The peace negotiations have been of service in demonstrating that it is not any ill blood engendered by war, any diversity of interests properly national, any supposed antagonism of race, but simply the slaveholding class, that now stands between us and peace, as four years ago it forced us into war. Precisely as the principle of Divine right could make no lasting truce with the French Revolution, the Satanic right of the stronger to enslave the weaker can come to no understanding with de-

mocracy. The conflict is in the things, not in the men, and one or the other must abdicate. Of course the leaders, to whom submission would be ruin, and a few sincere believers in the doctrine of State rights, are willing to sacrifice even slavery for independence, a word which has a double meaning for some of them; but there can be no doubt that an offer to receive the seceding States back to their old position under the Constitution would have put the war party in a hopeless minority at the South. We think there are manifest symptoms that the chinks made by the four years' struggle have let in new light to the Southern people, however it may be with their ruling faction, and that they begin to suspect a diversity of interest between themselves, who chiefly suffer by the war, and the small class who bullied them into it for selfish purposes of their own. However that may be, the late proposal of Davis and Lee for the arming of slaves, though they certainly did not so intend it, has removed a very serious obstacle from our path. It is true that the emancipating clause was struck out of the act as finally passed by the shadowy Congress at Richmond. But this was only for the sake of appearances. Once arm and drill the negroes, and they can never be slaves again. This is admitted on all hands, and accordingly, whatever the words of the act may be, it practically at once promotes the negro to manhood by brevet, as it were, but at any rate to manhood. For the offer of emancipation as a bounty implies reason in him to whom it is offered; nay, more, implies a capacity for progress and a wish for it, which are in themselves valid titles to freedom. This at a step puts the South back to the position held by her greatest men in regard to slavery. All the Scriptural arguments, all the fitness of things, all the physiological demonstrations, all Mr. Stephens's corner-stones, Ham, Onesimus, heels, hair, and facial angle, — all are swept out, by one flirt of the besom of Fate, into the inexorable limbo of things that were and never should have been. How is Truth wounded to death in the house of her friends! The highest authority of the South has deliberately renounced its vested interest in the curse of Noah, and its right to make beasts of black men because St. Paul sent back a white one to his master. Never was there a more exact verification of the Spanish proverb, that

he who went out for wool may come back shorn. Alas for Nott and Gliddon! Thrice alas for Bishop Hopkins! With slavery they lose their hold on the last clew by which human reason could find its way to a direct proof of the benevolence of God and the plenary inspiration of Scripture.

All that we have learned of the blacks during the war makes the plan of arming a part of them to help maintain the master's tyranny over the rest seem so futile, and the arguments urged against it by Mr. Gholson and Mr. Hunter are so convincing, that we can hardly persuade ourselves that the authors of it did not intend it to make the way easier, not to independence, but to reunion. It is said to argue desperation on the part of the chief conspirators at Richmond, and it undoubtedly does; but we see in what we believe to be the causes of their despair something more hopeful than the mere exhaustion it indicates. It is simply incredible that the losses of four years' war should have drained the fighting men of a population of five millions, or anything like it; and the impossibility of any longer filling the Rebel armies even by the most elaborate system of press-gangs proves to our mind that the poorer class of whites have for some reason or other deserted the cause of the wealthy planters. The men are certainly there, but they have lost all stomach for fighting. Here again we see something which is likely to make a final settlement more easy than it would have been even a year ago. Though the fact that so large a proportion of the Southern people cannot read makes it harder to reach them, yet our soldiers have circulated among them like so many Northern newspapers, and it is impossible that this intercourse, which has been constant, should not have suggested to them many ideas of a kind which their treacherous guides would gladly keep from them. The frantic rage of Southern members of Congress against such books as Helper's can be explained only by their fear lest their poorer constituents should be set a-thinking, for the notion of corrupting a field-hand by an Abolition document is too absurd even for a Wigfall or a Charleston editor.

Here, then, are two elements of a favorable horoscope for our future; — an acknowledgment of the human nature of the negro by the very Sanhedrim of the South, thus removing his

case from the court of ethics to that of political economy; and a suspicion on the part of the Southern majority that something has been wrong, which makes them readier to see and to accept what is right. We do not mean to say that there is any very large amount of even latent Unionism at the South, but we believe there is plenty of material in solution there which waits only to be precipitated into whatever form of crystal we desire. We must not forget that the main elements of Southern regeneration are to be sought in the South itself, and that such elements are abundant. A people that has shown so much courage and constancy in a bad cause, because they believed it a good one, is worth winning even by the sacrifice of our natural feeling of resentment. If we forgive the negro for his degradation and his ignorance, in consideration of the system of which he has been the sacrifice, we ought also to make every allowance for the evil influence of that system upon the poor whites. It is the fatal necessity of all wrong to revenge itself upon those who are guilty of it, or even accessory to it. The oppressor is dragged down by the victim of his tyranny. The eternal justice makes the balance even; and as the sufferer by unjust laws is lifted above his physical abasement by spiritual compensations and that nearness to God which only suffering is capable of, in like measure are the material advantages of the wrong-doer counterpoised by a moral impoverishment. Our duty is not to punish, but to repair; and the cure must work both ways, emancipating the master from the slave, as well as the slave from the master. Once rid of slavery, which was the real criminal, let us have no more reproaches, justifiable only while the Southern sin made us its forced accomplices; and while we bind up the wounds of our black brother who had fallen among thieves that robbed him of his rights as a man, let us not harden our hearts against our white brethren, from whom interest and custom, those slier knaves, whose fingers we have felt about our own pockets, had stolen away their conscience and their sense of human brotherhood.

The first question that arises in the mind of everybody in thinking of reconstruction is, What is to be done about the negro? After the war is over, there will be our Old Man of the Sea, as ready to ride us as ever. If we only emancipate him,

he will not let us go free. We must do something more than merely this. While the suffering from them is still sharp, we should fix it in our minds as a principle, that the evils which have come upon us are the direct and logical consequence of our forefathers having dealt with a question of man as they would with one of trade or territory, — as if the rights of others were something susceptible of compromise, — as if the laws that govern the moral, and, through it, the material world, would stay their operation for our convenience. It is well to keep this present in the mind, because in the general joy and hurry of peace we shall be likely to forget it again, and to make concessions, or to leave things at loose ends for time to settle, — as time has settled the blunders of our ancestors. Let us concede everything except what does not belong to us, but is only a trust-property, namely, the principle of democracy and the prosperity of the future involved in its normal development.

We take it for granted at the outset, that the mind of the country is made up as to making no terms with slavery in any way, large or limited, open or covert. Not a single good quality traceable to this system has been brought to light in the white race at the South by the searching test of war. In the black it may have engendered that touching piety of which we have had so many proofs, and it has certainly given them the unity of interest and the sympathy of intelligence which make them everywhere our friends, and which have saved them from compromising their advantage, and still further complicating the difficulties of civil war by insurrection. But what have been its effects upon the ruling class, which is after all the supreme test of institutions? It has made them boastful, selfish, cruel, and false, to a degree unparalleled in history. So far from having given them any special fitness for rule, it has made them incapable of any but violent methods of government, and unable to deal with the simplest problems of political economy. An utter ignorance of their own countrymen at the North led them to begin the war, and an equal misconception of Europe encouraged them to continue it. That they have shown courage is true, but that is no exclusive property of theirs, and the military advantage they seemed to possess is due less to any superiority of their own, than to the extent of their territory and

the roadless wildernesses which are at once the reproach and the fortification of their wasteful system of agriculture. Their advantages in war have been in proportion to their disadvantages in peace, and it is peace which most convincingly tries both the vigor of a nation and the wisdom of its polity. It is with this class that we shall have to deal in arranging the conditions of settlement; and we must do it with a broad view of the interests of the whole country and of the great mass of the Southern people, whose ignorance and the prejudices consequent from it made it so easy to use them as the instruments of their own ruin. No immediate advantage must blind us to the real objects of the war, — the securing our external power and our internal tranquillity, and the making them inherent and indestructible by founding them upon the common welfare.

The first condition of permanent peace is to render those who were the great slaveholders when the war began, and who will be the great landholders after it is over, powerless for mischief. What punishment should be inflicted on the chief criminals is a matter of little moment. The South has received a lesson of suffering which satisfies all the legitimate ends of punishment, and as for vengeance, it is contrary to our national temper and the spirit of our government. Our great object should be, not to weaken, but to strengthen the South, — to make it richer, and not poorer. We must not repeat the stupid and fatal blunder of slaveholding publicists, that the wealth and power of one portion of the country are a drain upon the resources of the rest, instead of being their natural feeders and invigorators. Any general confiscation of Rebel property, therefore, seems to us unthrifty housekeeping, for it is really a levying on our own estate, and lessening our own resources. The people of the Southern States will be called upon to bear their part of the grievous burden of taxation which the war will leave upon our shoulders, and that is the fairest, as well as the most prudent, way of making them contribute to our national solvency. All irregular modes of levying contributions, however just, and exactly just they can seldom be, leave discontent behind them, while a uniform system, where every man knows what he is to pay and why he is to pay it, tends to restore stability by the very evenness of its operation, by its mak-

ing national interests familiar to all, and by removing any sense of injustice. Any sweeping confiscation, such as has sometimes been proposed in Congress with more heat than judgment, would render the South less available for revenue, would retard the return of industry to its legitimate channels, by lessening its means, and would not destroy the influence of the misgoverning aristocracy. On the contrary, it would give them that prestige of misfortune whose power over the sentiments of mankind is the moral of the story of Stuarts and Bourbons and Bonapartes. Retribution they should have, but let them have it in the only way worthy of a great people to inflict. Let it come in a sense of their own folly and sin, brought about by the magnanimity of their conquerors, by the return of a more substantial prosperity born of the new order of things, so as to convince, instead of alienating. We should remember that it is our country which we have regained, and not merely a rebellious faction which we have subdued.

Whether it would not be good policy for the general government to assume all the wild lands in the rebellious States, and to devote the proceeds of their sale to actual settlers toward the payment of the national debt, is worth consideration. Texas alone, on whose public lands our assumption of her indebtedness gives us an equitable claim, would suffice to secure our liabilities and to lighten our taxation, and in all cases of land granted to freedmen no title should vest till a fair price had been paid, — a principle no less essential to their true interests than our own. That these people, who are to be the peasantry of the future Southern States, should be made landholders, is the main condition of a healthy regeneration of that part of the country, and the one warranty of our rightful repossession of it. The wealth that makes a nation really strong, and not merely rich, is the opportunity for industry, intelligence, and well-being of its laboring population. This is the real country of poor men, as the great majority must always be. No glories of war or art, no luxurious refinement of the few, can give them a sense of nationality where this is wanting. If we free the slave without giving him a right in the soil, and the inducement to industry which this offers, we reproduce only a more specious form of all the old abuses. We leave all political power in the

hands of the wealthy landholders, where it was before. We leave the poorer whites unemancipated, for we leave labor still at the mercy of capital, and with its old stigma of degradation. Blind to the lessons of all experience, we deliberately make the South what Ireland was when Arthur Young travelled there, the country richest in the world by nature, reduced to irredeemable poverty and hopeless weakness by an upper class who would not, and a lower class who could not improve. We have no right to purchase dominion, no right to purchase even abolition, at such a price as that. No *uti possidetis* conveys any legitimate title, except on the condition of wise administration and mutual benefit.

But will it be enough to make the freedmen landholders merely? Must we not make them voters also, that they may have that power of self-protection which no interference of government can so safely, cheaply, and surely exercise in their behalf? We answer this question in the affirmative, for reasons both of expediency and justice. At best, the difficulty, if not settled now, will come up again for settlement hereafter, when it may not be so easy of solution. As a matter of expediency, it is always wisest to shape a system of policy with a view to permanence, much more than to immediate convenience. When things are put upon a right footing at first, — and the only right footing is one which will meet the inevitable demands of the future as well as the more noisy ones of the present, — all subsidiary relations will of necessity arrange themselves by mutual adaptation, without constantly calling for the clumsy interference of authority. We must leave behind us no expectation and no fear of change, to unsettle men's minds and dishearten their industry. Both the late master and the late slave should begin on the new order of things with a sense of its permanence on the one hand and its rightfulness on the other. They will soon learn that neither intelligence can do without labor, nor labor without intelligence, and that wealth will result only from a clearly understood and reciprocally beneficial dependence of each upon the other. Unless we make the black a citizen, we take away from the white the strongest inducement to educate and enlighten him. As a mere proletary, his ignorance is a temptation to the stronger race; as a voter, it is a danger to

them which it becomes their interest to remove. It is easy to manage the mob of New York for the time with grape-shot, but it is the power for evil which their suffrage gives them that will at last interest all classes, by reform and education, to make it a power for good.

Under the head of expediency comes also this other consideration, — that, unless made citizens, the emancipated blacks, reckoned as they must be in the basis of representation, and yet without power to modify the character of the representatives chosen, will throw so much more power into the hands of men certain to turn it to their disadvantage, and only too likely to use it to our own. This mass, if we leave it inert, may, in any near balance of parties, be enough to crush us; while, if we endow it with life and volition, if we put it in the way of rising in intelligence and profiting by self-exertion, it will be the best garrison for maintaining the supremacy of our ideas, till they have had time to justify themselves by experience. Have we endured and prosecuted this war for the sake of bringing back our old enemies to legislate for us, stronger than ever, with all the resentment and none of the instruction of defeat?

But as a measure of justice also, which is always the highest expediency, we are in favor of giving the ballot to the freedmen. Our answer to the question, What are we to do with the negro? is short and simple. Give him a fair chance. We must get rid of the delusion that right is in any way dependent on the skin, and not on an inward virtue. Our war has been carried on for the principles of democracy, and a cardinal point of those principles is, that the only way in which to fit men for freedom is to make them free, the only way to teach them how to use political power is to give it them. Both South and North have at last conceded the manhood of the negro, and the question now is how we shall make that manhood available and profitable to him and to us. Democracy does not mean, to any intelligent person, an attempt at the impossibility of making one man as good as another. But it certainly does mean the making of one man's manhood as good as another's, and the giving to every human being the right of unlimited free trade in all his faculties and acquire-

ments. We believe the white race, by their intellectual and traditional superiority, will retain sufficient ascendency to prevent any serious mischief from the new order of things. We admit that the whole subject bristles with difficulties, and we would by no means discuss or decide it on sentimental grounds. But our choice would seem to be unqualified citizenship, to depend on the ability to read and write, if you will, and setting the blacks apart in some territory by themselves. There are, we think, insuperable objections to this last plan. It would put them beyond the reach of all good influence from the higher civilization of the whites, without which they might relapse into barbarism like the Maroons of Surinam, and it would deprive the whole Southern country of the very labor it needs. As to any prejudice which should prevent the two races from living together, it would soon yield to interest and necessity. The mere antipathy of color is not so strong there as here, and the blacks would form so very large a majority of the laboring class as not to excite the jealousy of rivalry. We can remember when the prejudice against the Celt was as strong in many of the Free States as that against the African could ever be at the South. It is not very long since this prejudice nearly gave a new direction to the politics of the country. Yet, like all prejudices, it had not coherence enough to keep any considerable party long together.

The objections to the plan are, of course, the same which lie against any theory of universal suffrage. These are many and strong, if considered abstractly; but we assume that theory to be admitted now as the rule of our political practice, and its evils as a working system have not been found so great, taking the country at large, as nearly to outweigh its advantages. Moreover, as we have said before, it compels the redress of its own abuses, and the remedy is one which is a benefit to the whole community, for it is simply to raise the general standard of intelligence. It is superior, certainly, to the English system, in which the body of the nation is alienated from its highest intellect and culture. We think the objections are quite as strong to any elective plan of government, for a select majority is as liable to be governed by its interests and passions as any popular one. Witness the elections at Oxford.

Is the average wisdom or unselfishness of mankind so high, that there should be no narrow minds and no selfish hearts in any body of electors, however carefully selected? The only infallible sovereign on earth is chosen by the majority of a body in which passion and intrigue and the influence (sometimes none of the purest) of conflicting courts are certainly not inoperative. Man is perhaps not the wisest of animals, but he has at least as keen a sense of his own advantage in a hovel as in a palace, and what is for the interest of the masses of the people is not very far from being for that of the country. It is said, to be sure, that we are inadequately represented in Congress; but a representative is apt to be a tolerably exact exponent of the merits of his constituency, and we must look for relief to the general improvement of our people in morals, manners, and culture. We doubt if the freedmen would send worse members to Congress than some in whose election merchants and bankers and even doctors of divinity have been accomplices.

With the end of the war the real trial of our statesmanship, our patriotism, and our patience will begin. The passions excited by it will, no doubt, subside in due time, but meanwhile it behooves the party in possession of the government to conciliate patriotic men of all shades of opinion by a liberal, manly, and unpartisan policy. Republicans must learn to acknowledge that all criticisms of their measures have not been dictated by passion or disloyalty, that many moderate and honest men, many enlightened ones, have really found reason for apprehension in certain arbitrary stretches of authority, nay, may even have been opposed to the war itself, without being in love with slavery, and without deserving to be called Copperheads. Many have doubted the wisdom of our financial policy, without being unpatriotic. It is precisely this class, dispassionate and moderate in their opinions, whose help we shall need in healing the wounds of war and giving equanimity to our counsels. We hope to see a course of action entered upon which shall draw them to its support. In peace, governments cannot, as in war, find strength in the enthusiasm and even the passions of the people, but must seek it in the approval of their judgment and convictions. During war, all the measures

of the dominant party have a certain tincture of patriotism; declamation serves very well the purposes of eloquence, and fervor of persuasion passes muster as reason; but in peaceful times everything must come back to a specie standard, and stand or fall on its own merits. Our faith is not unmixed with apprehension when we think of the immediate future, yet it is an abiding faith nevertheless; and with the experience of the last four years to sustain us, we are willing to believe almost anything good of the American people, and to say with the saint, *Credimus quia impossibile est.* We see no good reason why, if we use our victory with the moderation becoming men who profess themselves capable of self-government, conceding all that can be conceded without danger to the great principle which has been at stake, the North and the South should live more harmoniously together in the future than in the past, now that the one rock of offence has been blasted out of the way. We do not believe that the war has tended to lessen their respect for each other, or that it has left scars which will take to aching again with every change of the political weather. We must bind the recovered communities to us with hooks of interest, by convincing them that we desire their prosperity as an integral part of our own. For a long while yet there will be a latent disaffection, even when the outward show may be fair, as in spring the ground often stiffens when the thermometer is above the freezing point. But we believe, in spite of this, that all this untowardness will yield to the gradual wooing of circumstances, and that it is to May, and not December, that we are to look forward. Even in our finances, which are confessedly our weakest point, we doubt if the experience of any other nation will enable us to form a true conception of our future. We shall have, beyond question, the ordinary collapse of speculation that follows a sudden expansion of paper currency. We shall have that shivering and expectant period when the sails flap and the ship trembles ere it takes the wind on the new tack. But it is no idle boast to say that there never was a country with such resources as ours. In Europe the question about a man always is, What *is* he? Here it is as invariably, What does he *do*? And in that little difference lies the security of our national debt for

whoever has eyes. In America there is no idle class supported at the expense of the nation, there is no splendid poorhouse of rank or office, but every man is at work adding his share to the wealth, and to that extent insuring the solvency, of the country. Our farm, indeed, is mortgaged, but it is a mortgage which the yearly profits will pay off.

Those who look upon the war as a wicked crusade of the North against the divinely sanctioned institutions of the South, and those who hope even yet to reknit the monstrous league between slavery and a party calling itself Democratic, will of course be willing to take back the seceding States without conditions. Neither of these classes are any longer formidable, either by their numbers or the character of their leaders. But there is yet a third class, who seem to have confused their minds with some fancied distinction between civil and foreign war. Holding the States to be indestructible, they seem to think that, by the mere cessation of hostilities, they are to resume their places as if nothing had happened, or rather as if this had been a mere political contest which we had carried. But it is with the people of the States, and not with any abstract sovereignty, that we have been at war, and it is of them that we are to exact conditions, and not of some convenient quasi-entity, which is not there when the battle is raging, and is there when the terms of capitulation are to be settled. No, it is slavery which made this war, and slavery which must pay the damages. While we should not by any unseemly exultation remind the Southern people that they have been conquered, we should also not be weak enough to forget that we have won the right of the victor. And what is that right, if it be not to exact indemnity for the past and security for the future? And what more nobly and satisfactorily fulfils both those conditions, than utterly to extinguish the cause of quarrel? What we fear is the foolish and weak good nature inherent in popular government, but against which monarchies and aristocracies are insured by self-interest, which the prospect of peace is sure to arouse, and which may make our settlement a stage-reconciliation, where everybody rushes into the arms of everybody else with a fervor which has nothing to do with the living relations of the actors. We believe that the public mind should be made up as to what

are the essential conditions of real and lasting peace, before it is subjected to the sentimental delusions of the inevitable era of good feeling, in which the stronger brother is so apt to play the part of Esau. If we are to try the experiment of democracy fairly, it must be tried in its fullest extent, and not halfway. The theory which grants political power to the ignorant white foreigner, need not be squeamish about granting it to the ignorant black native, for the gist of the matter is in the dark mind, and not the more or less dusky skin. Of course we shall be met by the usual fallacy, — Would you confer equality on the blacks? But the answer is a very simple one. Equality cannot be conferred on any man, be he white or black. If he is capable of it, his title is from God, and not from us. The opinion of the North is made up on the subject of emancipation, and Mr. Lincoln has announced it as the one essential preliminary to the readmission of the insurgent States. To our mind, citizenship is the necessary consequence, as it is the only effectual warranty, of freedom; and accordingly we are in favor of distinctly settling beforehand some conditional right of admission to it. We have purposely avoided any discussion on gradualism as an element in emancipation, because we consider its evil results to have been demonstrated in the British West Indies. True conservative policy is not an anodyne hiding away our evil from us in a brief forgetfulness. It looks to the long future of a nation, and dares the heroic remedy where it is scientifically sure of the nature of the disease. The only desperate case for a people is where its moral sense is paralyzed, and the first symptom is a readiness to accept an easy expedient at the sacrifice of a difficult justice. The relation which is to be final and permanent cannot be too soon decided on and put in working order, whether for the true interest of master or slave; and the only safe relation is one that shall be fearlessly true to the principles in virtue of which we asserted our own claim to autonomy, and our right to compel obedience to the government so established. Anything short of that has the weakness of an expedient which will erelong compel us to reconstruct our reconstruction, and the worse weakness of hypocrisy, which will sooner or later again lay us open to the retribution of that eternal sincerity which brings all things at last to the test of its own unswerving standard.

Art. IX. — Death of Mr. Everett.

The death of a man so eminent for thorough training, and who had filled with distinction so many of the highest offices both of his native State and of the Republic, might well warrant us in departing from our ordinary practice, and paying some tribute to his virtues and services before the publication of his biography offered us our conventional text. But whoever else might be silent, it would ill become the North American Review to hold its tribute coldly in reserve. For if he did not originate our journal, he may certainly be said to have established it, to have given it influence, and to have obtained for it that foreign recognition which implied its independent nationality. He was its second founder, and what came to him brick he left marble.

This is not the place for any complete record of the events of his life, or elaborate discussion of his qualities of character and intellect. At the grave, a common instinct of human nature, no less than the first rule of good-breeding, excludes criticism and demands appreciation. And if criticism be untimely, panegyric also hushes, rebuked by the presence of that rigid sincerity of Death.

Born in 1794, and having completed the allotted threescore years and ten, he died in the fulness of his powers and of their public acknowledgment. Though his death was sudden, yet so perfect was the conscientious order of his life that he left no smallest duty, whether public or private, incomplete. The only regret which could be felt at such an end is, that he should not have been allowed to utter his *nunc dimittis* after witnessing the completed triumph of the country and the government he loved so well and had served so faithfully. But he had the truer comfort and the nobler blessing of believing in that triumph during the darkest days of trial, and of contributing toward it as perhaps no other man could do, by dedicating to it the public authority of his name and the energy of all his powers. His death, then, taking place, as it did, ere the inevitable diminutions of age had sapped either his physical or intellectual vigor, might seem but the natural completion of that good fortune which had attended him through life.

But to allow any such precedence to luck would be to moralize poorly a career of so much accomplishment and success. The root of all prosperity is in the character of the man. This is his better chance, his fortunate turn of events, the lading of his dice. Famous at an age when other men are only dreaming of fame, at twenty the most admired preacher of the day, at twenty-five a professor crowding the halls which others languidly emptied, at twenty-five sent to Congress by the eager public opinion of his district, at forty Governor of the State, and then successively Ambassador, President of the University, Secretary of State, and Senator,—office waited upon him to his dying day with that obsequiousness which is commonly shown only in seeking it. What to most men is the sufficing object of ambition was to him but a round of the ladder by which he climbed. He seems to have begun with that twenty years' start which is said to be the privilege in public life of noblemen's sons in England. But his was no such hereditary makeweight. The virtue was in himself, and not his accidents. Always acquiring and retaining what he acquired by that gift of tenacious memory which the Greeks wisely made the mother of all the Muses, and which is accumulated genius, he could always so readily apply his resources, that there was no sphere of public duty whose demands they could not answer as if by a special training to that end. What Dr. Zachary Pearce says of Lord Macclesfield may with equal truth be said of him. "*At tibi semper nihil eruditionis satis visum est, cui aliquid addi posset; illa igitur omnia ita propria tua fecisti, ut, quâcunque de arte sermonem haberes, videri posses non inertem et ingloriam vitam egisse si nihil aliud scires.*" And his industry was not merely that which pleases itself with voluntary acquisition, but was a conscientiousness equally prompt and conspicuous in the smallest details of official duty or personal courtesy. He was not more punctual in writing a despatch than in answering the letters of unknown correspondents. If we have had greater orators and greater statesmen than he, we have had none who combined in himself so many gifts of nature with such ripeness of various culture, or who balanced such a many-sided aptness with so much constancy of character. When Mr. Everett was chosen or appointed to any

post of duty, however distinguished, it would have been hard even for his enemies to have found so fit a man, — impossible to have named a fitter.

We have sometimes thought that, with his refinement of organization, his scholarly tastes, and his gifts as an orator, the true sphere for Mr. Everett would have been in the English House of Peers. He seemed out of place in the rough and tumble of democracy. But we are satisfied that, though his career might have been more unvexed with petty annoyances and incompatibilities, he could nowhere have been so useful as here. In early life he gave an impulse to our scholarship and our taste which cannot be over-estimated, and later his purity of character and dignity of demeanor were a constant lesson in political good manners. Nothing personal is to be found in his writings, speeches, or reported conversation. The credit of this has been given to the coldness of his temperament, it is true; but the emphatic rebutting testimony of his intimates must be accepted as conclusive on this point. We are inclined rather to attribute this seeming frigidity to a sensitiveness of nature, which fenced itself with decorum against the encroachments of that rudeness which some seem to consider the highest privilege, as it certainly is the most insidious enemy, of democracy. In nothing was Mr. Everett's example more beneficial than in this. He gave back to public station that dignity which the elective system insensibly abates, while rendering it only the more needful. It is the most vulgar of fallacies to say that the people make their magistrates because they choose them, and that they will not respect the work of their own hands. The man who is made by votes is sure to be unmade by office. But where, as should be the case, the fitness is in the man, and the popular suffrage but invests with the title, there is a chance that both office and its incumbent shall find the respect which is their due.

This sensitiveness of Mr. Everett's nature, however it may have unfitted him for some of the ruder shocks of politics, never became in him that morbidness which first shuns and then distrusts our system of government. He was always and everywhere an American, nay, that most intense of Americans, a New-Englander. From the time when he defended his coun-

try in the pages of this Review to the day of his death he never shrank from doing battle in her behalf. Naturally averse from conflict, and with a nature softened like his name from its old Teutonic grimness, he here in some measure justified his patronymic of Eberhard. This made perfectly natural and logical his position for the last four years, which surprised many who ought to have known him better. And we believe they were the happiest years of his life. Loving popularity, as all men of his temperament and his line of influence must, he now for the first time found himself where his own deepest instincts and those of his countrymen felt themselves in perfect unison. And it was beautiful to see how instantly the popular heart recognized it and throbbed to him its universal response of love and honor. The same sagacious tracers of historical parallels, who compute the chances of our democracy, with its two thousand miles of coast, by the standard of some ancient or middle-age republic not so large as one of our average counties, are fond of repeating the traditional reproach about the ingratitude of popular governments. Our British cousins (more than kin and less than kind), who always repay great services by a great estate, find especial pleasure in casting this slur upon us. We trust the day will never come when America shall pay off merit with money or pension it with office. And in Mr. Everett's case, what would even the Presidency have been in comparison with that warm enthusiasm which waited on the last years of his life with benediction, and that gratitude which felt his death as a public calamity?

A great part of the fame of a great orator, like that of a great actor, soon becomes traditional. The tone, the manner, the cadence, are evanescent. Mr. Everett was an artist in eloquence. The electric atmosphere of debate did not breed in his mind those sudden flashes that both startle and enlighten in some great speakers. He did not "fulmine," as was said of Demosthenes. But he delighted and persuaded. He lifted his hearers into an atmosphere of purity and principle. We have heard, to be sure, that he studied his intonations, his gestures, his pauses, his seemingly unpremeditated effects. Those who would not hear of an extemporized poet, or mathematician, or scholar, are willing to demand the perfection of

oratory without that labor and forethought which are the raw material, not only of excellence, but of that very ease which seems the gift of nature or the happy moment. Mr. Everett was wise enough to know that nine parts in ten of a native talent lies in the assiduous cultivation of it, and that the fire descends from heaven in vain unless it find fuel ready gathered to be kindled by it and to keep it alive. He came of a family remarkable for alertness of intellect, and no one who ever heard his conversation could doubt the fluency of his mind or his readiness of resource. If he composed his speeches with care, he did what all great speakers have done before him,— what was demanded alike by a proper respect for himself and his audience. It is as idle to undervalue him for repeating the same oration, as to reproach Homer with serving up again the same rhapsody to a new set of hearers. It is his praise that he always did his best.

We have not always agreed with Mr. Everett in his political opinions, but we have believed them to be sincere, as they were certainly consistent. Which of us has always agreed even with his former self? Had he been willing to make the same sacrifices with Mr. Buchanan, for example, who can doubt that he might have had Mr. Buchanan's reward, superior as he was to him in all that makes a man of value to his party? His was a more substantial guerdon in that honor for him living and that sorrow for him dead which are the worthiest civic crown of public service. Had he been only eminent by virtue of the places he had filled, he might have slunk in his tent, an inglorious Achilles, like some others to whom high station has given a name in our history. When he died, he was by common admission our foremost civilian, our most accomplished man. Even in verse he had early won his spurs by some of the most spirited examples of what is called occasional poetry. But if his ambition was keen, his patriotism was superior to all selfish motives. There was nothing in him sordid or unclean. He was as far from the demagogue as the cynic; and when he stands in marble, the image of him will not be whiter than that of the patriot, who in a time of war won for the toga its share in the praise of victory, will stand in the memory of his countrymen.

Art. X. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — 1. *Lectures on the Science of Language delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain in February, March, April, and May,* 1863. By Max Müller, M. A., etc. Second Series. With Thirty-one Wood-cuts. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green. 1864. 8vo. pp. viii., 600.
2. *The Same.* New York: Charles Scribner. 1865. 12mo. pp. 622. [Published by arrangement with the Author.]

Few of our readers, we are sure, can fail to be acquainted with the valuable series of popular lectures on language, by Professor Max Müller, published in London something over three years since, and soon after reprinted in this country. The last year has brought the English public a new series, and it also is now put within our reach by the same American publisher, who has honorably purchased from the author the right to issue American editions of both works: we may read them, then, in their handsome Cisatlantic dress, — not less elegant and tasteful, if less luxurious, than that furnished them in Paternoster Row, — without any qualms of conscience. The new book will doubtless gain the same wide circulation and high appreciation which was won by the old one. The reputation of Professor Müller in this department of science is not excelled, if it is equalled, by that of any other man who writes for the English-speaking public. In England itself his authority is wellnigh supreme: hardly any one ventures to oppose, or even to criticise with freedom and independence, the doctrines he teaches. That these have not been accepted altogether without reserve is shown, however, by the Preface to his present work, in which he very gracefully expresses his especial acknowledgments to those who have differed with him, and craves further criticism, as well as friendly indulgence. Solicitous to win as much as possible of his gratitude, and impressed with the necessity of submitting to a careful examination views which are likely to be implicitly received by so many admiring readers, we propose to use all liberty and plainness of speech in finding fault with, as well as in praising, what seems to us to call for either treatment.

The excellences and defects of this work are the same, in the main, with those of its predecessor. Foremost among their common faults we should account the looseness of their plan. There is no thoroughly systematic and orderly presentation of the subject dealt with; these are lectures not so much *on* the science of language as *about* it, — round

about it, touching here and there upon points to which their position and connections give special interest. This was a very noticeable peculiarity of the first series. It did not put directly before the student a clear and connected idea of what the science is, by what methods it proceeds, what it has proved, and how. While enlightened by its information, edified by its illustrations, and charmed by its eloquence, he yet rose from its perusal with an unsatisfied feeling. It had the air of a book somewhat hastily put together, of such materials as the author had at hand. It even contained whole paragraphs and pages nearly identical with what he had already published, once and again, under his own name. There were passages in it — such as the inquiry into the precise year when Bishop Ulfilas died, and the detailed history of Greek study at Rome — which had no bearing, or but the slightest, upon the proper theme of the work. And one or two of the most important subjects treated of — for example, the nature of the forces which are active in producing the changes of language, with the resulting place of linguistics among the sciences, and the origin of language — were handled in an exceedingly scanty, superficial, and unsatisfactory manner.

But this planlessness is, as might naturally have been expected, yet more characteristic of the second series than of the first. The author was, as he himself informs us, in something of a quandary as to what he should take up as the subject of a new course of lectures. He had thought of filling out in more detail the descriptive map already given of the world's languages; but concluded to abstain from such a task, as one affording him little chance for originality. We cannot but approve his decision: his map was quite full enough for its purpose; there were other parts of his system which called much more loudly for expansion and support. Without, however, directing his particular attention to such parts, as pointed out to him by the criticisms which his views had met with, he decided to limit his inquiries to the field of the Sanskrit, Greek, Latinic, and Germanic languages, and to derive from these "some of the fundamental principles of the science"; and he divides his course into two parts, one of which he promises shall deal with the outside or body of language, the other with its soul or inside, with the origin, growth, and decay of ideas. Here is a semblance of a plan, — and yet not an altogether promising one: for why should we not have *all* the fundamental principles, at least all that were left undiscovered in the first series of lectures? But it is carried out in the same loose and straggling way in which it is stated; as will plainly appear, we think, from an analysis and criticism of the lectures in their order, to which we now proceed.

The first lecture is styled Introductory, on new materials and new theories. It refers with deserved praise and pride to the complete decipherment in our generation of the Persian cuneiform inscriptions, glances at the absurdly exaggerated ideas entertained by certain Polynesian and African scholars respecting the value to linguistic science of their own pet languages, and then goes off upon a series of illustrations intended to show that what is true in one language may be true in others, related or unrelated, and false in yet others. The illustrations are in themselves highly interesting and instructive, as is usual with those which our author adduces; they are admirably chosen, acutely worked out, and ingeniously applied; they are full of suggestiveness; better we have nowhere seen; they constitute the chief charm of both works. In thus praising them, we have at the same time indicated what seems to us their fault. They are too prominent and engrossing; they often seem introduced more for their own sake than on account of what they should illustrate; they overlie the principles to which they ought to be kept subordinate, and draw off our attention from them; sometimes, when we are looking for argument or exposition, our author runs off into his studies among words, in which we follow him with pleased attention, yet with the feeling that we are balked of what we had a right to expect. We stop to ask ourselves, "What does all this prove?" and we are disappointed at the exiguity of the results to which we are conducted. Thus, in the present instance, after some nine pages of illustrations, we are told that "This must suffice as an illustration of the principles on which the Science of Language rests, namely, that what is real in modern formations must be admitted as possible in more ancient formations, and that what has been found to be true on a small scale may be true on a larger scale." (p. 31 [23].*) The conclusion sounds almost like a bathos: we should have called these, not fundamental principles, but obvious considerations, which hardly required any illustration.

Next we have an implied defence of our author's "Turanian" family of languages, which many comparative philologists reject, as founded by him on a wholly insufficient basis of linguistic evidence. We establish our Indo-European family on traceable coincidences of material and structure, but we ought not, he thinks, to require the same among "Turanian" languages; for the geologist does not look for fossils in granite and trap. Very true: but neither does the geologist venture to pronounce two beds of granite or outflows of lava contemporaneous, because they agree in general composition. Many more pages of interest-

* We refer to the American edition, but also add in brackets the page of the original English edition.

ing illustration follow, bearing upon the same point, and the case is summed up thus (p. 41 [33]): "Shall we say, therefore, that these languages cannot be proved to be related, because they do not display the same criteria of relationship as French and English, Latin and Greek, Celtic and Sanskrit?" We answer, Yes, certainly, unless they display other criteria of equivalent value. Two languages cannot possibly be proved related by showing that they both possess such tendency to variation that the material evidences of their common origin may have become obliterated: this will merely forbid us to maintain too dogmatically that they are not and cannot be related. Special correspondences of structure, like those between Chinese and Cochin-Chinese, or between Greenlandic, Algonquin, and Mexican, may perhaps be accepted as indications of cousinship; but to tie together by the name "Turanian" tongues as diverse as Turkish, Tamil, Siamese, Polynesian, and American is totally opposed to all sound principle in linguistics.

More illustration of linguistic variation, drawn from the curious usages of certain Polynesian and South-African peoples, and the introductory lecture is closed.

The second lecture is styled Language and Reason. It begins with a very long, and, for once, a very tedious, analysis of the philosophical system on which Bishop Wilkins, two centuries ago, tried to found an artificial and universal language; intended to guide us to the conclusion that, while such a language might possibly be invented, it would be very different from languages actually existing, and that we are not to suppose, until taught the contrary, that any of the latter were ever made in this manner. This seems to us very much like another elaborate attempt to prove an axiom; but, in the apprehension of Professor Müller, it has a very decided and positive value. It is a part of the argument whereby he controverts a false view of language, held, according to him, by many authorities, and against which he makes fight repeatedly, in different parts of his Lectures. Thus, in the immediate sequel of the analysis referred to, he declares (p. 72 [62]): "There never was an independent array of determinate conceptions waiting to be matched with an independent array of articulate sounds." And again, in the eighth lecture (p. 353 [336]): "But . . . . Locke never perceived that general ideas and words are inseparable, that the one cannot exist without the other, and that an arbitrary imposition of articulate sounds to signify definite ideas is an assumption unsupported by any evidence. Locke never seems to have realized the intricacies of the names-giving process; and though he admits frequently the difficulty, nay, sometimes the impossibility, of our handling any general ideas without the outward signs of language,

he never questions for a moment the received theory that at some time or other in the history of the world men had accumulated a treasure of anonymous general conceptions, to which, when the time of intellectual and social intercourse had arrived, they prudently attached those phonetic labels which we call words."

Now, in all this, we think that Professor Müller is combating a phantom of his own creating. We fail to see that Locke, or any other writer of consequence enough to be worth our author's refuting, holds that which he styles in this paragraph "the received theory." It is a common — perhaps generally an innocent, certainly always a gross and needless — misrepresentation of those who believe in the antecedency of ideas to words, and in the conventionality of language, to hold them up thus as maintaining that men first acquired a great stock of ideas, and then assembled in convention, decided to give names to them, and selected the names. What is actually meant by the conventionality of language, we may illustrate by a simple example. Of the words *you*, *Sie*, *vous*, *tu*, *ella*, *Usted*, *σύ*, *twam*, *bhavân*, *toy*, *ngò*, and the thousand others of like meaning which might be cited, is there one which is the natural and necessary representative of the idea of the person spoken to, and without which that idea could not have existed? Is not every one of them dependent for its meaning on usage, — that is to say, convention? Addressing my neighbor, I say "you," because that is the custom in the community to which we belong: he has learned this sign, and perhaps knows no other. If I go to France, I say *vous*, if to Italy, *voi* or *ella*, for the same reason; or, falling in with some one who has learned Latin, we may use *tu* together. I may cast all these signs away, and devise a bran-new one of my own, which seems to me better suited to its purpose; and if I can only persuade the rest of the community to look at the matter in the same light, to adopt the new word and forget the old, we shall have altered our common language, arbitrarily and conventionally, to that extent. And the same is the case with every item of which any language is made up. One sign is as good as another, provided only it be mutually intelligible between speaker and hearer.

And what, again, is implied in the doctrine that ideas are anterior to words? That any race or individual ever finished the work of elaborating ideas, and then turned to that of contriving articulate signs for them? Not in the least; but only this, that each individual idea precedes its own sign; that no name or sign would ever be devised and applied, but for the previous existence in the mind of something calling for a sign. An idea, then, of any class, may exist independently of any word expressing it. This our author himself perceives and ac-

knowledges, when he says (p. 324 [307]), that, "Out of the endless number of general notions that suggest themselves to the observing and gathering mind, those only survive and receive definite phonetic expression which are absolutely requisite for carrying on the work of life." How, alongside this statement, can stand the one quoted above, that a word is necessary to the existence of a general idea? Not every general idea becomes incarnate in a word; many a one has to be content with expression by a phrase; and who has not been conscious of thoughts which language furnishes no means of precisely signifying; which must be approached on this side and on that, guarded, limited, in order to their communication to others as they lie in our own minds? Professor Müller says (p. 82 [72]), that, "without words, not even such simple ideas as white or black can for a moment be realized." But why not? Suppose, for instance, there occurred but one white substance, namely snow, in the nature by which we are surrounded; it is both possible and altogether probable that, while we had a name for the substance, we should have none for the color; and yet, should we on that account any the less apprehend that color, as distinct from those of other objects, even as we now apprehend a host of shades of blue, green, red, purple, for which we possess no specific appellations? If then, on going southward, we made acquaintance with cotton, should we fail to notice and fully to realize its accordance with snow in the quality of whiteness, even though we had no name for the quality? Certainly not: we should probably call cotton "snowy," and, as we went on to meet with other substances of like quality, we should call them "snowy" also; and at length — particularly if we had left the zone of snow behind us — "snowy" would come to mean to us what "white" does now, and "snowiness" would signify "whiteness." This is a universally typical example: we make a new word, or give a word a new meaning, because we have an idea which wants a sign. To maintain that the idea waits for its generation till the sign is ready, or that the generation of the idea and of the sign is a simple indivisible process, is, in our view, precisely equivalent to holding, because infants cannot live in this climate without clothing and shelter, that no child is or can be born until a *layette* and a nursery are ready for its use, or that along with each child are born its swaddling-clothes and a cradle.

It is incontrovertibly true, that such thinking and such reasoning as we are in the constant habit of doing would be impossible without the aid of words. But this is far from justifying us in the inference that thought is impossible without language. So the processes of the calculus, of analytical geometry, nay, even the working out of a simple

proportion where the factors are of higher denomination than hundreds or thousands, are impossible without the aid of written figures and diagrams; yet mathematical relations and our power to apprehend them are neither identical with nor dependent on such signs. So, again, to build steam-engines and tubular bridges, to weave satins and Brussels carpets, to demolish mountains and fill up valleys, is impossible without the aid of complicated and powerful machinery; yet we do not for that deny all power and efficiency to the bare human hands. Language is the instrument of thought, the machinery with which thought works; an instrument by which its capacity is indefinitely increased, but which is not identical with it, which is only one of its own products.

We have dwelt at some length upon this point in our author's system, because it is one of prime interest and fundamental consequence, and because his error in regard to it appears to us to vitiate no small portion of his linguistic philosophy, involving him in reasonings and conducting him to conclusions which are alike opposed to sound philosophy and to common sense. Listen to the final argument by which he proves the indissoluble connection of ideas and words. The word *experiment*, he says (p. 84 [73]), has a real existence. But change its accent, alter one of its vowels or consonants, and it exists no longer; since "articulate sound without meaning is even more unreal than inarticulate sound." So *cháracter* has a meaning (and hence an existence) in English, as does *charácter* in German, and *caractère* in French; while each is non-existent in the other two languages named. If, then, articulate sounds exist nowhere, it follows that they could not have been picked up anywhere and added to our conceptions; hence, our conceptions can never have existed without them! Is this a serious argument, or is Professor Müller only laughing at us? Surely, the phonetic compounds *experíment*, *expóriment*, and so forth, when we utter them, are just as real existences as *expériment* itself; they are not precisely words, it is true, because a word is the conventionally established sign of an idea, and our usage accepts only the last of the three. Yet either of the former is also a word, if it be uttered with the intent of signifying something, and if we understand what it is meant to signify. How, else, did we derive it from the Latin *experiméntum*, without losing its "existence" on the way? A mispronunciation does not cost the life of a word, — most luckily, or the English would become a dead language very fast. If our Hibernian domestic, on flitting, applies boldly for a *charrácterr*, it would sometimes be convenient to be able to act as if the request, like the thing intended to be vouched for, were a nonentity.

But by far the most serious of the errors to which our author is led

by his false view of the relation between language and thought is his positive identification of speech and reason. Language, to him, is that property by which man differs from all other created things (p. 15 [7]); between language and reason there is no substantial, but merely a formal difference (p. 79 [69]); and so on. This may be taking a high view of language; it certainly is taking a very low view of reason. If only that part of man's superior endowments which finds its manifestation in language is to receive the name of reason, what shall we style the rest? We had thought that the love and intelligence, the soul, that looks out of a child's eyes upon us to reward our care long before it begins to prattle, were also marks of reason. We had thought, that to build a cathedral was as characteristic of man as to construct an argument; that tapestry, and statues, and pictures, and symphonies were, no less than poetry, works of which human nature only is capable. It is to be presumed that Professor Müller thinks so too; why, then, does he strive to hold a view which denies it? He is not afraid to push his doctrine consistently to one of its extreme consequences, by maintaining (p. 79 [69]) that the uninstructed deaf and dumb have never given any true signs of reason, though they catch something of the rational behavior of those in whose society they live! Upon so small a thread, then, hangs the possession of our humanity! A fever in infancy, which leaves an abiding impress only on the auditory nerve, while the rest of our organization retains its normal health, deprives us of reason, and reduces us to the level of the lower animals! And yet the lost possession is capable of being restored to us by instruction! Who shall venture to say longer that reason is a divine gift, inherent in human nature, and not rather the product of instruction? For it is certain that the young child, too, *learns* to speak from those about him; his "mother-tongue," whatever may be his birth or blood, is English, or French, or Chinese, or Choctaw, according as the mother-tongue of his nurses and instructors is the one or the other of these. And if he were set alone upon a coral isle, to live among the birds and monkeys, he would grow up yet more mute than they, having not even a comrade to chatter or sing to. Of course, he would be only a savage, with reason uneducated, with capacities undeveloped; his condition would be raised but little, comparatively speaking, above that of the higher kinds of brute animals; — there are, indeed, whole tribes and races which are not much better off than that, even though possessed of language, and so dowered with the accumulated wisdom of countless generations of their ancestors; — yet he could not abdicate his human nature; he would still be our fellow-creature, gifted with reason like ourselves, capable of a like training, expectant of a like des-

tiny. Professor Müller can make no claim to which we will not gladly assent, in behalf of the importance of language as a means of education, its pre-eminence among the manifestations of reason, its indispensableness to the progress of man towards that perfection which he was meant to attain: we only protest against his confounding the manifestation with the thing manifested, the product with the producer, the means with the agent.

The remainder of the second lecture is occupied with discussions, for the most part sound and instructive, respecting roots, and their reality as the historical germs of speech. Our author is here again, as elsewhere, very severe upon those who hold the onomatopœic origin of roots, but he does not venture a word in defence of his own theory of "phonetic types," laid down in the last lecture of his first series.

The next lecture is "a dissection of the body of language"; that is, a physical description of the spoken alphabet. The author, in it, is content for the most part to eschew originality, and to report the observations and conclusions of others; and he has brought together a great deal of valuable matter, not easily attainable elsewhere, especially by English readers. The subject is profusely illustrated with wood-cuts showing the vocal organs of the throat and mouth, and representing the different positions of these organs which give character to the different sounds. The exposition is professedly not exhaustive: only the more usual sounds of the alphabets familiar to us are described; some difficult and controverted points are passed over without notice; others are unsatisfactorily explained and determined. Thus, Professor Müller's view of the essential difference between vowels and consonants will not bear examination; his definition of the *wh* in *when*, etc., as a simple whispered counterpart of *w* in *wen*, instead of a *w* with a prefixed aspiration, is, we think, clearly false; trilling or vibration is not characteristic of an *l*, nor necessarily of an *r*; the description of *ch* (in *church*) is both wavering and unintelligible; and so on. But especially his account of the *spiritus asper* and the *spiritus lenis*, and his explanation of the difference between such sounds as *z*, *v*, *b*, on the one hand, and *s*, *f*, *p*, on the other, is to be rejected. We have a right to be astonished that he revives for these two classes of letters the old names "soft" and "hard," which have happily for some time been going out of use, and fully adopts the distinction which they imply, although this distinction has been so many times exploded, and the difference of the two classes shown to consist in the intonation or non-intonation of the breath during their utterance. It is in vain that he appeals to the Hindu grammarians in his support; they are unanimous against him: not one of them fails to see and define correctly the difference between "sonant"

and "surd" letters. He declares it physically impossible (p. 154 [144]) to intone a *b*, *d*, or *g*, although he had formerly (p. 143 [131]) quoted from Helmholtz, without dissent, the easy explanation of its possibility; namely, that air enough to support the intonation may be forced from the lungs into the closed cavity of the mouth. And he then proceeds to give a definition of his own, which either implies what he has just pronounced impracticable, or has no meaning at all. The fact which disturbs him, and deflects his reasonings from their true mark, is that the distinction of the sonant letters is capable of being preserved, to a certain degree, in whispering, or utterance with the *vox clandestina*. That the same is true of the vowels he has before admitted without difficulty. So, too, one may test the tone of a pipe without drawing a real note from it; one may distinctly whistle a tune through in a whisper, without a single resonant sound. It is as inherently distinctive of a *v* or *b* as of a *u* to be intoned; the fact, if it be one, that the utterance of the first two, as well as of the last, can be imitated by means of a tension of the vocal cords which falls just short of sonant vibration, is wholly unessential.

The fourth lecture takes for its theme the vast subject of phonetic change. It is filled with interesting information, learned illustration, and apt comment, and may be read with almost unmixed pleasure. Only we cannot think that Professor Müller has made out the fundamental distinction which he claims to exist between "phonetic decay" and "dialectic variation." The same agency brings them both about; they are alike produced by men, the users of language, mouthing over to suit them the words which they pronounce, adapting their utterances to their convenience and their caprice. To suppose, as our author does, that such later variations of an original word as *quatuor*, *chatwar*, *keturi*, *tettares*, *fidvor*, require the assumption of an undefined pronunciation of the initial consonant of their common ancestor, is, to our apprehension, unnecessary. The general agreement of the Indo-European languages as to their mute consonants shows that their articulation was clear and distinct before the dispersion of the family, even as it is at present.

The fifth lecture, that on Grimm's law, is by far the weakest and least creditable to its author of any in the series. As is well known to all historic students of language, "Grimm's law" is the accepted name for a fact of prime consequence in the etymology of the Germanic languages. Taking the series of three mutes, *tenuis*, *aspirata*, and *media*, belonging to each organ, — for example, *t*, *th*, and *d*, — as exhibited in the words of the older Indo-European languages, we find that the Germanic tongues in general have pushed each of them for-

ward one step, turning an original *t* into *th*, *th* into *d*, *d* into *t*; while the High-German dialects, to which the literary German belongs, have pushed each forward another step, converting an original *t* into *d*, *th* into *t*, *d* into *th* (replaced by a sibilant, *s* or *z*). Thus *tad* in Sanskrit is *that* in English, and *das* in German. The same is true of the series *k*, *kh*, *g*, and *p*, *ph*, *b*; the whole with certain restrictions and exceptions into which we cannot enter here. The phenomenon is perhaps the strangest and most puzzling of all those of its kind which the study of language has hitherto brought to light, and not one of the various explanations offered for it is satisfying to the mind. But our author's new explanation is altogether more unsatisfactory than any other; it is no real explanation, or even an attempt at one; it is a mere denial that there is anything to be explained. According to him, it is all a matter of difference of subjective apprehension. The Indo-European mother tribe found it expedient to distinguish, for purposes of expression, three dental letters, *t*, *th*, and *d*, applying each to the designation of certain ideas. But the German part of the tribe looked at matters from a stand-point of their own; they preferred to apply *th* where the others were applying *t*, and then, in order to preserve intelligible distinctness, they had to shift the applications of *t* and *d* also; while, finally, the High-Germans, by a farther idiosyncrasy, put *d* to use where the others were employing *t* and *th*, with, of course, the necessary consequence of a different application of their own *t* and *th*. Accordingly, says Professor Müller, "Throughout the whole of this process there was no transition of one letter into another; no gradual strengthening, no gradual decay, as Grimm supposes. It was simply and solely a shifting of the three cardinal points of the common phonetic horizon of the Aryan nations. While the Hindus fixed their East on the *gh*, *dh*, and *bh*, the Teutons fixed it on the *g*, *d*, and *b*. All the rest was only a question of what the French call *s'orienter*. To make my meaning more distinct, I will ask you to recall to your minds the arms of the Isle of Man, three legs on one body, one leg kneeling towards England, the other towards Scotland, the third towards Ireland. Let England, Scotland, and Ireland represent the three varieties of consonantal contact; then Sanskrit would bow its first knee to England (*dh*), its second to Ireland (*d*), its third to Scotland (*t*); Gothic would bow its first knee to Ireland (*d*), its second to Scotland (*t*), its third to England (*th*); Old High-German would bow its first knee to Scotland (*t*), its second to England (*th*), its third to Ireland (*d*). The three languages would thus exhibit three different aspects of the three points that have successively to be kept in view; but we should have no right to maintain

that any one of the three languages shifted its point of view after having once assumed a settled position; we should have no right to say that *t* ever became *th*, *th d*, and *d t*." (p. 227 [211].)

To us, we are constrained to say, all this exposition is "simply and solely" — nonsense; the paragraph deserves to be quoted as a striking example of the way in which language ought not to be written about, if those who read are to understand and learn. It is a darkening of counsel by words without knowledge. Professor Müller is generally esteemed in England a prime authority for the existence, long since, of a primitive "Aryan" language, spoken by a primitive "Aryan" people, from which are descended the tongues and nations of Europe and Southwestern Asia. Does he, or does he not, believe that this people, before its dispersion, had certain definite mutes, which it applied to certain definite uses? Did that little portion of the original community from which the Germanic branch afterward descended say at first *tad*, along with the rest, changing its pronunciation at a later period to *that*, under the impulse of some motive as yet unexplained, while a certain lesser part of them yet more recently changed the *that* to *das*? or were *tad*, *that*, and *das* said indifferently by all the Aryans, and did those who favored the last two modes of utterance finally sort themselves out and emigrate, offended at the phonetic perversity of the rest, afterward quarrelling with one another, and breaking into two parties, on like grounds? If there is any other alternative supposition to be made, what is it? What is meant by having one's phonetic horizon shifted as to its points of compass? If Professor Müller should come down some morning with a bad cold in the head, and should say "by bad" instead of "my man" over his breakfast-table, would his whole system of mutes be dislocated, and made to exchange places, as if they were playing the game of "puss in the corner"? We wait for further explanations, and prefer meantime to believe, with nearly the whole body of linguistic students, that this mutation of consonants, not less than the infinity of other phonetic changes, of inferior intricacy, which the study of language brings to light, is a real historical occurrence.

In a note to this same lecture, Professor Müller brings forward a very curious hypothesis, which we must not suffer to pass unnoticed, especially as he invites to it examination and criticism, and declares that he should be as glad to see it refuted as confirmed. It is as follows. He finds that the Germanic word for 'fir' (*furh*, *foraha*, etc.) is the same which in Latin means 'oak' (namely, *quercus*), as it also signifies 'oak' in one or two Germanic dialects. Furthermore, the Greek φηγός, 'oak,' is identical with the Latin *fagus*, Gothic *bôka*, our *beech*. Now he has read in Lyell that the peat-bogs of Denmark

show the nearly exclusive prevalence in that region, at a very early period (four to sixteen thousand years ago), of firs, which were succeeded in the same region by a prevailing growth of oak, and this, again, by the modern forests of beech. Combining these facts, he suggests that the Indo-European tribes may have come into Europe during the fir-period, and called the tree everywhere by its proper designation; while the turning of this word, in some quarters, into a name for 'oak' was an accompaniment and consequence of the replacement of the fir-forests by those of oak; and again, that the transition of the oak-period into the beech-period occasioned the conversion by the Germans and Latins of the old word for 'oak,' still retained in its primitive meaning by the Greeks, into a term signifying 'beech.' Hence, as the fir, oak, and beech periods are approximately accordant with the ages of stone, of bronze, and of iron, respectively, a valuable synchronism is thus discovered between the linguistic reckoning and the northern-archæological.

It will not be difficult, we think, to gratify Professor Müller by refuting this hypothesis. Not the very slightest shade of plausibility, that we can discover, belongs to it. Besides the various minor objections to which it is liable, it involves at least three impossible suppositions, either one of which ought to be enough to insure its rejection. In the first place, it assumes that the indications afforded by the peat-bogs of Denmark are conclusive as regards the condition of all Europe, — of all that part of it, at least, which is occupied by the Germanic and Italic races; that, throughout this whole region, firs, oaks, and beeches have supplanted and succeeded each other, notwithstanding that we find all of them, or two of them, still growing peaceably together in many countries. It assumes farther, in the second place, that the Germanic and Italic races, while they knew and named the fir-tree only, — so that later, when the oaks appeared, they could not find a designation for them otherwise than by changing the meaning of the old word for 'fir,' — yet kept by them all the time, laid up in a napkin, the original term for 'oak,' ready to be turned into an appellation for 'beech,' when the oaks went out of fashion and the beeches came in! And finally, the hypothesis implies a method of transfer of names from one object to another which is totally inadmissible; this, namely, that, as the forest of firs gave way to that of oaks, the meaning of 'fir' in the word *quercus* gave way to that of 'oak'; and in like manner in the other case. Now if the Latins had gone to sleep some fine night under the shade of their majestic oaks, and had waked in the morning to find themselves *patulæ sub tegmine fagi*, they might naturally enough have been led, in their bewilderment, to give the old

name to the new tree. But who does not see that, in the slow and gradual process by which, under the influence of a change of climatic conditions, one species of tree should come to prevail over another, the supplanter would not inherit the title of the supplanted, but would acquire one of its own, the two subsisting together during the period of the struggle, and that of the supplanted going out of use and memory as the species it designated disappeared?

Professor Müller himself notices one possible objection to his hypothesis, but makes little difficulty of disposing of it as follows: "Again, the skulls found in the peat deposits are of the lowest type, and have been confidently ascribed to races of non-Aryan descent. In answer to this, I can only repeat my old protest, that the science of language has nothing to do with skulls." (p. 252 [236].)

Whether this reply will be found as satisfactory as it is summary, may well be questioned. There is a certain sense in which the study of language is altogether independent of physical testimony; so far, namely, as concerns the classification and description of languages themselves, and their historical analysis. And yet, even here, physical evidences showing a mixture of diverse races may often be important auxiliaries to the explanation of proper linguistic phenomena. But so far as the science wears an ethnological aspect, so far as it attempts to deal with the history of human races, tracing their migrations and explaining their affiliations, so far must it admit the equal competency of physical science, and submit its conclusions to the review and criticism of physical ethnology. To derive from the changes of meaning of two words conclusions of a momentous character respecting the races of men inhabiting Europe in a primeval past, and to warn off with quiet disdain the physical interpellant, is not a proceeding calculated to bring the new science of language into credit with its sister branches of anthropological study.

The sixth lecture is entitled "On the Principles of Etymology." It is composed mainly of illustrations, respecting which we can only repeat what we have already said, — they are, for the most part, admirable. Objections, of course, may be taken to some of them. For example, we are by no means prepared to believe that the derivation of *gegend*, 'region,' from *gegen*, 'against,' was so distinctly present to the minds of the German tribes who mingled with the Romanic peoples, that they should have been led to form in imitation of it a new Romanic word, *contrada*, *contrée*, 'country,' from *contra*, 'against.' But we have no inclination to enter into a criticism of matters of detail like this, respecting which individual opinions cannot but differ. The title of the chapter seems to us a little too pretentious, since the examples and

accompanying arguments are directed to the illustration of only a single etymological principle, which is thus stated: "Etymology is indeed a science in which identity, or even similarity, whether of sound or meaning, is of no importance whatever. Sound etymology has nothing to do with sound." Of course, our author does not mean precisely what this says; he has only given way, perhaps not altogether wisely, to an inclination to put forth his proposition in a paradoxical and punning form. What he intends, as appears abundantly from the context, is that similarity or dissimilarity of form or meaning is no decisive evidence for or against the relationship of words.

The heading of the next lecture, "On the Powers of Roots," displays the same harmless tendency to play upon words. The lecture itself is one of the most valuable of the series. Its first half is occupied with interesting general discussions, especially on Greek ideas respecting language, and on the principle of "natural selection" as operative in human speech; the second half is a tracing out of the ramifications and developments of a single root, the root *mar*, in the Indo-European languages, in which our author's extensive learning, his wide range of research, his acuteness in combination, and his skill in presentation, are most favorably and pleasingly illustrated.

The eighth lecture is headed "Metaphor," and serves as an introduction to those which follow. It opens, again, with somewhat general disquisition, having reference particularly to Locke's ideas respecting language; a single paragraph we have already cited and criticised, in connection with the second lecture.

In the sequel of this discussion, it really seems as if Professer Müller were attempting to persuade us that such words as *nothingness*, *non-existence*, *extinction*, were words only, which, as having no idea beneath them, ought never to have been suffered to creep into the vocabularies; and that those who dread and those who court extinction are equally the fools of a congeries of meaningless articulations. We shall be prepared to rejoice at his success, and to use our utmost influence to have all words of the sort marked in the dictionaries as "obsolete," in order to their total omission later. He will thus at a blow annihilate — we beg pardon, put out of existence — no, extinguish — well, we may at least be permitted to say, reduce to a state of irretrievable pastness, a host of religious and philosophical systems.

Our author's illustrations of the wide reach and important bearings of the metaphorical use of language, are full of interest. From metaphor, then, he makes an easy and well-managed transition to mythology, which he regards and treats from a point of view quite novel and striking. The importance of etymological researches in the explanation of

mythological ideas and mythical stories has long been recognized; but Professor Müller is, so far as we know, the first to connect the subject so intimately with the study of language, pointing out to what extent mythology is, as he phrases it, a disease of language, a mistaken retranslation, into facts and tales, of expressions at first simply metaphorical in character. His essay on Comparative Mythology, published a few years since in one of the volumes of Oxford Essays (for 1856), attracted unusual attention and interest, and he has here worked over and expanded the subject, so that it fills four or five lectures, occupying the whole remainder of the present course. The titles of the successive lectures are, The Mythology of the Greeks; Jupiter, the Supreme Aryan God; Myths of the Dawn; and Modern Mythology. We have not space to follow our author into this part of his work; and we feel the less called upon to do so, as it is a digression from his true theme, a *hors d'œuvre*. Comparative mythology is not, in any proper sense of the term, a branch of linguistic science, however closely the two may be connected, and however necessary the one may be to the other; just as, to the apprehension even of Professor Müller, who holds language to be absolutely identical with thought and reason, linguistic science and mental science are not one and the same thing. That mythological discussions, then, running into such detail as the translation of Vedic hymns and criticism of the views of others respecting their interpretation, are made to constitute nearly a fifth of our author's whole double course on the Science of Language, is the most striking illustration we have found, perhaps, of that looseness of plan which we pointed out at the outset as characterizing these works.

And yet it would be almost ungrateful in us to complain, in the present instance, of our author's departure from strict method, for these mythological lectures are by far the most original and valuable part of his second series, if not of both series. We do not feel sufficiently versed in such researches to trust ourselves to form an independent opinion as to how far his interpretations of Indo-European myths will be found well-grounded in all their details; but the novelty, profundity, and beauty of his investigations cannot but impress and charm every one who examines them; his comprehension of the spirit of the mythological period seems more penetrating, and his representation of it more faithful and telling, than those of any who have hitherto made it the object of their studies.

While, however, our author's discussions of mythological themes are thus calculated to attract the attention and high approval of scholars, as well as of the general public, and to add to his reputation, we cannot regard the rest of the work as altogether worthy of him. The errors

and defects which we have pointed out in it — not in any fault-finding spirit, but because they were too conspicuous and important to be overlooked — are of such a character as seriously to detract from its authority and value. He has not, as it appears to us, been sufficiently mindful that *renommée*, as well as *noblesse*, *oblige;* he has taken his task too easily, sure that the public would be eager to receive, and ready to accept and approve, whatever it should please him to furnish. We are sure that he is fully capable of making a much better exhibition of this great and important subject, if he would take the pains to reason out his plan more thoroughly, carefully weighing the comparative importance of every part, and verifying the consistency of his various views and arguments; if he would lay out less of his strength upon the illustrative portion of his work, and more upon the theoretic and doctrinal, to which the other should be only subordinate and auxiliary.

---

2. — *The History of the Jews, from the Earliest Period down to Modern Times.* By Henry Hart Milman, D. D., Dean of St. Paul's. Reprinted from the newly revised and corrected London Edition. In Three Volumes. Boston: William Veazie. 1864.

Apart from all religious associations, the Jewish history has its own peculiar interest. The political system of the Jews was organized on the basis of a written constitution, or, rather, of a written code of laws which were irrepealable and unchangeable. This national charter of government did not, it is true, originate with the people, nor was it conceived in the spirit of an endeavor to secure the public liberties from the encroachments of power; its authority was placed above and outside of any popular sanction. But it consulted, studiously and in the homeliest particulars, for the welfare of the people. It recognized the equality of all Jews, and made the most agrarian, and even Utopian, provisions for promoting the general welfare. From the very nature of it as a written charter of government, it became the safeguard of the rights of all. And, accordingly, it gave birth to political parties, to a class of strict constructionists, and to a body of constitutional patriots who watched with jealousy all departures from its precepts, and upheld the spirit of it as against the narrowness and the literalness of ignorant and technical interpretations.

An American, therefore, in reading intelligently the history of the Jews, not seldom finds his attention arrested by circumstances which bear a striking resemblance to some that have arisen under his own political system; even in the same way, if the digression may be par-

doned, as American readers of recent events in England have had occasion, in the disputes of the English ecclesiastics over a late judgment of the House of Lords upon the fundamental written articles of their Church, to notice how all our controversies over the Dred Scott decision, and the constitutional power of the Supreme Court, have seemed to find a parallel. Why, we are tempted to ask, since English people are so fond of deploring the belittling effect of a written constitution in political matters, should they retain a written constitution in their Church?

Among the Jews there was not so much a union of state and church, as a sinking and disappearance of the state in the church, — so that the Jew Josephus had to coin a word — "theocracy" — to express the idea of his national polity.

He, therefore, who sets about writing a history of this people, has before him a task of peculiar difficulty. He approaches a subject which is connected by a thousand threads with the most cherished opinions and feelings of a majority of his readers, and which is watched, night and day, by all the contemporary dragons of religious bigotry. At the outset he must justify himself for presuming to undertake at all to make up a history out of the sacred books of the Old Testament; for at once, as he goes about to investigate the date, the authenticity, the historical value of these books, he is confronted by the frowning dogma of the plenary, literal inspiration of the entire canon. Then appear, one after another, the matter of the Old Testament miracles, the prophecies, the claim of the Jews to be the chosen people of God, the relation of their system to Christianity, and the ugly differences between their approved and divinely authorized behavior and the Christian ideas of God.

Now it is not customary to ask of an historian that he shall make us a confession of his religious belief, nor to estimate the value of his labors by the standard of his theological orthodoxy. And yet, unhappily for the historian of the Jews, he cannot well escape a general application of this irrelevant criticism, since he writes of a people whose whole national life was bound up in their religion, and whose religion is commonly supposed, in an historical point of view, to have been vitally implicated with Christianity. When, therefore, Mr. Milman, more than thirty-five years ago, published in England his History of the Jews, — a work which was marked by a devout and reverential spirit, but also by the good sense and liberality of a scholar, — it was greeted with a howl of dissatisfaction. "Who," cried one of his critics, "art thou, O man, who hast dared to lay bare the works of the Almighty arm, and delineate with such easy familiarity the acts of Him whose thoughts are not

as our thoughts and whose ways are not as our ways? We care not," it was candidly added, "what foundation the writer may have for such bold descriptions, nor how he may attempt to overwhelm us with the learning of Rosenmüller or Michaelis."

After an interval of thirty years, Milman has recently published a new edition of his History. A second edition had appeared in 1830. Mr. Veazie's excellent reprint sets before us Dean Milman's latest additions. The original work is very well known, and there is no need that we should speak of the charms of its picturesque and easy-flowing narrative, or of the genial and honorable spirit of sympathy with which he tells the sad and shameful story of this afflicted Jewish race. Of the manly liberality and fearlessness which marked it, we have already spoken. It is interesting to find that our author sees no occasion for retracting anything which he had formerly written in the interest of free inquiry. On the contrary, in a long Preface, which is written in a noble spirit, he now vindicates his position, and brings his work into relation with the advanced religious thought of the English Church at the present day.

In this Preface Milman claims "full freedom of inquiry" into the authenticity of the sacred books of Jewish history and all their contents, and the whole subject of Jewish history. He asserts that the one essential thing in the Old Testament, in a religious point of view, is its revelation of moral and religious truth; "beyond this sacred range, all, not only in science but also in history, is an open field." He is not anxious about the justification of the moral conduct of the Old Testament worthies; "Abraham, excepting in his worship and intercourse with the One True God, was a nomad sheik." He avows his continued belief in the miracles of the New Testament, nor does he find it possible to account, by natural causes, for all of the events recorded as miraculous in the Old Testament; yet he fully approves of the attempts to find such explanations, and condemns the habit of resting the truth and authority of Christianity upon the argument from miracles. "As such events recede," he says, "and must recede further into remoter distance and become more at issue with our ordinary daily thoughts and opinions, the belief in them becomes a stronger demand upon the faith. Men believe in miracles because they are religious: I doubt their becoming religious through the belief in miracles."

In the body of the work, the most interesting as well as the longest addition is a judicious and broadly conceived examination of the "concurrent facts of Egyptian monumental history and the Hebrew records." With a stout adherence to his English instincts, Milman will accept only a few very general conclusions out of the great number of closely

woven theories offered by the great German scholars. Even of the labors of his friend Bunsen our author bluntly says: "I confess that I have not much sympathy for this, not making bricks without straw, but making bricks entirely of straw and offering them as solid materials."

And now, in the interest of good letters, something ought to be said about Milman's style; for it is a style which is marked by extraordinary faults. It is, indeed, as to the main current of it, clear and easy and simple enough; it is also adorned by unobtrusive marks of classical and poetical culture, and occasionally by an apt and genial use of metaphor which is never excessive and never in bad taste. And yet sometimes, with strange facility, our author sinks, unconsciously and complacently, into the lowest mine of grammatical clumsiness, confusion, anacoluthon, and whatever else may render sentences unwieldy and meaning obscure. Nothing will illustrate what we mean so well as a few examples taken from the work before us; similar examples might easily enough be found in other of Milman's works.

Of Spinoza we are told: "And this did a man, himself of unimpeachable virtue, who, if his icy words ever kindle to any warmth, it is in commendation of purity, of kindness, of humanity, of universal charity." — Does not this remind one of the style of Mrs. Gamp? "Well," said Mrs. Gamp, "does Mrs. Harris know him, which indeed he is her own relation by her sister's marriage with a master sawyer."

It is said of Heine: "The one German whose short lyrics can be read after Goethe's may show what Jewish poets can become, if they will, I would that I could in his case say Christianize (though I believe that Heine's last hours were far different from his earlier ones), at all events fully and entirely Europeanize themselves."

Of modern Latin verse we are told: "No one, perhaps, can derive more pleasure than myself (through education, familiarity with Greek and Latin through Eton and academic studies and practice) from writers of modern Latin verse, the Italians, some of the French Jesuits, the Poles, our own Milton, Cowley, Gray, R. Smith, still I feel, every one feels that the whole is admirably ingenious but no more."

Again: "The history which at its later period is full and distinct in the relations between Egypt and Palestine, from Shishak to Necho, however the Books of Joshua and Judges may have been more incomplete and fragmentary than the Books of Kings and Chronicles, could not, if genuine or ancient, have been guilty of such an inexplicable omission."

And again: "Of what race or dynasty was the king, in what city of *Lower* Egypt (this alone seems certain) he dwelt, Memphis, Heliopolis, Sais, whether ruling over the whole country, or a local sovereign, there is no certain clew."

After referring to his work on Latin Christianity, our author, with a charming failure to convey his meaning, remarks: "As in Jewish history I shall touch but rarely and occasionally on that of Christianity, so in Christianity the history of the Jews sometimes forces itself upon the attention."

In reading of the distinguished positions held by Jews now and in past times, one is astonished to read that "M. Fould is now the finance minister, as in the older days of France and of Spain, to the Emperor Louis Napoleon."

And finally, where our author objects to the Jewish exaggerations in the matter of numbers, he says: "600,000 fighting men were checked and only secured from rout through prevailing prayer to God, by one Bedouin tribe, the Amalekites." — Milman undoubtedly did not *mean* to say that the Amalekites had been so powerful in prayer.

These sentences are not exceptional. It is perhaps the worst feature of these monstrous irregularities, that they occur most frequently in the recent additions and the newer parts of the book. Many of them seem to be accountable, as the errors of one who is used to write for the purposes of public speaking, where gesture and the tone and modulation of the voice will do much to supply what is wanting, and to illustrate what is obscure in the language of a writer. But however we may account for these faults, we can offer nothing whatever in excuse of them.

---

3. — *History of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States of America.* By Abel Stevens, LL. D., Author of "The History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century, called Methodism," etc. Vols. I. and II. New York: Carleton and Porter. 1864. Small 8vo. pp. 423, 511.

No one of the various sects into which Protestantism is divided has been more diligent in preserving the records and traditions of its early history than the Wesleyan Methodists. Within the last thirty years the press on both sides of the Atlantic has teemed with histories, biographies, essays, and occasional discourses, designed to commemorate the founders of the denomination, or to illustrate the story of its wonderful growth; and to this praiseworthy endeavor to do honor to its early preachers we owe the preservation of much historical material of general and permanent interest. Among the writers in this country who have labored with the most success in this department of ecclesiastical history, the author of the volumes before us holds a high rank; and his reputation extends even beyond the limits of his own denomination.

He was for several years editor of one of its chief periodical publications; and while thus employed, he enjoyed great facilities for collecting autobiographical details, local records, and manuscript sketches of one kind or another, of much importance to an historian. The study of Methodist history soon became his specialty, and nearly a quarter of a century ago he gave to the public the first fruits of his researches, in two volumes on the "Introduction and Early Progress of Methodism in the Eastern States," and in some other monographs. More recently he has published a "Life of Nathan Bangs," one of the great lights of the denomination in America, and an elaborate "History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century, called Methodism," from its origin to its centenary jubilee in 1839. To the latter work, "The History of the Methodist Episcopal Church" is designed to form the complement, though it covers in part the same ground, and may be regarded as in some respects an independent production. The two volumes now printed bring the narrative down only to the year 1792, the date of the first regular General Conference, and are devoted to the planting and training of American Methodism. The remaining volumes, we presume, will continue the history to the present time.

In this work, as well as in those which have preceded it, our author addresses himself to the great body of miscellaneous readers, rather than to critics and scholars; and it is not difficult to understand the large popularity which his writings have enjoyed. His knowledge of his subject is ample; his diligence in hunting up minute details is unwearied; and his candor seldom fails. His style is clear, unambitious, and direct; and in his sketches of the pioneers of Methodism he exhibits considerable discrimination. But in two or three respects his treatment of his subject is open to criticism. He has interrupted his narrative by too frequent and too extended citations from other writers, thus giving to some parts of the work the appearance of a mere compilation; and he has been too minute and too prolix in his delineations of the early itinerants. If he had thrown most of his illustrative extracts into the form of foot-notes, and had much abridged his accounts of the many obscure persons mentioned, his narrative would have gained in vigor, in rapidity of movement, and in general interest. It was, indeed, natural that he should feel a denominational pride in the men who spread Methodism broadcast over the land, and that he should be tempted to gather into his own volumes every particular respecting them; but the lives of many of these men have been recorded in separate memoirs, and the interest in them must be mainly confined to readers of their own Church. In referring to the other Christian sects, Dr. Stevens seldom exhibits even the slightest trace of sectarian big-

otry; yet in two or three instances — in speaking of the Episcopal Church in this country, the Unitarians, and the New England Congregationalists — there is a tone of asperity which we should not have expected to find in a writer of so much candor and fairness of judgment. With the qualification implied in these remarks, our author's labors are deserving of high praise; and his volumes must be regarded as an important contribution to the ecclesiastical history of the United States.

Methodism owes its introduction into this country to a small company of Irish "Palatines" who came to America in the summer of 1760, and settled in the city of New York. One of them, Philip Embury, had been a class leader and local preacher in Ireland, and several of the other immigrants were more or less devoted Methodists. But their zeal appears to have been much chilled by the voyage or by the new social atmosphere by which they were surrounded; and it was not until 1766 that Embury assumed the duties of a preacher, and gathered around him a small society. In the following year he was joined by a volunteer associate in the ministry, Captain Thomas Webb, who had become a Methodist some years before, and had been authorized to preach by Wesley, though he still held a commission in the British army. Webb was an Englishman by birth, had seen service at Louisburg and Quebec, at both of which places he had been wounded, and was a man of energy and ability. Hearing of Embury's little company, he left Albany, where he had been employed for some time as barrack-master, and hastened to New York to aid the struggling society. He entered at once into the work with zeal and good judgment, and thus became one of the principal founders of American Methodism. "To Embury," as Dr. Stevens observes, "unquestionably belongs chronological precedence, by a few months, as the founder of American Methodism, but to Webb belongs the honor of a more prominent agency in the great event; of more extensive and more effective services; of the outspread of the denomination into Long Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware; the erection of its first chapels, and the introduction of Wesleyan itinerants." By hisefforts, in connection with those of Embury, a rigging-loft in William Street was hired shortly after his arrival in New York, where they preached three times a week to as large audiences as the room could contain; and in October, 1768, the immediate fruit of their labor was seen in the dedication of the first Methodist chapel in America. It was a stone building, one story high, covered with blue plaster, and measured sixty feet in length and forty-two feet in breadth. The interior remained for a long time unfinished, the floor was sprinkled with sand, and the pulpit was constructed by Embury

himself. But if the society was poor, it was not wanting in zeal; and so rapidly did it increase in numbers, and so great was the interest to hear Webb and Embury, that within two years after the dedication of the chapel as many as a thousand hearers were at times gathered into the building and the area in front of it.

In 1767 or 1768, Webb went to Philadelphia, where he preached in a sail-loft, and formed a class of seven members; and in 1769 he introduced Methodism into Delaware. At a little later period he preached in Baltimore; and in 1772 he went to England, apparently to obtain additional preachers for the Colonies. The remainder of his life was spent, partly in America and partly in England, in the active promotion of the cause which he had espoused. His death occurred in 1796. President Adams, who heard him preach in Philadelphia in 1774, bears strong testimony to the effectiveness of his pulpit discourses. "In the evening," he writes in his Diary, "I went to the Methodist meeting, and heard Mr. Webb, the old soldier, who first came to America in the character of quartermaster under General Braddock. He is one of the most fluent, eloquent men I ever heard; he reaches the imagination and touches the passions very well, and expresses himself with great propriety. The singing here is very sweet and soft indeed."* But it was not by his power as a preacher alone that Webb contributed so effectually to the establishment of American Methodism. His money was freely given to aid in the erection of chapels, and his executive ability was of great use in arranging and organizing classes and circuits, while his urgent appeals when he was in England were the means of bringing several of the most successful laborers from abroad into the field.

Not very long after Embury's arrival in New York, Methodism was introduced into Maryland by an Irish local preacher, named Robert Strawbridge, who settled on Sam's Creek, in Frederick County, and entered with great zeal on the work of an itinerant minister. He was a fluent and energetic speaker, with much of the genuine Irish fervor, thoroughly in earnest, and with an undoubting confidence that the modest wants of his family would be provided for while he was engaged in "seeking for the lost sheep." He did not confine his labors to his own neighborhood, but extended his travels into other parts of the Colony, and even into Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Among his converts was Richard Owen, the first Methodist preacher born on this continent, a man of moderate abilities, but of considerable power as a speaker, and with the frugal and industrious habits which charac-

* Works of John Adams, Vol. II. p. 401.

terized many of his fellow-laborers. Several other preachers were called into the field by Strawbridge's persuasive words and example; and it was in no small degree through his preaching that Methodism became firmly established in Maryland.

Spreading southward, and still gaining strength with its advance, the new denomination soon acquired a footing in Virginia; and in 1772 we find another Transatlantic preacher, Devereux Jarratt, laboring in that Colony, principally at Norfolk and in its vicinity. From this point he occasionally made his way into North Carolina; and to his preaching is ascribed the conversion of Jesse Lee, the founder of Methodism in New England. Another pioneer of the Church, whose name must be mentioned with those already enumerated, was John King, an Englishman, who came over in 1769, and whose labors extended through all the Middle States, and as far south as Raleigh, North Carolina. To these men the planting of Methodism over a large part of the country must be ascribed; and their names must always be held in especial honor by the members of their own denomination. At the same time the purity of their lives, the earnestness and simplicity of their faith, and the usefulness of their labors, will be cordially recognized by persons of different theological opinions.

The success of these laborers speedily attracted the notice of Wesley, and from time to time he sent over additional missionaries to aid in the prosecution of the work. One of these was Francis Asbury, then a young man of twenty-six, but already giving evidence of those remarkable powers which made him the most conspicuous personage in the early history of his denomination in this country. He was the only son of an honest and intelligent peasant of Staffordshire, but had received only the most elementary instruction, and had become interested in Methodist preaching when he was a mere boy. When he was seventeen he began to hold public meetings; before he was eighteen he preached his first sermons; and at twenty-one he set out as an itinerant preacher, though not yet received by the Annual Conference. In the year in which he came to America, 1771, only three hundred and sixteen members were returned as belonging to the infant churches; at his death, in 1816, the denomination included more than two hundred and eleven thousand members and upward of seven hundred itinerant preachers. During these forty-five years he is supposed to have preached about sixteen thousand five hundred sermons, or an average of one each day, and to have travelled about two hundred and seventy thousand miles; and he is said to have presided in two hundred and twenty-four annual conferences, and to have ordained more than four thousand preachers. Such was the tireless activity of this remarkable

man; and by such exertions was Methodism so early and so widely spread over the country. Asbury, like many of his associates, was a solemn and impressive preacher, with a clear and sonorous voice, and his sermons were often marked by bursts of fervent eloquence; but his great success was mainly owing to his flaming zeal and to his unrivalled administrative ability. He was often despotic and unreasonable, but he had great insight into character; his judgment, in general, was sound, and his energy was such as to surmount all obstacles, and to bear down all opposition.

The year after Asbury's arrival, Wesley sent over another man of commanding ability, Thomas Rankin, to serve as general superintendent in America. In company with Webb and several other missionaries, Rankin embarked in the spring of 1773, and after a long and tedious voyage landed at Philadelphia on the 3d of June. The same night he preached his first sermon in America; and a few weeks afterward he attended the first annual conference held on this side of the Atlantic. Ten preachers were present, all of them of foreign birth. The session extended over three days, and the whole number of members in the various societies was returned as one thousand one hundred and sixty. Two of the rules adopted were of no small importance as regards the subsequent growth of the denomination. By the fourth rule the preachers in America were forbidden to reprint any of Mr. Wesley's books without his authority, when it could be obtained, and without the consent of the brethren; and by the fifth rule Robert Williams was permitted to sell the books which he had already printed, but was forbidden to print any more, except in accordance with the terms of the fourth rule. It seems that Williams had printed many of Wesley's sermons in small pamphlets, which had been widely circulated. "But, notwithstanding the good that had been done by the circulation of the books," says an early historian of Methodism, "it now became necessary for all the preachers to be united in the same course of printing and selling our books, so that the profits arising therefrom might be divided among them, or applied to some charitable purpose." It was not, however, until fifteen or sixteen years afterward that the "Book Concern" was regularly organized, and that the business of publishing denominational books became one of the most important operations of the Church. At the present time, according to our author, there are two publishing houses and five depositories, giving employment to twelve editors and nearly five hundred clerks and operatives, and distributing nearly thirty thousand different publications, including fourteen periodicals, with a monthly circulation in the aggregate of more than one million copies. But, from the first, religious

reading had been one of the chief instrumentalities on which the itinerants had relied to quicken and keep alive the impression produced by their sermons and prayers; and as they rode over their wide-extended circuits they carried with them a supply of books, which were eagerly purchased by the new converts. How much importance was attached to this means of instructing the common people is seen in the adoption of these rules at so early a period in the history of the denomination.

During the Revolution the Methodist preachers were the subjects of not a little persecution, and several of the societies almost entirely died out. Most of the preachers of foreign birth returned to England soon after the breaking out of the war, while many even of the native itinerants were strongly suspected of favoring the royal cause. Some of them were mobbed or cast into jail, and others were obliged to seek safety in concealment. So great was the decline of Methodism in some portions of the country, that Dr. Stevens thinks there was not a single Methodist in the Northeastern States at the close of the war. Yet even during this period there were frequent revivals in the Middle and Southern States, and in spite of the obstacles which it had to encounter from political prejudice and the lawless state of society in many places, the denomination actually gained in strength. In the conference of 1783, the number of itinerants reported was eighty-two, and the whole number of members a little less than fourteen thousand, of whom only sixteen hundred and twenty-three were north of Mason and Dixon's line. With the return of peace, and the establishment of American independence, began that wonderful growth of Methodism which soon placed it at the head of all our religious denominations.

Meanwhile a controversy of some importance had arisen among the preachers as to their right to administer the Christian ordinances. On the one hand, it was contended that those who had not received episcopal ordination were not authorized to perform this function, while on the other hand it was justly maintained that to enforce this view was to deprive the great mass of the people of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, and that the necessities of the case required the adoption of a different policy. To obviate this difficulty, and to heal a rupture which threatened to endanger the existence of the Church, Wesley applied to Bishop Lowth "to ordain at least one presbyter to administer the sacraments among the American Methodists." The request was refused, and finally, in 1784, Wesley took upon himself to remedy the evil. On the 1st of September, at Bristol, then as now an important stronghold of the denomination, he ordained Richard Whatcoat and Thomas Vasey deacons; and on the following day he proceeded a step farther, and ordained the same persons elders, and Thomas Coke, a

graduate of Oxford and a man of much energy and ability, superintendent or bishop of the Methodist societies in America. A fortnight afterward they embarked for the new field of their labors; and on the 3d of November they landed in New York. The same evening Coke preached his first sermon in the New World, and at once entered on the discharge of his episcopal duties.

On the 24th of December he attended the first General Conference, in Baltimore. At this memorable meeting, which is commonly called the Christmas Conference, and at which about sixty preachers were present from different parts of the country, the necessary steps were taken for the organization of an Episcopal Church, with the three hierarchical grades of superintendents, elders, and deacons. Coke and Asbury were unanimously elected superintendents, and subsequently received the personal title of Bishops. The Conference lasted ten days; and among its proceedings were the adoption of a liturgy, which, however, was not received with much favor by the societies and soon ceased to be used; the enactment of rules for the government of the Church and the discipline of its members; the election of preachers to the different orders; and their ordination. On one other subject, which had already been freely discussed, the Conference took high and honorable ground. Referring to the institution of slavery, they declared: "We view it as contrary to the golden law of God, on which hang all the law and the prophets, and the inalienable rights of mankind, as well as every principle of the Revolution, to hold in the deepest debasement, in a more abject slavery than is perhaps to be found in any part of the world except America, so many souls that are all capable of the image of God. We therefore think it our most bounden duty to take immediately some effectual method to extirpate this abomination from among us." Accordingly, every Methodist was required to "execute and record within twelve months after notice from the assistant" a deed emancipating all his slaves at certain specified ages; and his failure to comply with this rule made him amenable to various ecclesiastical penalties. But members in Virginia were allowed two years to determine the question of compliance; and so great was the excitement, that it was deemed expedient to suspend the rule altogether within six months. The controversy did not, however, end here; and in our own day we have witnessed its culmination in that memorable schism by which the Church was split into two great geographical sections.

The seven or eight years which elapsed between this episcopal organization of Methodism and the first regular General Conference were crowded with labors by the new bishops and their fellow-workers. A college was founded at Abingdon in Maryland; active and ener-

getic men began to preach beyond the Alleghanies, in New England, and in Nova Scotia and Canada; the number of members was increased from a little less than fifteen thousand to nearly sixty-six thousand, and the number of preachers from eighty-three to two hundred and sixty-six. At this point, as we have remarked, the portion of Dr. Stevens's work now published closes. But if we extend our view across the interval of seventy years, we shall find that the wonderful progress of the denomination has continued, and has kept pace with the growth of the country. By the Minutes of the Conference of 1864, we find that the number of members at that time was 928,300, an increase over the preceding year of 4,926; that there were 6,821 travelling preachers, and 8,205 local preachers; and that the benevolent contributions to the three great denominational organizations, the Missionary Society, the Sunday-School Society, and the Tract Society, amounted to $529,829.44, an increase of more than one fourth over the contributions of 1863. If to these figures we add the numbers belonging to the Church South, and to the seven or eight smaller sects connected with the denomination, we shall find that the whole number of American Methodists at the present time is not less than one million six hundred thousand.

While considering this immense growth of the denomination, the causes of which may be readily traced in its rejection of the Calvinistic theology, in the remarkable zeal and energy of its early preachers, in the fervor of its hymnology, in the social character which was from the first impressed on its organization, in its adoption of the itinerant system, and in the special adaptation of its preaching to the wants of a new and uncultivated people, there are two or three questions which must occur to every thoughtful reader of Dr. Stevens's volume. What is likely to be the future of Methodism in America? How far does the transformation through which it is now apparently passing touch that which is essential to its continued growth and influence? Will the erection of sumptuous church edifices in the place of its first humble chapels, the introduction of paid choirs and the disuse of congregational singing, and the extension of the term of ministerial service in a single church, leading perhaps to the abandonment of the itinerant system, weaken its hold on the masses of the people? — these are questions which cannot be overlooked in contemplating the history of Methodism. But this is neither the time nor the place for their consideration; and the remarks which we might otherwise offer must be deferred for a more convenient opportunity. Meanwhile we shall look with much interest for the continuation of Dr. Stevens's work.

4. — *Martin's History of France. The Age of Louis XIV.* By Henri Martin. Translated from the Fourth Paris Edition by Mary L. Booth. Boston: Walker, Wise, & Co. 1865. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. xxii., 563, and viii., 543.

M. Martin's History of France, in spite of great defects, is undoubtedly the most serviceable and valuable history of the nation to which it relates, and a good translation of it will fill an important place in the library of English historical works. The want of an extended History of France in English has long been felt, and it is probable that the immense scope of the undertaking has alone prevented any English or American scholar from attempting to supply it. Mr. Parke Godwin, indeed, some time since began the work, but seems, we regret to say, to have abandoned it at its first stage.

M. Martin's History has obtained the stamp of approbation from the highest French critical and literary authority. On three different occasions it has received a portion or the whole of the great Gobert annual prize of 10,000 francs for the best work on the History of France; first in 1844, as the award of the Academy of Inscriptions, and again in 1856 and 1859, as the award of the French Academy. In 1860, M. Martin was one of the leading competitors for a still more brilliant prize. In this year the French Academy had for the first time to bestow a biennial prize of 20,000 francs, founded by the Emperor, to be awarded to the work the most honorable or serviceable to the country produced during the preceding ten years, — each of the five Academies of which the Institute is composed to award in its turn. Three candidates for this prize were presented to the Academy, — George Sand, M. Martin, and M. Jules Simon, the well-known economist and moralist. Their rival claims were so warmly supported by their respective adherents, that a majority of votes could be obtained for neither, and the Academy freed itself from the dilemma in which it was thus involved, by selecting one of its own members, M. Thiers, to receive the prize. But the position given to M. Martin's name shows in what high esteem his work is held. No doubt a portion of its credit springs from the fact that it represents principles supposed to be adverse to the imperial *régime.* Political opposition may exhibit itself in a literary judgment. But whatever difference of opinion may exist in regard to it on this score, M. Martin's History is accepted by all parties in France as a work of distinguished merit.

Leaving out of question the older general histories which have now become obsolete, Sismondi and Michelet remain as competitors in the field with M. Martin. In certain respects each is his superior. Sis-

mondi had the disadvantage of not being a Frenchman, and his history shows a want of sympathy with some of the prevailing traits of the French genius. But if not always comprehensive enough in his feelings, and if sometimes under the sway of preconceived notions, he is usually thoughtful and sensible, while the strength and purity of his moral convictions often give dignity and breadth to his judgments of men and of affairs. It was his misfortune to write at a period when the original resources for a great part of the history were still unexplored. He came too early to profit by the fruitful researches of the school of historical investigators founded by such masters as Guizot and Thierry. These researches, beside illuminating the earlier period of the life of the nation, and affording the student the means of forming a clearer appreciation of individual characters, have disclosed partially at least the intricate succession of causes and effects, and have shown the relations of special events and institutions to the general progress of civilization.

Michelet, more fortunate than Sismondi in this respect, has made great use, sometimes well and sometimes ill, of the new materials. A man, if not of genius, at least with the temperament of genius, of fervid and ill-regulated imagination, of vague principles, of prurient fancy, and of much learning, he has produced a brilliant and often misleading comment upon history, rather than a true history. Facts serve him as the ornaments, rather than as the foundations, of dramatic generalizations. Occasionally, indeed, his penetrative imagination lights up a dark passage with unexpected brightness, or seizes the truth with quick and convincing intuition; but in the main he is an unsafe guide, and his style, which is now and then eloquent and poetical, is in the long run an abomination to those who prize moderation of statement, or prefer sober truthfulness to the most dazzling displays of rhetorical exaggeration.

M. Martin, without the dignity of Sismondi or the poetic spirit of Michelet, has a grasp of facts superior to either. His work is one of astonishing extent, and yet no part of it has been slighted. His thorough acquaintance with his subject is the result of unwearied industry, labor, and patience. He too has his theories, and views history through their medium; but he knows and he gives to his readers the facts on which they rest. Much of his philosophy of history is unsound, but it is instructive because based on wide inductions. He is a thorough Frenchman, and writes with the ardor of patriotic zeal, perhaps sometimes with the blindness of patriotic bigotry. For fulness of preparation, for fidelity of investigation, for exactness of statement, and for the scope and general fairness of his work, he deserves high praise. He

narrates concisely and well; and his style, though rarely marked by any special beauty, and occasionally careless and inelegant, usually possesses the virtue of clearness. Altogether the book is that of an uncommonly skilful workman, rather than of a complete artist, — of a clever rather than a great author.

A proper criticism of the work would lead us too far. We can but repeat, that for the common reader as well as for the student it is, on the whole, the most serviceable general History of France, and as such is well worthy of translation. The two handsome volumes before us are the first instalment of the work in English, and present us with one of its most interesting portions, — that relating to the age of Louis XIV. In these volumes the merits and the defects of M. Martin are alike conspicuous. The story of this gilt rather than golden age is narrated clearly and intelligibly. The characters of the actors in it are plainly presented to view; but the historian himself is sometimes dazzled by the brightness of the scene, in which France, Louis, the Court, Versailles, shine with resplendent aspect. The lustre of the time deludes him. It is the reign of magnificent and decorous pretences; and the historian fails to recognize the unreality, the emptiness, of this great, wonderful, but unsubstantial pageant. The strange foreboding contrast between the realities of life and the actual business in which these actors are engaged does not strike him. *Le Grand Monarque* is only the biggest puppet on the stage. Everything is factitious, everything different from what it seems and from what it assumes to be. Rochefoucault's Maxims are but the counterpoise to Bossuet's Funeral Discourses. Nature is no longer respectable; and human nature is exiled to take refuge in the true and delightful comedies of Molière. The tragedy that underlay these comedies no man saw. Racine was the great tragic author of the time!

M. Martin does not show any philosophic insight in his estimate is this pre-revolutionary epoch, but his book contains the facts from which readers may draw conclusions for themselves.

To translate well such a book as this, the translator must have, not only intelligence, patience, accuracy, and a good knowledge of the French language, but a better knowledge of the English than is usually possessed even by tolerably educated persons. The number of subjects treated is so great, and their nature so various, that a vocabulary both wide and exact is required, together with a large stock of specific historical knowledge, as well as of general knowledge derived from other sources.

The translation before us is a proof of the industry and good intentions of the translator, but, we sincerely regret to say, gives evidence

of the want of other requisite qualifications for the satisfactory performance of the task. The translator has not that command over English which is essential for a good style, especially in preventing the transference of a foreign idiom into our own language. The pages of these volumes are sprinkled with Gallicisms, which annoy the reader; and they are not free from errors which may mislead him, and for which it is difficult to find excuse.

The first chapter relates mainly to the financial condition of France during the earlier years of the reign of Louis, from 1661 to 1672. The subject is an intricate one, and, owing to the number of technical terms required in treating of it, makes great demands on the accuracy and intelligence of the translator. The first page of the translation prepares us for disappointment. The fourth sentence stands thus: "The court did not wholly experience the same impressions as the people"; — an awkward form of expression in itself, and an incorrect rendering of the original, "La cour n'éprouva pas tout à fait les mêmes impressions que le peuple," — "The court did not experience altogether the same impressions as the people."

In the fourth line from the foot the important word "councils" is omitted, and the next sentence is very imperfectly rendered.

We proceed to give, in the briefest manner, a few specimens of the numerous errors we have noticed in this chapter.

The verb *prétendre* is often and inaccurately rendered by "pretend." P. 2, "Fouquet pretended to purchase," for *aspired* to purchase. P. 4, "pretend to rear monstrous fortunes"; read, *attempt* to rear, &c.

On p. 6, we find "villain tax" as the translation of the word *taille*, and the same rendering is preserved throughout the History, in which the word very frequently recurs. It would have been far better to retain the French word, for which we have no equivalent in English, and to explain its meaning in a note, than to translate it by a phrase at once so incorrect and misleading.

P. 8, "The *penny post* had been established at Paris in May, 1653." An anachronistic mistranslation of the phrase *la petite poste*, which means simply the city post, in distinction from *la grande poste*, the post throughout the kingdom and to foreign countries.

P. 14, "villages . . . were authorized to resume possession of usages . . . alienated during the war." The French *usages*, in such a connection as this, means *rights;* the sentence as it stands has no meaning.

P. 15, "Disastrous conditions had consumed twenty millions of the annual revenue." Read, "Some twenty millions of the annual revenue had been alienated on disastrous conditions."

P. 18, "they caused purely fictitious *credits* to be paid by the state." "Créances" means *debts*.

P. 25, "Brittany and Normandy, where old malecontents were lurking." Read, "old discontents were brooding."

P. 30, "*He conducted* all the affairs of France for eight years, *when* he became." Read, "He *had* conducted . . . *before*," &c.

P. 32, "Accountable officers were subjected to security." "Les officiers comptables sont assujettis au cautionnement," — "Officers who have to render accounts are obliged to give bonds."

P. 38, "Condemned to death *by* contumacy"!

P. 55, "The nobles . . . obtained the condition . . . that compensation should be made for noble property which they had sold and plebeian property which they had purchased within a century," — an utterly unintelligible statement. The original is, "que l'on compensât les biens nobles qu'ils avaient vendus et les biens roturiers qu'ils avaient achetés depuis un siècle"; which, properly translated, means, "that the noble property they had sold and the plebeian property they had purchased should be set off one against the other."

P. 58, "The imposts on consumption produced more and more in proportion *as they were freed from burdens*," — unintelligible. The French is, "à mesure qu'on les dégrevait," "in proportion as they were lightened," i. e. not *freed from burden*, but made less burdensome.

We might extend our list of errors indefinitely, but we pass to another chapter, the subject of which — Society and Literature — affords fewer difficulties to a translator. But we find similar defects here, and examples of even greater carelessness.

What can be more inelegant than this passage on p. 140, in which, speaking of the petty nobility, the translator says: "The king and Colbert wished to open to *it* the resource of commerce, but *it* refused to countenance *it*, and would accept no other honorable resource than positions in the army, which *it* filled to overflowing. The great lords, in their turn, *once fully encumbered*, fell back upon the king for support." *Bien obérés*, rendered "fully encumbered," means "deeply involved."

On the next page, it is said that the king deprived certain "offices of all character of direct or indirect property, *for the purpose of* reducing them again to mere temporary functions"; this should be "*by* reducing them again," &c.

Passing much over, we find on p. 154 the assertion concerning Huyghens, that "To an epoch *subsequent to his life* belong, at least by the date of their publication, his admirable studies on light." The original has it correctly, *à une époque postérieure de sa vie*, "*to* a subsequent period of his life."

On p. 156 a curious blunder occurs. "Indefatigable workers," it is

said, "passed their lives in extracting materials for history from the *careers* of the past." The original has *carrières*, and the sentence becomes intelligible by reading *quarries* for *careers*.

On p. 163, it is said that Louis "may, as is related, have breakfasted with the poet [Molière] in his room." Hardly. The original is *faire manger le poëte avec lui le matin dans sa chambre*, "may have had the poet to breakfast."

P. 167, "Doubtless a few rhetorical commonplaces may be raised up against" Boileau. This is not what M. Martin says, but that one may remark in the works of Boileau some rhetorical commonplaces.

On p. 171 we read the illogical assertion, that "we must listen to many prosers to discern flashes of true poetry . . . in Quinault"; but M. Martin says justly, that "we must undergo many insipidities in order to reach the flashes of true poetry in Quinault."

P. 182, "the fluid and numerous verse" of Racine, should be "the fluent and harmonious verse." On the same page a curious ignorance is displayed in the translation of the words "Le roman de Renard . . . avait donné à l'apologue le devéloppement des Chansons de Gestes," by "The novel of Renard had developed apologue into *Chansons de Gestes*." The proper translation is the literal one, "The romance of Renard had given to the apologue the proportions of the *Chansons de Gestes*," and a note should explain, for the benefit of unlearned readers, the character of the *Chansons de Gestes*.

P. 185. Here is the strange statement that "the age was *anthropomorphous*, he too, he who," &c. The phrase in the original is no doubt a poor one, but it is very different from this, — "the age was anthropomorphist, it too, it which," &c.

Pp. 202 and 205. The word *gestes*, properly used in the meaning of the *action* given by an artist to the figures in his composition, is mistranslated by "tricks" and "artifices."

Pp. 208 and 209, "site" is mistranslated by *site;* it means, as the context shows, *prospect*.

P. 210, "Mythology was no longer but a great enigma," — "La mythologie n'est plus qu'une grande enigme." Properly, "Mythology is nothing but [no more than] a great enigma." This common idiom often troubles the translator.

P. 213, "The treasures of France were dwindling away in the drawing-rooms of Versailles," — "Les trésors de la France s'amoncellent dans les salons de Versailles"; correctly, "The treasures of France are heaped in the saloons of Versailles."

Pp. 236 and 239, *les réformés* is, with strange ignorance, translated "the Reformers," instead of *the Protestants*.

In a letter recently published in the newspapers, M. Martin expresses in the warmest terms his satisfaction with the translation before us, and compliments it on the ground of its perfect fidelity, not only in expressing "the substance, but the turn of expression of the thought of the author." "The literary and philosophic history surpasses," he says, "what seemed to me possible." We have given our readers some means of judging of M. Martin's standard of the possible in regard to the literary history. We proceed to show more briefly its value in its application to that portion of the history which treats of philosophy.

In Vol. II. p. 231, the sentence, "Boileau en prenant si vivement parti pour Descartes contre Aristote, prouva que son adoration des anciens n'etait rien moins qu'un aveugle fétichisme," is rendered wholly contrary to its meaning, — "Boileau . . . . . proved that his adoration of the ancients was nothing except a blind fetichism." Correctly it should read, "was anything but a blind fetichism."

P. 239. In speaking of Spinoza's idea of extension, the phrase *étendue intelligible*, meaning extension as apprehended in thought, is translated by the incomprehensible words "intelligent extension."

On the same page, in the account of Spinoza's doctrine concerning the soul, where the original has, "L'âme humaine est un mode de la pensée de Dieu destiné à tomber dans le temps," we find the inexplicable translation, "The human soul is a mode of the thought of God, *destined to fall in time*." The true meaning is, *destined to fall into the sphere of time.*

But we will not go on. We are weary of this unpleasant task, in which we have engaged solely with the hope that the exposure of the errors in these two volumes may prevent the remainder of the translation from being disfigured in like manner, and thus deprived of value for careful readers. In the proper execution of the work, the public have an interest with which that of the publishers and of the translator ought to correspond.

The publishers should secure the services of some competent scholar to revise the translation of future volumes before they are put to press.

---

5. — *Meditations on the Essence of Christianity, and on the Religious Questions of the Day.* By M. Guizot. Translated from the French, under the Superintendence of the Author. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1865. 16mo. pp. 356.

It is interesting to see what so eminent a statesman, historian, and philosopher as M. Guizot has to say on those deeper questions of the

day which lie beyond the horizon, and beneath the field in which his labors have hitherto been confined. He assures us that he is going to say something distinct, if not decisive, about them in the course of the four volumes of Meditations which he has laid out for himself; but the present volume by itself, however well designed, is an unimportant contribution to religious thought or theological literature. It will undoubtedly contribute somewhat to the comfort and satisfaction of a certain class of the religious community to know that a man so eminent in politics and scholarship has uttered a grave and impressive warning against the double danger of Romanism and radicalism, and has written his name in large letters upon the old landmark of orthodoxy; but those who, not satisfied with the sound of formal words, *must* have thought and logic and reason to rest upon or to go by, will demand a stronger friend or a stronger opponent than this volume presents.

M. Guizot, indeed, carries his old political method into religious controversy. While occasionally he uses language which implies the strictest orthodoxy, elsewhere he speaks in a way that an orthodox believer, unless of a new school, must find it very hard to accept. His ideas of the inspiration of the Scriptures are certainly somewhat Coleridgian; and as to original sin, it is not a little startling to find that what one reads in a note of Coleridge's as if it were a pun, is with M. Guizot a serious doctrine, namely, that *original sin is that sin which man originates.* These are not his words, but this is the whole drift of the reasoning on pages 77 – 83.

But the concessions which M. Guizot makes more or less indirectly to the spirit of liberal thought, only leave us to marvel and mourn the more that thinking and reasoning men, students of philosophy, should be content, when it comes to the highest and most important subjects, to repeat old formulas with an authoritative tone, as if the distinctness of the sound gave a distinctness to the sense in the mind.

Assumption, however, does not always take the tone of the lion. It often insinuates itself in a mild and modest manner; but in the one form or the other, the substitution of authority for argument, of thunder for lightning (or for light), has always been the greatest vice of theological literature; and it considerably vitiates M. Guizot's book. Not that we charge him with arrogance, — far from it; but he, too, often slips into the error of proceeding as if the report of the celestial phenomenon would answer instead of the flash of truth and the stroke of conviction.

Luther said to Erasmus, "I do not argue, I assert"; and M. Guizot, without any such impolitic tone or thought, simply starts with saying that he shall only show the Christian religion and let it speak for itself,

quietly assuming, however, that his or somebody else's idea of Christianity *is* Christianity. He *assumes* a theory of the responsibility of the Christian religion for Jewish religion; and yet, when he comes to speak of the Old Testament in its parts and progress, he leans very far towards the liberal idea (Lessing's) of the Bible as being the record book of the Divine education of humanity.

Though we find little in this volume that is of worth either in form or idea, we yet look forward with considerable interest to the future volumes of M. Guizot's works, which shall treat successively of the history, present state, and future destiny of Christianity. On these subjects M. Guizot's respectability, political experience, and historical studies will be of more service to him than in treating of the essence of Christian Faith and Doctrine.

---

6. — *Tuscan Sculptors: their Lives, Works, and Times. With Illustrations from original Drawings and Photographs.* By CHARLES C. PERKINS. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green. 1864. 2 vols. 4to. pp. lvi., 267, and vi., 267.

THESE handsome volumes are an important addition to the history of Italian art in English. They are the work of an American long resident in Italy, and do honor alike to his taste, his industry, and his liberal culture. We regret that the small demand in this country for works of this class, in so expensive a form, should have compelled its author to publish his book in England; but although published abroad, it deserves cordial recognition here, and we trust that the reception of these volumes may be such that Mr. Perkins will be encouraged to complete his work, as he states in his Preface that he hopes to do, with a similar account of the sculptors of Northern, Southern, and Eastern Italy.

"Italian sculpture," says Mr. Perkins, "has, in comparison with Italian painting, found but few admirers or illustrators." "It has seemed to me that a space remained to be filled in the literature of art, in which the names and works of many illustrious artists might be pointed out." After an Introduction, in which the author gives a brief account of sculpture in Italy previous to the thirteenth century, he begins his book with the life of Niccola Pisano, the great master of the mediæval revival of sculpture, who was born about the year 1205. The history proceeds in the form of biographical narratives through the period marked by the great names of Pisano, Orcagna, Ghiberti, Donatello, and Luca della Robbia, to the age of Michel Angelo; and in his second volume Mr. Perkins traces the decline of sculpture in Tuscany till the

death of Gian Bologna in 1608. The work thus extends over four hundred years, in which were included the glory, the decline, and the fall of intellectual life in Italy, and affords in its course the most striking illustrations of the general conditions of society and thought during that period.

Mr. Perkins has endeavored, and not without success, to remedy the disadvantages of the biographical form in which he has cast his subject, by interweaving with the lives of the artists some account of the events of their times, which may be supposed to have influenced their characters and genius. But the merit of his book lies mainly in the good use he has made of the scattered materials of pure biography. It is distinguished not so much by philosophical method, historical insight, or penetrative imagination, as by accuracy of statement, candor of judgment, and unpretending good sense.

We regret that Mr. Perkins has not devoted larger space to "the Architectural Sculptors," as he terms them, even, if need had been, to the omission of the names of many of the inferior artists of the later period when sculpture had ceased to be subordinate to architectural effect, and was pursued as an end to itself. Scanty as are the remains of the works of the predecessors of Niccola Pisano in what we may call the Gothic period, — the period, that is, in which the influence of Gothic architecture penetrated Italy, — they yet contain evidence of the existence of a spirit which was fully manifested in Niccola himself, and which deserves more attention than it has received, as indicating the mental and moral conditions under which art and literature rose to their greatest height, and rivalled each other in the grandeur of imaginative conceptions and in the thoroughness and beauty of their execution. The age of the cathedrals of Orvieto, of Siena, of Florence, of Pisa, of Arezzo, was the age of imaginative sculpture. The dependence of great sculpture upon great original architecture was never more clearly manifest.

Gothic sculpture — and by this we mean the sculpture of the time when Gothic architecture prevailed — was purely an architectural decoration. Every work of Niccola Pisano, of his son Giovanni, of all the sculptors of the thirteenth century, had an architectural purpose. Even where not strictly part of a building, it was designed with reference to one; — pulpit, shrine, monument, were not to stand by themselves; they were to be in and for the building which held them. The change which was to come over the art when it should be practised for its own sake is perhaps to be foreseen in some of the works of Niccola himself. In the purely Gothic sculpture, form is disregarded in comparison with expression. In modern sculpture, form has become the chief aim.

Niccola shows the beginning of this change, — a change indicative of deep moral difference, of difference in thought and in feeling, between the Middle Ages and our own.

In following out these topics, many suggestive and fresh illustrations might be derived from Mr. Perkins's present volumes; but we trust that he may yet give us a fuller treatment of them in the later portion of his work.

These volumes, if reprinted in a compact form, would serve as a very useful handbook for travellers, and would be brought within the means of many students of art who cannot otherwise possess them. We wish that an American edition of this kind might be published, and that the illustrations, many of which are of great beauty, might be issued separately, to be purchased by those who desire them.

---

7. — *A Critical Examination of our Financial Policy during the Southern Rebellion.* By Simon Newcomb. New York: Appletons. 1865. 12mo. pp. 222.

It has been the fortune of this country, during the four years' war in which it has been engaged, to make quite as many and as serious blunders in the conduct of its finances as in the management of its armies in the field. It would be idle to attempt to hide these errors, or even to palliate them; and fortunately it is not necessary to do either. The record of these eventful years still contains so much that is honorable to the spirit of our people and flattering to their pride, that it needs no great exercise of candor on their part humbly to confess every fault which they have committed, either in civil or military strategy. If we have made mistakes, we have known how either to repair them or to triumph in spite of them. If we have had feeble and incompetent generals, we have been able to get rid of them, and to put men in their places whose just fame will not suffer by comparison with that of most of the great captains of Europe during the last two centuries. If we have expended twice as much treasure, and contracted at least thrice as much debt, as was necessary, still it is consoling to remember that the whole of this vast expenditure has been defrayed by our own industry, that nearly every dollar of the debt is due to our own people, and that the power and the willingness of the North to continue the struggle, if need be, for the attainment of its original purpose, are seemingly not one whit less than they were when the war first broke out. We have been obliged to improvise both our military leaders and our financial statesmen, and the wonder is that we have succeeded so well.

We anticipate, then, the unfavorable results of "a critical examination of our financial policy during the Southern Rebellion," and are prepared to consider them without flinching. Mr. Newcomb is a very competent critic. A Professor of Mathematics in the Navy, now attached to the National Observatory at Washington, he shows the effects of sound mathematical training by his skill in analyzing the complex problems of finance, and by a remarkable talent for the systematic evolution of his subject, and for distinct and vigorous exposition of its details. Though he seems to have a competent knowledge of the literature of political economy, he has wisely chosen not to avail himself of it by resting his conclusions on the received doctrines of authorities in the science, but has preferred to carry back the investigation of each point to first principles, or, in other words, to those maxims of common sense which everybody admits. Yet the reasoning is so clear and so fully stated, that a school-boy can follow it with ease, while the logic is so vigorous that it is hardly possible to dispute any of the main results. The adoption of this method, it is true, is not favorable to brevity; and what might otherwise have been compressed into a pamphlet has here swelled into a volume of fair dimensions. But popular illusions are so rife on subjects of finance, that we are glad to have a popular refutation of them, which those who were previously ignorant of the science can yet relish and understand. Mr. Newcomb has fairly proved one of the main positions of his book, that there is a science of finance, which is not to be mastered by any degree of familiarity with the mere details of banking or the operations of commerce, but which is still so easy of comprehension that all its doctrines may be clearly traced out with no other aid than a patient application of common sense and sound logic. He has done excellent service by a clear and full exposition of this science, as applied to the criticism of the financial measures of Congress and the Treasury during the last four years; and we heartily wish the book may attain the circulation and influence which it well deserves. The style in which it is written is admirably adapted to its purpose; the illustrations being numerous and apt, while the rhetoric is never permitted to obscure the logic. Almost the only instance which we have noticed of bad writing in the book is to be found in its first two pages, the author having yielded a little too much to a temptation which easily besets young architects, — that of erecting a somewhat stately portico before an otherwise plain house of moderate dimensions.

Perhaps the tone of Mr. Newcomb's criticisms might have been rendered a little less severe, if he had kept more studiously in view the maxim, that what is theoretically best as a measure of finance is not always politically expedient. The problem to be solved by the Secre-

tary of the Treasury and his supporters in Congress was not exclusively financial; they had not to ask themselves merely how this fearful and protracted civil war could be carried through with the least possible expenditure of treasure, with the smallest interruption of the nation's industry, and with the entailment of as light a burden as possible on posterity. If to find an answer to that question had been their only duty, we know not that any severity of censure of their proceedings would be unfair or misplaced. But they had to look further. They had to consider a division of opinion, a separation of parties, even at the North, and to ask themselves whether the whole cause, the cause of Union and of the freedom of every human being born on American ground, might not be imperilled by the institution at once of those vigorous measures of finance which the magnitude of the occasion so loudly demanded. As politicians, and especially as party politicians, it is now easy to perceive that they over-estimated this danger, and that they did not do justice to the ardor and unanimity of the whole people in their attachment to the Union, and in their resolution to do and endure all rather than submit to its dismemberment. But standing where they did, and with the training which they had recently had in party conflicts, we cannot blame them for keeping this peril in view, though we can now see plainly that they were timid politicians and incompetent financiers.

This political faint-heartedness is all that can be alleged to palliate — we do not say to excuse — the first great blunder in the financial management of the war. Congress, which assembled in extra session in the summer of 1861, a few months after the outbreak of the Rebellion, failed to take any adequate measures to support by taxation the national credit, though it was now apparent to all that immediately, and for a long time to come, this credit was to be strained to the utmost. The wants of the Treasury were immense, and were pressing at the very moment. An army of half a million men was rapidly assembling, and all its wants were to be provided for; a navy was not merely to be fitted out, but to be created; all the munitions for war on the largest scale were to be furnished. The spirit of the nation was high; in the whole history of the world, excepting perhaps the first outbreak of the great French Revolution, no parallel can be found to the wave of enthusiasm which overspread the North after the attack on Fort Sumter, and which has been aptly called "the awakening of a great people." This enthusiasm was shared as fully by the rich as by the poor, as was manifested by the munificence of private gifts in aid of enrolling and caring for the soldiers. Heavy taxes imposed at once would have been received with acclamation, and paid with alacrity, for the country was rich as

well as willing. The action of Congress alone in all financial measures, though not in military affairs, was feeble and inefficient; and great blame must also be laid on the Treasury Department, for it does not appear that vigorous action was even counselled by its head, since nearly all that he did recommend, we believe, was actually enacted into law. Except some insignificant modifications of the tariff, a direct tax of $20,000,000, imposed on the States, and an income tax of only three per cent, both to be assessed and paid only after the lapse of a year, were the only measures adopted to raise money except by loans.

Prospective taxes! Taxes to be levied a year ahead, and then but to an insignificant amount, as the only means of supporting an army of half a million, when the enemy were already thundering at the gates of the Capitol, and when it was feared that neither Washington nor Baltimore could be defended against them! Why, after the first battle of Bull Run, which took place before the passage of this tax bill, it appeared doubtful to many persons whether, a year hence, there would be any United States in which these imposts could be collected. Capitalists do not relish such postponed and contingent security for their money. Congress seemed aware of this fact, and was thereby induced, in the bill for borrowing money, to commit its second great financial blunder, by instituting a system of short loans, which, by maturing before there was any reasonable prospect that the war would be over, only enhanced the much greater difficulties of the Treasury at a later period. A loan was authorized of $200,000,000 in treasury notes at over seven per cent, payable in three years. Accordingly, in the summer of 1864, when our financial difficulties were at their height, when a gold dollar was worth two and a half paper dollars, when a million of men in arms were to be provided for, and Mr. Chase was at his wit's ends in the attempt to provide funds for the exigencies of the day and the hour, means had to be provided by him for the repayment of this great loan, matured, though only three years old; and as if the national credit was not even then low enough, the means by which he did provide for its repayment formed a breach of the national faith. He virtually pleaded bankruptcy, and, saying that he could do no better, forced the holders of the notes to accept forty cents on the dollar; that is, in return for a treasury note on which one hundred gold dollars had been received, with a promise of repayment in three years, they were compelled to take a bond, running at least five years longer, the market value of which was one hundred paper dollars, each worth forty cents in coin. Surely, there is a Nemesis in finance, as well as in all other sublunary matters. This breach of faith, which we do Mr. Chase the justice to

believe that he heartily regretted and believed he could not help, was the necessary result of the political timidity and financial short-sightedness which, in 1861, caused the Treasury to advise, and Congress to decree, that there should be only short loans and no immediate taxation.

As if to push this system of short loans to the extreme, this same Loan Bill authorized a further issue of $50,000,000 in notes payable on demand, and receivable for all dues to the government. Of course, such a loan was only a mode of anticipating the slender proceeds of the revenue for the coming year; it allayed the hunger of the Treasury in July and August only to raise that hunger to actual famine in November and December. After the suspension of specie payments, which took place the next winter, these demand notes were quickly absorbed in the payment of customs duties, thereby depriving the government of the receipt of so much gold coin; and when only a small remnant, $3,000,000, of them remained outstanding, Mr. Chase consented, as if to prove that the United States Treasury could keep a conscience, that they should be paid in specie.

The effect on the credit of the government of this feeble action of Congress was immediately apparent. The loan of two hundred millions was negotiated only with great difficulty at over seven per cent, though the five per cent bonds of the single State of Massachusetts were even then above par, and though the national government had borrowed money recently with ease at six per cent. In fact, this loan could not have been negotiated at all, if it had not been for the patriotism of the State banks, which reflected and carried out the enthusiasm of the people. One effect of the subsequent depression of the public mind caused by this low state of national credit, and enhanced by the unaccountable sloth and inactivity of McClellan at the head of his noble army, even after the insults received at Ball's Bluff and by the blockade of the Potomac, was the aggravation of commercial difficulties, which compelled the banks to suspend specie payments late in December, 1861. Congress accepted this act as a national necessity, and by a law passed the next February authorized the Treasury also to stop payment in coin, and to issue one hundred and fifty millions of dollars in paper currency.

Here we are compelled to differ in opinion from Mr. Newcomb, who censures this law both as a blunder and a crime, and attributes to it all our subsequent financial difficulties. We maintain that, under the circumstances, it was unavoidable; and if proper measures had been afterwards adopted, especially if the due limit had been observed in the issue of government notes to take the place of the specie which had disappeared from circulation, there would have been no further shock

to public credit, no injurious depreciation of the currency, no breach of faith, and that the act would even have tended to increase the national strength. The suspension, if wisely managed, might have continued as long as that of the Bank of England at the close of the last century, which lasted over twenty years, and during the first seven or eight of those years did not cause the currency to depreciate more than six or seven per cent. Certainly the immediate effect of the act of February 25, 1862, was to release about two hundred and fifty millions in specie from its employment as money, for which purpose it had become useless, to convert it into a commodity exchangeable for goods from abroad, and to give the government the benefit of a free loan, without interest, of this large sum, by merely issuing its own notes in place of the coin so withdrawn. These notes, *if not issued in excess*, would not have depreciated except to a trifling extent of four or five per cent, or not enough to cause any perceptible loss or embarrassment in trade; actually they did not so depreciate for about five months, as gold did not rise to as high a premium as five per cent till the next June, though the banks had suspended in December. Still further, the State banks, by originating the suspension two months before Congress followed their example, had forfeited every shadow of a claim to be permitted still to use their own notes as currency; they had thereby converted their circulation into true "bills of credit," or paper money, which the Constitution expressly prohibits any "State" or State institution from emitting; while this express prohibition, through what the lawyers call a negative pregnant, impliedly authorizes Congress to emit such money, even if it does not expressly authorize it to do so by granting to this body a power to "regulate the value" of money. It would have been strictly just, therefore, as it surely was highly expedient, to put a prohibitory tax upon the circulation of the suspended banks, thereby driving it out of use altogether, and so creating another vacuum in the currency, to the extent of at least a hundred and fifty millions, which Congress might fill by an additional issue to that amount of national paper currency not liable to depreciation. The whole profit derivable from the issue of currency belongs of right to the people in their collective capacity; and in the great struggle for national existence which was then pending, it was strictly equitable for the nation to exercise this right, so far as it could do so without injuring the right of individuals by compelling them to use paper money which would depreciate or oscillate in value. Nothing can be more certain than that, by driving coin and bank-notes out of circulation, Congress might have gained for the country, in its sore need, the free use of at least four hundred millions of dollars, for an indefinite period, without interest, without injury to the national credit, and without discounting the resources of the future.

To the precise extent, therefore, which we have now indicated, and no further, we stoutly justify, against Mr. Newcomb, the act of February 25, 1862, and what was done in pursuance thereof. But what did Congress and the Treasury actually do? In the first place, they let alone the dishonored State bank circulation, making no attempt to displace it, or even to force it (except some time afterwards, and to a very moderate extent) to contribute to the nation's necessities. Secondly, in defiance of one of the plainest principles of financial science, — a truth verified a hundred times by experience, and recognized by every banker, political economist, or statesman who has written or thought upon the subject for at least a century, — they proceeded to issue their own currency *in lavish excess*, in seeming ignorance of the fact that it would depreciate, or of the lamentable consequences that would follow such depreciation. They seem to have reasoned by induction, thus: We have issued two hundred and fifty millions of this money, and no harm has ensued; therefore we can safely continue the issue to the extent of a thousand millions.

Νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός.

For a clear and forcible statement of the truth which they ignorantly or wilfully disregarded, we will not quote any of the acknowledged lights of modern financial science, from Adam Smith down to Ricardo and J. S. Mill, though they all agree upon the point, merely because we have an American authority at hand which answers the purpose better. Nearly eighty-five years ago, John Adams, looking at the sad results of the old Continental currency, which were soon to produce a dangerous rebellion even here in Massachusetts, wrote thus to the Count de Vergennes: —

"The amount of ordinary commerce, external and internal, of a society, may be computed at a fixed sum. A certain sum of money is necessary to circulate among the society in order to carry on their business. This precise sum is discoverable by calculation and reducible to certainty. You may emit paper or any other currency for this purpose until you reach this rule, and it will not depreciate. After you exceed this rule, it will depreciate; and no power or act of legislation hitherto invented can prevent it. In the case of paper, if you go on emitting forever, the whole mass will be worth no more than that was which was emitted within the rule." — J. Adams's *Works*, Vol. VII. p. 195.

The precise deficit in this fixed sum caused by driving the specie out of circulation was perfectly well known not to exceed, at the utmost, two hundred and fifty millions of dollars. Yet the Treasury, acting under the discretionary powers which it had received from Congress, issued between March, 1862, and September 30, 1864, the enormous sum, in

round numbers, of seven hundred and thirty-two millions of legal tender paper currency. This sum consisted (round numbers again) of four hundred and thirty-three millions of "greenbacks" or government currency proper, two hundred and twenty-nine millions of legal-tender Treasury notes on interest, twenty-five millions of fractional currency, and forty-five millions of National Bank circulation. Of course, depreciation followed; and it is curious to observe how precisely the ratio of this depreciation conformed to the law as stated by Mr. Adams. The specie displaced was to the whole sum of paper issued, as we have seen, very nearly as one to three; and the price of a gold dollar, in July and August, 1864, rose to $2.80 in paper. The currency was put forth at intervals, and in successively increasing amounts, during two years and a half; and the price of gold taken at different times during this period indicated very accurately how much of this currency had then come into use. Thus the premium on gold, which had been trifling up to June, 1862, rose from 20 to 30 per cent before the next October. From this time forward it fluctuated greatly, but with a general progress upward, till it reached 80 in May, 1864; and then, large amounts being issued suddenly to provide the immense supplies needed for the great campaign about to open, it mounted swiftly and with wild oscillations to 185 in July and August. In other words, in those months $2.85 in paper were needed to buy either one dollar in gold, or any commodities which that single gold dollar could purchase.

Of course, this voluntary depreciation of the currency was a breach of public faith, and an avowal both of private and public bankruptcy. The act which sanctioned it authorized every debtor in the community, and the government, which was the greatest debtor of all, to diminish every obligation to pay money as much as the depreciation of the currency had increased during the interval between giving that obligation and its coming to maturity. Any person who, in return for goods purchased, gave a note at six months from February, 1864, for $1,000, each dollar being then worth 63 cents in coin, would pay it the next August with 1,000 dollars worth only 39 cents each; that is, for $630 received he repaid only $390, or less than 62 per cent. But creditors are not always the losers; as the depreciation of the currency, when excessive, is subject to violent and sudden oscillations, it may happen that one who has contracted a debt when dollars are worth only 40 cents each, is obliged to pay it when they have risen in value to 60 cents. In such case, all trade, beyond immediate cash transactions or mere barter, becomes a lottery, commerce is crippled and demoralized, and all faith in contracts is shaken.

We borrow from Mr. Newcomb's work two illustrations of the injustice done by the progress of the depreciation.

"Three years ago two hundred mechanics each put $100 in gold into a savings bank. The savings bank afterward loaned this $20,000 to a shipbuilder, who employed it in building a ship. He sends the ship to England and sells her for $22,000 in gold, making ten per cent legitimate profit. By every principle of justice, $20,000 of the money belongs to the savings bank. But now the legal-tender clause comes in and declares the builder relieved from the debt on payment of 20,000 paper dollars. He therefore buys these paper dollars with perhaps $8,000 in gold, pays them to the bank, and keeps the additional $12,000 for his own private use. He can cover Mrs. Shipper with diamonds, indulge in riotous living during the rest of the war, and furnish to the country a striking example of commercial prosperity.

"A professional man, dependent entirely on his income for support, insured his life in order that his family might not be left penniless at his death. The life-insurance company loans the money to Mr. Shoddy, who invests it in manufacturing capital. With the rise in gold Mr. Shoddy finds both his capital and profits apparently to increase in a corresponding ratio. When his debt is due, he finds that he can sell one half his stock for greenbacks sufficient to pay it, he retaining the other half, though it also rightfully belongs to the insurance company."

And if the insured person dies while the depreciation continues, his family receives only forty or fifty cents on the dollar from the sum which is rightfully their due.

But the government is far the greatest loser in the affair; and rightfully so, for it has not only broken its own faith, but obliged other people to break theirs. To adopt Talleyrand's witty remark, which compresses into a nutshell the wisdom that is of this world, the act of the Treasury which produced this depreciation was worse than a crime; it was a blunder. As its necessities were great, and its breach of faith had been flagrant, it had voluntarily ruined its own credit, and could expect to be able to borrow only by offering the most usurious rates of interest. Accordingly, in the very acts which authorized the excessive issues of currency, Congress was obliged to stipulate that the interest — and by necessary implication the principal also — should be paid in coin. Accordingly, during the last twelve months, the depreciation being on an average two for one, the government has been borrowing enormous sums on the hard terms of covenanting to return two dollars for every one received, and of paying meanwhile ten or twelve per cent interest. Of course the public debt has accumulated during this period with frightful rapidity. To offer a still greater inducement for capitalists to take up the loans, it is further covenanted that the national stocks shall

forever be free from either municipal, State, or national taxation; thus adding at least two per cent to the already excessive rate of interest, and making a serious inroad upon the future capacities of the country to sustain the annual charge of the debt and reimburse the principal.

But we have no heart to follow out any further the lamentable consequences of this long succession of financial blunders. Mr. Newcomb's work is a clear and able exposition of them, though, if considered as a review of our whole financial policy during the last four years, it has some defects. It lacks, in the first place, a connected historical sketch of the financial legislation of Congress and the acts of the Treasury Department, each measure being viewed with reference to the state of public affairs and of military events at the time when it was taken. It is presupposing too much and too accurate knowledge on the part of every reader to take for granted that he remembers with sufficient particularity all that has occurred during the last four eventful years which has any bearing on financial operations. Another and more serious defect is the want of any notice whatever of the large system of internal taxation, which, at too late a day, and with too many marks of crudeness, imperfection, and extravagance, Congress has at length established. We could wish, moreover, that our author had indicated with more distinctness his opinion of what remains to be done in the finances of the war, or of the course which ought to be pursued now in order to remedy as far as possible the errors of the past, and to provide for future exigencies. It is not enough to point out, however clearly, past blunders, without showing how new ones may be avoided.

It is due to the author to observe, that, though his criticisms are expressed with sufficient severity, his whole book is animated with a spirit of earnest attachment to the cause of the Union and the North, and of uncompromising hostility to a wicked and unprovoked Rebellion. But he evidently thinks, and we agree with him, that "faithful are the wounds of a friend"; and that it is a poor way of manifesting the warmth of our love of country to keep an awkward and constrained silence respecting the errors and shortcomings, perhaps the crimes, of those who, in any department, are trusted with the administration of its concerns. Political timidity is the easily besetting sin of our countrymen. At the present hour, certainly, when light is breaking forth from every quarter of the horizon, the cause has more to fear from the cowardice of its friends than from the strength or bravery of its enemies.

8.—1. *Fiftieth Annual Report of the American Tract Society, presented at Boston, May* 25, 1864. *With the Addresses delivered at the Fiftieth Anniversary, and the Proceedings at the Jubilee Breakfast of the Society; also, a Sketch of the History and Operations of the Society during the last Half-Century.* Published by the American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston. 8vo. pp. 192.

2. *Thirty-ninth Annual Report of the American Tract Society, presented at New York, May* 11, 1864. Published by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York. 1864. 8vo. pp. 227.

3. *Daily Prayers for the Lord's Hidden Ones.* Published by the American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston. pp. 48.

4. *Letters to a Theological Student.* By LEVERETT GRIGGS, Pastor of the Congregational Church, Bristol, Ct. Ditto. pp. 112.

5. *The Medicine Shelf.* Ditto. pp. 315.

6. *Jerry and his Friends; or, The Way to Heaven.* By ALICE A. DODGE. Ditto. pp 300.

7. *Apples of Gold in Pictures of Silver.* By MRS. J. P. BALLARD. pp. 205.

8. *Black and White; or, The Heart, not the Face.* By MRS. JANE D. CHAPLIN. Ditto. pp. 174.

9. *Home Stories for Boys and Girls.* Ditto. pp. 144.

10. *Pictures and Lessons for Little Readers.* By MRS. JANE S. WARREN. Ditto. pp. 96.

11. *The Curse; or, The Position in the World's History occupied by the Race of Ham.* By REV. INCREASE N. TARBOX. Ditto. pp. 160.

12. *Hours with the Toiling. A Book for Women.* Ditto. pp. 94.

13. *Ancient Egypt: its Antiquities, Religion, and History, to the Close of the Old Testament Period.* By the REV. GEORGE TREVOR, M. A., Canon of York. Ditto. pp. 400.

14. *Human Sorrows.* By the COUNTESS AGÉNOR DE GASPARIN. Translated by MARY L. BOOTH, with a Notice of the Work, by M. LABOULAYE. Ditto. pp. 279.

15. *The Life of Mrs. Sherwood.* Written by herself. Abridged from the London Edition. Ditto. pp. 441.

16. *New Stories from an old Book.* By LAURENS. Ditto. pp. 216.

17. *Christ the Children's Guide.* By REV. T. S. SEWELL. Ditto. pp. 36.

MOST of our readers probably know how there came to be *two* American Tract Societies. The *original* one was formed in Boston half a century ago, though it did not take its present name till 1823. The New York Society, under the same name, was formed in 1825.

Shortly after, the two societies united under the common name. In 1859 the fast growing moral feeling against slavery, which had cracked with its heat several large religious organizations of the country and rent them asunder, made itself so strongly felt in the Tract Society, that, after some stormy sessions, that portion of the body which sympathized in the demand for more of the free spirit of the Gospel in the action and publications of the Society, and particularly for a clear testimony against slavery, withdrew and reorganized at Boston, of course retaining the old national title first adopted there in 1823.

Although, had the two bodies held together a little longer, the separation would have been obviated by the converting power of events, still it was no doubt a good thing that a new centre of life and influence was again established in Boston; nor do we know that the change may not have had a considerable effect in ripening moral sentiment for the coming national crisis. But be this as it may, the Boston Society's doings have to our ears a clearer ring of the metal the times need than those of the New York Society. The latter acknowledges in the Report of 1863, for example, that this "unnatural and fratricidal civil Rebellion," while "interfering with some of the Society's most cherished plans of usefulness," "has providentially opened new fields of labor"; while the former rejoices (the same year) that it has been "called so prominently to aid in the *moral education of the nation* in this period of its struggle for life," recognizing that struggle as "only the culmination of that conflict with wrong which four years ago compelled the resumption by the Society of a separate and more vigorous activity," and finally declaring the "duty of a Christian publishing society in such a crisis" to be, —

"To stand by the government in the discharge of its solemn responsibilities; to uphold its rightful authority; to teach the duty of loyalty and the crime of treason; to kindle among all classes sentiments of elevated patriotism; to afford to our brave soldiers and seamen religious counsels and consolations suited to their need; to send the messages of God's love and sympathy into hospitals and stricken homes; to prepare the dying for death; to afford instruction to those once enslaved, but now free, and serving as citizens under the banner of our common country; and to diffuse among all the people a love of justice and a devout submission to the will of God, the Supreme Ruler of all men."

It is, however, not the least among the numerous signs of the mighty change in public sentiment, that the President of the New York Society should have been able to say in his opening address at the last anniversary: —

"And now, brethren, since we have been led thus far, let us have courage

to be consistent with what we rejoice in. Let us face the whole result of the providence we have been contemplating. Let the enfranchisement of our colored brethren be a complete enfranchisement. Let it not stop in the removal of the shackles till all are taken away. If the colored man is fit to be a soldier in the full pay and uniform of our citizen armies, standing at least upon an equality of danger and trial with the white man in defence of our government and its blessings, he is fit to be a citizen under our government in full liberty and privilege." — p. 6.

Well does Mr. Beecher, in his admirable speech at the Boston Jubilee, in May, 1864, sum up the trouble between the Societies, and the happy, Divine cure: —

"It was abominably afraid of the radicalism of the present day, and compensated itself by printing all the books of the men who were the radicals of their own day; for there never was a man whose books lived after he was dead, who was not a radical. From the day when it was declared that *the axe was laid at the root of the tree*, it has been only root-men or radical men, which are the same things, who have had any life. *Now*, thank God, we are in a condition to take hold of hands again. You, sir, remember that the last time I had the privilege of standing on the platform of the Society, it was in New York. My work was less agreeable than it is to-night. It was my task then to set forth the sins of the other Society, and, with parental fidelity, chastise them. If that work was not then done, I shall never have another opportunity, I think, of doing it; for God, in his providence, has converted them. I ask nothing better than the address of such a man as Bishop McIlvaine. I ask nothing better than the tone and temper of many of the utterances at New York; and so far from entertaining any grudge, so far from being sorry that even, at last, the New York American Tract Society is prophesying with the rest of the prophets, I thank God for that, too, — the bright consummation of this great struggle." — *Report*, p. 152.

There was, however, one expression in the speech of Bishop Eastburn at the New York Anniversary, which seemed to us not altogether happy, well-timed, or quite just, in its implied interpretation of the signs and tendencies of the times and the indications of Providence.

"And is not," he asks, "much of the preaching of the day since this war against Rebellion began, responsible for such low appreciation of the Saviour's redeeming work? Are we not often told in effect, if not in so many words, over the graves of soldiers slain in battle, that patriotism is a substitute for Christianity, and that the fighting man's passport to eternal life is the blood that flows from a bullet-wound, and not the blood which flowed on Calvary, and which alone cleanses from all sin?"

For ourselves, we think there is far more danger in the direction the Bishop's own narrow view of the Christ's *work* points, than in the direction of that exalting of patriotic heroism and martyrdom which he seems to fear. But the Bishop's sentiment is only one example

of a too common mode of regarding the events of these times in their religious aspects and Christian relations.

We have, indeed, a deep conviction that there is in the present crisis of our country a message of the Gospel to its professed defenders and diffusers, of which scarcely a religious body amongst us seems to have quite caught the import. There is a great slowness of heart among Christians to acknowledge that this startling change in our whole national existence, instead of teaching us simply to work and worry along with all the patience Divine grace may afford, until the time comes for falling back into the old ruts of doctrine and sentiment and method, signifies that God will have us accommodate ourselves to a new style of religious life and Christian charity; that politics is henceforward to be no longer looked on by Christians as an empire of the Devil's founding, but as a sphere of humanity and a field of the Divine Providence; in short, that the Church is to recognize and respect the Christian elements of thought and feeling and purpose and aspiration which have, by whatsoever circuitous ways, modified the civilization of society. The Church will have to learn that true piety must show and prove itself now by true patriotism, and that it always finds its specially evangelic expression in the form of humanity. That is to say, the great struggle, which has only just begun, between freedom and tyranny indicates, not an incidental and secondary, but a primary, perennial, and legitimate work for Christian faith. "The field is the world." It seems to us that one and a not inconsiderable lesson of these times is, that the salvation of the soul is not a selfish, but a social matter; that no man can be saved exclusively; that the soul is not a delicate thing, to be laid up carefully in a napkin and so saved, but it is the man himself, and is to be saved from the evil that is in the world by working and warring against it, and especially against the root of all iniquity, selfishness, by watching against its most subtle and refined forms.

Hardly a religious body in the land, as we said, seems to have had a clear and full vision of the truth which we have now been trying to indicate; but there are evidences that more than one is feeling an uneasy yearning towards a worthier idea of its mission as a representative of the Gospel of the Son of man and Saviour of man. And we look hopefully upon the present attitude and action of the American Tract Society represented in Boston as one of the auspicious signs of the times.

In the recent publications of this Society we recognize a decided advance toward that largeness and freedom of spirit which the Gospel inspires, and which civilization, as we have intimated, is commending, —

which indeed it is commanding the Christianity of the age to cultivate. And yet the struggle with the old narrowness and superstition is slow and painful.

The books named at the head of this paper afford, we judge, a fair idea of the improvement as well as the struggle of which we speak. They are a sample of the merits and of the faults of the American Tract Society's latest literature.

The little book called "Black and White" is a very taking and timely one, and we give it a place in our regards by the side of that charming story entitled "Trust in God," which appeared about a year ago, being a chapter from the history of the German poet Gellert. It is one of the gems for the young (and old too) which shine out from amidst the common pebbles and mere rubbish which too much of our juvenile literature must be called.

The books on our list designed especially for the youngest children are very attractive specimens of print and picture, and the lessons generally are unexceptionable. In the miniature volume called "Christ the Children's Guide," there is something of the old talk about *temper* in children as the sign of a depraved nature, which we wonder men of culture will continue to indulge. It is quite time that the noble and divine element of *temper* were better appreciated, and that teachers and preachers respected it as a thing to be cultivated and trained up to the great work it should do in the trials and strains of mature life.

But the beautiful book of "Pictures and Lessons for Little Readers" presents a painful illustration, in two of its pages, of the fly in the ointment. On page 45 we are told: "It is said that a greater number of persons are drowned on the Sabbath than on any other day of the week. Thus God speaks with a loud voice and reproves those who profane his day." Waiving all consideration of the question whether the view of the Sabbath taught here is Jewish or Christian, we had really thought that all reflecting minds had come by this time to see the bad moral effect of making children's sense of the right and wrong of certain practices depend on having God's judgment in the matter manifest to the senses. We had supposed it to be generally felt what a loose and low state of conscience that must be which estimates the enormity of sin by the *visible* danger of committing it. But as to the alleged fact on which the warning is based, *is* it a fact that more, in proportion to the number who go to sail on that day, are drowned on Sunday than on any other day? We doubt it.

But what shall we say of the story that pollutes the next page, when we turn the leaf over? A young man who had been led away by some infidels is taken sick, and as death draws near he is converted from the

error of his ways. One of his old associates comes to see him. "As the infidel went out, a brother of the sick man took him by the shoulder and said, 'Never show your cloven foot here again! If you do not believe in God, I will give you good reason to believe in man, for I will break every bone in your skin!'"

And this is printed without the least sign of disapproval, as if it were a commendable example of holy zeal. What a comment on the softening influence of a sick-chamber, of the tender influence of death! We marvel what kind of editorial responsibility was exercised in this volume. Is this the way children are to be trained to the humane religion of Jesus?

But such defects and distortions as these will, we trust, gradually disappear, and the noble sentiments in regard to the Christian and human literature the age demands, and which Mr. Beecher in his speech (already quoted) so well utters, be satisfied in the wholesome mental, moral, and spiritual food which the Tract Society shall, with its growing means, supply to the young and the old.

---

9. — *The Correlation and Conservation of Forces: a Series of Expositions, by* Prof. Grove, Prof. Helmholtz, Dr. Mayer, Dr. Faraday, Prof. Liebig, *and* Dr. Carpenter; *with an Introduction and brief Biographical Notices of the chief Promoters of the New Views.* By Edward L. Youmans, M. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1865. 12mo. pp. xlii., 438.

The essays collected in this volume have already an established reputation as summary expositions of the most interesting and instructive results of modern physical researches; and Dr. Youmans has done a great service to the American public, in presenting it with selections so well chosen and in such compact and readable shape.

That Dr. Youmans has great skill in book-making appears both in the present volume and in his recently published class-book of Chemistry. In the latter he has incorporated modern ideas of physical science with an apparently distinct apprehension of their true range and value. But this is strangely at variance with the vague talk with which he introduces these essays. It is unfortunate that the impression this Introduction is calculated to make about the scope and character of the essays should be allowed to prepossess the mind of the reader.

Dr. Youmans speaks of the general subject of these essays as "a new philosophy" and as "the new doctrine of force." But the emphatic part of the general doctrine is not about the nature of force

as an entity or a causal agency, but about the quantitative elements and relations in those general orders of succession in physical phenomena which are manifested in motions. The word "force" is used only for a convenience, and by most of the writers with the same careful limitation and separation from any substantive signification as in mathematical mechanics. Dr. Mayer says: —

"The exact sciences are concerned with phenomena and measurable quantities. The first cause of things is Deity, — a being ever inscrutable by the intellect of man; while 'higher causes,' 'supersensuous forces,' and the rest, with all their consequences, belong to the delusive middle region of naturalistic philosophy and mysticism."

The other essayists hold similar views, and disconnect the objects of scientific inquiry from those of religious thought and feeling. But their editor, occupying that "delusive middle region of naturalistic philosophy" which Dr. Mayer describes, and without heeding his warning, speaks of the progress which these essays are designed to illustrate, as showing a tendency "ever *from* the material *toward* the abstract, the ideal, the spiritual." He confounds the scientific distinction between concrete material objects and abstract formal relations, with the philosophical distinction between the material and the spiritual, and illustrates what he understands by materialism, by instancing the crude devices of ancient astronomy.

"At length," he says, "the labors of astronomers, terminating with Newton, struck away these crude devices, and substituted the action of a universal immaterial force. The course of astronomic science has thus been on a large scale to withdraw attention from the material and sensible, and to fix it upon the invisible and supersensuous. It has shown that a pure principle forms the immaterial foundation of the universe. From the baldest materiality we rise at last to a truth of the spiritual world, of so exalted an order that it has been said 'to connect the mind of man with the Spirit of God.'

"The tendency thus illustrated by astronomy is characteristic in a marked degree of all modern science. Scientific inquiries are becoming less and less questions of matter, and more and more questions of force; material ideas are giving place to dynamical ideas."

The editor speaks throughout this essay as if he were publishing a new Gospel of Force, according to Grove, Helmholtz, Mayer, Faraday, and others, — a design which no one would more earnestly reprobate than these distinguished physicists. Nothing can be conceived more erroneous than presenting these remarkable essays as illustrations and proofs of Mr. Herbert Spencer's dynamism. The editor may honestly admire Mr. Spencer's vagaries, but it is difficult to conceive how any

one with the scientific attainments which Dr. Youmans's books exhibit, can have undesignedly so misrepresented the character of the writings he has here collected.

Modern science uses the words "force" and "cause" always under protest, and not to express any substantive object of scientific research. The are used to avoid paraphrase, and to express in each particular case that part of a series of related phenomena which, for some scientific reason, is to be separately considered; and they generally comprise those antecedent conditions of any phenomenon which bring it into the most extensive rational connection with other and more general phenomena. Professor Grove says of causes: —

"The common error, if I am right in supposing it to be such, consists in the abstraction of cause, and in supposing in each case a general secondary cause, — a something which is not the first cause, but which, if we examine it carefully, must have all the attributes of a first cause, and an existence independent of and dominant over matter."

Of forces he says: —

"Do we know more of the phenomenon, viewed without reference to other phenomena, by saying it is produced by force? Certainly not. All we know or see is the effect; we do not see force, — we see motion or moving matter."

Scientific ideas of cause and force are the same as those of the Positive Philosophy, though they are not derived from this source; the Positive Philosophy being itself derived from a one-sided attention to the ideas of modern science.

Dr. Mayer uses "force" and "phenomenon," not as antithetical, but as species and genus. He divides phenomena into two species, "forces" and "properties." Properties are unchangeable phenomena; forces are convertible phenomena, but convertible according to unchangeable laws, through balanced and correlated processes. The "indestructibility of matter" and "the conservation of force" mean in science only that certain measurable properties of matter persist unchanged throughout all natural changes, and that forces or convertible phenomena are so related that no changes can affect the measures according to which these forces are mutually convertible. Both these doctrines are concerned with measurable phenomena, and have nothing to do with the vague "matter" and "force" of naturalistic philosophy. There is nothing of an *a priori* or philosophic character about them.

If there be anything which should be credited exclusively to empirical science it is the establishment of these doctrines, which have only a superficial resemblance to anything which speculative philosophy has ever excogitated. Nevertheless Dr. Youmans, who ought to have known better, claims for Mr. Herbert Spencer

"the honor of crowning this sublime inquiry by showing that the law of the conservation, or as he prefers to term it 'the Persistence of Force,' as it is the underlying principle of all being, is also the fundamental truth of all philosophy. With masterly analytic skill he has shown that this principle, of which the human mind has just become fully conscious, is itself the profoundest law of the human mind, the deepest foundation of consciousness. He has demonstrated that the law of the Persistence of Force, of which the most piercing intellects of past times had but partial and unsatisfying glimpses, and which the latest scientific research has disclosed as a great principle of nature, has a yet more transcendent character; is, in fact, an *a priori* truth of the highest order, — a truth which is necessarily involved in our mental organization, which is broader than any possible induction, and of higher validity than any other truth whatever."

The extravagant absurdity of this claim is only surpassed by that of Mr. Spencer's pretensions, who is quoted as follows: —

"We might, indeed, be certain, even in the absence of any such analysis as the foregoing, that there must exist some principle which, as being the basis of science, cannot be established by science. All reasoned out conclusions whatever must rest on some postulate. As before shown, we cannot go on, merging derivative truths in these wider and wider truths from which they are derived, without reaching at last a widest truth, which can be merged in no other or derived from no other. And whoever contemplates the relation in which it stands to the truths of science in general will see that this truth, transcending demonstration, is the Persistence of Force. . . . . Such, then, is the foundation of any possible system of positive knowledge. Deeper than demonstration, deeper even than definite cognition, deep as the very nature of mind, is the postulate at which we have arrived."

Mr. Spencer's "Persistence of Force" may be deeper than definite cognition, — indeed, we have found it so; but the law of the conservation of force is essentially comprehensible and definite. It is exclusively concerned with the phenomenal and the measurable; and though it has not yet been demonstrated with mathematical certainty as a universal law of nature, yet experiment has rendered its universality so probable that no reasonable doubt of it remains in the minds of physicists.

The introductory remarks of Professor Grove's essay on "the Correlation of Physical Forces," contain an excellent discussion of the scientific use of the words "cause" and "force," and may serve to correct the false impressions which the reader will get from the editor's Introduction.

10. — *Harper's Weekly. A Journal of Civilization.* 1857 – 1864. 8 vols. folio.

Is it eight or eighty years that are chronicled in these volumes? The leading article in the first number of Harper's Weekly, bearing date of January 3, 1857, was on the election of Buchanan, and it contains the following words: "The principle lying at the basis of free government — the only principle on which a free system, as opposed to systems of force or of a class, can exist — the principle of peaceful arrangement of contending forces and interests — is the principle, in a word, of COMPROMISE." "When the sun of compromise in this country shall set, it will rise on a scene of civil conflict, and, in all probability, of bloody strife."

The leading article in the last number of the last volume of Harper's Weekly, bearing date of December 31, 1864, contains the following words: "War is sorrowful, but there is one thing infinitely more horrible than the worst horrors of war, and that is the feeling that nothing is worth fighting for, and the blindness which cannot see that war is often the safest, surest, shortest, and least bloody way of peace." The difference in the tone of thought of these two passages marks the change wrought during the interval of time between them.

In Putnam's Magazine for March, 1857, appeared an article on "Harper's Monthly and Weekly." It was a just criticism of their merits and defects. It said of the paper: "Like the Magazine, it will follow, and echo, and shirk; but whoever believes in his country and its constant progress in developing human liberty, will understand that he has no ally in Harper's Weekly. But as a repository of pleasant, various reading, of sprightly chit-chat, and safe, vague, and dull disquisitions upon a few public questions, it will probably live long and be widely sold."

Three years later, even four years later, the same or even a severer judgment might have been passed upon it. It was not till the 27th of April, 1861, that Harper's Weekly found out that it had a country to be believed in, and learned that *compromise*, or surrender of right to wrong, was worse than war. Up to that time it had tried to offend nobody, and it had succeeded in offending every earnest and right-thinking man. At length it was forced to have and to express opinions. It must take a side, and it did so. From that time to this it has steadily grown stronger and more vigorous. It has given up compromise; it has obtained principles, and with principles an influence such as it never possessed before. During the past two years it has been one of the most powerful of the organs of public opinion. Its vast circulation, deserved-

ly secured and maintained by the excellence and variety of its illustrations of the scenes and events of the war, as well as by the spirit and tone of its editorials, has carried it far and wide. It has been read in city parlors, in the log hut of the pioneer, by every camp-fire of our armies, in the wards of our hospitals, in the trenches before Petersburg, and in the ruins of Charleston; and wherever it has gone, it has kindled a warmer glow of patriotism, it has nerved the hearts and strengthened the arms of the people, and it has done its full part in the furtherance of the great cause of Union, of Freedom, and of Law. "Whoever believes in his country, and its constant progress in developing human liberty, will understand that he has an ally in Harper's Weekly." The author of the article in Putnam's Monthly from which we have quoted is now the editor of the weekly journal. Time has brought about its revenges.

The articles upon public questions which appear in the paper from week to week form a remarkable series of brief political essays. They are distinguished by clear and pointed statement, by good common-sense, by independence and breadth of view. They are the expressions of mature conviction, high principle, and strong feeling, and take their place among the best newspaper writing of the time. They are a running commentary upon events, and are themselves an important expression of that public opinion which they help to mould and to direct.

The numerous illustrations in each number of the paper constitute an interesting and valuable pictorial record of the war. The scenes of the successive campaigns — lately of the march through Georgia, the capture of Fort Fisher, the occupation of Charleston — are represented with such spirit and truthfulness as to fill out and render vivid the descriptions in the letters of special correspondents or the reports of generals. There is still room for improvement in the execution of these cuts, but occasionally a work appears of real merit in execution, as well as in conception. There has been very little work done in America better studied from nature than some of the illustrations, and for spirit and feeling our exhibitions rarely show anything so good as "Phil Sheridan's Ride to the Front," on page 705, or the "Chase of a Blockade Runner," on page 758 of the last volume. Some of the symbolical pictures by Mr. Nast were among the most effective political tracts of the recent campaign, and merit preservation as embodiments of the popular imagination. A little more care and expense, and the abolition of the caricatures which usually vulgarize its last page, would render the illustrations of Harper's Weekly worthy of the place the paper now occupies in public regard. There has been such im-

provement in other respects that there should be improvement also in this, and still more in the character of the advertisements admitted into the journal. Such a paper as this ought not on any terms to consent to lend its columns to promote the interests of swindling and gambling concerns, about whose character there can be no question. The code of newspaper morality on this subject is low. Messrs. Harper and Brothers have the power to do something to raise it.

Our historical societies and public libraries throughout the country should secure a complete set of the volumes of the Weekly,—for every year will add to their value as an illustrated record of the times; and as long as the paper is edited as it now is, and maintains the public cause with such vigor, independence, and effect, it will be one of the most trustworthy and important exponents of the better political opinions of the times.

11.—*Johnson's New Illustrated (Steel Plate) Family Atlas, with Physical Geography, and with Descriptions Geographical, Statistical, and Historical, including the latest Federal Census, a Geographical Index, and a Chronological History of the Civil War in America.* By Richard Swainson Fisher, M. D. New York: Johnson and Ward. 1865. Atlas folio. 104 Maps.

This work is the improved successor of that long favorably known as Colton's Atlas. It is the best existing atlas of North America, and it contains very serviceable maps of the other portions of the world, which, though not as good as those in the best foreign works of the kind, are sufficient for most purposes; and the whole is furnished at a price far below that at which corresponding European works can now be obtained. The maps of the United States are of the highest value. They are clear, accurate, and brought up to the present time. The interest which the existing war gives to localities in the States leads to a demand for correct maps, which is amply and satisfactorily met by those contained in this volume. The need of a good atlas, in which the progress of our arms can be intelligently followed, is felt by every family, and we can cordially recommend this work as well adapted to satisfy this general want. Beside the maps, it contains a vast amount of well-digested statistical, historical, and geographical information. A portion of this information is really useful, but some part of it seems to us superfluous, particularly that relating to history and physical geography. The entire contents of the volume may be of value to some of its purchasers, but we wish that the publishers would issue an edition of the maps

alone, without the accompanying letter-press, and without the engravings, some of which are so poor as rather to disfigure than ornament the work. In this reduced form we are sure that it would be welcome to a large public.

The new maps added by Mr. Johnson to the work are admirable specimens of map engraving, and we repeat that the work so far as it relates to America is eminently satisfactory.

---

12. — *Vanity Fair. A Novel without a Hero.* By William Makepeace Thackeray. With Illustrations by the Author. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 3 vols. 16mo.

"Vanity Fair" needs no recommendation. But this beautiful edition of it deserves special notice. It is worthy of the merits of the novel and of the reputation of the University Press at Cambridge, from which it proceeds. In form, in style, in typographical execution, it is much superior to any other edition of the book ever published either in England or America. The designs with which Thackeray illustrated his works, which are, so to speak, his own commentary upon them, and without which the story loses half its point, — which illustrate Thackeray's character scarcely less than his pages, — are admirably reproduced.

It is pleasant to see the great house of Harper and Brothers engage at length in the publication of a really handsome book, and we trust that its reception by the public may be such as to induce them to proceed with the complete edition of Thackeray's works in uniform style, of which they hold out the promise.

---

13. — *Wet Days at Edgewood: with old Farmers, old Gardeners, and old Pastorals.* By the Author of "My Farm of Edgewood." New York: Charles Scribner. 1865. 12mo. pp. 324.

Mr. Donald G. Mitchell is a well-known author and a successful farmer. He tells us that in his farm-house he has a library, of which the eastern alcove is filled with many books in many different languages, — the English, the German,

> "The learned Greek, rich in fit epithets,
> The Roman eloquent, the Tuscan grave,
> The braving Spanish, and the smooth-tongued French."

Of all these tongues Mr. Mitchell is so far master as to read them with

pleasure; and in them all he has found pastoral poems, and works that treat of farming, of gardening, of the care of poultry and bees, of the raising of cattle and horses, and of divers other branches of the science and art of husbandry. Moreover, he is fond of a country life, and willing to amuse himself and such other persons as may care to listen by a little desultory chat about his favorite authors and their works.

His talk is, on the whole, pleasant; somewhat labored, perhaps, now and then, and ambitious, but not so to any offensive degree; and if there is an occasional display of rather cheap erudition, it is to be recollected that the talk was first addressed to a circle of ordinary magazine readers, and that the display is infrequently made.

Passages quoted from many and various writers, from Hesiod and Horace Walpole, from Charles Lamb and Tibullus, from Politiano, Jethro Tull, Columella, William Cobbett, and a hundred others, make up one third of the volume. The rest of it is composed of Mr. Mitchell's comments and criticisms, interspersed with episodical dissertations on "Virgil," "A Florentine Farm," "A British Tavern," "The Early Gardeners," and other such subjects.

In judging so slight a performance there is no place for severity of criticism. To break a butterfly upon the wheel is not only difficult, but also a wasteful excess of punishment. It is a task not much easier nor much less cruel to apply any high standard of requirement to such a writer as the one now under consideration: with a nonchalant air he lounges into the presence of the public; proposes nothing more laborious than "a few wet days of talk"; announces that in taking up the pen he has not laid aside the cigar, and that, while he discourses of John Abercrombie and the Gardener's Pocket Journal, he keeps his pipe in his mouth, and likes to burn "a little incense (Havana) to the nymph Volutia." Therefore we shall say but little of the merely literary merits and demerits of the book.

The style of our author seems to us to deserve reprehension as being slipshod, not a little affected, and characterized by that namby-pamby-ism of thought and expression which appears to be the besetting sin of a certain class of modern writers, who dearly love to "babble of green fields," and whose prattling imitative mannerism leads the reader to doubt if such as they could ever like the wholesome simpleness of country living unless they could talk about Izaak Walton and the "Complete Angler." Faults of literary execution far greater than any to be alleged against this book would be indeed altogether venial when compared with another charge that may fairly be preferred. Its tone in reference to the government of the country and the war in which the American people are engaged is such as must offend every right-

minded man among the author's fellow-citizens. *Its tone*, we say, because the offence is committed, not by open assertion of opinion and plain statement of fact, but by insinuation and covert sneers. Mr. Mitchell does not declare that the United States Commissioner of Agriculture is a cheat and a charlatan. He prefers to convey that impression to the reader's mind by a page of dull pleasantry, ostensibly directed against some imaginary Byzantine to whom he supposes the Emperor might have intrusted the preparation of a certain agricultural work. It does not please our author to aver that Mr. Lincoln endeavors to make people "forget outrage" by cracking jokes. New York partisan newspapers may be depended upon for open attacks of that sort. Mr. Mitchell's purpose is answered when he can quote from an Italian author some advice on the right method of allaying a civil war among bees. The harvests of the Shenandoah Valley, the graves of our soldiers in Virginia, the shade of Virgil's Marcellus, are dragged needlessly into the text, in order that it may be hinted to us that our war for life is a frantic and sanguinary party conflict. Mr. Mitchell dreams a "Roman Dream": — "And what of that arrest of Seneca? 'It could hardly have happened,' they say, 'in the good old days of the Republic.' And with this mention as with the sound of a gun the Roman pastoral dream is broken." A New England village comes into the field of his vision; he sees a soldier's hospital and over it a flag flying: "It reminds of nearer and deadlier perils than ever environed the Roman Republic, — perils out of which if the wisdom and courage of the people do not find a way, some new Cæsar will point it with the sword."

We suppose we know what inference Mr. Mitchell would like us to draw; but we decline drawing it. We believe that Ohio, Connecticut, and several States beside, might, by summary arrest or other lawful process, be emptied of every enemy of the American government, and yet not a single Seneca be expatriated. We are of good cheer, have a lively faith in the wisdom and courage of the people, and are not dismayed by any apprehensions of a Cæsar to come.

If it be true that deadlier perils than ever threatened the Roman Republic do to-day beset the American state, — if indeed we have meaner foes within and a more dangerous enemy without, — we for our own part are supported by the belief that these mightier than Roman dangers confront a people mightier to withstand them than even was the pagan and despotic mistress of the ancient world. That in our great struggle precious blood has been spilt, is truly a saddening thought. But is the reflection so entirely mournful and depressing as this writer would have us believe? Wounds are grievous, yet there

are wounds whereby we are healed. By the Roman code it was ordained that, if the soldier slain in battle had traced in bloody letters on his shield his last will and testament, the instrument should bind his survivors, and be good in law. In these fresh red stains we do not see bloodmarks merely, but, as it seems to us, we can read solemn injunctions concerning the great heritage of which, by the death of those who have given their lives to their country, we are made heirs. To avert our eyes in weak horror, is to commit a crime against the dead, and to fail in duty toward the living. Better than this it would be to echo the sentiment of Conrad Heresbach's ideal farmer, who in his love of the country forgot love of country, "and, giving over all, lay hid in the pleasant countries, suffering other men in the mean time to be tost with the cares and business of the common weal," and himself, if he did nothing to kindle their ardor, doing nothing to damp it.

LIST OF SOME RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. The Life and Times of Sir William Johnson, Bart. By William L. Stone. Albany: J. Munsell. 1865. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. xv., 555, and xv., 544.

2. Physical Geography of the Holy Land. By Edward Robinson, D. D., LL. D. A Supplement to the late Author's Biblical Researches in Palestine. Boston: Crocker and Brewster. 1865. 8vo. pp. xvi., 399.

3. Comparative Geography. By Carl Ritter. Translated for the Use of Schools and Colleges, by William L. Gage. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1865. 16mo. pp. xxx., 220.

4. Zulu-Land; or Life among the Zulu-Kaffers of Natal and Zulu-Land, South Africa. With Map and Illustrations. By Rev. Lewis Grout, for fifteen years Missionary of the American Board in South Africa. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Publication Committee. [1864.] 12mo. pp. 351.

5. A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistle. With a Revised Translation. By Rt. Rev. Charles J. Ellicott, D. D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1865. 8vo. pp. 265.

6. A View of the Evidences of Christianity. In Three Parts. By William Paley, M. A., Archdeacon of Carlisle. With Annotations by Richard Whately, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. New York: James Miller. 1865. 8vo. pp. viii., 407.

7. German Rationalism, in its Rise, Progress, and Decline, in Relation to Theologians, Scholars, Poets, Philosophers, and the People; a Contribution to the Church History of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. By Dr. K. R. Hagenbach, Professor of Theology in the University of Basel. Edited

and translated by Rev. William Leonhard Gage and Rev. J. H. W. Stuckenberg. New York: Charles Scribner. 1865. 8vo. pp. xix., 405.

8. Remarks on the Sonnets of Shakespeare; with the Sonnets. Showing that they belong to the Hermetic Class of Writings, and explaining their General Meaning and Purpose. By the Author of "Remarks on Alchemy," etc., etc. New York: James Miller. 1865. 16mo. pp. 258.

9. A Dictionary of Medical Science; containing a Concise Explanation of the various Subjects and Terms of Anatomy, Physiology, Pathology, Hygiene, Therapeutics, Pharmacology, Pharmacy, Surgery, Obstetrics, Medical Jurisprudence, and Dentistry; Notices of Climate and of Mineral Waters; Formulæ for Officinal, Empirical, and Dietetic Preparations, etc., etc. By Robley Dunglison, M. D., LL. D., Professor of the Institutes of Medicine, etc. in the Jefferson Medical College of Philadelphia. Thoroughly revised and very greatly modified and augmented. Philadelphia: Blanchard and Lea. 1865. Lexicon 8vo. pp. 1047.

[An improved edition of a work that is of such established value as to need no new recommendation.]

10. Too Strange not to be True. A Tale. By Lady Georgiana Fullerton. Three vols. in one. With Illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1865. 8vo. pp. 276.

[Too strange indeed! The Rocky Mountains bounding the tropical landscape in Illinois; and groves where "monkeys grin and chatter amongst the branches." — p. 19.]

11. The Thinking Bayonet. By James K. Hosmer, Author of "The Color Guard." Boston: Walker, Fuller, & Co. 1865. 12mo. pp. 300.

12. History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. By E. H. Gillett, Author of "The Life and Times of John Huss." Philadelphia: Presbyterian Publication Committee. 1865. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. xxiv., 576, and xii., 605.

13. Science for the School and Family. Part III. Mineralogy and Geology. By Worthington Hooker, M. D. Illustrated by nearly two hundred Engravings. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 12mo. pp. 360.

14. The Culture of the Observing Faculties in the Family and the School: or, Things about Home, and how to make them Instructive to the Young. By Warren Burton. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. 16mo. pp. 170.

NOTE.

The Index to Vol. C. will be given in the next number.

Cambridge: Stereotyped and Printed by Welch, Bigelow, & Co.

JUN 5 1939